Transcript
HİKMET ÖZDEMİR
The Ottoman Army
1914–1918
Disease & Death on the Battlefield
The Ottoman Army, 1914–1918
Utah Series in Turkish and Islamic Studies
M. Hakan Yavuz, series editor
Debating Moderate Islam: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West
Edited by M. A. Muqtedar Khan
The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide
Guenter Lewy
The Armenian Rebellion at Van
Justin McCarthy, Esat Arslan, Cemalettin Taşkiran, and Ömer Turan
Autobiographies of Orhan Pamuk: The Writer in His Novels
Michael McGaha
The Ottoman Army, 1914–1918: Disease and Death on the Battlefield
Hikmet Özdemir
Translated by Saban Kardaş
The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti
Edited by M. Hakan Yavuz
The Ottoman Army
1914–1918
Disease & Death on the Battlefield
Hi˙kmet Özdemi˙r
Translated by Saban Kardas
¸
Utah Series in Turkish
and Islamic Studies
The University of Utah Press
Salt Lake City
Utah Series in Turkish and Islamic Studies
M. Hakan Yavuz, series editor
All rights reserved. Except as permitted under the U.S. Copyright Act of , no part of
this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any
means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of
the publisher.
Material in this book was originally published in Turkish in Salgın
Hastalıklardan Ölümler, –. Ankara: Türk tarih Kurumu, .
of Utah Press. It is based upon a four-foot-tall, Ancient Puebloan pictograph
(late PIII) near Glen Canyon, Utah.
---- (pbk. : alk. paper)
---- (ebook)
L C C--P D
Özdemir, Hikmet, –
e Ottoman army, – : disease and death on the battlefield /
Hikmet Özdemir.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
---- (pbk. : alk. paper)
---- (ebook)
. World War, –
—Health aspects—Turkey. . World War, –—Medical care—
Turkey. . Soldiers—Health and hygiene—Turkey—History—th
century. . Turkey. Ordu—Medical care—History. . Public health—
Turkey—History—th century. . Epidemics—Turkey—History.
. Communicable diseases—Turkey—History. I. Title.
D.TO
.'—dc
Printed and bound by Sheridan Books, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan.
Interior printed on recycled paper with post-consumer content.
To Birsen and Manas
Table of Contents
List of Figures and Tablesâ•…â•… viii
List of Abbreviationsâ•…â•… xi
Pronunciation Guideâ•…â•…xii
Acknowledgmentsâ•…â•…xiii
1.
Introductionâ•…â•…1
2. Between Two Firesâ•…â•… 10
3. Under the Crescentâ•…â•… 28
4.
Epidemic Disasterâ•…â•…50
5. Ordeal with Diseasesâ•…â•… 68
6.
Unburied Corpsesâ•…â•…106
7.
Unexpected Resultsâ•…â•…134
8.
Unarmed Warriorsâ•…â•…165
9.
Epilogueâ•…â•…186
Appendix 1â•…â•…205
Appendix 2â•…â•…217
Notesâ•…â•…233
Bibliographyâ•…â•…257
Indexâ•…â•…267
Figures and Tables
Figures
3.1 Major Railways in the Ottoman Empire During
World€War€I╅╅ 29
Tables
1.1. Casualties occurring in some wars before 1914â•…â•… 5
2.1. Casualties in the Crimean War (1854–1856)â•…â•… 13
2.2. Cholera epidemic 1910–1913â•…â•… 19
2.3. Çatalca Army Medical Inspectorate’s hospital recordsâ•…â•… 21
3.1. Casualties of the Fifth Expeditionary Force that occurred
during its journey to the front (1915)â•…â•… 37
4.1. Casualties of Sarıkamış disasterâ•…â•… 52
4.2. Red Cross hospital admissions recordsâ•…â•… 55
4.3. Death causes of the Ottoman medical officers (1914–1918)â•…â•… 57
4.4. The months of deaths of the Ottoman medical officersâ•…â•… 58
5.1. Number of sick in a British brigadeâ•…â•… 72
5.2. The numbers of ill and wounded treated in hospitals
in Akbaş and Akdereâ•…â•… 74
5.3. Deaths from dysentery in the 3rd Armyâ•…â•… 80
5.4. Deaths from tetanus in the 3rd Armyâ•…â•… 81
5.5. Deaths from erysipelas in the 3rd Armyâ•…â•… 81
5.6. Laboratories in the army stations in Mosul, Kirkuk,
Shikrat, and Nusaybin (1917–1918)â•…â•… 90
viii
FIGURES AND TABLES
ix
5.7. Deaths from influenza in some countriesâ•…â•… 93
5.8. Deaths as found in the records of İzmir municipalityâ•…â•… 95
5.9. Data relevant to various diseases encountered in
Aydın Province (March 1919)â•…â•… 97
5.10. The epidemics and deaths in Turkeyâ•…â•… 103
6.1. French, German, Belgian and American death ratiosâ•…â•… 107
6.2. Total war casualties according to Cruttwellâ•…â•… 108
6.3. Total war casualties according to Colonel Butlerâ•…â•… 111
6.4. Austro-Hungarian casualties (1914–1918)â•…â•… 112
6.5. French casualties (1914–1918)â•…â•… 112
6.6. British army hospital admissions (in November 1916)â•…â•… 116
6.7. Casualties suffered up to October 1917â•…â•… 116
6.8. German casualties according to Colonel Butler (1914–1918)â•…â•… 117
6.9. US Army fatalitiesâ•…â•… 118
6.10. Bulgarian casualties (1914–1918)â•…â•… 118
6.11. Casualties of Ottoman Empire according to a British sourceâ•…â•… 119
6.12. Total casualties of the Ottoman armies (1914–1918)â•…â•… 121
6.13. Deaths in the nine Ottoman armiesâ•…â•… 121
6.14. Distribution of deaths by various diseasesâ•…â•… 123
6.15. Ottoman military casualties according to hospital records
(1914–1918)â•…â•…124
6.16. Deaths in hospitals among the 1st Army units (1914–1918)â•…â•… 126
6.17. Deaths in hospitals among the 2nd Army units (1914–1918)â•…â•… 126
6.18. Deaths in hospitals among the 3rd Army units (1914–1918)â•…â•… 126
6.19. Deaths in hospitals among the 4th Army units (1914–1918)â•…â•… 127
6.20. Deaths in hospitals among the 5th Army units (1914–1918)â•…â•… 127
6.21. Deaths in hospitals among the 6th Army units (1914–1918)â•…â•… 127
6.22. Deaths in hospitals among the 7th Army units (1914–1918)â•…â•… 128
x
FIGURES AND TABLES
6.23. Deaths in hospitals (1914–1918)â•…â•… 129
6.24. The ill and wounded in the 3rd Army (1915–1918)â•…â•… 132
6.25. Admissions to hospitals from the 3rd Armyâ•…â•… 132
7.1. Deaths that occurred in the Ba’Quba Refugee Camp
(September 1918–October 1919)â•…â•… 140
7.2. Infectious diseases and deaths recorded in Pozanti hospitals
(August 1917–July 1918)â•…â•… 148
7.3. Deaths in the 6th Army attributed to recurrent feverâ•…â•… 153
7.4. Deaths in Baghdad and Mosul attributed to typhoidâ•…â•… 153
8.1. The medical officers shown according to their ranksâ•…â•… 178
8.2. Medical officers who died from diseaseâ•…â•… 180
ABBREVIATIONS
ATASE
Turkish Military Archive
Ankara University
AÜ
AÜDTCF Faculty of Letters, Ankara University
Faculty of Political Sciences, Ankara University
AÜSBF
AÜTF
Faculty of Medicine in Ankara University
Archives of Turkish Prime Ministry (Ottoman Section)
BAO
BCA
Archives of Turkish Prime Ministry (Republican Section)
Ed. Editor
FO
Foreign Office (UK)
Academy of Military Medicine of Gülhane
GATA
İÜ
İstanbul University
Medical Faculty of Cerrahpaşa, İstanbul University
İÜCTF
Medical Faculty of İstanbul University
İÜTF
LON
League of Nations Archive in Geneva
MB
Bulletin of Microbiology in Ankara University
Middle East Technical University in Ankara
ODTÜ
Prep. Preparer
Turkish Post Office Administration
PTT
Pub.
Publishing House
Institute of Health Sciences
SBE
SBF
Faculty of Political Sciences
Institute of Turkology Studies
TAE
TBMM
Grand National Assembly of Turkey
TİTE
Institute of Turkish Revolution History
Trans. Translator
Institute of Medical History
TTE
TTK
Turkish History Council
TÜBİTAK The Scientific and Research Council of Turkey
United Kingdom
UK
xi
PRONUNCIATION OF
TURKISH NAMES
The Latin Turkish alphabet, introduced by Atatürk in 1928, is an extremely
clear and consistent one.
Most of the letters sound very similar to their English equivalents, with the
following exceptions:
c
j as in join.
ç
ch as in church.
b, d as in English, but at the end of a syllable they are frequently
pronounced and often written p, t (e.g., Recep/Receb, Ahmet/
Ahmed). Both are correct.
ğ
soft g, lengthens the preceding vowel.
h h is always pronounced, including at the end of syllables (e.g.,
Falih)
ı
somewhat like u in stadium.
j
stands for the English sound in pleasure.
ö
like French word deux or the German ü.
ş
sh as in shout.
ü
like French lumiere.
v
lighter than English v.
The stress on a Turkish word usually comes on the last syllable, and this is
always the case with the names of people: Kemal, Tevfik, Hasan.
However, place names regularly have the stress on the first syllable: Ankara,
Erzurum, Elazığ.
xii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The following people and organizations have generously contribu�
ted to the completion of the study. Hence, I would kindly like to thank
each one for their invaluable help, hospitality, and encouragement. I present my special thanks to İlker Başbuğ, Aslan Güner, and Nusret Taşdeler
from the Headquarters of the Turkish Armed Forces; to Ertuğrul Apakan
and Ecvet Tezcan from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and to Baki
Komsuoğlu from Kocaeli University. In addition, I am particularly grateful to Yusuf Sarınay, the general director of the State Archives of the Turkish Republic; to Neşecan Uysal, the chief librarian of the Turkish History
Council; to Ahmet Tetik from the Turkish Military Archive; and to M. Rıfat
Hisarcıklıoğlu, the president of the Union of Chambers and Commodity
Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB). I am also very thankful to the National Archives of the United Kingdom, Lidell Hart Center for Military Archives,
the Wellcome Library, and to Mehmet Ali Dikerdem in London; and to
Blandine Blukacz-Louisfert and Bernhardine Pejovic from the United Nations Archives in Geneva.
None of these people, of course, bears any responsibility for my views
as expressed in this volume. I accept full and exclusive responsibility for all
opinions expressed throughout the work.
Finally, I cannot neglect mentioning the great patience of my wife,
Birsen, and my dearest daughter, Manas, as I spent so many hours among
books and files and before computer screens. Their encouragement has been
invaluable.
HÖ
Ankara, January 2008
xiii
1
INTRODUCTION
The word history carries two meanings in common parlance. It refers
both to what actually happened in the past and to the representation of
that past in the work of historians.
—â•›John Tosh,
The Pursuit of History
What kind of a relationship can be said to exist between wars and epidemics? It is widely held that epidemics have affected the outcomes of many
wars, and that a significant relationship between the spread of infectious
diseases and the fall of empires existed in the Old World. Because diseases
are among the primary causes of death, they are considered to be one of the
decisive factors shaping the course of history. Until World€War€II, more victims of war died of war-borne microbes than of battle wounds.1 As a corollary, other scholars also emphasize that not only goods, ideas, and technology, but also “microorganisms causing various diseases” were in constant
circulation between different communities in the Old World. The intensification of interactions across different parts of the Old World resulted in
the spread of various types of diseases, which were previously confined to
one or another part of Eurasia or Africa, to new regions, causing very heavy
mortality among previously unexposed societies. Historical records from
China and Rome, for instance, make it clear that these societies suffered
from a series of plagues in the first and second centuries a.d. Many parts of
the Roman Empire, indeed, began to experience depopulation, and the lack
of manpower became a chronic problem for the Roman authorities from
200 a.d. on, if not before. One could, therefore, reasonably suggest that
epidemic diseases resulting from increasing contacts between Eurasia and
Africa played a major role in the collapse of the Roman and Han empires,
along with several other factors, such as internal social tensions and barbarian attacks from without.2
The epidemics of infectious diseases, besides their effect on the structure
1
2
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
of military organization, also affected the architecture of cities and castles.
In the Roman Empire, the duties of the medical companies within the army
included not only the treatment of wounded soldiers, but also, and more
importantly, the prevention of the emergence and spread of infectious diseases. The Roman commanders were concerned more with controlling epidemics than with fighting against attacking enemy forces. Therefore, “the
hospital (valetudinarian)” was considered an integral part of Roman castle
architecture.3 These facts led M. W. Flinn of Edinburgh University to argue that had the cross-border plague epidemics affecting several nations
between the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries not occurred, European
history would have taken a very different course. During this period, the
plague became extremely contagious, and in some cases the fatality rate
increased from 60 to 100€percent.4
The Peloponnesian War is the notorious example of how epidemics resulting from infectious diseases had an impact on the outcomes of major
wars in ancient Greece. A terrible plague breaking out toward the end of the
twenty-seven-year war between Athens and Sparta decisively determined
the outcome of the war; by ravaging Athens it paved the way for the defeat
of the Athenians. Even Pericles, the preeminent Athenian statesman, died
of that plague.5
In Asia Minor, one of the most important consequences of the epidemics that took place during the Seljuk dynasty in Anatolia was the population
loss caused by mass deaths. The plague epidemics no doubt dealt a serious blow to economic and commercial activities, increasing the prices of
various commodities and services, hence stimulating inflation. Although
the written records provide no direct relationship, it is estimated that the
same epidemics account for some of the migration and mass resettlement
programs, which led to social unrest and disorder. The epidemics, moreover, severely limited the maneuvering capabilities of military forces operating in the regions affected. The epidemics, ravaging both soldiers and
animals, prevented countries from attaining the desired results of military
campaigns, hence depriving the societies of potentially beneficial social consequences and political advantages of a military victory. In some cases, on
the contrary, starvation and epidemics breaking out in the besieged cities
aided the eventual capture of those cities by the enemy. In that sense, depending on the circumstances, plague epidemics acted as either facilitating
or inhibiting factors for military campaigns.6
The fatality rates due to infectious diseases are beyond any comparison
with those of other causes of death. In 1875, an average of 266.5 per 10,000
people died in Prussia; of those, an average of 26.8 people, or approximately
Introduction3
10€percent, died of old age. The remaining 90€percent died prematurely,
one-third of whom lost their lives due to infectious diseases. In Prussia in
1912, the number of deaths per 10,000 inhabitants was 154.9, and the ratio
of deaths from infectious diseases remained the same. According to other
statistics, the number of inhabitants in Prussia in 1900 who died as a result of epidemics was 162,224. Of those, a total of 70,602 deaths—nearly
44€percent—were caused by tuberculosis. Another statistic regarding children shows that in 1900, an average of 471.5 out of every 10,000 children
under one year of age died from infectious diseases. In other words, one in
21 children died of epidemics.7
According to a popular study published in 1991, throughout most of
“civilized” history, peasants have been biological fodder for the great microbial communities that cities grew and nurtured. Until the 1600s, most
of the world’s great metropolises renewed their wealth by swallowing the
sons and daughters of soil tillers. Whenever the peasants multiplied too
quickly, city-states usually disposed of the surplus by declaring a war on a
neighbor, or through famine or disease triggered by overpopulation. The
outcome of war mostly depended on which side developed the strongest
disease resistance response. The Arabs, for instance, defeated the Crusaders
with malaria, while the Russians repelled Napoleon’s armies with typhoid.
One of the reasons why the Union Army won the American Civil War was
because it outnumbered the Confederate Army in the wake of a diarrhea
epidemic. Similarly, nomads, hunters, and New World aborigines lost their
battles against expansionist European powers largely because of their lower
levels of exposure to the germs transmitted by the European invaders. It
therefore has been suggested that until this century, all wars had been fought
with germs and won by farm and city people with the stronger resistance
mechanisms against infection.8
The four-year-long Civil War cost the United States 200,000 lives out
of a national population of around 32 million, according to the 1860 census. When an additional 400,000 who died in the same period as a result
of diseases or other causes related to the war are added, the human toll of
the Civil War amounts to around 600,000 people.9 In another illustrative
example, during the Balkan War of 1913 the Bulgarian army was forced to
retreat due to the outbreak of a severe cholera epidemic. The retreating Bulgarians threw the dead bodies into the streams and wells to contaminate the
drinking water, causing the Greek soldiers drinking the water to catch the
same disease.10
Andrew Nikiforuk believes that the medical reformist Rudolf Virchow
conclusively answered the question of how humans become infected. Based
4
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
on his in-depth research into microorganisms, Virchow, a Prussian bacteriologist, provided a succinct definition of illness: “a life under altered conditions.” By “altered conditions,” he meant changes in nutritional habits,
commercial activities, travel, lifestyle, clothing, weather conditions—in
short, the whole environment. Virchow maintained that when living conditions are significantly altered, the relationship between human beings and
microorganisms takes an unpredictable turn, in most cases leading to fatal
consequences. Virchow, widely regarded as the father of modern epidemiology, first expressed these ideas based on his investigations into the typhus
epidemic that swept through the poor cotton workers in Upper Silesia (a
part of today’s Czech Republic and Germany) in 1848. In the long report
he prepared following his visit to the region, Virchow argued that severe
rains, adverse living conditions, and poverty, rather than the microorganisms themselves, were the main cause of the epidemic.11
In another influential study, J. N. Biraben compiled a wealth of data
showing how the movement of troops carried the plague across Europe during the fourteenth through seventeenth centuries.12 Daniel Panzac presents
additional data documenting the spread of plague, which further substantiate the same claim in the case of the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth
century and the beginning of the nineteenth century.13 P. Mühlens, a German hygiene expert, in his discussion about how the health conditions of
the civilian population and the army affect the outcomes of wars, reached
an important conclusion: “The wars fought in the territories of the Ottoman Empire have demonstrated that maintaining hygienic standards during the war, especially in the regions with hot climate conditions, constitutes an important part of strategic war planning.”14 Cold regions, on the
other hand, have their unique military conditions, which are unlike those of
warmer regions. An example of the influence of colder climatic conditions
can be found in earlier Turkish history. Since the earliest times of Turkish
settlement in Central Asia, large-scale death of humans and animals was
recorded during periods of yutmak (swallowing up) caused by severe winter
conditions.15
Another way through which war amplifies the adverse effects of climatic
and hygienic conditions is the need to allocate the means of transportation
for military purposes, i.e., carrying soldiers and munitions. According to a
British report dated 1 February 1878, many Muslim refugees traveling along
the railways in an attempt to reach areas protected by the Ottoman soldiers
froze to death while they were waiting at the train stations in Philippopolis
and Çorlu.16
The frequency, prevalence, and severity of epidemics vary also according
Introduction5
Table 1.1. Casualties occurring in some wars before 1914*
Years
Number of
Soldiers
Combat
Deaths
Diseaserelated
Deaths
Crimean War
(French)
1854–56
301,000
20,000
75,000
French-Prussian War
(Prussian)
1870–71
800,000
28,300
14,904
Russian-Japanese
War (Japanese)
1904–05
420,000
58,887
27,158
Russian-Japanese
War (Russian)
1904–05
490,000
47,608
27,830
Army
*â•›From Manual of Elementary Military Hygiene, 1912, in Butler, Australian Army Medical Services, 866.
to seasonal changes. Winters are marked by increases in deaths, as well as by
the occurrence of certain diseases. For instance, influenza epidemics are observed during the winter and the highest numbers of patients are recorded
in the winter.17
Typhoid epidemics of various scales ravaged armies in literally every
war in history, which led many to consider it the disease of warfare conditions. During the World€War€I, for instance, all the armies fighting on the
European front suffered greatly from typhoid epidemics. While the number
of persons affected by the illness was very high in the Austrian, French,
and German armies, that of the U.S. Army remained remarkably low because of the successful implementation of hygiene measures and regular
vacci�na�tions.18 One needs to note a progressive trend, though: until 1914,
the scourge of diseases on armies, hitherto the major cause of death, had
been reduced significantly by the British and French armies. In the case of
the British Army, the Boer War (1899–1902) was the last war in which the
number of disease-related deaths exceeded that of combat related fatalities.
The British Army initiated several programs to improve health conditions
following the Boer War, which brought down the British Army’s casualty
rates to tolerable levels during World€War€I. As a result, the health conditions were better in the military barracks than in the urban areas. Moreover,
the recruits had nutrition superior to the civilian population because they
were supplied with high-quality agricultural food products. The regular
physical exercises undertaken as part of military training further improved
the health conditions of soldiers. The figures about fatalities suffered during World War€I also demonstrate a steady decline in infant mortality and
6
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
a rise in civil�ian life expectancy as compared to the previous century. By
September 1915 the British army had one million casualties, one-third of
which were considered fatal, in the battles for the Marne, Aisne, Picardy,
and Champagne fronts. In the battle of Verdun (1916), the army’s casualties skyrocÂ�keted: the number of dead, wounded, and missing soldiers approached five hundred thousand (the conventional death-to-wounded ratio
is one to three). In the same war, the German casualties were more than four
hundred thousand. On the first day of the battle of the Somme on 1 July
1916, almost twenty thousand British soldiers were killed, a number which
equals the total number of combat- and disease-related casualties it had suffered in the entire Boer War.19
The improvements in fighting diseases did not eliminate completely
the effect of epidemics on armies during World€War€I, though. Illustrative examples are the Balkan and Caucasus fronts. Just at the beginning
of World€War€I, a severe typhus epidemic broke out in Serbia, claiming
100,000 lives between January and April 1915. One-fifth of the Serbian population caught the disease, and nearly a third of the doctors fighting against
the epidemic fell victim to it.20
Soldiers captured from the enemy ranks also played an important role
in spreading diseases, hence affecting the fate of war. The drastic typhus
epidemic that broke out in Serbia in 1915 was in fact sparked by the arrival of
the Austrian war prisoners; it later spread to Bulgaria and Romania through
Serbian war prisoners captured by those countries.21 Another major typhus
epidemic recorded during the Great War affected the Russian soldiers kept
in German war prisoner camps.22 During the Turkish Liberation War, it
also was observed that moving around war prisoners between different “garrisons and battalions” caused the spread of epidemics.23
As one war quickly followed another and armies had to fight successive
enemies, a sort of chain reaction developed through which diseases spread.
In the case of the Ottoman Army, Major General Dr.€Ekrem Şadi identified a path by which infectious diseases were transferred from the Balkan
Wars to World€War€I. He maintains that the soldiers discharged from the
army in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars acted as carriers of infectious and
parasitic diseases, causing epidemics throughout Anatolia. When the First
World War started shortly thereafter, the same diseases afflicted the Ottoman armies severely, particularly the 3rd Army fighting on the Caucasus
front. According to the same source, the effects of those infectious diseases
causing epidemics continued to be felt throughout the Turkish National
Liberation War.24
Introduction7
A severe typhus epidemic, similarly, erupted during the Russian civil
war in the wake of the First World War. At the beginning of 1920, some
50,000 soldiers of the White Army died of typhus, whereas 573,000 cases of
typhus were reported by the Red Army between 1918 and 1923. During the
period between 1918 and 1922, the population of St. Petersburg decreased
from 2 million to 700,000. Of the factors behind this drastic fall, the typhus
epidemic had the largest share. Between 1918 and 1922, some 25 to 30 million cases of typhus were recorded in Russia alone. In other words, 20 to
25€percent of the total population was affected by the disease. In his address
to the Seventh Soviet Congress, Lenin put it bluntly:
We hear the cracking of a whip on us; lice and typhus are spreading through
our armies. The terrible conditions existing in the regions afflicted by typhus, where people are dying in masses, where no livestock are available,
and where the life has literally stopped are beyond imagination.25
The German influence was growing in the Sublime Porte as a result
of the Ottoman-German Treaty of Alliance signed on August 2, 1914. The
Ottoman Empire’s decision to enter the war on the side of the Central Powers a few weeks later was taken in desperation by a small group of energetic
and ambitious men. The war, however, turned out to be disastrous for Turkey as she was handicapped by her poverty, technical backwardness, and
extremely inadequate communications and supply lines.26 Exact figures are
not available on the Ottoman military casualties in the war, which stems
from several factors. Most importantly, much of the widespread deaths from
diseases took place in regions, or at times, where and when nobody was
available or in a position to count the human toll. In other cases, nobody
cared to count the death toll at a time when the country was overwhelmed
by the contingencies of the war.
In 1982, Sarkis Karayan published an article disputing the figures on
Ottoman casualties in World€War€I, provided by Turkish historians and
other experts on Ottoman history, such as Professor Stanford Shaw and
Norman Itzkowitz. According to Karayan, in order to justify the massacre of some two million Armenians during 1915–1918, Turkish authorities
and historians have repeatedly insisted over the last sixty-seven years (as
of 1982) that if a few thousand Armenians died due to deportations from
strategic military zones in Turkey, the number of Turks who lost their lives
due to “Armenian atrocities” during the same period was between 1.5 and
3€million.27
8
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Sarkis Karayan continued his argument as follows:
The actual and direct cause of the terrible Turkish loss of life from illness,
among soldiers and civilians alike, was the Union and Progress Party, the
İttihad, under the autocratic rule of the Talat-Cemal-Enver triumvirate.
There is general agreement among both Turkish and other historians that
Turkey’s entry into World€War€I was a disaster for Turkey, a desperate gamble taken by a small group of ambitious men.
He went on to say that
Turkey was not ready to wage a large-scale war after her 1911 defeats in Tripoli Tania [now Libya], in Africa, and in the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913.
The miserable state of the Ottoman army is well known to surviving Armenians who were in Turkey before and during the war.28
Eric Jan Zürcher’s subsequent studies on the issue concluded that following the outbreak of war in 1914, the Army and Navy Headquarters of
the Ottoman Empire mobilized at a very slow pace (even slower than the
Russians). The fact that mobilization took place under winter conditions
further augmented problems, rendering the whole process of mobilization
more burdensome, especially in eastern Anatolia. The terrain and severe
winter weather made warfare practically impossible, posing obstacles to the
military campaigns on the Caucasian front. In fact, if Enver Pasha had not
squandered the lives of 72,000 (out of 90,000) by ordering a premature attack over the mountain passes at Sarıkamış, the Ottoman army would have
been at full war strength in men, weapons, and equipment by spring. As
noted by Zürcher,
the call to arms was answered relatively well, in Anatolia if not in the Arab
provinces, but as in the Balkan War, the conditions in the army (payment
with worthless paper money, undernourishment, lack of medical care, epidemics of typhus, cholera and dysentery, bad or non-existent clothing and
shoes) were so bad, that desertions soon started to become a problem of
enormous proportions. By the end of the war the number of deserters was
four times that of soldiers on the front.29
Introduction9
The tragic human consequences of the war on the Ottoman Empire are not
the main focus of this current study. The question this study attempts to
answer is this: how many Ottoman soldiers were lost during the First World
War, and by what causes?
When I commenced this study to explore these questions one very
hot day in the summer of 2004 in Ankara, I didn’t move into a realm of
scientific inquiry already populated by established theories. I approached
my research with an open mind to capture various perspectives on the issue. Although significant limitations exist on accessing relevant material, a
wealth of in�formation was available in the state archives as well as national
and international libraries. I endeavored to gather a wide variety of data
from as many sources as possible, most of which are surely biased in one
way or another. The conclusions of my study establish unequivocally that
during World€War€I the number of soldiers dying from infectious diseases
in the Ottoman Army was far greater than that of combat-related fatalities. My findings, moreover, show that the outbreak of epidemic diseases in
the Ottoman battles during World€War€I resulted in great losses of life not
only in the Ottoman military but also among the civilian population in the
region. Although further research is needed to validate these conclusions,
the preliminary findings of the current study provide a very solid picture
of the reasons behind the casualties suffered by the Ottoman Army during
the war.
As an academic specializing in the history of Modern Turkey, I would
like to end this chapter with a citation from a great historian, Professor Stanford Shaw (who passed away on 15 December 2006), which I regard as his
last will and testament:
Only when all the sources which have survived from all parties involved in
the Ottoman Empire during World€War€I are fully available to all historians
wishing to use them with an open mind and without preconceptions will
we really secure as full a picture as is humanly possible of events and conditions that went on in Ottoman Empire during World€War€I.30
2
BETWEEN TWO FIRES
During these early days of January 1878, the mortality in Erzurum was
something appalling. Out of a total number of about seventeen thousand troops in the town, there were on one day no fewer than three
hundred and two deaths, and the daily death rate frequently rose two
hundred! The weak, emaciated survivors had hardly strength left to dig
graves for their dead comrades in the hard and frozen ground. At last
they gave up even the pretence of digging, and the bodies were simply
carted out about a mile from the main thoroughfares of the town, and
left in the snow just inside the city walls.
—â•›Charles S. Ryan,
Under the Red Crescent
It is suggested that epidemics in the Ottoman Empire followed a predictable pattern as they occurred in the wake of uprisings, banditries, migrations, famines, earthquakes, fires, and floods.1 This theory can be accepted
provided that the crucial relationship between wars and the outbreak of epidemics in the Ottoman imperial domain is also recognized. This phenomenon might apply to the Ottoman Empire as it would to other countries.
Another study, however, puts the emphasis on a different factor which plays
a more decisive role in the occurrence of epidemics than those mentioned
above. According to this study, a more accurate explanation would need to
consider the territories of the Ottoman Empire as areas constantly vulnerable to epidemics. The author of this interesting thesis, French historian
Daniel Panzac, in his study entitled La peste dans l’Empire Ottoman (Plague
in the Ottoman Empire), demonstrates that the vast area extending between
the Atlantic Ocean and the Persian Gulf shared substantial commonalities
in terms of health (or, to put it better, unhealthiness) in the modern age.
The same kinds of diseases affected different people living in various parts of
that area, from the North Sea to the Sahara in Africa, and from Bretagne in
France to Iraq. Starting from the end of the seventeenth century, however,
the common destiny of these peoples slowly came to an end, to a certain
10
Between Two Fires
11
extent due to different trajectories of plague in these regions. Whereas the
plague disappeared from most parts of western, northern, and central Europe after 1718, it remained a threat to the societies in the Balkans, Anatolia,
and the Arabian Middle East until the mid-nineteenth century.2
The plague even had a weakening impact on relations between the
Ottoman Empire and the European powers. Disappearance of the plague
from European countries complicated the nature of European-Ottoman
diplomatic and commercial relations, as well as military conflicts. This situation produced a sui generis relationship between the two sides, giving way
to new forms of cultural and scientific attitudes and exchanges affecting
both parties.3
William Witmann, an English medical doctor, recorded in his memoirs
his observations of the hygienic conditions and epidemics in the Ottoman
Empire at the beginning of the nineteenth century (covering the period
between 2 July 1800 and 7 March 1802). Dr.€Witmann reports that about
eighteen months before his visit to Çanakkale and its environs in November
1799, a plague epidemic had broken out in the region, claiming thirty to
forty lives each day. Smallpox was one of several diseases Witmann documented. In another record, he estimates that in November and December
1800, between sixty and one hundred deaths occurred daily in the Ottoman
garrison of Jaffa due to dysentery, tropical malaria, and plague. His notes
dated 19 March 1801 are particularly illustrative of the extent of epidemicrelated deaths in the Ottoman army. According to these notes, the Ottoman
base in El-Arish lost half of its men due to a plague ravaging the city since
7 March. A few weeks before, fatalities from the plague amounted to six
thousand.4
Severe epidemics affecting the soldiers transferred from Anatolia to Istan�
bul during the Ottoman-Russian War of 1828, causing numerous deaths, are
also widely documented. An English medical doctor by the name of McFerline, who was working in Istanbul at the time, identified the disease as marsh
fever (L. grippotyphosa).5 Dr.€Osman Şevki believed that the disease known
as marsh fever was possibly the spotted fever (typhus). He also noted that
marsh fever and other infectious diseases, which were widespread among
the Russian soldiers, were transmitted to the Ottoman Army.6
The Crimean War
Although the estimates differ, it is not disputed that disease was a significant factor in casualties among Ottoman troops in the Crimean War. An article published in 1919 by Dr.€Osman Şevki discusses the medical conditions
12
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
within the Ottoman Army during that war. The article provides valuable information about the breadth of the typhus epidemic, stating that 70€percent
of those infected lost their lives. According to Dr.€Şevki, although numerically it was possible to fight the enemy, the army fell victim to the disease.7
Carl Rousso, on the other hand, states that the total casualties in the Ottoman Army due to spotted fever were thirty-five thousand. Kemal Özbay
reasons that a casualty figure of around eighty-five thousand is likely for the
Ottoman Army, given that it did not have better sanitary conditions than its
allies.8 Ekrem Kadri Unat, however, estimates the Ottoman casualties in the
Crimean War at around thirty-five thousand.9
It would be legitimate to say that the next stage of the Crimean War
was fought in the hospitals located in Istanbul and its environs. While the
number of combat deaths by 31 December 1857 was 1,200, the deaths that
occurred in hospitals reached 90,000. During the Crimean War, the armies
in the battlefields looked like mobile hospitals. Several times a week, large
groups of soldiers, consisting of thousands of men, were transferred in boats
to Istanbul to be treated in the hospitals of Kasımpaşa, Deniz (Navy), SeliÂ�
miye, and Haydarpaşa, or on board the battleships anchored in the Golden
Horn.10
It is illustrative to note that chief commanders of the British and French
armies, too, died from epidemics during the Crimean War. French Commander St. Arnaud and British Commander Lord Raglan were also among
those who died from disease. St. Arnaud contracted cholera when he was in
Sevastopol, and died on the ship transferring him to France. Lord Raglan
also died from cholera on 28 June 1855.11 As for the soldiers, they literally
perished. Despite their numerical superiority over the Russians, the allied
forces suffered the first blow from the epidemics, rather than from the Russian Army. Thousands of officers and soldiers found themselves struggling
against infectious diseases instead of fighting the Russians.
The Crimea came to resemble a headquarters for patients rather than
a battlefield. The Selimiye Barracks, Haydarpaşa Hospital, Kavak Summer Pavilion in Selimiye, the Cavalry Barracks in Çengelköy, the British
St.€George Hospital, and two battleships anchored in the Golden Horn
were full of patients arriving from the Crimea. The French casualties caused
by typhus during the Crimean War were 90,000.12 In the French army,
the number of deaths from spotted fever was 734 in December 1854, then
1,524 in January 1855, and 3,400 in February 1855. Seventy€percent of those
infected by the disease lost their lives. Spotted fever took its toll among the
medical doctors as well. In the French Army alone, 58 doctors died of the
Between Two Fires
13
Table 2.1. Casualties in the Crimean War (1854–1856)*
Armies
British
French
Ottoman
Russian
Total
Deaths
98,100
309,400
165,000
888,000
1,460,500
Casualties Due to Other Reasons
Combat Losses
2,755
8,490
10,100
30,600
51,945
Wounded
1,847
11,750
10,800
42,000
66,397
From Disease
17,580
75,375
24,500
374,000
491,455
Total
(Other reasons)
22,182
95,615
45,400
446,000
609,797
*From the German source titled Sanitatsbericht, in Butler, Australian Army Medical Services, 866.
disease within a few months.13 In that war, the casualty rate for the British
and French armies was around 30€percent, and disease-related deaths accounted for 70€percent of the total losses. The diseases causing those deaths
were mainly spotted fever, typhoid, and cholera. A French doctor, who was
the first to diagnose spotted fever among the patients arriving from Crimea,
also differentiated spotted fever (typhus) from its rival typhoid.14
Because the number of deaths due to infectious diseases such as typhus,
cholera, fever, and scurvy were ten times greater than the combat deaths, the
French hospitals in Crimea were overwhelmed. As a result, the French had
to transfer their patients to hospitals in Varna, Gallipoli, Çanakkale, and
Edirne, in addition to the thirteen hospitals in Istanbul used by the allied
forces.15 The miseries of the British and French soldiers during the Crimean
War aroused deep concern among European public opinion, which led to
several fund-raising campaigns. Florence Nightingale utilized some of these
funds to set up a medical care service in the Crimea. In 1854 she assumed
the care of patients in the Selimiye Barracks, where sixty patients were dying every day. She brought hygiene and order to the wards, significantly
improving the medical conditions. However, she also caught typhus in spite
of her efforts in preventive care.16
A major cholera epidemic, which broke out in Varna on 28 June 1854
during the course of the Crimean War, killed many English and French soldiers. This epidemic is believed to have been ignited by the corpses of Russian soldiers and dead animals left behind by the retreating Russian Army.
The same cholera epidemic continued severely through August 1854.17
14
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Coincidently, it also is believed that the spread of syphilis throughout Turkey was facilitated by the movement of Ottoman and foreign soldiers during and after the Crimean War of 1854.18
Ottoman-Russian War of 1877–1878
The epidemics caused by the movements of immigrants during the
Â�Ottoman-Russian War of 1877–1878 resulted in colossal losses of life. The exact number of soldiers and emigrants who died after their arrival in Istanbul
is unknown. During that war, the hospitals in Erzurum were overcrowded,
and all doctors, whether Ottoman or contracted foreigner, without exception
caught infectious diseases. Half of all the doctors serving in the city, including Colonel Yusuf Ziya, the chief medical officer of the army, died. Of the
military contingent defending the city, around three hundred sick soldiers
per day lost their lives due to the disease. The extreme poverty of the local
people, in addition, exacerbated the severity of the epidemic even further.19
In 1877, on another front during the Ottoman-Russian War, the Ottoman Army fighting in Plevna converted some houses into temporary hospitals, where wounded soldiers were taken for treatment. According to Osman Şevki, “dysentery swept through the population, perishing almost a
hundred soldiers a day.” The Grand Mosque of Plevna was also turned into a
hospital, flying a Red Crescent flag on its minaret. The patients inside were
struggling to keep themselves warm by burning the wooden parts of the
mosque, such as the mahfel (screened and elevated loge in a mosque), the
mihrap (niche in the wall indicating the direction of Mecca), and the minber
(pulpit beside the mihrap).20
During the Ottoman-Russian War, the Muslim inhabitants of territories
occupied by the Russian Army fled in masses to Anatolia and particularly
Istanbul to seek refuge under the protection of the Ottoman Army. On their
way to Anatolia, however, they not only were infected by severe diseases, but
also contributed to further epidemics by transmitting the diseases en route.
In 1878, the public health in Istanbul deteriorated as the diseases brought
by the emigrants sparked epidemics, further augmenting the deaths among
Istanbul residents.21 To address the problem, 60,000 of the refugees were
transferred to other provinces by early April 1878, of whom 18,000 died.
Approximately 300 to 500 people were dying each day in Istanbul due to
continual epidemics of typhoid, typhus, and pneumonia.22 The accommodation of more than 100,000 refugees in large buildings, mainly mosques,
stimulated unrest. Moreover, the sick people among the refugees, as well as
the decaying corpses, acted as agents in transmitting new epidemics. With
Between Two Fires
15
the advent of spring and warmer weather, the typhus spread further; as a
result, within only a few days 22,000 patients flooded the hospitals. Especially the places like mosques became centers of epidemics such as typhus.
Only in May 1878 could the disease be contained somewhat, and the weekly
number of deaths due to typhus was reduced to 400.23
The number of immigrants who died of infectious diseases during the
Ottoman-Russian War exceeds that of those killed by the Russians or the Bulgarians. Typhus, typhoid, and in some cases smallpox surfaced wherever the
refugees were concentrated. Of the 45,000 refugees living in Edirne, 16,000
caught typhus, which resulted in 100 to 120 deaths a day. The hundreds of
thousands of people arriving in Istanbul had to go through unimaginable
misery and pain. Foreign doctors, who examined the situation upon the invitation of the Sublime Porte, reported that a total of 180,000€refugees arrived
in Istanbul as of April 1878. Of those emigrants, 60,000 were transferred to
other cities, and 18,000 died of several diseases. On the Anatolian side of
Istanbul alone, 21 deaths were recorded daily. Of the 4,000€immigrants who
were sheltered in the Saint Sophia Mosque, 25€to 30 died daily.24
A major problem encountered during the 1878 epidemic in Istanbul was
the haphazard burial of the corpses. As an initial precaution, burials in the
cemeteries of the city were prohibited. The failure to designate new cemeteries outside the city center, however, led the refugees to bury their dead in
Eyüp Cemetery, which was within the city boundaries. The huge number
of deaths overwhelmed the capacity of the Eyüp Cemetery in a short time,
which even forced the people to reopen the graves every two to three days to
bury another body. The smell coming out of the decaying corpses spread all
over the neighborhood. The corpses brought to the Gümüşsuyu Cemetery
close to the German Embassy were placed haphazardly in graves that were
not dug deep enough or covered properly. In another case, several corpses
were barged to the Haydarpaşa Quay, after having waited for burial up to
three or four days, and were kept there one more day until they finally were
buried in Karacaahmet Cemetery. Such practices spread microorganisms
into the environment, facilitating the outbreak of further epidemics.25
The Ottoman-Greek War of 1897
Another case illustrative of the toll of epidemics on wars is the OttomanGreek War of 1897. Of the 40,000 casualties the Ottoman Army suffered during the war, 28,000 died from infectious diseases, whereas only
2,000€died from combat-related wounds. A total of 35 doctors, moreover,
died of spotted fever.26 Severe epidemics ravaged throughout the war, with
16
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
soldiers losing their lives due to spotted fever (typhus), dysentery, malaria,
and cholera.27 The chief medical officer of the 3rd Army Corps and his colleagues were also among those who died of spotted fever, which was not diagnosed as typhus back then.28
The Balkan War
Stories of the tragic impact of those epidemics can be found in the memoirs of G. v. Hochwaechter, a German major who was stationed in the Ottoman headquarters during the Balkan War. Below are some excerpts from his
memoirs:
Friday, 8 November [1912]. Unfortunately a very severe cholera epidemic
broke out; 400 soldiers brought here on a train were quarantined in a camp.
It is hoped that the epidemic be contained.
Sunday, 10 November. Cholera epidemic spread to Yassıviran. Only today,
70 cases were diagnosed. The soldier doing the private service of Kemal Bey
died in our house in miserable conditions. We found the poor man this
morning lying doubled up in the stable of our house.
Monday, 11 November. The worst of all is the threat of cholera, as I had
previously mentioned. The disease still continues to spread, and I was told
that they had many kinds of medicines in the main depot here, but none
for cholera.…↜Since no fresh water can be found here, soldiers are drinking
water from dirty puddles. All of the men seem scrawny. Under those miserable conditions, it would be impossible for them to endure epidemics, rain,
cold, and hunger any longer. The soldier in my private service was given
food only yesterday since we came here…↜.
It is 4.30 p.m. I was out a short while ago. About 2,000 soldiers arrived,
all hungry, who later were given food and sent to Istanbul by train. Dozens
of them were falling down on the ground. Two soldiers were lying as if they
were dead between the rails. I called a doctor’s attention to them; but he
glanced at me indifferently and walked away. Just after a second, a third one
fell down near them. At last, their friends came to their help and carried
them on their backs to a wagon carrying goods. It is only a matter of time
before others fall down like them. The ones who faint due to hunger are
mistakenly thought to be patients of cholera, and very frequently, cholera
lime is poured on them without checking to see if they are really dead or
Between Two Fires
17
not. The lime is burning the hollow eyes of those men. Those who want to
live a bit longer are looking around in horror; but only for a minute!
Tuesday, 12 November. The number of deaths from cholera and typhus is
terrifying. During a one-hour journey we made a while ago, I counted sixty
five people who were either dead, or were about to die.
Friday, 15 November. The sanitary conditions in the army are getting worse
and worse. I saw many sick in the rear lines of the Second Army Corps,
though the troops on the frontlines still seemed healthy. In Hadımköy,
however, hundreds of corpses were waiting to be buried. One of every
two soldiers was ill. The civilians are still fleeing. The sickest patients had
flooded into a few railway cars left in Ispartakule, and they were lying in
masses on the roofs of the wagons. The medical equipment and supplies
are no longer sufficient.…↜Exciting news coming from Istanbul is spreading; but I don’t know what to believe anymore. Meanwhile, it is said that
because an epidemic occurred among the Bulgarians too, a truce is likely to
be signed soon.
November 16, Saturday. I couldn’t sleep last night; the terrible scenes I witnessed yesterday stayed in my head all-night. They were really horrible. On
the right hand side of the road heading to Hadımköy is a large piece of land,
on the upper side of which a few houses are built. Those houses, which used
to be used as hospitals, have been empty for a long time. Although separate
graves were dug in the field, all corpses were amassed together. The hardened arms and legs could not be buried properly and were visible above
the ground. Most of those poor people died on their way to hospital, in
the places where they had fallen down. On the other side of the road, men
in white clothes were digging very large holes. At first, I thought that they
were for the dead people from the area. After a while, however, I saw a large
convoy of carriages bringing the dead people, who would be buried in the
holes, unknown to anyone, and no tears being shed for them.
At the station, it was almost impossible to move because of the huge
crowd. Thousands of people, with sunken cheeks, and red eyes fixed on a
point somewhere far, were running as if they were dragged toward the two
long lines of wagons. They were trying to climb onto the wagons and the
roofs. Some had died on the roofs, from where their arms and legs were
hanging down. Some dead bodies even were lying between the wagons. Even
healthy people would definitely catch the disease in such an �environment.
18
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
One could rarely see an officer or a doctor in the vicinity; possibly they fell
victim to the epidemic too. In a house that used to be the Officers’ Club of
the High Command till four days ago, where I dined for the last time, beds
are placed for severely ill officers.
Everywhere, we hear endless moaning. Vacant ground is full of vultures
and dogs, fighting over the spoils they find there. The air is contaminated,
and the entire field is covered with corpses. I don’t think that I could bear
to see these scenes anymore!29
The 1910–1913 cholera epidemics created various dramatic scenes similar to those narrated by the German major. That epidemic, which continued
throughout the Balkan Wars, annihilated large numbers of army members
as well as civilians, irrespective of their religious or national identities. On
another note, Ekrem Kadri Unat argued that the epidemics occurring during the Balkan Wars were continuation of the pandemic that broke out in
1899.30 The number of deaths from cholera along the Çatalca front alone
was estimated to be forty thousand in 1912.31
Despite the measures taken, a cholera epidemic hit Istanbul in November 1912, which prompted the Municipality of Istanbul to issue an official
notification on the matter.32 Moreover, the Council of Medical Affairs set
up a ninety-bed cholera hospital in Istanbul in December 1912.33 Medical
statistics from the period of 1913–1914 demonstrate that Istanbul Municipality made the following assessment regarding the cholera epidemic:
Based on the information obtained regarding the outbreak of the disease,
it appeared that the continuation of the severe epidemic in Thrace and in
the areas occupied by the armies of the Balkan states through 1912–1913
forced people to move from Tselonika and its environs to Istanbul, who
brought the disease to Istanbul, and sparked an epidemic by November (as
seen in the table [Table 2.2]). After September, following the dissolution
of the army in Thrace, the severity of the epidemic markedly increased, as
indicated in the table. Although the city was threatened by the impending
epidemic caused by both the refugees, and the military operations, further
escalation of the crisis was prevented by acquiring timely information about
the situation, tracing the course of the disease, and quarantining and treating the patients.34
The situation was different on the frontlines, though. During the Balkan War, outbreaks of epidemics such as cholera, typhus, typhoid, and dysentery could not be prevented due to the lack of essential sanitary measures
Between Two Fires
19
Table 2.2. Cholera Epidemic 1910–1913
Year
Duration of Disease
Number of Cases
1910
4 months
1,343
1911
5 months
2,620
1912
2 months
2,529
1913
6 months
238
in the areas of military build up, on the battlefield, and during the movements of the army.35
Seyhülislam (the chief religious authority in the Ottoman Empire for
Muslims) Cemaleddin Efendi points out that the Ottoman Army called a
truce in the First Balkan War due mainly to the lack of ammunition and
the cholera epidemic. “When the cholera, God willed it, grew more Â�fatal
than the war, calling a truce became necessary in order to respond to the
impending threat to the government center.” In fact, the Bulgarians were
also in desperate need of a truce because the battlefield moved away from
their headquarters; they started experiencing interruptions in the supply of
ammunition and food to the frontlines due to weather conditions; they, too,
suffered heavy casualties on the Çatalca front; and cholera swept through
their soldiers. The commanders and representatives of both parties, therefore, agreed to come together in Bahşayiş village, near Çatalca, where they
decided to call an armistice in order to start peace negotiations.36 A. Naz�
limov, who served in the Bulgarian army during the Balkan War, testifies
how the Bulgarian Army was also struck by the same set of problems as
the Ottoman Army. According to Nazlimov, the first case of cholera in the
Bulgarian Army was encountered in the Cavalry Division around Çorlu on
28 October 1911.37
In Istanbul a cholera epidemic broke out in January 1911 among the
reserve units returning from the autumn maneuver, carried out in Albania.
Because no cases of cholera had been reported in the hometowns of the soldiers serving in these contingents until that time (all of them were coming
from the provinces on the coast of the Eastern Black Sea), the epidemic was
thought to have been transmitted by the soldiers from the areas of maneuver in Albania through the ports and quays of Thrace, where they stopped
on their way back home.38 In 1912, when a cholera epidemic broke out in
the Ottoman contingent returning from Albania, which was sent to suppress the uprising there, the soldiers were quarantined in a military camp
20
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
in Serviburun. As a protective measure, a health officer was tasked, at the
quaysides in Istanbul, to spray a few drops of corrosive sublimate on the passengers getting off the steamers.39 According to another source, the cholera
epidemic, which broke out during the Balkan Wars, causing many military
and civilian fatalities, originally had been carried from Egypt and Syria.40
In the Balkan Wars, the Ottoman Army was on the retreat from 21
October 1912 on. During that retreat, too, which took place under adverse
weather conditions, a cholera epidemic broke out. The cholera epidemic,
of course, brought several unexpected problems, amplifying the hardships
experienced by the army. The epidemic intensified and expanded in a short
time span in Hadımköy, and the entire city of Istanbul was threatened by
a possible outbreak which could be sparked by the soldiers being relocated
from Hadımköy to Istanbul. To avoid such a crisis, the field medical inspectorate ordered that the patients be taken off the train at Yeşilköy station,
before reaching Istanbul, and be treated there. However, neither the Greek
School, nor the tents set up in vacant lands, nor the houses converted into
hospitals, sufficed to accommodate all of the patients in Yeşilköy. The chaotic
situation in the region frightened the inhabitants of Yeşilköy, causing them
to flee. During the Balkan Wars, the senior students of the Military Medical
School were drafted into the army at the rank of captain. The sheds set up
for the patients with epidemic diseases in Yeşilköy during the Balkan Wars
were later used in the First World War.41 After its defeat, the Ottoman Army
retreated rapidly and formed a defensive line in the trenches in Çatalca.
The Muslim inhabitants of the areas abandoned by the retreating Ottoman
Army migrated to Anatolia under grave conditions. The majority of those
who finally reached Istanbul, after a difficult journey through muddy roads
and heavy winter conditions, became ill. As many as ninety large buildings
and mansions were used as hospitals for the treatment and care of those
migrants.42 Following a decision of the medical department of the Ottoman
Army, the soldiers infected with cholera were boarded in large mosques:
3,600 in St. Sophia Mosque, 1,200 in the Sultanahmet (Blue) Mosque, 450
in Nuruosmaniye Mosque, and 1,250 in Mahmutpaşa Mosque.43
The Indian Red Crescent Organization also sent a twenty-four-member
delegation consisting of Indian Muslims, chaired by Dr.€Ahmed Erzari who
was working in Charing Cross Hospital in London. The delegation actively
participated in the efforts to control the epidemics in Istanbul during the
Balkan Wars.44 In addition, the Red Crescent Organization from Egypt, and
Red Cross Organizations from England, Romania, Austria-Hungary, and
Germany also sent delegations in order to help the sick and wounded during the Balkan Wars.45
Between Two Fires
21
Table 2.3. Çatalca Army Medical Inspectorate’s hospital records
Referred
patients
Cholera
Officers
219
Recruits
11,443
Other
diseases
–
4,336
Total
number
Number of
deaths
219
11
15,779
137
The units defending the Çatalca line suffered from insufficient numbers of doctors and health officers, as well as an inadequate or nonexistent
supply of medical equipment and medicine. Cholera and dysentery were
rampant among the troops. In the face of those difficulties, not only appropriate treatment but also protective measures were insufficiently provided.
According to the records of the army medical inspectorate in Çatalca, the
situation in the hospitals within that inspectorate’s area of responsibility was
as follows (see Table 2.3).46
The observations of military doctor Abdülkadir Noyan provide a good insight into the grim state of medical facilities at a central place like Istanbul:
The trains were halting at a point between the gramophone factory and the
station. The sick were unloaded there, while the dead were simply dumped,
being rolled down from the slope to the land below. We, the doctors, wearing rubber boots and black oilcloth coats, and carrying Red Crescent mark
on our arms, were coming to work at dawn, staying there until late at night.
In the first chaotic days, the patients had only soup, and the only available medicine was lemonade prepared with lactic acid containing labdanum. Freshly slaked lime and lime milk were used to sterilize the inner and
outer surfaces of the tents. The increasing number of patients surpassed the
capacity of the tents, sheds, and houses used as hospitals. The farm where
tents and temporary hospitals were set up resembled the doomsday. Some
of the patients transported from the Çatalca front-line died on the way;
only their dead bodies made it. It was impossible to bury the dead in separate graves. Cholera victims were buried with their clothes on in the deep
ditches dug on the vacant fields in the south of the record factory, close
to the sea shore. The number of the cholera patients arriving in Yeşilköy
was 20,000. In the course of that epidemic, a total of over 30,000 soldiers
caught the disease, one third of whom died.47
The enemy was stopped eventually on the Çatalca front on 15–19 November 1912. Nazım Pasha reinforced the Ottoman forces in Çatalca with the
22
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
divisions coming from Trabzon, Erzurum, and İzmir, which in fact contained soldiers diagnosed with cholera, who then were known as the zuafayı
aske�riye (weak soldiers of the army).48
An interesting witness of the Ottoman Army’s struggle against cholera
was Leon Trotsky, one of the future leaders of the Bolshevik Revolution in
1917, who at the time was in exile in Vienna. In the fall of 1912, Trotsky went
to the Balkans as a “war correspondent” of the journal Kievskaya Misl (Kiev’s
View). In the reports he sent from the battlefield, Trotsky remarked that in
Çatalca the Ottoman Army was fighting not only the Bulgarian Army but
also the “monster of cholera.”49 In one of his articles, Leon Trotsky quotes
the following words from a letter written by a clerk who was dispatched to
Stip to open a branch of the National Bank in Bulgaria:
A horrible situation! It is depressing to witness how the Ottoman civilian villagers sometimes were killed without any reason, their properties
were seized, and their wives and children were left in poverty and hunger.
Around 2,000 Ottoman migrants, mostly women and children, died from
hunger between Radovishte and Stip. Yes, they died only from hunger.
After quoting these words from the official, Trotsky goes on to observe that
life in a region liberated [from the Ottomans] is made up of a 70 year old
elderly man, whose head lay mangled, thousands of women and children
dying from hunger, revolutionary partisans degenerated into bandits, a police chief protecting burglars. One cannot expect the newly assigned administrators to act as honorably as Catos, when they find themselves in such an
environment. No limitations exist on the government’s arbitrary practices,
and opportunities for making a quick fortune are appealing. A state official
writes to one of his colleagues: “Tell N.N. that the mentioned land can be
purchased at a very little cost here, and especially in Ovtse Polje.” The Turks
fled leaving all their lands and properties behind, and nowadays, the plundering of them has reached its highest point.50
Shortly after the measures implemented against cholera bore some fruits
in Yeşilköy, another cholera epidemic broke out in a division dispatched
from Elazığ. A sanitary cordon was placed around the site of the outbreak
(the Kartal and Yakacık districts of Istanbul), and the troops from the contingent were housed in the homes nearby. The gardens of those houses were
contaminated with human feces, and most of the wells also were under the
threat of pollution by the groundwater. After a while, the authorities decided to relocate the infected division to Tuzla, another district of Istanbul.
Between Two Fires
23
According to a witness, however, “no medical means were available to combat the epidemic of cholera.”51
In March 1913, cases of spotted fever (typhus) were encountered in the
Yeşilköy Hospital of Infectious Diseases. At that time this disease was believed to be occurring sporadically in the eastern provinces. Typhus was
also detected among the troops dispatched from Erzurum.52 In May 1913,
an epidemic of recurrent fever broke out in the Yeşilköy hospital. It turned
out that the soldiers originating from the east brought this disease.53 Meanwhile, a cholera epidemic broke out once more, during the army’s offensive
which resulted in the recapture of Edirne on 10 July 1913. About 400 patients were referred to the hospital in Dimetoca suspected of cholera; 134
of them were diagnosed with the disease. On this occasion, proper medical
measures were employed to combat the epidemic. A cholera vaccine developed by Dr.€Reşat Rıza and Dr.€Mustafa was used. Besides the Ottoman
Army, cholera was also diagnosed in the Bulgarian and Greek armies around
the same time.54 In October 1913, a cholera epidemic broke out among the
Ottoman troops who were congregated in Derince upon their return from
enemy captivity. Among the 6,000 soldiers gathered in the military camp,
about 25 to 30 new cholera cases were emerging each day.55 According to
the statistics collected later, the total casualties of the army from cholera on
the Çatalca front were 40,000.56 Against the background of defeat in the
Balkan Wars, a dysentery epidemic broke out just as the cholera epidemic
was about to end. The total number of dysentery cases was about 6,000 to
7,000, 15€percent of which resulted in death.57 Cholera also hit the Bulgarian Army during the Balkan Wars, and according to one estimate, its death
toll was around 19,000.58 When Edirne was besieged during the Second Balkan War of 1912–1913, A. Geron, who was then principal of the Jewish Girls’
School in Edirne, took the following interesting notes in her diary about the
hunger and epidemics reigning in the city:
18 December 1912. The sanitary conditions in the city are very bad. Epidemics of scarlet fever, cholera, and dysentery have broken out. Our children
are drinking water from the Arda River, which is full of corpses. This is very
dangerous. I will immediately inform the School’s Administrative Board
about the situation and request them to take urgent measures.
January 17, 1913. Death, exacerbated by hunger, lack of salt and wood, dysentery, and cholera, is spreading every day, causing a great concern. More
people are dying due to these conditions of deprivation created by the siege
than due to the bombardments.
24
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
March 9, 1913. Hunger is becoming severer [sic] every day. Authorities allocate each adult individual a daily ration of bread equal to 100–150 g. The
poverty is unbearable for the poor who have been unemployed for months.
The ugly death is chasing the weakened and anemic organisms. Hundreds
of people died of hunger. Human beings compete with animals for the fresh
grass on land. Although the grass suppresses their hunger, it also irritates
their stomach. Deceiving the feeling of hunger has been the only occupation of these people for months.59
In the aftermath of the war, when the army started discharging troops
in September 1913, the 31st and 32nd divisions were ordered to move to Gelibolu. Because the troops passed through areas where the epidemic was still
present, including Dimetoca, and some of them already had suffered from
the disease, inevitably an epidemic broke out again in Gelibolu.60 In March
1914, epidemics of recurrent fever and cholera were encountered in the 2nd
Army Corps stationed in Edirne. Furthermore, 25 to 30 cases of spotted fever were diagnosed among the troops every day. A total of 104 soldiers died
during this epidemic.61 The epidemic also took its toll in other parts of Anatolia and advanced into the central parts of the country. In November 1914,
5 to 6 spotted fever cases per day were being detected among the inmates in
the Prison of Konya. That outbreak was immediately followed by another
spotted fever epidemic in Sille (a small village near Konya).62
Cemil Pasha, the mayor and a surgeon by profession, provides interesting observations about the Balkan War in his memoirs:
A few days after the declaration of the war, migrants started to arrive in our
city. But what an arrival! They were all in a very miserable condition. Those
poor people coming to Istanbul, packed in sailboats and trains, were then
finding themselves in Sirkeci, hungry and broke. Not to mention those who
set off from their villages and towns on oxcarts.
In the meantime, a cholera epidemic beginning among the troops in
Kartal aggravated the situation. The poverty in the city reached an extreme
level. The disease claimed many lives every day.
It was winter. Every day thousands of people infected with cholera were
abandoned in large fields—where the Gülhane Park is located today. As I
was contemplating where and how to treat those poor people, suddenly the
large mosques came to my mind. I called the late Ziya Pasha, the then Minister of Foundations, to request his permission to have some of the mosques
placed under the authority of the Municipality immediately. Ziya Pasha,
however, turned down my request on the grounds that “[he] can never
Between Two Fires
25
give permission for making the places of worshipping filthy.” I decided to
bring the matter to Sadrazam [Prime Minister] Kamil Pasha without delay.
Though it is unusual to listen to the Mayor during the cabinet meetings,
they let me in.
Cemil Pasha goes on to narrate the exchange between himself and Ziya
Pasha. Whereas he made a case to demonstrate that the urgent health conditions in the city made it necessary to use large mosques for accommodating
the people affected by the epidemic, Ziya Pasha insisted that this act would
be disgraceful to these holy sites, hence not acceptable from his perspective.
In the face of this opposition, Prime Minister Kamil Pasha remained hesitant, which prompted Şeyhülislam Cemaleddin Efendi to throw his weight
behind Mayor Cemil Pasha by saying that he would support the idea of using not only one, but if necessary all, mosques for the treatment of patients
and refugees suffering from cholera. He went on to add that he could even
issue a fatwa (opinion on a matter involving the Islamic religious rules) to
that end. He concluded by saying that “harboring the refugees and patients
in mosques under such critical conditions is not against the Shari’a, because Islamic places of worship are at the same time Houses of God.” This
strong support lent by the Şeyhülislam removed the obstacles before Cemil
Pasha’s proposal, and the Council of Ministers unanimously decided that
the mosques would be placed under the authority of the municipality to be
used for the purpose of fighting the epidemic.63
Another witness of the chaotic conditions reigning in Istanbul, Doctor
Major General Ekrem Şadi, who was a high school student then, writes that
during the Balkan Wars countless people were arriving in Istanbul in a great
panic.
I saw those people in mosques [transferred from vegetable gardens]. Their
cheeks were sunken. They were looking for wheat grains in the soil. Back
then, we used to go to Gülhane hospital to prepare war packages (bandages,
gauzes, and cotton in them) for the wounded. When we visited the operating room of the hospital in our spare time, we used to run into wounded
soldiers on the stretchers, screaming.
Ekrem Şadi also recalls the following:
In the tents set up in a disorderly manner along the banks of the Danube
River, 20–25 soldiers were packed into a single tent. The ill and healthy
soldiers were lumped together. In this overcrowded camping area, even the
26
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
death of a soldier could not be noticed. Whereas 50–60 of our soldiers were
losing their lives per day, thanks to the preventive measures taken, later that
number was reduced to 4–5 a day.64
Works On Hygiene At The Beginning Of The War
When the First World War started in 1914, the Ottoman Empire was confronted with new problems, particularly a typhus epidemic. Throughout
the war, widespread cases of typhus appeared in the center of Istanbul and
in the region around Üsküdar-Galata-Eyüp. In order to combat that epidemic, which persisted due to the war conditions, an elaborate plan of action was drafted, as though the whole city was mobilized to fight against the
disease. As part of the measures taken to address the crisis, first of all, soon
after the commencement of World€War€I, all civilian doctors, pharmacists,
and dentists between the ages of twenty and forty-five were drafted into the
army under Law No. 1097, dated 1 August 1914.65 Shortly before the war, in
fact, during Dr.€Reşat Rıza’s term in office as the director of hygiene, a directive on the “Regulations on the Infectious Diseases and Epidemics,” consisting of sixty-five articles, was issued on 13 April 1914.66 The directive laid
out the responsibilities of respective bodies to prepare for the city’s upcoming combat against infectious diseases.67 Under that framework, the Istanbul Commission to Combat Infectious Diseases was established. At the beginning, the commission dealt with diseases such as typhus, recurrent fever,
and cholera. Later its mandate was extended to include smallpox and the
plague.68
The following are some of the measures proposed by the plan:
▪〉 Let it be communicated to health officers working in the countryside that
passengers traveling to Istanbul from the places in Anatolia or the Marmara
region where typhus epidemics exist shall undergo a medical examination
before boarding the trains, or sea vehicles, and it shall be deemed necessary to
disinfect their belongings as much as possible.
▪〉 New recruits shall be sent to the quarantine establishment at Tuzla to be
cleaned, where they shall be kept under observation for fourteen days before
being dispatched to their units. In the military units, appropriate measures
shall be taken to prevent infections. The soldiers, who return from leave after
recovering from typhus, shall also undergo the same process.
▪〉 The servicemen with typhus, who are in hospitals, barracks, and various
units, shall not be sent on leave, nor shall they be discharged.
Between Two Fires
27
▪〉 In the military places which are the origin of spotted fever cases, such as the
Selimiye Barracks and Hospital, and Hospitals of Rami and Davutpaşa, as
well as various military units where spotted fever cases are detected, urgent
measures shall be taken to eliminate the micro organisms of diseases and
parasites thoroughly. Those places shall be kept under strict medical control
and surveillance.
▪〉 Even when all of the abovementioned measures are implemented strictly, the
elimination of the disease completely would be near to impossible. When
the seasonal conditions allow, the people previously residing in the designed
parts of the city shall be resettled outside the city, or be placed in the tents.
▪〉 The doctors working for the Municipality’s medical services shall be considered to be on emergency duty during the course of the epidemic, and they
shall be compensated for the travel expenses related to their duties.
▪〉 As it would be beyond doctors’ capacity to examine all the cases referred to
them, a health officer shall be assigned to each of the 38 public health centers
in order to carry out doctors’ duties, and help the doctors.
▪〉 When the trains, irrespective of whether they are operating within the city
or coming from other places, have to wait for more than an hour at a station,
their wagons shall be disinfected, using 5% petroleum or phonic acid solutions, or 3% cresol solution. The furnishings, carpets, mats, and floor shall
first be wetted with those solutions, and then brushed and rinsed.
▪〉 Hotelkeepers are responsible to maintain the cleanliness of hotel rooms, corridors, and bedclothes. They shall be informed that the hotels failing to do
so, or are found to contain lice, fleas, or bedbugs will be closed until they are
cleaned, in order to maintain the public health.
▪〉 Although the Municipality decided to subcontract the disinfection of the
personal belongings and furniture of those living in hostels, bachelors’ housing, and brothels step by step, those individuals are required to take utmost
care to keep their bodies, clothes, and other belongings clean from lice, fleas,
and bedbugs. Let them know that otherwise they shall be punished.
▪〉 The Ministry of Foundations shall be asked to ensure that naphthalene powder is sprinkled on and beneath the carpets in the mosques and other places
of worshipping in order to protect them against moths.
▪〉 The Municipality shall lease five public baths in certain neighborhoods initially in order to allow the poor to bathe.69
3
UNDER THE CRESCENT
In fact all corps had been reduced from the strength of divisions to that
of regiments, and regiments to that of battalions or even companies.
A drastic reorganization of the Third Army became essential.
—â•›W. E. D. Allen and Paul Muratoff,
Caucasian Battlefields
The great disaster in Sarıkamış in the winter of 1914–1915 reduced the
3rd Army to a mere 12,000 men who were left unorganized and were afflicted with eruptive typhus. Their commander, Hafız Hakkı, died of this
terrible sickness. These meager forces were reinforced by about 20,000 recruits, many of whom succumbed over time to typhus, malnutrition, and
lack of hygiene and medical supplies. The main reason for these misfortunes
was the enormous distance separating the Caucasian front from the last station of the railway, a distance of between five and six hundred kilometers
comprised of trails passing through rough terrain. Moving troops by sea was
considered impossible since the superior Russian fleet would be able to intercept Ottoman ships.1
Troops And Routes
One question that begs an answer is this: what was the situation of the Ottoman transportation facilities in Anatolia, Syria, and Iraq during the First
World War? This question is important for a proper understanding of the
Ottoman Army’s performance during the Great War, as the level of a country’s transportation infrastructure has a direct bearing on its social, economic, military and political achievements.2
The Ottoman Empire was only able to operate around one hundred small trains in 1914.3 Before the outbreak of the Great War, only the
Haydarpaşa (Istanbul)-Konya segment of the Istanbul-Baghdad railroad
could be completed. Later during the war it was extended further from
28
Under the Crescent
29
Figure 3.1. Major Railways in the Ottoman Empire during World€War€I.
Konya. By the end of 1914, the following lines became operational: KonyaKarapınar (291€km), Durak-Yenice, Adana-Misis-Toprakkale-Osmaniye,
Carablus-Telebyaz (81€km), Baghdad-Samarra (119€km), and the ToprakkaleOsmaniye-İskenderun line.4 By the end of 1915, only three sections remained
unfinished: the 37€km from Karapınar to Durak in the Taurus; the 54€km
stretch between Mamure and Islahiye in the Amanus; and the 588€km between Ras-ul-Ain and Samarra in Mesopotamia. In 1915–1916, as a result,
the soldiers had to pass through the Gülek Pass in the Taurus Mountains
on foot in order to reach the Syrian territories from Anatolia.5 The war later
made the Baghdad-Basra section completely out of reach for the Ottoman
Army.6 Between Ulukışla and Erzurum no railway connection was available
back then. This was the grim condition of the transportation facilities available to the wartime Ottoman Army.
İ. Hakkı Bey, who was assigned as a reserve officer to the Caucasus front
while he was a second-year student at Istanbul Faculty of Law, traveled to
30
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Pozantı together with his unit by train. He relates the following about his
journey:
All troops got off the train in Pozantı. On the night of 20/21 June, we slept
in the pine groves of Pozantı. Since no vehicle was available, we would have
to travel on food to the plain of Adana.7
The journey of the First Expeditionary Force from Istanbul to Aleppo,
Syria, also started from Haydarpaşa railway station on 24 December 1914.
Meanwhile, because the British Navy controlling the Gulf of İskenderun
had destroyed the railways and bridges with cannon fire and through the
detachments landed there, the first Ottoman units dispatched to Aleppo
had to walk from Toprakkale to İskenderun, while the rest marched from
Osmaniye to Aleppo directly, bypassing İskenderun.8 When mobilization
was declared in August 1914, Münim Mustafa and his friends, who were
drafted into the army while studying at Istanbul Faculty of Law, were assigned to the 4th Army headquarters in Syria. In order to join their unit,
they also traveled to Pozantı by train, but as no rail service was available
after Pozantı, they had to pass through the Taurus Mountains on foot, and
continued their way by marching along the Osmaniye-Hasanbeyli-İslahiyeRaco route. They first participated in the military campaign in the Canal
region (in Suez), and later fought in Çanakkale and at the Caucasus front.9
The memoirs of a military doctor are of great value, in this case providing detailed information on the situation of the roads in Anatolia and Syria
at the onset of the war. Abdülkadir Noyan of the Ottoman Army started his
duty in Iraq as the deputy chief doctor of the 6th Army in December 1915.
The route the medical captain followed to reach his place of duty, as well
as the vehicles he used en route, were as follows. On his way to Baghdad,
where he was assigned, he first took the train from Istanbul to Pozantı. He
then traveled from Pozantı to Mosul on horseback and from there to Baghdad on keleks (a kind of raft mounted on animal skins filled with air).10
All Ottoman troops deployed to the Iraqi front could reach that region
only after a two-month walk, which naturally had a very adverse effect on
their health condition.11
In an illustrative example, the contingent where Bartınlı Hamid, one
of the Ottoman recruits, served moved from Viranşehir to Revandiz in fifty
days in March 1915, including breaks taken along the way. In the spring of
1915, his unit engaged Russian forces in Urumiye, Iran. In the meantime,
hunger and epidemics started to affect the troops. They had insufficient
food and many times they went hungry for days. In addition, more than
Under the Crescent
31
two hundred soldiers drowned in the Tigris River. The unit eventually arrived in Ahlat on 25 June 1915 to find an entirely empty town.12
After mobilization was declared, the 29th Division stationed in Erzincan was dispatched to Erzurum. It took ten days for the division to walk
the distance of 180€km between Erzincan and Erzurum, at an average speed
of 20 to 30€km per day.13 The units subordinate to the First Expeditionary
Force, which were deployed in Aleppo, set off for Erzurum on 22 January 1915. The contingent first was transported from Aleppo to Akçakale by
train, and from there the soldiers had to walk.14 As the “longest walk” in the
four-year history of the Great War started there, in an unfortunate coincidence, the diseases of spotted fever, black fever, recurrent fever, and dysentery were occurring all over Anatolia, either as isolated cases, or in the form
of epidemics.15
Dr.€Abdülkadir Noyan, who had ample opportunity to observe the
health conditions along the route between Istanbul and Baghdad, took the
following notes in December 1915:
My impressions about the medical conditions on the roads after Adana and
Aleppo were upsetting. The migration of the Armenians from the east toward
the south also took place during the same time. As far as I was informed, the
epidemics of spotted fever and typhoid were advancing toward Istanbul. On
the other hand, on the way from Istanbul to Aleppo and Mosul, one could
easily notice the increase in the number of spotted fever cases.16
The “death walk” taken by the young people, who were drafted into the
army to defend the homeland after the Ottoman Empire joined the war,
lasted for four long years until the end of the war. These Ottoman youth,
en route to battlefields, had to travel under the most arduous conditions,
sometimes having to march 800€km under the desert sun. A German medical officer, Colonel Seuber, who served as the chief doctor of the Lightning
Group of Armies, took the following notes between 1917 and 1918:
A 800€km-long journey through the desert, where no railroad but one road
parts of which are convenient for automobile transportation exists! What a
journey! 800 kilometers with insufficient water and food supply. The German units would never endure this 800€km.-march in summer conditions.
Even the winter and rainy seasons were of no help to ease the hardships.17
In 1918 Hamdullah Suphi visited the Syrian front together with Halide
Edip upon the invitation of Cemal Pasha. Suphi reported his observations
32
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
during their journey to Syria through Ulukışla, which is located at the crossroads of the military dispatch routes, in the Türk Yurdu magazine. He depicted the condition of the soldiers he met in Ulukışla as follows:
I used to hear the name of Ulukışla from those who traveled between Syria
or Iraq and Anatolia. We arrived there early in the morning, while one could
still smell fresh morning air. On a small square on the left side of where we
stopped, one could see gatherings of camels, donkeys, and people. It was
noticeable at first sight that Ulukışla, located at the intersection of the roads
leading to various battlefronts, was distinctively vivid, unlike other towns.
As months pass by, we see younger and younger people joining those
feverish activities going on behind the battlefronts for years. The youngsters
from the towns, which are deserted day by day, have been flowing incessantly to Suez, Diyarbakır, Iraq, and the Caucasus. The atmosphere in this
town reminds me more than anywhere else of the fellow brothers, and of
those who, after resting for five to ten minutes in such destructed towns,
have traveled to the farthest frontlines, with a noble hope in their hearts,
many of whom have fallen to the ground, decaying in unknown places,
without leaving any name or any trace behind. The overcrowded dispatch
routes and the endless noise that accompanies them make one think of war
more than anywhere else in Ulukışla.
The carriages, horses, camels, donkeys, mules, and automobiles carrying goods are coming and going in haste on the roads. A huge mechanism,
consisting of those different means of transportation, is constantly in operation to keep the war machines far away from here running. All these
vehicles and animals are transporting the soldiers from Anatolia and pouring them into the deserts, to Iraq, Syria, and Diyarbakır. On the other side
of the road, convoys of weak soldiers, comprising the youngsters worn-out
and exhausted by war, are returning [to] their homes. These youngsters,
with hollow eyes looking at the death or darkness, and with sunken cheeks,
appeared unsure whether they would be able to see their distant villages
again.18
In 1917, one year before Hamdullah Suphi and Halide Edip’s journey to
Syria, the German military doctor Seuber, mentioned above, had traveled to
the region by train and stopped in Karapınar in the Taurus Mountains. He
provides the following impressions from a doctor’s point of view:
For the time being, Karapınar serves as a crucial transfer point. Karapınar,
which is very hot even in the morning, becomes like a hell during the day,
Under the Crescent
33
conducive to the spread of malaria. I had some time to visit the centre
where the sick are gathered, and the facilities for cleaning lice, as well as
other medical facilities, which were in poor conditions. Then we continued
our trip through decauville railways, traveling in wagons open on all sides
whose roofs are covered with tents.
All kinds of houses exist in Karapınar. The Turks, the Armenians, and
the Greeks are living together in tents, underground shelters, or booths,
surrounded with the germs of malaria. In contrast, above this miserable
hell of malaria, on the skirts of the mountains, one could see beautiful and
well-ornamented houses resided by the German engineers working in the
construction of the Anatolian railways. In Karapınar, a large mass of people
consisting of diverse races from Europe and Asia are working together under the German leadership for the common purpose of building a road to
the south, through the Taurus Mountains.19
Some soldiers had to be left behind because they became ill during the
longest walk “under the crescent.” İ. Hakkı’s unit was about to leave the district of Eloğlu (Türkoğlu), located on the plain stretching from the outskirts
of the Gavur Mountains between Adana and Maraş. The onset of cholera
within the unit forced them to leave the ill soldiers:
It is evening, and we are about to leave. I watched the ill to be left here: all
of them were scrawny, and their cheeks were sunken. Some of them were
throwing up, while some others were defecating in one corner. Some of
them were bathing in a large puddle in front of the village. I shouted at
them: “is it a good time to do that?” One of the soldiers replied to me: “Sir,
it is cholera. They are afraid of dying without ablution.”
It was a tragic scene: There was no hospital, nor anybody to look after
them. We left by saying “May God protect you.” I only wished the disease
would not be transmitted to the villagers.20
Of the 10,000 troops serving in the Ottoman division that set off from
Istanbul, only 4,635 could make it to Palestine. The rest either became ill or
deserted. The ones who reached Palestine were ill and had lost their strength.
Most of the troops in the Ottoman division did not even have blankets.
As narrated by the medical officer serving in an Ottoman-German joint
machine-gun company, none of the soldiers in the company were healthy
as of May 1917. The most common diseases were amoebic dysentery and
malaria.21
As of early 1917, the number of wounded continued to rise due to the
34
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
ongoing battles. About eight to nine thousand ill and wounded soldiers had
to be accommodated in the houses and tents in the town of Samra, on the
left bank of the Tigris River. Soon after, however, the military had to withdraw from Samra, which made it necessary to move those ill and wounded
servicemen across the river:
In order to transfer the ill and wounded to Mosul, first of all they had to be
moved across the river. The only means of transportation that were available
in Samra were a few simple baskets covered with pitch (called a “kufe”).
Each of those kufes could hold 8–10 persons. First, they were lifted up to
a height of 200–250 meters, and left to the current of the river. Later, by
using the oars the people inside could reach the other bank. It took more
than half an hour to move a kufe from one side to the other and back.22
In January 1915, cognizant of the difficulties that would arise if the German Army attempted to cross the desert on foot, Liman von Sanders argued
against a proposed offensive. When the headquarters in Berlin ordered the
offensive anyway, the units set off for Suez under the command of Kress von
Kressenstein. During the offensive in Suez, and on the return from there,
the water shortage and other problems emanating from it sparked various
intestinal disorders which later turned into dysentery. Von Kressenstein observed that “few of the Germans under [von Sanders’] command remained
healthy enough to carry out the daily routines.” Von Sanders himself lost
one third of his body weight due to malnutrition.23 According to von Sanders, malaria and dysentery in particular took a heavy toll in the hot summer
months of 1918. All the mobile hospitals and convalescent-hospitals along
the frontlines as well as in the interior were overcrowded.24
Supply Of Food And Shelter For The Troops25
Excluding the first three months of 1914, during the entire period of war
till the declaration of the ceasefire, a total of 654,468 Ottoman troops were
admitted to military hospitals and other central hospitals. The main reason causing such a large number was the chronic problem of malnutrition,
which could not be eliminated despite all efforts.26 The situation of the 3rd
Army deployed on the eastern front was particularly critical. The nutrition
levels for the officers and the troops were alarming; the difficulties encountered in transportation due to insufficient and primitive transportation vehicles, and the long and severe winters caused frequent interruptions in the
food supply.27
Under the Crescent
35
An Ottoman officer who inspected the 4th Division of the Reserve Cavalry Army Corps during the war had the following observations fifteen years
after the Great War:
What I saw during the inspection of the 4th Division in Velibaba was
deeply upsetting. The headquarters of that division was in Viranşehir, and
its troops were recruited from regions with hot climates, who only had
underclothes on, and instead of military greatcoats were wearing maşlahs
(long, open-fronted cloak). They were sleeping on the ground, on earth in
the narrow and dirty rooms of the miserable village, and they did not have
any blankets to cover their bodies while sleeping. At a temperature 5 degrees below 0 Celsius, it was a torture to task those insufficiently clothed
young village boys to guard the front door. When the whole division was on
horses for inspection in the early morning, I saw their naked feet twisted on
the iron stirrups because of the cold. I felt ashamed of seeing them. At the
same time, I wondered how those soldiers could fight in a battle. I went to
Erzurum on 1 October 1914. I told the Army Commander (Hasan İzzet Pasha) about my impressions of the general situation of the cavalry regiments,
their equipment, and their combat readiness. The Army Commander replied: “In the Balkan War, our Army was well clothed and equipped, yet we
were defeated. This time, let’s fight without equipment.”28
Another Ottoman officer, Colonel Sadık Sabri, in his report submitted
from the 17th Division to the 9th Army Corps, which was subordinate to
the 3rd Army, documents the terrible consequences of poor health conditions and disease on his unit:
Most of the soldiers were recruited by the Recruiting Branch of the 10th
Army Corps, and joined their battalions after walking for 35–40 days. Most
of them are old, weak, and vulnerable to diseases. Some of them got sick
and died soon after they joined their battalions. The disease is still prevalent among the survivors. You would find the medical report on the general
health conditions, attached. Since no doctors and medicines were available
in those units, the spread of the disease could not be prevented. That the
capacity of the mobile hospital had to be increased to 790 beds is an indication of the persistence of the disease. Most of the animals are emaciated. Most of them were wounded but could not be treated since the units
had no veterinarians and medicines. Obviously those wounded and emaciated animals cannot be used in any military operation. The number of
mule drivers is not sufficient to carry all the loads of the units according to
36
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
current calculations. Since the Division would not be able to compensate
for the required mule drivers, I have requested you to reinforce them.
More than half of the recruits are still in their civilian clothing. We sent
80 animals without packsaddles to Hamdi Village. I had 900 cartridge belts
belonging to the Division picked up from Bayburt and distributed them to
the soldiers. They were, however, sufficient for only half of the soldiers. The
rest still doesn’t have any. Nor do they have haversacks. The soldiers could
carry their rations in the bags they brought from their villages; however
they have no means to carry their ammunition. Furthermore, the shoes of
many of the soldiers are in a very bad condition. It is obvious that the tired
and weakened soldiers cannot walk as desired with those shoes.
I warned the officers several times about the need to prevent the transmission of the diseases and eradicate them. The officers, who even don’t
care about their own health, have difficulty in understanding the dangers
of the disease. The lack of doctors and medicines, and the vulnerability of
the poorly-dressed, tired, and weakened soldiers to diseases set obstacles to
efforts at preventing the epidemics. The disease is spreading rapidly even
among the officers; therefore the number of officers is constantly decreasing.29
According to Dr.€Abdülkadir Noyan, the course and fatality level of a
disease depends mainly on environmental conditions, nutritional intake,
and clothing. Particularly in the case of amoebic dysentery and chronic
enteritis, malnutrition and cold play a major role. Those diseases cause sudden deaths among people who have gone hungry for long periods. That
phenomenon might explain the cases of sudden deaths observed in soldiers who came back from the desert after gathering wood, and in the patients who died shortly after they were hospitalized or while they were being
examined.30
A Palestinian Jew of Romanian origin was among those recruited during
the war and assigned to the 4th Army. As he narrates, most of the uniforms
given to the soldiers were old and dirty, having been previously worn by others and probably still carrying the germs of various diseases.31 This situation
was in fact unusual, as in many places the soldiers did not even have access
to such “previously used, old, dirty, and infected” uniforms. For instance,
the units of the 3rd Army dispatched to their concentration region were not
dressed suitably for the severe climate conditions of the East Anatolia.
According to a note sent in March 1916 from the Detached Cavalry Brigade to the Battle Group of Iraq, although they were able to send the troops
to the public baths in Mosul and Baghdad, the soldiers had to wash their
Under the Crescent
37
Table 3.1. Casualties of the Fifth Expeditionary Force that occurred during its journey to the
front (1915)
Ill soldiers who could travel with their units (970 foot injuries)
2,708
Ill soldiers who could not travel with their units
1,040
Desertions
1,041
Deaths (49 due to diseases, 39 freezing to death,16 due to other reasons)
102
clothes only with water, as there was no soap available. Lice spread through
the troops since they had no soap to wash their hands, let alone their bodies.
The Cavalry Brigade tried to purchase some soap from Baghdad, but there
was none to be had. Under those conditions, naturally, it was not possible to
prevent the spread of typhus.32
Typhus was the most dangerous disease threatening the military forces
operating in Syria and Iraq. The Ottoman soldiers who were taken prisoner
by General Allenby’s army were first placed in barrels filled with corrosive
sublimate to prevent the introduction of the disease to the British soldiers.33
On the other hand, epidemics and endemics of hepatitis were observed
among British and French prisoners of war in the Mediterranean region
during the Great War.34
In 1915, the units of the 5th Expeditionary Force fell victim to freezing
temperatures as they were transferred from Istanbul to Erzurum, a twomonth trek via the Taurus Mountains. Particularly the 40th Infantry Regiment and the Artillery Battalion of the same force, which set off from Erzu�
rum, were caught in a snowstorm around Deveboynu, where many of the
troops froze to death.35
The First Expeditionary Force, which conducted operations in Iran,
“had to carry the ill soldiers with it while it was going to Mosul via the route
of Pozantı, Aleppo and Telleübyas, since no medical facilities were available
on the way past Aleppo. Some of the patients were left behind in Mosul and
Erbil. When the Expeditionary Force eventually arrived in Urumiye, an epidemic of spotted fever was spreading among the migrants there.”36
Since the winters were long, and heavy snowfalls and temperatures below −40°C were common on the Caucasus front, providing soldiers with
clothes and equipment suitable for severe winter conditions was critical.37
The troops of the 28th Division dispatched to the environs of Hasankale on
31 January, however, had no greatcoats and some of them did not even have
proper clothing. The troops could hardly endure the cold temperatures,
38
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
which fell to −20°C during the night. Every day three to four hundred of
them were getting ill and were sent to Hasankale.38
Major Guze, the Commander of the 3rd Army, documents how illness
acted as a major force shaping the course and outcome of the war, in his report dated 25 May 1915: “Of the soldiers dispatched from the army training
grounds only few can make it to their units. Disease, and poor nutrition and
housing conditions, as well as desertions decreased the number of soldiers
arriving significantly.”39
A telegram message sent by the German Consulate in Erzurum on 2
June 1915 recorded the following observations: “One third of the soldiers in
the military encampment in Erzurum are ill. On the other hand, another
third of the soldiers desert on the road to here.”40
During the course of the Battle for Erzurum in 1916, Ottoman forces
suffered 2,000 combat deaths, and another 2,546 were taken as prisoners.
When the wounded and frozen soldiers are also added, the losses of the
Ottoman Army reached 13,000. The toll of the battle on the Russian side
was equally terrific: 14,000, including dead, wounded, and frozen.41 The deciphered message which the 3rd Army Command had sent to the Supreme
Command headquarters on 12 September 1915 is of historical significance
as it recognized the miserable conditions of the army, which was in fact an
early warning sign of the tragic end awaiting the Ottoman soldiers:
The strength of the 3rd Army is about 160,000 men for the time being.
Only parts of the troops wear uniforms, whereas the rest are still in their
civilian clothes. They in fact have nothing but underclothes and shirts. Set
aside the disciplinary implications of this situation, most of the troops in
those clothes will soon get sick due to the severe climate conditions prevailing in this area. We resorted to every measure to find a solution to this
problem; for example any fabric that could be found was used to make
military clothes. Although the soldiers whose clothes seem to be relatively
okay are not given new ones, the ones we would be able to tailor in these
primitive ways are enough to protect only a small portion of the troops. It
appears that many soldiers will become ill and eventually die during the
long and severe winter. Clothes for 100,000 soldiers, as well as conical tents
sufficient to hold those soldiers are badly needed. We request immediate
supply of as many greatcoats, shoes, clothes, and tents as possible.42
Those urgent calls and warnings, however, were of no avail: there was no
way to equip the entire troops of the 3rd Army with sufficient clothing. As a
result, it is common to find entries similar to the one below in the journals
Under the Crescent
39
of many military personnel: “The weather is very cold. On the night of
25/26 April [1915], eight soldiers were frozen to death.”43
The Russian Army, on the other hand, was well supplied. Therefore,
when an Ottoman soldier was able to take the clothes of a dead Russian
soldier, his friends envied him:
Russian soldiers were wearing long greatcoats covering their legs entirely,
and had good clothes keeping their bodies warm. They were wearing leather
boots on rainy days. Their haversacks were full of daily food rations, including even tea, and sugar. An Ottoman soldier who happens to seize them
from Russian soldiers aroused intensive feelings of envy among his friends:
as if he had captured a treasure from the enemy.44
Liman von Sanders, based on his experience on the Mesopotamian and
Syrian fronts, had the following observations about the incidents of appropriating the clothes of the dead soldiers in desert conditions:
The Ottoman soldiers did not have clothes suitable for summer conditions,
and were wearing coarse woolen clothes (which could be better called as
rags). Considering that more than three-fourths of the Ottoman soldiers
did not have underclothes any more, it was apparent how uncomfortable
it was for those soldiers to wear such thick clothes directly on their skin.
Therefore, one cannot consider Ottoman soldiers’ attempt to strip of the
clothes of the dead British and Indian soldiers who fell in front of the Ottoman trenches after another unsuccessful attack callousness. It was the only
opportunity for the Ottoman soldiers to find clothes, shoes, and underwear. The prohibitions issued against seizing the clothing of the dead bore
no fruits. In such cases “the European manners” were of no use; and the
Ottoman soldiers were immediately replacing the shabby clothes on their
scrawny bodies with the new ones taken from the enemy.45
İbrahim Talî, chief doctor of the 3rd Army, after inspecting the 34th and
18th divisions in February 1915 together with the deputy chief of administration, noted the following: “We observed that the troops were living under
miserable conditions in the tents, and were not provided with sufficient
food. The meat given to them had a gelatinous appearance and seemed to
have lost all its nutritive value.”46
In 1916, already during the early stages of war, the Ottoman troops deployed in Palestine also were being fed insufficiently. From that year on, the
bread rations of soldiers were reduced from nine hundred to five hundred
40
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
grams. Sometimes they did not even receive that amount. Most of the soldiers were so weakened that they did not even have the strength to do routine training or military exercises. Many incidents of poisoning occurred as
the hungry soldiers started to eat poisonous leaves and plants.47
By the end of October 1914, the 11th Army Corps was desperately in
need of provisions. The means of transportation at the disposal of the army
corps were insufficient. The governor undertook the responsibility to have
the 150,000 kg of provisions carried on the backs of civilians only once. The
commander of the Army Cavalry Corps in Erzurum recounts the following
after the disaster in Sarıkamış:
The people of Erzurum, with their proven love for their homeland, eagerly
accepted to transport the provisions. Sacks with a capacity to carry 30 kg
were prepared. Upon seeing the school children, starting to walk from the
Government House in a self-sacrificing manner with the bags of flour on
their backs, none of us could control their tears.
According to the initial plan, the people of Erzurum would bring the
flour to Nebi Han, where the residents of Hasankale would take their turn
and transport it to Hasankale. The people from Erzurum fulfilled their
duty completely. Because Hasankale was under-populated, however, the
city could assign only 700 people a day. As a result, it took rather longer
to have the flour carried from Nebi Han on by the people and the military
vehicles.48
According to the German Major Paraguin, who was the commander of
the 6th Army, out of the total strength of 3,332 the 18th Army Corps had,
1,895 remained out of service due to hunger. During an inspection he made
in December 1917, Paraguin also observed that the soldiers were sent to
combat missions in torn clothes, some of whom even had no boots on their
feet.49
Hygiene
At the outset of the war in 1914, the Ottoman Army did not have sufficient medical institutions, medicines, or medical supplies. What is more,
only 37,000 beds were available in the stationary hospitals, 14,000 of which
were in Istanbul.50 As a result of the efforts of the Supreme Command headquarters, the number of doctors serving in the 3rd Army, which had a total
strength of 150,000, was increased from 234 as of 5 October 1914 to 425, by
recruiting the previously retired doctors and the reserve officers. The Mevkii
Under the Crescent
41
(local) Hospital in Erzurum was requisitioned to the Fortified Base Command in Erzurum. In addition, two mobile hospitals were established in
Erzurum. Of the fourteen army station command posts established at the
beginning of the war, doctors could be assigned to only the ones in Erzincan, Kelkit, and Bayburt. None of the latter, however, had sufficient medical supplies and equipment. Moreover, no medical stations or rest areas
could be built on the main roads which were used for the transportation of
the ill, wounded, and weak soldiers as well as the soldiers temporarily sent
to other places for medical reasons. Those units had no vehicles to transport
the sick.51
German Officer Gusse, the Commander of the 3rd Army, had some interesting observations:
Infectious diseases such as typhus, spotted fever, dysentery, and recurrent
fever ravaging the army, the shooting ranges, and numerous towns throughout the country, particularly Erzurum. Although it was not clear whether
the immediate cause of these diseases was the large-scale troop relocations
in the ranges, or the battles against the irregulars at the border areas, it is
certainly true that the outbreak of the diseases were precipitated by the lack
of hygienic practice among the inhabitants of the East. In addition, that
the troops had to serve for extended periods of time under adverse climate
conditions made them vulnerable to those diseases. The medical measures
implemented so far have not proven effective in eliminating the diseases affecting a large number of individuals.
The number and capacity of hospitals were far from meeting the demand; whereas the existing hospitals were very dirty. Beds and sheets were
far from sufficient, nor the number of doctors. There seemed to be no way
out to improve the situation. Furthermore, the steps taken toward the amelioration of the conditions were too slow. Whatever could be found in the
country were collected to this end, and new hospitals gradually were made
available. The intensive efforts and utmost care put in these initiatives, and
some improvements achieved increased the morale within the army. Food
supplies are handled carefully and necessary precautions are taken for the
treatment of the patients.
Despite these advancements, great difficulties were being encountered
in the transfer of the patients to the areas in the interior. No railroads or
automobiles were available for that purpose. The patients had to be transported with vehicles such as horse pulled carriages, oxcarts, or packhorses,
which were not suitable for their health conditions. Even those impractical transportation means were in short supply. Some patients, who in fact
42
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
should not walk, had to walk. The number of the sick was increasing everyday on the frontlines, and there was no way to avoid the enormous task
of carrying them to the rear out of fire. Difficulties had increased.52
Colonel Ali Osman, commander of the 30th Division subordinate to
the 3rd Army, submitted a report to the Command of the 10th Army Corps
on 15 November 1914. The information provided in the report under the
heading of “medical situation in general” and the “medical company” is
striking:
Though the medical situation was good back in Giresun, it deteriorated
rapidly after coming to this cold region since it was impossible to provide
food and shelter to the troops in the regular way. As a result, diseases such
as diarrhea, dysentery and the common cold became widespread particularly among the troops who did not have greatcoats and shoes and still wore
summer clothes. Even though previously the division had more units, the
average number of patients seeing a doctor was about 250 a day. That number has now reached 550, and the average number of soldiers hospitalized
per day has increased to 60. That the clothes the soldiers were supplied with
were not suitable to winter conditions has been the major factor leading to
the increase in the cases of disease.
The most badly needed medical supplies in the Division, lately, are alcohol, quinine, and iodine, which should be sent urgently. Additionally,
1,200 bandages are needed. Previously twenty crates and two bales of medicines and medical supplies had been sent to Trabzon from Istanbul for the
Division. Lack of transport prevented delivery [from Trabzon].
The medical company consisted of 184 recruits; when the mule drivers,
cart drivers and nurse attendants are subtracted from that number, only 32
recruits were available. As this figure was below the minimum number of
recruits needed in a medical company, the musical instruments belonging
to the band company of the Division were stored in a depot in Hasankale,
and the officers and recruits of the band company were assigned to the
medical company, where they underwent medical training.
Since there was no ongoing battle, no mobile hospital was established
for the Division. As new recruits arrive in Erzurum they will be used to
make up for the missing staff.53
In the wake of the Sarıkamış disaster in late 1914, epidemics of various
diseases broke out in Erzurum:
Under the Crescent
43
Erzurum was full of sick, wounded, weak, and deserted soldiers. Many
people died on the streets, in hotels, and in stables. Cases of spotted fever
and recurrent fever were at their peak levels. The Field Medical Inspector
General caught spotted fever, and the Army Commander had died of the
same disease. Most of the doctors were infected with the disease, and a large
number of them fell victim to it. In some hospitals, all medical and administrative personnel became ill, except one or two of them. Since Erzurum
could not hold the entire ill and wounded, the weak and ill soldiers were
accommodated in the villages of Ilıca, Kan, and Stavuk. A great misery was
prevailing in those places. It was impossible to keep track of the deaths occurring daily. The diseases were also transmitted to the local people. Every day 20–30 inhabitants were dying in Erzurum. The epidemics spread
to the rear areas as well. Erzincan was also surrounded with a large wave of
epidemic.54
Tevfik Sağlam also adds: “As of 8 March 1915 no doctor was available in
Aşkale, 60% of the inhabitants had caught spotted fever, and 5–6 victims
were dying of the disease every day. About 500 of those patients were sent
to Erzincan.”55
The bitter fact of the war, though, was that the ill and wounded had
to be transferred to other places on foot. Transferring the ill and wounded
from Erzurum to Erzincan proved troublesome. Although initially necessary precautions were taken on the road, the number of patients soon overwhelmed the existing capacity, and a “great misery” erupted. Between 14
January and 2 February 1916, a total of 11,897 sick and wounded were evacuated from Erzurum; 7,342 of them reached Tercan, 1,131 reached Aşkale, and
2,888 reached Erzincan as of 2 February. A further 4,454 ill and wounded
were estimated to be en route to Tercan from Erzurum. During the course
of that withdrawal, a total of 18,080 ill and wounded were evacuated from
Erzurum.56 The transfer could not be carried out as planned since it was
extremely cold, and the Army could not utilize the means of transportation
owned by the local people, who also were fleeing to other areas.57
In the winter of 1916, the Ottoman Army suffered great losses due to
lack of transportation vehicles and to problems encountered in the supply
of food and clothing. A report dated 24 November 1916, prepared by a division commander in the area, contained the following information:
We suffer great losses due to the lack of food and clothes. Many of the
Ottoman soldiers still are wearing thin summer clothes. They don’t have
44
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
shoes and greatcoats. Most of the time, they are wrapping rags around their
feet, but of course that doesn’t help much. Their feet remain naked anyway.
The daily food supply is only one third of the suggested daily intake. The
faces of the soldiers reflect their malnutrition. Draft animals barely get any
feed whereas riding animals are given daily 1 or 1.5 kg barley. Consequently,
animal losses are also high, and the number of animals available for carrying loads is ever-decreasing.58
German Doctor Schilling, in his report dated 16 December 1916, tells of
the situation in Diyarbakır as follows:
It seems that the Ottoman Army Station Command is unable to care for
the numerous sick; only in Diyarbakır there are approximately 5,000 to
6,000 patients. I personally saw about 500 to 600 patients in bad conditions in Mardin, who were brought there in the empty vehicles of the German truck convoys. They seemed very dirty and helpless.59
Another doctor, Dr.€Nikau, reported on the situation in Harput in his
report dated 24 December 1916:
The patients brought here really were in a pitiable condition. Besides being very dirty and lousy, they were about to die of hunger. I could find two
places to use as graveyards only with the help of the medical unit of the
Army. The monthly average death toll is about 900.60
Liman von Sanders goes on to say that “mass deaths started to occur in
the 2nd Army, and 1916 was a year of disaster on the Caucasus front.”61
The following description is very disconcerting. As of the beginning of
October 1916, the strength of one company was 6,575 men. Through October, the company suffered 51 dead, 17 of whom were in combat, and 105
injuries. Furthermore, 622 soldiers were hospitalized, whereas 422 cases of
desertion were recorded. As winter approached, naturally, the conditions
prevailing in the company further deteriorated. In November 1916, a total
of 215 soldiers died due to exhaustion and weakness in the shooting ranges,
and another 1,340 were admitted to hospitals. As a result, the strength of
the company decreased markedly. Nor were the reinforcements sent there
sufficient to make up for the previous losses. By January, not surprisingly,
the total strength of the company was down to 3,424 men. These perilous
conditions led German Officer Guhr to write that probably the patients
Under the Crescent
45
who died during transportation to other places were “luckier” since “their
pains came to an end.”62
The Fifth Expeditionary Force gathered around Erzurum. That expeditionary force had the strength of a division, formed through the reassignment of some units of the 5th Army Corps in Istanbul. It set off from Istanbul as a well-equipped force and walked for two months. During this walk,
2€percent of the troops encountered foot disorders, and 1.5€percent had common diarrhea. Rarely, cases of dysentery were observed, and three or four
soldiers drowned while crossing rivers. Around forty cases of hypothermia
occurred when the force was only a few days from Erzurum, as well as when
it was passing through Deveboynu after Erzurum. The Fifth Expeditionary
Force established a 300-bed army station hospital in Diyarbakır, in addition
to the Guraba Hospital already existing there. A doctor from the mobile
forces was assigned to that hospital. As of 26 February, the new hospital had
239 patients. The Fifth Expeditionary Force established another hospital in
Palu and put it under the responsibility of the municipality’s doctor, where
about 100 severe patients were treated. The force also assigned one doctor at another hospital it established in Kiğı, which admitted 123 patients.
Although the expeditionary force was able to transport a mobile drying
oven used for sterilization as far as Diyarbakır, despite various difficulties
encountered on the way, it could not carry it any farther. Despite the fact
that the division was walking in an orderly manner and was rather successful
in observing the rules of hygiene, it could not protect itself from being contaminated in Erzurum. Because epidemics were prevalent in Erzurum, as a
precaution the detachments there preferred to set up their own infirmaries
for the treatment of their ill personnel. As many seriously ill patients had to
be treated in the infirmaries under primitive conditions, large numbers of
deaths were recorded. A mobile hospital established in Müdürke started to
admit patients on 19 February. By the time it reached Erzurum’s environs,
the health conditions in the Fifth Expeditionary Force had deteriorated rapidly, and besides diarrhea, dysentery, and malaria, several cases of spotted
fever were also encountered.63
Dr.€Mecit, who was assigned as the chief doctor to Ağvanis Hospital
in Kara Yakup Gazi, east of Suşehri, reported the following on 18 January
1917:
There is no hospital in Ağvanis; there is only one sefalethane (dispensary/
nursing home). A 500-bed hospital is oxymoron for Ağvanis since it is only
a village, half of which is burned to the ground. The 49th Division occupied
46
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
the rest. The detachments deployed here are the following: the Division
headquarters, a military band, workshop, depots, a medical company, an
artillery regiment, an assault battalion, and a battalion of convalescence
consisting of 400 men. Only the stables were left to be used as a hospital.
Yesterday, I visited the wards, during the daytime. Due to the darkness, it
was impossible to walk inside, or recognize the faces of patients. The thickness of walls renders it difficult to open windows. In fact some of them have
openings in the ceiling. When those holes are covered, it becomes very dark
inside, whereas if they are left open, snow comes inside. No glass is available
here [to be used for windows]. Except for one or two wards, the patients are
either lying on beds on earth, or directly on earth without any bed. Nor is
there any wood to build beds. There are no trees nearby to cut down. The
forest is far away and it takes hours to go there. The wards have no lighting or heating systems. The soldiers had tried to put a dome-shaped earth
stove in the middle; but it could not be used since there was no flow of air
inside. Everywhere is ice-cold. Two of the wards are separated from others
for “hospital admissions” and “convalescence.” You can also see inside the
wards some bodies lying on the ground, which belong to the soldiers who
died while being brought here.
To give you an idea about how crowded the wards were, the following comparison is in order. The size of a ward is 130 cubic meters and it
was holding a total of 150 patients including exhausted soldiers, those discharged from the hospital and still on sick leave.
Yesterday morning, four corpses were lying in front of the quarantine
ward. As the ward is very crowded, the four ill recruits brought from the
detachment the previous evening could only be placed in front of the door.
Until morning, however, all of them died. Yesterday, I discharged the exhausted soldiers; many of them will die in a few days. At the headquarters
of the division, there is a battalion of 400 convalescent men. The soldiers of
that battalion are lying on the ground, one on top of another. Yesterday, I
sent 11 of those soldiers to the rear, on foot. The number of patients in the
hospital is 711. Only 23 of them were sent from other detachments; the rest
are from the 49th Division. Five cases of smallpox were recorded among the
troops of the division. Nine patients yesterday and eight patients today died
in the hospital, apart from the deaths occurring outside of the hospital.
Yesterday, 100 exhausted soldiers sent from various detachments arrived here. Since they cannot be transported to the rear areas, these exhausted soldiers constantly are being transferred from the battalion to the
hospital, then from the hospital to the battalion of convalescence, and from
the battalion of convalescence to the hospital again. Today, four individ-
Under the Crescent
47
uals were admitted to the hospital suspected of typhus, whereas three of
the previously admitted patients diagnosed for typhus died. As recurrent
fever cannot be diagnosed without medical tests, previously it could not be
differentiated from other diseases. As of today’s morning, the microscope is
operating; hence it will be possible to diagnose recurrent fever. My personal
opinion is that unless a disciplined and devoted chief doctor is assigned to
this division, it soon will entirely melt away. There is no army station command stationed around here. No vehicle belonging to any of the columns
passes nearby. In case a hospital is established here, it will be necessary to
ensure transportation to the interior on a daily basis, in order to maintain
the number of personnel here. But how can it be realized under those conditions? The Suşehri Commander states in his telegram that the provisions
needed for the hospital would be supplied from Suşehri, and asks the 49th
Division to send animals to carry them. The Division however has to have
its own provisions carried on the backs of the residents of Alakilise. Only
once or twice a week, 5 to 10 animals are sent to Koyulhisar in order to
deliver barley to the detachments there. The same animals also are used for
transporting the exhausted soldiers from the convalescence battalion to the
Mesudiye Recovery Centre.64
Following the withdrawal of the Russian forces in 1917, the 6th Army
was now fighting against only the British army. The units of the 6th Army,
however, had been completely exhausted by the war. What is more, because
the tribes in the region allied with the British, food supplies could not be
obtained from local sources. An epidemic of dysentery continued to inflict
its harm, the victims of which filled up all the hospitals in the area including
the mobile hospitals of the Army Corps.65
Commanders Also Die
In the case of the Ottoman Empire, the first death of a commander from
disease during the Great War occurred on the Caucasus Front. Hafız Hakkı
Pasha, commander of the Ottoman 3rd Army in Erzurum, died of typhus
on 12 February 1915, shortly after he had replaced the previous commander,
Hasan İzzet Pasha, on 8 January 1915. Hafız Hakkı Pasha was a young commander. The following are his words quoted from the book Bozgun (The
Rout), which he had written after the Balkan War:
The rout resembles a storm, or a hurricane. It breaks out suddenly, destroying and upsetting everything, and leaving ruins behind. A well-trained
48
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
soldier is no different than a well-grown crop field standing against storm.
Just as the wheat ears bend down in the wind, but return to their original shapes immediately after the storm subsides, he also recovers in a short
time, as if nothing had happened.66
The “rout,” however, defined by Hafız Hakkı Pasha was nothing compared
to an epidemic. Even strong and well-trained soldiers and healthy civilians
were helpless against the epidemics, as was Hafız Hakkı Pasha himself, who
fell victim to disease. Another commander who lost his life because of illness
was the famous German field marshal Goltz who served in the Ottoman
Army during the Great War. In November 1914, Marshal Goltz wrote the
following in his diary: “I wish I could die in battle. Unfortunately no bullet shoots me!”67 Marshal Goltz returned to Baghdad on 31 March 1916, on
a ship full of ill and wounded. On 9 April his situation worsened and he
died from typhus, “the epidemic disease of the Great War,” ten days later.68
(Although the French colonel Lamouche states that Marshal Goltz died on
6 August 1916, he is incorrect.69) Lieutenant Colonel von Kisling, in a letter
to Major Restorf dated 16 June 1916, describes the last days of Marshal Goltz
and his illness, which lasted quite a short time:
When the Marshal came back from the headquarters on 9 April, he complained about dizziness and in the evening he had a lack of appetite. The
next day, he had high fever. We brought three doctors to examine him:
Dr.€Haerle, Dr.€Sandrok, and the Turkish doctor Abdülkadir Bey. They diagnosed the disease as spotted fever. Since his heart seemed well, we had
some hope in the beginning. He recognized me when I approached him.
However, on the morning of 18 April, one day before his death, his periods
of unconsciousness became more frequent. He summoned me many times
to his bed to work together; but soon after he started to talk, he became
mentally confused. Though unconscious, he still continued to be preoccupied with the management of military matters. He was talking unconsciously about the Army food supplies, the situation in Kut al-Amarah, the
next military operation, as well as Colonel Gleich and Adolf Friedrich, the
Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, who had been just assigned here.
He probably realized that he had come to the end of his life. On the
third day of his illness, he said to me, “I am about to retreat gradually to the
grand general headquarters.” Another time, he said: “I know, these doctors
don’t want to tell me that I’m going to die soon; they act attentively. Anyway, I know it.”
During the first days of his illness, he was yelling at the doctors con-
Under the Crescent
49
stantly and complaining that they were giving him a hard time. He later
became a very obedient patient and did whatever the doctors told him to
do. On the morning of 18 April, I gave him the good news about the victory won by Halil Bey in Kut, which made him very happy. After that, he
entered into a long lasting period of mental confusion and unconsciousness, and we lost him on the night of April 18/19.70
Dr.€Abdülkadir Noyan, the chief doctor of the 6th Army, writes the following about the illness and death of Marshal Goltz:
I began the vaccination campaign at the army headquarters. Kazım Karabekir, our Chief Officer, as well as other staff officers, the chief doctor, and
other doctors were all vaccinated. I suggested our Army Commander Marshal von der Goltz and his private doctor Oberndörfer be vaccinated too.
But they refused, probably because they did not believe in the benefits of
vaccination. Army Commander Marshal von der Goltz was gone for inspecting the Kut al-Amarah Front. Ten days after his return, he became ill.
Together with the German Naval Doctor Lieutenant Sandrock, I tried to
treat the Marshal at the Army headquarters. The course of the illness was
not alarming at the beginning, but on the eleventh day, pneumonia started
in both lungs, accompanied by difficulty in respiration and high fever. The
next day, that brave Marshal, who was very fond of the Turks, passed away.
Like everybody else, I too wept for his loss. It was not his fault to reject the
vaccination against typhus; his doctor had not given him the permission to
do that.71
Another commander who lost his life during the typhus epidemic in
the Great War was the British general Maude, who died on 18 November
1917.72
4
EPIDEMIC DISASTER
7 November 1916, I set off from Silvan for Bitlis.…↜Just as we passed
over the Batman Bridge, we saw a man lying, like dead, on the road as
he couldn’t find any strength to walk any further due to hunger. We
saw two more men lying in the same position on the road between the
bridge and the resting area. We found out that they were refugees.
On the road between the Batman Bridge and Silvan, and after
passing over the bridge, we also saw two horses that seemed to have
died a short while ago (both the people and animals are dying from
hunger).
—â•›Atatürk’ün Hatıra Defteri
A popular book entitled Captain Selahaddin’s Novel provides valuable
information about the Ottoman military losses in the Sarıkamış Mountains
during the winter of 1914–1915:
The forces of Tsarist Russia had crossed our eastern border on 1 November
1914. At the end of the battle which started in the vicinity of Hasankale
(on 10 January 1915), our 3rd Army was almost completely wiped out.…↜At
that time, Enver Pasha was thirty-five years old. As a result of the offensive
against the Russian forces, initiated on his orders during the coldest days of
the winter, out of the total of 112,000 men serving in the Ottoman army,
53,000 froze to death, 7,000 were taken as prisoners, and 30,000 were sent
to hospitals, unable to fight.…↜Whereas on the Russian side, 10,000 soldiers got frozen to death, and 2,000 were taken as prisoners. The number of
those who were either killed in fighting or became ill was 20,000.1
The numbers stipulated by the Russians themselves approximate those
figures. The losses suffered by the Russian Caucasus Army in Sarıkamış were
29,000 dead, 20,000 of whom were killed during combat and 9,000 who
froze to death. When another 2,000 to 3,000 Russians taken as prisoner by
50
Epidemic Disaster
51
the Turks are added, the total death toll of the Russian Army reaches a figure as high as 32,000.2 The official figures released by the Russians indicate
that they captured 7,000 Turkish soldiers in the course of the fighting, and
after the battle another 23,000 dead were buried. The Ottoman losses reach
60,000, when the 10,000 soldiers who died in the sector of the 11th Army
Corps deployment, and the 20,000 who were frozen to death at the back
of the frontlines, are also taken into consideration. As of 14 February 1915,
the total strength of the army was calculated at 42,000 men. Since the army
consisted of 118,000 men before the battle, the fate of the remaining 16,000
soldiers is not known. It is estimated that probably some of those soldiers
joined the local militia, whereas some others spread through the villages
nearby. On the other hand, according to another assessment made by the
officials, “one reason behind the enormous loss of life in the war was the
insufficient number of medical staff and hospitals.” The clothing and food
provided to the soldiers also were far from being adequate. Whereas the
hospital in Erzurum had only 900 beds, at times as many as 15,000 sick and
wounded gathered in that city.3
Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, the chief of general staff, gave the following
information at a speech he made at the War College on January 22, 1935:
Based on the figures we gathered from different documents, initially the
fate of around 78,000 soldiers could not be accounted for. These recruits
were thought to have been killed or captured by the enemy. Eventually, we
were able to find traces of some of them in the hospital registers. In March,
38,000 men were admitted to hospitals. If we add 10,000 dead per month
to that figure, as well as those who had taken refuge in the villages closeby, a total casualty toll of 50,000 men can be obtained. When we add a
further 10,000 killed in the battle, 10,000 deserted from the hospital one
month later, and 8,000 other deserters, which make a total of 28,000, we
can account for 78,000 soldiers initially unknown. Since all of the soldiers
admitted to hospitals during those days died, it would be a correct estimation to say that half of the soldiers participated in the Sarıkamış battles, i.e.,
60,000, lost their lives.
You can see how the lives of soldiers were wasted. When as many as
30,000 patients were admitted to hospitals per month, various epidemics,
such as typhus, recurrent fever, dysentery, typhoid, and the like inevitably
broke out. Under those miserable conditions, the soldiers were looking for
some place to die on the roads. As we understand from the information
provided in a book written by Arif Bey, Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Pasha’s secretary, similar things also took place in Erzurum during the 1877–78 Russian
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
52
Table 4.1. Casualties of Sarıkamış disaster
Units
22 December 1914
18 January 1915
Casualties
9th Army Corps
36,784
–
36,784
10th Army Corps
48,943
2,200
46,743
11th Army Corps
27,019
5,200
21,816
5,428
1,500
3,928
118,174
8,900
109,271
2nd Cavalry Division
Total
War. The epidemics caused the death of 30,000 soldiers back then, which
was related to the fact that the villages in the area had long been suffering
from epidemics of infectious diseases.
The medical infrastructure was not well organized yet. Although Erzurum needed a medical capacity for 16,000 patients, only one 900-bedded
hospital was available. The dead were being piled up in the tents like heaps
of wood.4
A study published in 1988, on the other hand, contends that the Ottoman losses in Sarıkamış amounted to 109,274 men. The findings of this
study are presented in Table 4.1, prepared based on the number of troops in
the units as of 22 December 1914 and 18 January 1915.
Doctor Colonel Tevfik Sağlam, who was assigned as the medical chief of
the 3rd Army after the Sarıkamış disaster, makes the following assessment in
his study published in 1940:
It could be easily imagined how difficult it was to carry out medical services
during the course of the arduous offensive and the tragic retreat. Though
it was not possible to calculate the exact figure of our casualties, Marshal
Fevzi Çakmak admits that around 60,000 soldiers died in that battle, a figure which is likely to reflect the actual death toll. In fact, numerous officers and soldiers were martyred during the long walks and battles. Many
of them died from hypothermia, whereas the ones, whose hands and feet
were frozen, either died or became disabled. The soldiers returning from
the frontlines were completely exhausted, several of whom easily became
ill and died. Under such conditions, it was only natural that the epidemics
found a very suitable environment for spreading and affecting the people
severely. The ill and the wounded spread over the area, and sought shelter
Epidemic Disaster
53
in different places. Whereas some others traveled long distances to reach
their homes, many of whom died on the roads. Especially among those
who found shelter in the villages located in the Pasinler Plain, the Tortum
Valley, and the Erzurum Plain, many died, and the ill were left without
proper treatment. Many villages in Hasankale, as well as on the plains of
Pasinler and Erzurum were full of ill and wounded soldiers.5
Dr.€Begfeld, the German consul in Trabzon, in his report from 2 March
1915, illustrates the effects of the Sarıkamış disaster on Trabzon. He observed: “All the hospitals in the town are full of patients with spotted typhus.
That infectious disease has created a real disaster here; of the 900–1000 ill
soldiers, 30–50 are dying each day.”6
What occurred in erzurum and its environs
at the beginning of 1915?
During the three-month period between the start of mobilization and the
declaration of war, the 3rd Army had the largest military build up in Erzurum and its vicinity. The soldiers arrived there from remote areas on foot
and had close contacts with the local people in villages where they stopped
over on their way. Both the soldiers and the people were lousy. The soldiers
did not have a chance to bathe on the way, nor did they have any means to
get rid of the lice in their contingents. Not only in large cities such as Erzu�
rum, but also in small villages, housing conditions were extremely bad, and
all these areas were overcrowded. The soldiers were mixed with the local inhabitants. As a result, right from the onset of the war, the army was regularly
exposed to louse-borne diseases such as spotted fever and recurrent fever.7
The real disaster, though, started after Sarıkamış. In the aftermath of
that dramatic offensive, which resulted in the destruction of a large part of
the army, all the villages in the Pasinler Plain, Hasankale, Erzurum, and the
villages in the Erzurum Plain were flooded by ill, disabled, and exhausted
soldiers. The hospitals could not accommodate all the soldiers in need of
treatment. In most hospitals, almost all doctors and administrative personnel caught spotted fever. Süleyman Numan Pasha, the field medical inspector general, also became ill with spotted fever. The disease turned into an
epidemic among the people, causing twenty to thirty deaths daily in Erzurum. In February, the situation deteriorated even further. The soldiers sent
to their homes on sick leave, as well as those who deserted from the army,
acted as agents for transmitting the infection to the interior. Another epidemic broke out in Erzincan, overwhelming the capacity of the hospitals.
54
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
The epidemic ravaged the main line where the army stations were located
(extending to Ulukışla), as well as along the roads connecting ErzurumKiğı-Palu-Maden-Diyarbakır and Erzurum-Erzincan-Harput-Diyarbakır,
including the villages close by. At the beginning of March, the epidemic
started to ease after taking a heavy toll at the battlefront. The epidemic,
however, still persisted very severely among the labor battalions, the gendarmerie, and the warehouse personnel, as well as among the people living in
the region.8
The contagious diseases, such as typhus, spotted fever, and dysentery,
caused a second disaster for the 3rd Army after the one inflicted in Sarıkamış.
Because the disease was transmitted to the animals, too, most of the time
it was not possible to transport patients from the battlefront to even the
closest hospital. Thousands of ill soldiers had to walk to hospitals. The number of hospitals and medical personnel were far from meeting the demand
anyway. On some occasions, 15,000 patients had to wait for treatment at
Erzurum’s only hospital which in fact had only a capacity for 900 patients.
There was no way to implement effective methods of disinfection for most
of the soldiers stationed in the trenches on the high mountains covered with
snow. Not only the soldiers, but also the officers in contact with the soldiers,
were infected by the disease. Two of the three German doctors serving in
Erzincan had to be sent back to Germany since they became ill with typhus,
whereas the third died of typhus in Erzincan.9
Doctors Colley and Zlosisti, who were among the Red Cross doctors
stationed in Erzincan, wrote the following on 3 March 1915: “No medical
services can be properly provided due to the lack of all kinds of preventive
medical measures. As a result of that, the casualties among the Ottoman
soldiers are much higher than the Germans.” The lack of medical services “is
perishing the Ottoman soldiers in unbelievably great numbers.” As a result,
the Ottoman army had to struggle with the challenge of providing medical
treatment to the withdrawing forces in addition to the military disasters it
encountered.10
The report sent in March 1915 by the 3rd Army’s Office of Medical Chief
to the General Medical Inspectorate provides valuable information about
the admissions to the hospitals attached to the 3rd Army for several diseases,
as well as the deaths that occurred there. Those figures add credibility to the
observations of the Red Cross doctors regarding the severity of the epidemic
(see Table 4.2).
In 1915, just during March, 45€percent of the servicemen in the 3rd
Army became ill with infectious diseases, and eventually the 3rd Army lost
Epidemic Disaster
55
Table 4.2. Red Cross hospital admissions records
Admissions to hospitals
in one month
38,730 admissions
9,242 dead
Typhoid
1,243 admissions
654 dead
Spotted fever
2,109 admissions
1,116 dead
Recurrent fever
2,102 admissions
622 dead
Dysentery
2,250 admissions
846 dead
677 admissions
50 dead
Influenza
11€percent of its total strength due to diseases. Of those who caught diseases,
24€percent died.11
A study carried out at Istanbul University in 1999 calculated the incidence rate of the typhus epidemic that broke out in Erzurum in 1915, based
on data provided by the monthly reports prepared by Dr.€Tevfik Sağlam, the
medical chief of the 3rd Army in the Great War. According to those calculations, in March of that year 2,478 soldiers of the 3rd Army became ill with
typhus. In the aftermath of the severe epidemic, which broke out in late 1914
and became more severe in January and February of 1915, typhus remained
a significant threat. Given that most soldiers took shelter in the villages following the defeat in Sarıkamış, and the infected soldiers could not be quarantined in their units, it would be reasonable to conclude that the actual
incidence rate of typhus was greater than the calculated value. Toward the
end of June, the incidence rate of typhus started to decline gradually, and in
July the decline became steeper.12
According to the same study, the incidence rate of the recurrent fever affecting the 3rd Army units in 1915 was higher than that of typhus. The annual
variations calculated for the two diseases, on the other hand, seem almost
equal. As far as the epidemics of louse-borne diseases are concerned, more
cases of recurrent fever were encountered than those of typhus. The epidemics of recurrent fever and typhus continued through 1916. Compared to the
previous year, however, an evident decrease was observed in both diseases.
From the beginning of 1916 until mid-August of that year, the Ottoman
Army was on the retreat, which, accompanied by fierce battles, caused the
flow of great numbers of ill and wounded into hospitals. Nevertheless, despite large numbers of wounded flooding into hospitals and the great poverty that arose during the army’s retreat, the incidence rate of both diseases
56
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
did not increase noticeably in the first months of 1916. The increase observed
in the spring was countered by a decrease during the summer. By the end of
the year, however, a significant surge was observed in the incidence rates for
both diseases. That surge from January 1916 on was interpreted as a second
epidemic. Typhus was more frequently encountered when soldiers were in
their barracks than in the months when military operations were being carried out. Because the barracks were overcrowded, lice more easily spread
through the wards. As a matter of fact, no large-scale military operation was
carried out in the 3rd Army’s area of operation in 1917. Since the winter of
1916–1917 was very severe, however, a famine devastated the army. The incidence rates of typhus and recurrent fever, which had been increasing during
the last months of 1916, started to decline and fell to a low 0.1€percent from
January 1917 on.
The medical report for January 1917 narrates a wide-scale struggle
against lice conducted throughout the month. The exercise grounds and
the points of dispatch were completely cleaned of lice. The places where
the patients had caught the disease were detected and disinfected. Clothing and belongings of 40,176 people on the frontlines and 62,478 people in
the rear were cleaned during January, despite the shortage of fuel. The fight
against lice continued through February and March. As of March, sixtythree mist boxes were available on the frontlines, and eighty-nine in the
rear. During the same month, however, sudden deaths from malnutrition
were encountered in the army. The army persistently continued to implement the measures against lice in July, and as a result, the soldiers deployed
in the frontlines were almost completely free of lice. The figures on the
disease rates in 1917, indeed, attest to the success of those efforts. Although
the figures pertaining to the last months of 1916 were pointing toward an
imminent epidemic, the incidence rates of diseases significantly decreased
in the following months, a result of the determined efforts of the doctors
and other medical staff working under the 3rd Army’s Office of Medical
Chief. In March 1918, the typhus epidemic resumed after the arrival of new
reinforcements from Istanbul. Notwithstanding this development, overall,
the incidence rates of typhus and recurrent fever were significantly reduced
in 1917 and 1918.13
The high incidence rate of typhus in 1915 is confirmed by Table 4.3,
which shows the number of deaths due to various causes among Ottoman
medical officers working in the area.
Of the 300 medical officers who died between 1914 and 1918, 222 lost
their lives due to typhus. That ratio of over two-thirds is unbelievably high.
During the Great War, a large portion of Ottoman medical officers died
Epidemic Disaster
57
Table 4.3. Causes of death of Ottoman
medical officers (1914–1918)
Typhus
222
Typhoid
17
Cholera
10
Malignant fever
7
Enteric fever
4
Freezing to death
4
Recurrent fever
3
Influenza
2
Dysentery
1
Paratyphoid
1
In hospital
2
On ship
1
Accident
1
In captivity as prisoner
1
Unknown
3
On the front
Total
21
300
while they were struggling with infectious diseases. A direct and meaningful
relationship was established between the incidence rates of the diseases and
the distribution of deaths, which is obtained by tabulating the number of
deaths into the years and months of their occurrence. The highest number
of deaths was observed in 1915 (113 deaths). It was followed by 81 deaths
in 1916; 57 deaths in 1917; and 21 deaths in 1918. Moreover, each year the
number of deaths occurring in the first half of the year exceeded that of the
second half: The number of deaths in the first half of the years in question
were as follows: 101 deaths in 1915; 67 deaths in 1916; 45 deaths in 1917; and
16 deaths in 1918.
The number of medical officers who died during the first six months
of 1915 accounts for one-third of the total number of medical officers who
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
58
Table 4.4. The months of deaths of the Ottoman medical officers
Year
January–June
July–December
Total
1914
3
7
10
1915
101
12
113
1916
67
14
81
1917
45
12
57
1918
16
5
21
232
50
282
Total
died during the entire war. This is indicative of the fact that in the beginning of 1915, the Ottoman medical officers were confronted with enormous
epidemics which forced them to work in close contact with patients affected
by the diseases for extended hours. The death toll the Ottoman Army suffered under these extraordinary conditions is very well documented by the
statistical data regarding the deaths of medical officers.
When Dr.€Tevfik Sağlam was assigned as the medical chief of the 3rd
Army, Dr.€Mayer, the deputy field medical inspector general, told him the
following before he left Istanbul for Erzurum:
The 3rd Army is in a grim situation. I don’t know what the exact conditions
in the region are, where and which hospitals exist, and how many patients
need treatment. I could say for sure though that Erzurum is virtually in the
middle of a fire. The responsibility incumbent upon you is to contain the
disease where it is and prevent it from spreading further. Other than that,
there is not much to be done in Erzurum.
Dr.€Sağlam also narrates the following in his memoirs:
Past Niğde, we encountered isolated cases of spotted fever in many places.
In most cases, however, the disease was diagnosed as influenza instead.
Most of those cases thought to be influenza were in fact spotted fever. The
spotted fever was very severe in Erzincan whereas the epidemic had not yet
reached its peak level in Erzurum. Except for those who previously had
spotted fever, almost all of the doctors were either ill, or were on convalescence leave.14
Epidemic Disaster
59
Aziz Samih, who was working at the 3rd Army Headquarters in Erzurum in January 1915, provides the following observations about the extent of
the disaster encountered in the region:
I was woken up at midnight by a phone call on 29 January. I went to pick
up the phone. Avni Pasha, the Inspector of Army Stations, was calling. He
told me that Hakkı Pasha had passed away at two thirty a.m. local time,
and wanted me to ask Enver Pasha where to bury him. We went to Erzurum, and laid Hakkı Pasha to rest in Kars Kapısı. He had a diary with a
black cover. At the headquarters, I used to see him writing something on it
every day. They told me that in his will he had requested that his diary be
taken by Captain Cemal, the Commander of the Headquarters, to his wife
after his death.
The diseases of typhus and recurrent fever, having spread to even the
Army Commander, are causing too many deaths. Long and deep ditches
have been dug in the north of Hasankale. The carriages constantly transport
the dead bodies to the ditches every day. Staff Officer Şemseddin recently
died of recurrent fever. Two doctors assigned to the Headquarters, Adil and
Şükrü, also caught typhus. They were taken to the hospital.…↜That louseborn disease, which has no known method of treatment, follows its victims
everywhere. No infectious disease specialist is available in Erzurum. Twenty
doctors are ill.15
According to Dr.€Sağlam, at the beginning of 1915 around twenty to
thirty civilians per day were dying due to the disease in Erzurum. He provides the following observations regarding the conditions prevailing there:
Erzurum was flooded by ill, wounded, and weak soldiers, as well as deserters. One could see many people suffering on the streets, in hotels, or in stables, waiting for their turns. Epidemics of typhus and recurrent fever have
reached their utmost severity…↜.
Since all the ill and wounded could not be accommodated in Erzurum,
the exhausted and ill soldiers were also placed in the villages of Ilıca, Kan,
and İstavuk, located on the Erzurum Plain. Extreme poverty was prevailing
in those places, and it was impossible to keep records of the deaths. The
diseases diffused to the local people, causing around 20–30 civilian deaths a
day in Erzurum. All the provincial officials volunteered in hospitals in the
town and in the villages to help care for the patients. The number of deaths
among them due to disease was not negligible.
60
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
At the time, the Ottoman authorities could not provide “exact figures”
about the 3rd Army’s epidemic-related losses in January 1915. According to
the officials stationed in the area, it was not possible to keep track of the
deaths. Most of the time, the IDs of the patients could not be registered, let
alone diagnosing their illnesses.16
On 29 November 1914, some 139 officers and 5,646 recruits wounded in
battle were transferred to Erzurum from the Caucasian front. As of that date,
a total of 6,929 ill and wounded were receiving treatment in the hospitals in
Erzurum and Hasankale, 4,985 of whom were in Erzurum. Dr.€Nâzım Şakir,
who was assigned to Erzurum then, narrates the following about the onset
of the typhus epidemic:
One week after the commencement of the war, all of the 300 beds of the
hospital were occupied by patients. The hospital offered extremely bad care
and treatment services. Since no autoclave was available, all of us had lice
on their bodies. The spotted fever, which already had existed in the town
before the war, intensified and spread throughout the towns and villages
and into the hospitals. One of the reasons behind the failure to prevent the
spotted fever before the war, which was borne by the lice transmitted from
the villages to the town, was the lack of preventive measures against the
spread of lice. A second reason was the reluctance on the part of doctors to
care for patients, since they believed that the disease was airborne.
The typhus epidemic turned into a real disaster with the arrival of the
soldiers moving back and forth between the frontlines and the interior, as
well as the ill and wounded being treated in the town. It was beyond our
ability to care for all of the patients. In the meantime, young doctors who
had graduated in 1914 were assigned to Erzurum. Since they were too young
and inexperienced, they caught typhus before us. We could not provide
them with the medical care they needed. The medical resources and personnel were inadequate. As typhus is one of those illnesses that become more
hazardous the more they spread through body, [we knew that] any complication affecting especially the lungs and the heart would definitely end with
death. Once that merciless disease entered the body, it was migrating to different organs freely, and settling in whatever organ it would choose, causing
various clinical symptoms. The course of the disease was very severe, and
70% of the patients were dying. Only those who were receiving good care,
who had a strong bodily constitution, or who were infected by viruses with
lower levels of toxin could recover from the disease.17
Epidemic Disaster
61
Dr.€Şakir, having caught typhus during the outbreak in Erzurum in the
fall of 1914, had to undergo a long period of convalescence. After his recovery, he went back to the hospital only to burst into tears when he realized
none of his friends were there: “After recovering, I went back to the hospital
where I used to work. I could not see any of the people who I had known
while working there. The doctors, nurses, and patients were replaced completely. I could not help crying.”18
The typhus also took its toll among the inhabitants of Erzurum and
Erzincan, in addition to the losses it caused in the army. Dr.€Server Kâmil
was appointed as the chief doctor of the Red Crescent Hospital in Erzincan,
which was established through the contributions of the people of Konya.
He commenced his duty on 26 March 1915. He later noted that eight of his
colleagues, including Dr.€Süfyan and Dr.€Recai, died of typhus, and fifty
to sixty deaths were observed daily among the soldiers.19 The ill doctors lay
with open bruises on their back which could not even be dressed.20 Three
doctors of the Hasankale hospital died one after another due to typhus. As
the water pipes of the hospital bath were frozen, the patients could not be
cleaned of lice. Burying the dead proved extremely difficult as it was almost
impossible to dig the frozen soil.21
Dr.€Sağlam, the former medical chief of the 3rd Army, made the following explanations regarding the disease-related deaths during the Great
War, in a speech he delivered at the Gülhane Military Medical Academy on
8 January 1939:
The number of admissions to hospitals during a period of 42.5 months between March 1915 and the end of 1918 was 564,498 in the 3rd Army. That
makes an average of 13,250 admissions per month, and 435 admissions
per day. Given that the average strength of the army was approximately
110,000€men, each month 12% of the servicemen were ill. On the other
hand, a total of 44,234 wounded soldiers were admitted to hospitals, which
implies a monthly average of 1,040 and daily average of 34. In other words,
the number of the ill is 12 times greater than that of the wounded. As for
the deaths, 107,761 soldiers fell victim to diseases. Whereas 3,801 servicemen died of wounds, 9,001 were killed in the course of fighting. Thus, the
total number of deaths was 120,563.22
In the winter of 1914–1915, epidemics with high incidence rates broke
out in and around Erzurum. The records of the 3rd Army’s Office of Medical
Chief regarding death rates in the military units deployed in the area reflect
62
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
the following: A total of 9,485 individuals were admitted to hospitals, 5,842
due to illnesses and 3,643 due to wounds. Of those, 2,366 of the ill and 389
of the wounded died while in the hospital. The number of patients admitted
due to spotted fever was 522, of whom 218 lost their lives. Of the 537€patients admitted for dysentery, 145 died. While 46 patients with erysipelas
were hospitalized, 37 of them died. All 5 tetanus patients who were admitted to hospitals died. “Those numbers are definitely well below the actual
figures.” Even though the medical conditions had improved somewhat, and
the effect of spotted fever had been alleviated by March 1915, still a total
of 38,000€patients were admitted to hospitals during that month, 9,242 of
whom died. Spotted fever alone accounted for 2,109 of the admissions and
1,116 of the deaths.23
As of 6 February 1915, the number of sick and wounded soldiers in
various towns was as follows: 2,041 in Hasankale, 8,906 in and around
Erzurum (Ilıca, Kan, Istavuk), 1,050 in Bayburt, 1,000 in Trabzon, 457 in
Bulanık, 913 in Hınıs, 412 in Malazgirt, and 521 in Van. The total number
of ill and wounded within the 3rd Army reached 20,000, including those
admitted to hospitals in Erzincan, Elazığ, Muş, Bitlis, and Diyarbakır.24
After the 3rd Army lost half of its manpower in Sarıkamış in the winter
of 1914–1915, the 37th Division and other detachments of the 13th Army
Corps joined it in January 1915. However, since those detachments came
from warmer provinces, they could not transfer all of their troops; the weakened and sick soldiers were left in various cities along the way: 539 in Malazgirt, 372 in Bulanık, and 381 in Hınıs; and 415 patients were sent back home
from the hospital newly opened in Esmer. The vehicles carrying the mobile
hospitals could not go beyond Diyarbakır, and most of the personnel from
the medical company became ill. A hospital was set up in Mişki by the
medical company, which was formed for a second time. Only one doctor
was assigned to that hospital, and he had to care for 681 patients as of 16
February.25
According to the 3rd Army’s statistics, the number of admissions to
hospitals due to spotted fever (typhus) declined progressively from 1915
on, when a severe epidemic of typhus broke out: a 42€percent reduction
in 1916; 75€percent in 1917; and 94€percent in 1918. During the period between March 1915 and September 1918, a total of 19,619 cases of spotted fever
were recorded, 7,310 of whom died.26 Another source provides the following
data: a total of 93,000 typhus cases were encountered within the 3rd Army
during the four years of war, 26,322 of which resulted in death. Those figures
did not include the deserters or those who died away from their units, either
on the roads or in various villages.27
Epidemic Disaster
63
Of the epidemic diseases occurring within the 3rd Army during the
Great War, recurrent fever played a significant role from November 1914 on.
As with spotted fever, recurrent fever caused the highest level of deaths in
the winter of 1914–1915, according to hospital records from the 3rd Army’s
area of responsibility.28 The statistics prepared in the early periods of the war
show that enteric fever (typhoid) was also widespread. In July 1915, a smallscale “paratyphoid A” epidemic broke out in Erzurum.29
During the Great War, many cases of death from hypothermia occurred
within the 3rd Army, due to the severe winter conditions prevailing in Eastern Anatolia. Most of those cases of hypothermia were encountered during
the military operations carried out in winter.30 In Sarıkamış, the casualties
the Ottoman Army suffered under the command of Enver Pasha was caused
more by cold and hunger than by the fighting. According to Guhr, the number of wounded was only around eighteen to twenty thousand. The rest of
the troops were almost wiped out by typhus.31 Liman von Sanders wrote the
following on that incident: According to the official records, of the Army’s
total strength of ninety thousand men, only twelve thousand were able to
withdraw. The remaining troops were either killed in combat, were taken as
prisoners, died of hunger, or were frozen to death in military camps without
any tents. “Then, an epidemic of spotted fever broke out, killing most of the
remainder who had lost their bodily strength.”32
Dr.€Bentmann, a hygiene specialist, narrates the following assessment
about the situation. “The typhus epidemic was like a strong desert fire burning down the entire country, which first surfaced among the ruins of the
3rd Army in the Caucasus in January 1915.” From just the province of Sivas,
290,000 typhus cases were reported to the German authorities. That typhus
epidemic later was accompanied by a cholera epidemic, which broke out in
1915. None of the later epidemics were as widespread as the one in the winter
of 1915. In the aftermath of the battles taking place in 1916, a new typhus epidemic ravaged the area, similar to what had happened in 1915. In the course
of that epidemic, which peaked in 1917, the ill soldiers died “like flies.”33
A proposal sent from the Ottoman Ministry of Internal Affairs to the
Ministry of War on 17 April 1914 stated that before taking necessary medical measures against cholera, which was seen widely in the military units, it
would be more suitable to reach a joint decision of the military and civilian
doctors under the authority of the Medical Directorate General, as was the
case in the past. The same communiqué also stated that the doctors should
be sent to the places with epidemics only after appropriate measures were
decided upon according to the suggested procedure.34 The cholera epidemic,
which started in Lapseki in 1914–1915, also ravaged the provinces of Kale-i
64
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Sultaniye and Hüdavendigar.35 Right after the onset of the cholera epidemic
in Erzurum-Hasankale at the beginning of 1915, all civil servants were reassigned to the hospitals to make up for the missing medical staff. They soon
caught the disease, and all but a few lost their lives.36 Another area plagued
by cholera was the province of Aydın.37 Since syphilis became widespread in
Biga and its surrounding villages, as well as in the district of Çan in 1914, the
government decided to implement a more intensive program to combat the
disease in Kale-i Sultaniye.38
The greatest danger for the Ottoman Army and the people of Anatolia
during the Great War was no doubt the typhus epidemic. Dr.€Lütfi Aksu,
who was sent to Van in the winter of 1911 in order to examine an epidemic
that had started there, identified it as typhus.39 During the first days of mobilization in 1914, the detrimental effects of typhus were already being felt
at the Army’s dispatch center in Konya and within the labor battalions in
Sille.40 During that epidemic in Konya, the Red Crescent Society distributed free medicine.41 According to the American Missionary Board records,
a very severe typhus epidemic started in Erzurum and Harput in the fall of
1914. The same epidemic also affected Mardin, Van, and Bitlis to varying
degrees. In December, four hundred cases of military and civilian deaths per
day were recorded in Erzurum. The medical personnel and medical facilities in the region were inadequate. The disease claimed the lives of seventy
people per day in Harput. During the Armenian uprising in Van, five American missionaries caught typhus and one lost her life.42 As several historical
documents, reports, and the narrations of the missionaries indicate, as of
1915 the typhus epidemic started to spread all over Anatolia, and particularly
in Konya.43
In late 1914, in response to the outbreak of a typhus epidemic in Balıkesir,
the Medical Board of the Balıkesir Society of National Defence, the most
influential nongovernmental organization in the area, issued two declarations on health conditions. The second of those declarations in particular
was written in plain language which could be understood easily by the local
people, and circulated in all villages by the gendarmerie.44 The declaration
of the Balıkesir Society of National Defence was as follows:
Unfortunately, this disease has penetrated us. Due to our failure to take it
serious, and implement necessary measures, it spread through our villages.
Many people died, and many children were left orphans, and in destitution because of the disease. In some of the households nobody remained
alive. The doors were closed. Many gallant young men, many old or young
people perished due to the disease. In some villages only a few people died.
Epidemic Disaster
65
If we add up all those few people, however, we would reach a figure that
can be expressed in hundreds. As a usual habit, we failed to pay attention
to this problem. Nobody came to us and told that they were suffering from
a disease in their village, neighborhood, or house. Although people travel
from one village to another to seek advice when even one of their animals is
ill, they have not done anything about this disease, affecting human beings.
From now on, at least, please listen carefully to the advice given to you, and
implement it. There is no excuse for rejecting any advice. On the contrary,
if you implement them, you will be performing a good deed for the common good, and you will acquire merit in God’s sight.45
The above declaration regarding the typhus epidemic in Balıkesir and
its environs was dated 15 December 1914. It is a very important document
indicating that the typhus epidemic was already affecting even a distant part
of Anatolia during the first months of the war, which was far away from the
battlefronts and not involved in the war. Despite this fact, some people attempted to explain the deaths from epidemics by referring to other causes,
such as the negligent attitude of the local people toward diseases.46
The above-mentioned declaration is in no way the only document
regarding the typhus epidemics seen in Anatolia. According to a military
medical authority, the disease of typhus, which was then called “spotted fever,” had existed sporadically for a long time in the eastern provinces. Only
occasionally, especially in winter months, small- or large-scale epidemics
of typhus had been observed. Before the beginning of the Great War, cases
of spotted fever also had been recorded in various places in Anatolia. In
April 1914, cases of spotted fever were observed in Sivas, Samsun, Merzifon, Amasya, and Bayburt; in June of the same year in Sivas and Tokat; in
July in Sivas, Erzincan, Bayburt, and Trabzon; in September in Erzurum
and Van; and in October in Hakkari, and Hasankale-Erzurum. To illustrate
this point, we could look at a telegram dispatched on 14 August 1914 to the
field medical inspectorate, by the then medical chief of the 3rd Army before
Dr.€Tevfik Sağlam took up that position. It stated that the “spotted fever,
which had prevailed in Erzurum in the form of a widespread epidemic and
had claimed the lives of many servicemen in the previous years, is now encountered here sporadically.”47
Following the death of Hafız Hakkı Pasha from typhus on 30 January
1915, Mahmut Kamil Pasha was assigned as the 3rd Army commander. The
new commander set off from Istanbul on 17 February, together with his
headquarters personnel, and arrived in Ulukışla, the last railway station, two
days later. The people traveling in this convoy came across cases of typhus
66
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
on its way from Niğde to Erzurum. As of 27 February, the hospitals in Erzincan were full of patients affected by typhus. When the convoy members
reached Erzurum on 9 March, they encountered similar scenes.48
Captain Hüsamettin Tugaç, who was captured by the Russians in
Sarıkamış in the winter of 1914, later wrote that he had been taken to Samara
(Kuybyshev) together with his friends and kept under quarantine there,
due to the typhus epidemic existing in the town. The Ottoman war prisoners, after being kept in railroad wagons without water and food for several
weeks, died of hunger, lack of water, and illnesses. Captain Tugaç, who had
graduated from the war college with honors in 1910, also caught typhus in
Samara. While lying ill in bed, he recalled some disasters that were caused
by typhus epidemics and were buried in the depths of history:
I remember that almost a hundred thousand soldiers and civilians died
of typhus during and after the Balkan Wars. Hadn’t we lost 40 doctors in
Tekirdağ? Hadn’t I heard that a total of 10,000 people, servicemen and civilians, fell victim to typhus in Van after the mobilization? Shortly before
the outbreak of war, hadn’t I observed how almost 80% of the troops of the
company at the frontal area of Muş were in a miserable condition in their
tents, unprotected from the burning heat of summer?49
Guze has the following observations about the winter of 1916–1917: “It
was a very severe winter; it seemed as if a struggle was waged against hunger
and cold.”50
The typhus epidemics, which ravaged the battlefields after 1914, continued at various intervals until the conclusion of the war. The “second” typhus
epidemic of 1916 is considered the continuation of the one in the winter of
1914–1915. The latter epidemic continued very severely through the winter
of 1918–1919, notwithstanding short-term pauses.51
The typhus epidemics in Balıkesir and in the provinces of East Anatolia
had started months before the Ottoman government made the decision in
the spring of 1915 to resettle some of the Armenians in an area far from the
battlefield controlled by Russia (the decision of deportation meant obli�
gatory migration and resettlement of the Armenians). This decision was
taken as a precautionary measure to protect the transportation and supply routes of the Ottoman Army and to ensure public order in the wake
of the Armenian uprisings that occurred in Zeytun, Van, Muş, Sivas, and
Şebinkarahisar.
Before the commencement of the Great War, typhus epidemics were
observed in various places along a long line extending from the inner parts
Epidemic Disaster
67
of Asia in the East, and from Samara to the Caucasus, to Anatolia, and to
Serbia in the West. The conditions prevailing during the Great War triggered widespread typhus epidemics, as well as other local epidemics, causing
mass movements of both troops and civilian people (in the form of migrations). Since those mass epidemics had extremely high incidence rates,
they claimed the lives of millions of people from various nationalities and
religions.
5
ORDEAL WITH DISEASES
We are getting on for two months now since the August fighting—
all that time we have been allowed to do nothing—literally, allowed
to do nothing, seeing we have been given no shell. What a fiasco! The
Dardanelles is not a sanatorium; Suvla is not South End. With the men
we have lost from sickness in the past six weeks we could have beaten
the Turks twice over.
—â•›General Ian Hamilton,
Gallipoli Diary
Five short sentences an Ottoman officer serving in Gallipoli wrote in his
diary are a succinct description of the conditions prevailing in the Ottoman
Army during the four long years of the Great War. Not only at the Battles of
Gallipoli, but on all fronts the army had to fight against epidemics of infectious diseases more than it did against the enemy:
December 4, 1915…↜I was told that the Commander had arrived. I went to
brief him. He told me that he had assigned 26 raw recruits to the company,
and added that we were losing lots of soldiers. I answered by saying that
most of them were lost due to diseases. He replied: “You are right, I am
aware of that fact.”1
Military Doctor Abdülkadir Noyan also had striking memories of the
battlefield in the Gallipoli Peninsula:
The first row of trenches had a very upsetting scene. Our martyrs and
the dead bodies of enemy soldiers were lying so close to each other that
they resembled people prostrating themselves during a Friday prayer in a
mosque. This prostration was disorderly and one could see it in a multitude
of people who had found eternal peace. The flies had laid their eggs on the
noses and mouths of the dead, and the hatching worms, well nourished and
68
Ordeal with Diseases
69
developed there, were marching towards the trenches with their white and
fat bodies. The scene was unendurable. The dead bodies, having been there
for days, were emitting an overpowering odor into the surroundings.2
Observing the same scene on the other side of the trenches, British Sergeant Johnston records in his diary:
As I made my way along the trench I passed many heaps of dead upon
which the great ugly flies were feasting.
Wounded by the dozen were huddled in side trenches waiting for the
time when it would be possible to get stretchers along to convey them to
the base.3
As the battles in Gallipoli occurred mostly in the form of hand-to-hand
bayonet fights between the combatants, the wounded mostly had to be left
under the blazing sun in summer, exposed to the attacks of millions of flies.
Following these attacks, they were abandoned to die without any treatment.4
It also was observed that the viruses carried by those flies transformed into a
mosquito-borne infectious disease called “dengue.”5
Writing in 1956, forty years after the battles, Robert Rhodes James depicted the flies at the Gallipoli Front as follows:
By now the heat was almost unbearable. The trenches were like ovens; the
grass had long since withered and vanished, and the hot wind stirred up the
dust, which drifted across the Peninsula, covering everything, and horribly
pungent with the stench of war and death. On the limpid sea the corpses
of horses were churned up in the propellers; if they still refused to sink they
were left to their own devices, and the hideously mangled carcasses often
found their way back to the beaches.
Ashore, the bloated loathsome green flies—“corpse flies” the men
called them—were becoming literally pestilential. Feasting on the corpses
in No Man’s Land, swarming hideously in the latrines, filling every trench
and dug-out and covering the food, they were directly responsible for a virulent form of dysenteric diarrhea—generally known as “the Gallipoli Trots”
or “the Gallipoli Gallop”—which spread rapidly through the army in July.
It was particularly serious at Anzac, where the closely packed trenches and
dugouts provided perfect conditions for the spread of disease. By the end
of July Birdwood was losing as many men in a fortnight through sickness
as would be expected in a major attack; in one week alone (July 21st–27th)
1,221 cases of acute dysentery were reported at Anzac, or nearly 5 per cent of
70
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
the garrison, but these figures give no adequate indication of the [extent] of
the epidemic…↜.
In August, when it was at least conclusively proved by a team of Australian doctors that most of the men were suffering from dysentery and diarrhea, and some from a virulent form of paratyphoid, Birrell issued circulars
on “The Prevention of Flies in Camps and Billets” and “The Prevention of
Typhoid.” As an embittered Australian doctor remarked, “you might as well
have spat on a bushfire.” By then, the Anzac force was melting away at the
appalling rate of 10 per cent per week, and it was calculated that nearly 80
per cent of the Allied troops on the Peninsula were suffering to some extend
from the disease.6
The British Official History of War, prepared by General C. F. AspinallOglander in 1932, had the following assessment about the difficulties encountered in Gallipoli:
A deterioration in the health of the troops, which, here as at Hellas, became more and more marked as the summer advanced, was aggravated by a
constant shortage of water, a plague of loathsome flies, and a daily average
temperature of 84 degrees in the shade.
Though there was little fighting during June and July, and the normal
daily number of casualties was small, the drain on the corps from sickness
and the disease began to assume disturbing proportions as the summer heat
increased. In July the number of men evacuated for sickness and wounds
amounted to an average of 1,400 a week, of which approximately 75 per
cent were sick.
Even hard work and hourly risk of death could not relief the monotony of existence on those barren, sun-baked hillsides; and as week followed
week with no change in the situation, and no sign of the promised advance
from the south, it needed all the philosophy of which the troops were capable to keep their spirits from dropping. Cooped together in stifling trenches
or shadeless gullies, tormented by flies, tortured by thirst, stricken by disease, and ignorant of the reasons which condemned them to activity, it was
difficult to keep light-hearted as the early hopes of victory gave way to disillusionment.
During the hot weather the troops were for the most part dressed in
“shorts” and shirts, while workers on the beach would often be stripped
to the waist. Many of the biggest men in the first contingent had already
passed away.
Ordeal with Diseases
71
On the 23rd August, his [General Ian Hamilton’s] wastage from sickness was becoming abnormal, and his total losses, including sick, since the
opening of the offensive amounted to over 40,000 men.7
In a note dated 3 July 1915, General Ian Hamilton, commander-in-chief
of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, describes his personal condition
as “very hot; very limp with the prevalent disease.”8
Dysentery became widespread among the British troops by mid-July
1915. In a time span of fifteen days, the losses of the Anzac forces, under the
command of General Birdwood, due to dysentery exceeded their combatrelated losses. By that time, 80€percent of the troops already had been afflicted with infectious diseases.9
On 10 July 1915, the British commander-in-chief wrote the following in
his diary:
We have refused the request made by His Excellency, Weber Pasha, who
signs himself Commandant of the Ottoman Forces, to have a five hours’
truce for burying their piles of dead. The British Officers who have been
out to meet the Ottoman Parliamentarians say that the sight of the Turkish
dead lying in thousands just over the crest line where Baikie’s guns caught
them on the 5th inst. is indeed an astonishing sight. Our Intelligence is
clear that the reason the Turks make this request is that they cannot get
their men to charge over the corpses of their comrades. Dead Turks are better than barbed wire and so, though on grounds of humanity as well as
health I should like the poor chaps to be decently buried.10
Another British Commander, General Godley, noted in a letter to his
wife on 5 September, “They are all quite worn out, and from my Division
alone going sick at the rate of 100 a day.”11
According to a memo sent by General Birdwood to General Hamilton,
the losses caused from infectious disease were quite high during the last
days of August 1915.12 That month, 43,553 men were evacuated, of whom
12,968 were suffering from dysentery; the 1st Australian Division, which had
landed 13,300 strong and received reinforcing drafts of 7,700 men, was now
reduced to a total of 8,500; the evacuation rate for sick alone was 1.7€percent
at Suvla, 5.1€percent at Hellas and 7.5€percent at Anzac.13
On 11 October 1915, General Hamilton informed General Robeck that
their strength had already been reduced to half, and that a further 50€percent of that half-strength were ill.14 According to a Turkish source, within
72
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Table 5.1. Number of sick in a British brigade
Date
Number of sick
August 28
59
August 29
64
August 30
58
August 31
17
September 1
2
September 1*
6
*Note: In the original, September 1 appears twice, which
is most likely a mistake.
the period of five months between July and the end of November 1915, the
Ottoman Army suffered a total of 46,881 wounded, 31,420 of those in the
Gallipoli front.15 The British commander-in-chief wrote the following note
on 14 October 1915: “Colder than ever. We are told that the winter will kill
the flies and that with their death we shall all get hearty and well. Meanwhile, they have turned to winged limpets.”16
Although General Hamilton was correct in his estimation about the
reduction of cases of malaria, this time a new and totally different cause of
death started to threaten the British Army:
The nights of the 27th and 28th were nights of horror throughout the Suvla
zone. In the front line many men had been drowned in the trenches. The
severe cold following the floods proved an unbearable strain to men whose
health had been undermined by the hardships of the summer campaign.
Hundreds were dying from exposure and the 86th Brigade was practically
out of action. All over the plain, streams of utterly exhausted men were
struggling back to the beach, many collapsing on the roadside and freezing
to death where they fell. The hospitals, ordnance tents, supply depots, and
every place where any cover was available, were packed to overflowing; but
more and more sick came pouring in, for which no shelter could be found.
Night and day the doctors struggled devotedly to grapple with the situation. But the suddenness of the emergency had outstripped the means of
dealing with it. It was impossible even to provide the men with warm food
and drink, and while the storm lasted it was equally impossible to send
them away from the peninsula or any help to arrive from outside. To make
matters worse large quantities of winter clothing, which had only recently
Ordeal with Diseases
73
arrived at Suvla and was now so sorely needed, by cruel error had just been
re-embarked.
On the 30th November the wind abated, the frost disappeared, and for
the next three weeks there was an almost unbroken spell of perfect autumn
weather with the sun shining continuously, the sea a lake of turquoise, and
the air like sparkling wine. But the blizzard had left its mark. At Suvla alone
in the course of the three days’ storm there had been more than 5,000 cases
of frost-bite, and over 200 men had been drowned or frozen to death.17
According to Robert Rhodes James, cases of frostbite and exposure were
encountered on several fronts: over 12,000 at Suvla, nearly 3,000 at Anzac,
and about 1,000 at Hellas, where the conditions were relatively better. A
total of 280 men died as a direct result of the storm and the blizzard.18
The Gallipoli Front
In terms of the hygiene conditions on the Gallipoli front, the Ottoman side
had the following facilities and constraints:
The health affairs were put under the responsibility of Directorate 5
(the Chief Doctor’s Office) integrated within the organizational structure of
the Fortified Position Command in Gallipoli. Before the war, the districts
of Seddülbahir, Kumkale, Kilitbahir, Gallipoli, and Eceabat each had one
infirmary of 25 to 100 beds. A 250-bed Mevkii (local) hospital also was in
operation in Gallipoli. When the British forces appeared at the entrance of
the Dardanelles Strait, the number of beds in the infirmaries was increased
to around 150.
Certain factors adversely affecting human health in the area, however,
could not be eliminated. Some of those factors include the following: The
marshes in the region of Gallipoli, especially the ones located in the east
of Kumkale and in the south which were formed by the Menderes stream,
as well as the stagnant waters in other parts of the region were providing a
very suitable environment for malaria, which had been frequently observed
among the troops and the local people. Other diseases frequently encountered in the area were cholera, typhoid, and smallpox. Spotted fever (typhus), tuberculosis, pneumonia, and pleurisy were also common diseases in
the region, whereas lice were very widely seen on the bodies of people. The
living conditions of the soldiers were extremely poor. For one, the barracks
were overcrowded. Because no bunk beds were available, soldiers had to
sleep on the ground; nor did they have any bedspreads to cover their bodies.
There was a shortage of water, and no water pumps were at the service of
74
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Table 5.2. The numbers of ill and wounded treated in hospitals in Akbaş and Akdere
April 1915
25,065 wounded
207 ill
May 1915
16,298 wounded
1,192 ill
June 1915
15,031 wounded
953 ill
Total
56,394 wounded
2,352 ill
the soldiers. Severe difficulties were encountered in the provision of medical supplies. Shortly after the onset of the war, restrictions were placed on
the use of tincture of iodine due to a shortage. Since the medical companies
of the divisions had no transportation means at their disposal, the ill and
wounded had to be carried to the medical units located behind the battlefront by the transportation convoys normally carrying ammunition.19
In May 1915, the capacity of the Ottoman Army hospitals in Gallipoli
was increased to 5,050 beds. Additional hospitals to supplement the stationary hospitals run by the Inspectorate of the Army Stations were established.
The wharf in Akbaş was modified into a transfer center for the wounded. All
the ships arriving here from Istanbul were transporting the ill and wounded
on their return. As a result, long queues were among the ordeals the ill
and wounded waiting for transfer had to endure as their sheer numbers
overwhelmed the capacity of the wharf in Akbaş.20 Another source notes
that the ill and wounded literally were crammed onto the ships going to
Istanbul.21
From the start of the battles in Gallipoli on 25 April 1915 and continuing
through 1 July, the numbers of ill and wounded treated in the hospitals in
Akbaş and Akdere were recorded as shown in Table 5.2.22
Aptülahat Akşin, a foreign affairs officer by profession who then was
serving as a reserve officer in the 1st Army, witnessed the cries of thousands
of wounded who were “trying to clean their wounds of maggots by washing them with sea-water, or even by putting lime on those wounds” while
waiting in crowded groups on the Akbaş wharf at Gallipoli, to be sent to
Istanbul in the aftermath of the battle of Anafartalar.23 Since Istanbul was
the main medical center, the ill and wounded soldiers from various fronts
were flooding into Istanbul, particularly in 1915. All official and private hospitals in Istanbul were packed, prompting the field medical inspectorate
general to issue a declaration calling the army to halt the transfer of the ill
and wounded to Istanbul.24
Ordeal with Diseases
75
A document kept in the Turkish Military Archives provides the following information about the battles in Anafartalar:
At the onset of the war, hospitals serving the various units deployed in the
sector of the fortified position of Gallipoli had a 500-bed capacity. After the
start of the mobilization, cases of typhoid, cholera, and meningitis started
to be seen too. In response, the bed capacity of the existing hospitals was
increased to 1,270. A total of 64 soldiers were killed and 9 were wounded
when the enemy’s navy conducted its first strike against the outer fortifications. Since the first aid center was located inside the fortifications, close to
the ammunition dumps, they were frequently coming under fire. In addition, the means of transportation were inadequate to carry the wounded.
Cases of cholera, dysentery and spotted fever were detected within the units.
In the course of the enemy’s naval attack against the Strait on 18 March
1915, 44 soldiers were killed and 70 were wounded. After the first landing
of the enemy forces, large numbers of wounded soldiers began flooding to
the medical companies. During the first hours of the battle, the number of
the wounded arriving in the Mobile Hospital of the 9th Division alone exceeded 2,000, and that number later increased to 5,000. Since the hospital
had only 300 beds available, additional hospitals were set up in 45 houses
previously evacuated in Maydos. The beds and shields used in these hospitals were collected from the local people. During the enemy bombardment
on 18 March 1915, however, these converted hospitals were also hit, and all
of the equipment was destroyed. Several ships of the Şirket-i Hayriye (the
company then running the city line ships in Istanbul), numbered 66, 67,
and 70, as well as the ship Gülnihal were seconded to the Army to help
with the transfer of the ill and wounded. They transferred the wounded
to several hospitals set up on the coasts of Anatolia and Rumelia. Large
casualties were suffered during the mutual offensives and counter-offensives
carried out during the battles of Kerte, Zığındere, Kerevizdere, Kanlısırt,
and Conkbayırı, as well as during the landing at Anafartalar. The corpses of
thousands of soldiers were heaped in front of the trenches. Meanwhile, the
dysentery epidemic continued to ravage the army, and cases of hypothermia
began to occur after September.25
In August 1915, a report prepared by British military intelligence aroused
new hopes in the British Command as it hinted that the Ottoman Army
was as exhausted as the British Army. According to this report, the situation
prevailing in the Ottoman Army was as follows:
76
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Notwithstanding the satisfactory results achieved in August, General Liman
von Sanders still regards the future with anxiety.…↜The wastage amongst the
Ottoman troops was alarmingly high, and the danger was that they would
gradually bleed to death.…↜Further formations were hardly likely to become available for Gallipoli. Drafts were coming in more slowly and their
standard was growing worse. The increased size of the Army enhanced the
difficulties of supply. Not only were the lines of communication barely able
to meet the existing demands, but the resources of the capital appeared to
be running short.26
Ekrem Şadi Kavur described the situation on the Gallipoli front as
follows:
During the course of the battles in Gallipoli, one of the wounded I met in
the hospital, a cadet, told me that it was like a hell in the Gallipoli Peninsula: it was entirely surrounded by a ring of fire encompassing the sea, air,
land, and the underground sewers.
Despite the accumulation of a huge number of forces in a narrow area
in Gallipoli Peninsula, no significant disease other than those such as malaria, dysentery, filariasis, recurrent fever, and scurvy were observed. As the
battle was transformed into a trench war, more and more soldiers needed to
be hospitalized.27
The troops of the 1st and 5th armies who, having survived the battles
where hundreds of thousands were fighting, were sent to the Thrace for rest,
had to fight the disease of typhus this time under conditions of extreme
misery and poverty. The typhus epidemic, which proved to be a real disaster,
could only be controlled after a month-and-a-half-long struggle. Some of
those troops assigned to the 6th and 15th Army Corps were dispatched to
the fronts at Romania, Austria, and Galicia. Though they were in a relatively
better condition compared to those fighting on other fronts, they nonetheless were unable to escape the typhus, as it already existed among the Germans and Austrians there. On the other hand, the losses from diseases of the
Russian armies fighting them were even greater.28
The Fronts Of Dobruja, Galicia, And Romania
In the far north of Gallipoli, on the fronts of Dobruja and Romania in the
Balkans, the hygienic conditions were relatively good:
Ordeal with Diseases
77
The 7th Army Corps divisions had their own medical companies. They
took no mobile hospitals there. During the first engagement with the enemy, 17€soldiers were killed and 49 were wounded. Soon, the number of
wounded exceeded 1,200 who could not receive any treatment since no mobile hospital was yet allocated to the force. The Muslim residents in the
area provided beds to help accommodate the patients. Later, the German
Mobile Hospital 172 was assigned to the Ottoman Army, which contributed to the regularization of the transfer of the wounded. After some time,
however, new difficulties were encountered in the transfer of large numbers of the wounded because the mobile hospital remained far behind as
the Army Corps advanced further into the enemy lines. Although a Red
Crescent Hospital was sent from Istanbul to the 7th Army Corps to alleviate these problems, the Bulgarian Government did not allow the Ottoman
Army to set up a hospital in Dobruja. Despite sporadic cases of cholera and
spotted fever seen among the troops, they did not transform themselves
into epidemics. Since the Ottoman Army Corps suffered heavy casualties
in the battles that took place in the North of Dobruja and Ortaköy, it was
reinforced with the newly dispatched 26th Division. In the course of the
battles, which turned into a trench war along the Seres River in the winter,
severe cold caused an increase in the cases of hypothermia, 63 of which resulted in death. Three mobile hospitals and one Red Crescent Hospital sent
from Istanbul became operational in Bucharest. In addition, the Muslim
Community in Ruse set up another hospital. As of 1917, the cases of recurrent fever, spotted fever, and venereal disease increased significantly among
the troops.29
The conditions on the Galician front could also be considered reasonable:
Before the 15th Army Corps was assigned to the Galician Front, dysentery,
malaria, recurrent fever, and spotted fever existed among its troops. Although the divisions could transfer their medical companies to the frontlines, they could not take any mobile hospital. Upon their arrival in Zemlin
via the route of Sofia and Belgrade, each division of the Army Corps was
assigned one consultant doctor by the Austrian Government. The Austrian
Government also provided the medical supplies. In response to the increase
in the number of the wounded, two mobile hospitals were dispatched and
put under the mandate of the Army Corps. Cases of dysentery, typhoid,
and malaria were noted widely in the units.30
78
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Overall, the medical services were maintained at reasonable levels on
the Galician front from the beginning of the battles on. The evacuation of
the dead and wounded from the battlefields, however, could be performed
slowly and with difficulty as the large number of casualties overwhelmed the
capability of the existing infrastructure. Meanwhile, typhus was recorded in
one of the brigades.31
Because the Ottoman 6th Army Corps was ordered to leave behind
its mobile hospitals in Turkey before setting off for the Romanian front,
it faced great difficulties in evacuating casualties from the battlefield and
providing treatment to the wounded in the course of the initial battles. The
Ottoman medical doctors tried to treat their patients in the houses of the
Turkish villages nearby. As the military units were constantly moving from
one place to another, however, most of the time the patients in those houses
had to be abandoned to their destiny.32
Already at the beginning of the operations, infectious diseases were detected among the Ottoman troops at the Macedonian front, the severity
and depth of which caught the close attention of the German general headquarters. Shortage of beds and inadequate medical support in the hospitals
were the main reasons behind the high rates of death. The 2,082 casualties
the 20th Army Corps suffered are broken down as follows: 1,165 deserters
and missing soldiers, 653 wounded, 173 combat deaths, and 91 deaths in
hospital. The Ottoman detachment in Rumelia, on the other hand, suffered
1,655 casualties: 100 deserters and missing soldiers, 860 wounded, 410€combat deaths, and 285 deaths in hospital.33
Meanwhile, the situation in the fortified position on the Black Sea Strait
was as follows:
When the Black Sea Strait was bombarded by the Russian fleet for the first
time in March 1915, no casualties occurred among the troops. The subsequent bombardments caused a few casualties in the army and among the
residents. The most widespread diseases in the area were dysentery, malaria,
recurrent fever, typhoid, and the venereal diseases.34
The Caucasian Front
In the previous chapter, “The Epidemic Disaster,” the typhus epidemic and
the cases of freezing in Eastern Anatolia are already discussed. Here, other
diseases that emerged in the same region (cholera, dysentery, malaria, smallpox, tetanus, and erysipelas) are covered.
A communiqué issued by the field medical inspectorate general in mid-
Ordeal with Diseases
79
August 1915 stated that a cholera epidemic had affected Tbilisi and Baku
in the Caucasus first, and later spread to other parts of Russia as well as to
the Tabriz, Hoy, and Urmia regions of Iran. This information prompted
the medical authorities of the 3rd Army to take very strict measures against
the danger approaching from the front. Considering the possibility that
migrants, refugees, and prisoners of war could transmit cholera into the
country, these groups of people were subjected to strict examination, disinfection, and isolation. A hygiene consultant and mobile laboratory were
provided to each of the army corps. More importantly, a vaccination campaign against cholera was launched within the entire army. In order to meet
the enormous demand for vaccine, the Erzurum institute of vaccine was
reorganized to produce only cholera vaccines. By October 1915, vaccination
of the entire army against cholera was completed.35
In November 1915, cholera epidemics broke out in three different centers within the 3rd Army’s area of responsibility. The first of those epidemics
broke out in Bayburt on 26 November. When an individual, who had not
recently left Bayburt, died of a disease indicating the symptoms of cholera,
his feces were immediately sent to Erzurum for analysis. In that material,
which had the appearance of rice water, vibriones were found. Then, a recruit from the labor battalion in Bayburt became ill with diarrhea on 22
November and was sent to the hospital on suspicion of cholera. After the
latter case, a bacteriologist and mobile laboratory were sent from Erzurum
to Bayburt to investigate the extent of the disease there. The medical chief of
the army also went there to review the situation and to ensure that all necessary measures were being implemented. In addition to these two cases, a
recruit who came from Erzurum to Bayburt and a patient hospitalized since
17 November also showed symptoms of cholera. As a result, strict measures
were put into place in Bayburt.36
The second province where cholera was recorded within the 3rd Army’s
sector was Trabzon. In Trabzon, the first case of cholera was seen in the
2nd Mobile Gendarmerie Battalion on 27 November 1915, the same day
as the one in Bayburt. The fountain pool in front of the barracks was used
by soldiers for drinking water or washing their hands and faces. Because
a guest house was also located within the barracks, it was thought that a
vibrione-bearing visitor might have contaminated the water. In 1,033 feces
analyses conducted by 14 December 1915, a total of 337 vibrione bearers were
detected.37
The third incidence of cholera started in Erzurum, where the first case
was seen in the Morgof Hospital on 30 November. Soon after, the disease
turned into an epidemic within the barracks, from where it spread into the
80
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Table 5.3. Deaths from dysentery in the 3rd Army
Years
Admissions
Deaths
Percent ratio
1915 (9 months)
8,315
3,578
43
1916
3,002
1,615
54
1917
995
648
65
1918 (10 months)
330
101
30
12,642
5,942
47
Total
city.38 After Erzurum was occupied by the Russians and the 3rd Army withdrew behind Erzincan, the cholera epidemic was carried into interior locations by the refugees. The first case of cholera in Erzincan as a result was seen
on 27 February 1916.39 Within a period of one month, 98 out of 151 cholera
patients being treated in the Central Hospital of Erzincan lost their lives.40
Dysentery also ravaged the 3rd Army throughout the Great War, and is
considered as one of the most damaging infectious diseases. Within a period
of 42.5 months, a total of 12,642 patients were admitted to hospitals for
dysentery, and the same disease accounted for 5,942 deaths in the 3rd Army.
In other words, the admissions due to dysentery amounted to 2.3€percent of
the total admissions, and the deaths caused by dysentery made up 5.4€percent of the total deaths from disease. The deaths from dysentery peaked
in 1915. The largest numbers of admissions to hospitals for dysentery were
recorded in March and April of 1915. Another increase was observed after
August of that year. As is well documented, during the Great War dysentery
mostly emerged in hospitals. According to the medical records of the 3rd
Army, for instance, dysentery took a heavy death toll in 1915 in the Central
Hospital of Erzurum. Within the same year, improved hygiene conditions
in the hospital helped contain the disease.41
In October 1915, some 1,085 patients were admitted to the Central Hospital of Erzurum for diarrhea, 266 of whom died. In other words the death
rate was 24€percent, which is high by any measure. In November of the same
year, 784 admissions and 94 deaths (12€percent) were recorded. In December, there were 530 admissions and 19 deaths (only 3.4€percent), which indicates a progressive improvement in the conditions and treatment.42
In the 3rd Army’s area of responsibility, the struggle against malaria
could be initiated only in August 1917.43 On the other hand, during the
period between March 1915 and September 1918, smallpox accounted for
Ordeal with Diseases
81
Table 5.4. Deaths from tetanus in the 3rd Army
Years
Admissions
Deaths
1915 (9 months)
44
23
50
1916
69
45
65
1917
37
30
80
1918 (10 months)
32
20
62
182
118
65
Total
Percent ratio
Table 5.5. Deaths from erysipelas in the 3rd Army
Years
Admissions
Deaths
Percent ratio
1915 (9 months)
1,446
374
26
1916
1,246
287
20
1917
345
74
21
62
1
1.6
3,099
736
24
1918 (10 months)
Total
346 of the admissions to the 3rd Army’s hospitals, 40 of which (30€percent)
resulted in death.44 Tetanus was not common within the 3rd Army despite
the fact that the army was involved in large-scale battles where many cases
of local hypothermia occurred among troops. The low number of tetanus
cases was due to dressing the wounds of the soldiers without delay and applying tetanus serum within the proper time frame on wounds that looked
dirty and were suspected of tetanus infection. Another important observation reached after studying the records of the 3rd Army on tetanus is
that tetanus-related admissions to hospitals were most common during the
winter months, indicating that most of the cases of tetanus resulted from
freezing rather than from the wounds that occurred in fighting. The annual
figures about tetanus-related admissions and deaths, however, are significantly high.45
Erysipelas and the deaths it caused were also among the frequent problems the 3rd Army encountered during the Great War. Most cases could be
found on faces, since the disease was caused by the chaps occurring on the
82
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
skin due to cold and lack of care under those adverse conditions. Erysipelas
patients were referred to hospitals mostly in winter and in the months when
the battles proved to be more intensive. The admission-to-death ratio was
quite high.46
The Hijaz Front
Other than malaria and sunstroke, no major epidemics threatened the
troops deployed at the Hijaz front. However, the combat capabilities of the
units were severely limited by several factors such as hot weather, lack of water, malnutrition, and lack of medical supplies and medicines. In one instance, the personnel of the 2nd Battalion of the 42nd Regiment deployed
around Medina had to be taken to hospitals or infirmaries due to malaria.47
According to the records found in the Turkish Military Archives, the
army came across scurvy frequently at the Hijaz front. For instance, in the
55th regiment subordinate to the 58th Division, twenty-five of the soldiers
who visited the doctor on 21 February 1916 were found to have that disease.
As malaria season approached, the recruits were obliged to take quinine
twice a week. Epidemics of recurrent fever are known to have prevailed in
the area from time to time. Some evidence demonstrating inadequacy of
the medical services in the Yemen is uncovered as well. The Ottoman forces
operating in the region faced these epidemics and their harmful effects both
in the beginning and during the later stages of the war. In an environment
where life-threatening heat, lack of water, malnutrition, and lack of care
were prevalent, the tragic condition of the troops was described in a note
sent on 30 January 1915 from the Regional Command of Operations in Taiz
to the Army Corps Command:
1. The doctors I tasked to investigate the health conditions of the units in
Mendep have returned. From the telegrams they had sent, it appeared that a
total of 244 officers and recruits, as well as all but 15 recruits from the national
battalion seemed to be exhausted, disabled, and absolutely unable to carry
out their duties, who needed to be transferred to Moza for two months for
medical reasons. Following my oral conversation with the returning doctors,
I gave the necessary orders to the Mendep area commander for the transfer of
the said personnel to Moza so that they can rest as quickly as possible. Given
their ailing conditions, my own judgment was that keeping them in Mendep
any longer would be to the detriment of the army rather than providing any
benefits.
Ordeal with Diseases
83
2. In addition to the above-mentioned points, it also was seen that the drinking
water had a bad odor and contained salt, alum, and other organic materials.
A general state of weakness, moreover, plagued the units, caused by the lack
of vegetables, extreme fatigue, and the difficult weather conditions specific
to Tehama.
3. The most common diseases are fever, enteritis, acute common cold, and
scurvy. More than 400 ill and very weak soldiers were documented in
Mendep.
4. In order to prevent the artillery batteries in Mendep from vanishing and
becoming unable to fight, I found it necessary to include the artillery units
in the rotation scheme initiated between the forces in Mendep and Moza.
The necessary orders already have been given to the Command of Mendep
Region to send a mountain battery to Dibap, so that the troops could drink
fresh water, as much as they wish.
The Ottoman Commander also stated in his report that seventy infantry troops living under those conditions died in November and December
of 1914, and added that a similar number of soldiers were about to die.48
The Syrian Front
According to a document available in the Turkish Military Archives:
Various hospitals were set up in the cities of Aleppo, Damascus, Jerusalem,
and others in Syria, by appropriating the existing government and municipality hospitals, as well as the foreign hospitals. The total bed capacity of
those hospitals was 4,400. During the Canal Operation, a medical depot
was established in In, and convoys for the transportation of the wounded
were formed, each composed of 8 camels. The army fighting on the Canal
front had one medical section on both right and left wings, and two medical companies in the centre. At the rear were two mobile hospitals. Since
those hospitals were close to the frontlines, they were targeted by the enemy’s battleships, and as a result had to be relocated. The medical companies
were both evacuating the wounded from the battlefield, and carrying water
on the stretchers to the combatants. When the fighting ceased, the medical
units were gathered in Keteb-ul Halil for the treatment of the wounded
soldiers. During the Canal expedition, 196 soldiers were killed, and 565
84
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
were wounded. When the army was retreating, the wounded were evacuated in four convoys, together with the convoys charged with supplying
water and provisions. During the retreat, cases of recurrent fever and scurvy
were encountered. Since the infectious diseases could never be completely
eradicated in the country, the cases of spotted fever, recurrent fever, smallpox, and dysentery seemed to have increased both among the civilians and
within the army. In Jerusalem and Aleppo, epidemics of spotted fever broke
out. In order to combat those epidemics, commissions of hygiene were established in the districts, and very strict measures were implemented; the
vaccines produced in the Syrian hospitals were used during these efforts.49
The most widespread diseases seen on the Syrian front were typhoid,
typhus, and cholera. Malaria and dysentery, on the other hand, stubbornly
persisted in the region and could never be eliminated completely. Cholera and typhus mostly afflicted the local people. In an illustrative example,
a Jewish village called Afule was completely evacuated and burned down
under the orders of the military authorities, since it was a major breeding
ground for typhus. The diseases mostly were erupting in the winter and
during shortages of food supply. Deprivation, hunger, exhaustion, and lack
of medical services caused mass losses during the long years of war. During those years, the number of doctors also was reduced drastically and the
dentists, veterinarians, and pharmacists were assigned to their positions to
meet the demand for medical doctors in the battalions or mobile hospitals.
As the war continued, existing medical supplies either were used up or became unusable. The failure to resolve the clothing problem, combined with
the shortage of food, aggravated the adverse conditions, providing a suitable
ground for infections.50
The following sentences taken from the 26th Division’s Journal of War
reflect very well the dramatic conditions encountered by the military units
from time to time throughout the war:
Since the artillery units ran out of kerosene or candles, they were burning
barks of trees to have some light to align their weapons.
On the evening of 7 December 1917, sleet began to fall, accompanied
by a severe cold. Most of the soldiers did not have any underwear, whereas
others lacked raincoats and portable tents. Their feet were naked, and their
clothes were ragged and worn out. The situation was communicated to the
Army Corps, which ordered us to supply the required materials from the
army station at the rear. An officer sent to the army station also was given a
letter of pledge written by the Division Commander. We requested [the res-
Ordeal with Diseases
85
idents] to give the bed sheets in hotels, and some of the carpets in mosques
and churches to the soldiers who were defending them in rough terrain under great deprivation. Unfortunately those requests were of no avail.51
German Military Doctor Seuber recalls the following about his visit
in 1917 to the 59th Division’s tented camp area, located about 10€km south
of Aleppo, which he visited in order to investigate an outbreak of cholera
there:
I went to the Division in question. Even though the infected battalions
were quarantined, in fact the entire division was infected. Those who
were slightly ill were lying on earth in front of the cone-shaped tents, unprotected against the sun, and without any cloth covering on them. The
seriously ill were a little bit farther away; but they too were lying on the
ground, writhing in pain.
Even if one disregards the effects of cholera, the 59th Division was not
in a condition to be used in any military mission. That Division seemed
to me as a large group of delicate individuals, who were exhausted from
hunger. The Deputy Commander was a German Lieutenant Colonel. He is
sitting desperately in his tent located under a pomegranate tree; he seems to
have surrendered to his fate, and detached himself from the whole world.52
The following scenes, depicting the plight of the 26th Division in its
Journal of War, are indeed very tragic:
Reduction of the bread ration to 0.400 grams affected the soldiers very
badly. Approximately half of the personnel are in vain. The hospitals along
the road and the army stations in the interior were overwhelmed by the ill
soldiers. As was the case in other units, as soon as our Division wanted to
take a rest, it fell victim to the epidemics of the diseases such as scurvy, anemia, and dysentery, caused by living under pathetic conditions for a long
period of time (7–8 months). More than 20% of the total strength of the
division was lost; many soldiers either died, or were sent on leave for medical reasons. Since the Division did not have its own mobile hospital and
other means to treat the ill except for a medical company, it ran into serious
difficulties.53
As of 17 November 1917, the last Ottoman and German troops had
withdrawn from Jerusalem and headquarters were transferred to Nablus. As
a result, the ill and wounded surged into the town, bringing with them the
86
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
risk of cholera there. The first epidemic eventually surfaced among the Ottoman soldiers. The only method of disinfection that could be implemented
against the epidemic was to spread chloride of lime around the tents of the
patients diagnosed with cholera. The regiment infected with cholera could
not be dispatched to a quarantine station. In fact, the local people rather
than the soldiers were under the threat of that disease as they grew vulnerable over time. The health conditions of the local people had deteriorated
enormously. Hunger was reigning in Palestine and in most parts of Syria.54
The struggle against malaria accounted for a large part of the army’s
activities on the Palestinian and Sinai fronts throughout 1915. In Jerusalem,
the cisterns used for storing water became main sources of malaria as they
were a suitable breeding ground for the mosquitoes of the anopheles type.55
Another malaria epidemic was recorded in Der (Palestine) in 1917.56
Between the dissolution of the commanderships of the 4th Army and
Sinai front on 28 September 1918, which were replaced by the Command of
the Lightning Group of Armies, and the establishment of the Chief Inspectorate of the Lightning Army Stations, the medical services for humans and
animals were carried out by both medical and veterinary units within the
Office of the Deputy 4th Army Command.57
The official historical records published by the Turkish General Staff
provide the following remark about the conditions on the Palestinian front
during the period of 1917–1918: “[A]lthough a quite extensive medical infrastructure was in place, the treatment of the ill and wounded was far from
satisfactory.” Although a network of hospitals, infirmaries, and convalescent
hospitals existed in cities such as Damascus, Beirut, Aleppo, Humus, Der,
Zahle, Hama, and Baalbek, the medical services in those places had to be
carried out with insufficient personnel. Moreover, the same records also
emphasize that the cases of typhoid, typhus, cholera, malaria, and gangrene
caused by wounds were so widespread that they overwhelmed the capacity
of those medical institutions.58
The Iraqi Front
The following medical measures were taken on the Iranian-Iraqi front, the
battle area of the 6th Army forces:
The precautions implemented were very primitive. The enormous need for
tents, greatcoats, clothes, shoes, and the like could hardly be met. The insufficiency of food supplies further contributed to the bleak health conditions
throughout the war. Even General Goltz lost his life due to an infectious
Ordeal with Diseases
87
disease. Although each division was assigned a medical company and a
mobile hospital, the shortage of specialist doctors, medical equipment and
medicines resulted in great casualties.59
According to the Turkish Military Archives, during the four years of the
war, 45,000 to 50,000 people were affected by infectious diseases, and more
than 10,000 soldiers died on the Iraqi front. The number of soldiers who
were killed in battle, on the other hand, was only 5,934.60
On the Çapakçur Front, the battle area for the 2nd Army, hunger, lack
of proper clothing, and infection took a heavy toll, too:
The 2nd Army units came from Pozantı on foot, and they did not receive
sufficient food on the road. Cases of malaria, sunstroke, and cholera were
widespread among those units. As a result of the atrocities committed by
the Armenians, which took advantage of the Russian Army’s offensive, large
groups of refugees diffused through the interior areas, carrying with them
infections of spotted fever and recurrent fever. The outbreak of a large-scale
cholera epidemic was prevented among the military units, thanks to timely
examinations to diagnose the carriers of disease, and routine vaccinations.
On this front, though, insufficient nutrition, lack of proper clothing, and
seasonal diseases caused large casualties.…↜The most common infectious diseases were cholera, spotted fever, smallpox, recurrent fever, and dysentery.61
The death toll within the 2nd Army tended to increase in the winter months. Again, insufficient nutrition and the lack of cleaning materials
prepared a fertile ground for the outbreak of infectious diseases such as
typhoid, typhus, and cholera. Moreover, many troops suffered from night
blindness and lost their ability to move due to malnutrition. Most of the ill
and wounded died while they were being transferred from the front lines to
the rear bases on the backs of horses and mules or on oxcarts under miserable conditions. In 1916–1917, the 2nd Army lost 24€percent of its strength
because of epidemic diseases.62
According to a document from the Turkish Military Archives:
During the British offensive against Fav, 56 soldiers were killed but the
number of wounded was unknown. Some of the units could not evacuate their wounded from the battlefield, as they had neither any doctors,
nor any means to carry patients. Cases of dysentery, typhoid, spotted fever,
smallpox and plague were encountered within the Army. The British Army,
which surrendered after the siege of Kut al-Amarah, suffered 380 wounded
88
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
and more than 1,000 ill soldiers. Cases of dysentery and scurvy were widely
seen among the British and Indian detachments. An Army Corps subordinate to the Ottoman Army moved to Iran and occupied Kirmanshah. Since
initially no network of military stations was available behind the frontlines, 1,123 wounded had to be transferred to Hanikin. Later, a hospital was
opened in Kirmanshah. Cases of spotted fever and recurrent fever arose
within the units deployed in Iran. In the 6th Army, while trachoma and venereal diseases became widespread, cholera and dysentery also maintained
their prevalence. Before the evacuation of Baghdad, about 8,000 ill soldiers
were transferred to Samra first and then to Mosul, and the bed capacity of
the hospitals in Mosul was increased to 5,000. Since the food rations given
to soldiers were reduced drastically during the last years of the war, cases
of scurvy surged and large number of losses occurred due to cholera and
amoebic dysentery.63
On the Iraqi front, the epidemics of typhus, cholera, and amoebic dysentery posed great difficulties for the medical authorities of the Ottoman
army. One study notes that the British forces, which used Basra as a logistics
base after occupying it on 23 November 1914, also were impaired by infectious diseases, the most common of them being smallpox, cholera, dysentery,
malaria, and typhoid.64 When the British Army initiated its move northward in May 1915, the most adverse climate conditions were encountered,
and 117 persons died in one day because of sunstroke alone. Some British
officers were reported to have died in a few hours because they refused to
cover their heads. After the fall of Amarah on 25 July 1915, the British also
captured Nasıriyah. During that campaign, the British forces suffered fewer
than 1,000 casualties including the dead and wounded, whereas those who
died from diseases were several times greater.65
An order issued by the Ottoman Army Command on 16 February 1916
noted an ongoing typhus epidemic in Kut al-Amarah. Therefore it ordered
that all refugees and prisoners from the region be taken to the headquarters directly, without being allowed to establish contact with anybody.66
According to the list submitted by British forces surrendering to the Ottoman Army in Kut al-Amarah, the British prisoners included the following:
5€generals, a total of 481 officers consisting of 277 British and 204 Indian,
a total of 13,309€recruits consisting of 2,592 British and 10,717 Indian, 43
artillery, 13,700 rifles, a large number of machine guns, 6 automobiles, and
large amounts of equipment and supplies.67 As of late April 1916, a total of
1,347€British and Indian soldiers were being treated in the hospitals of Kut
al-Amarah, 400 of whom were wounded and the remainder ill; 308 of those
Ordeal with Diseases
89
patients were British, and 1,035 were Indian.68 Their transfer to prisoner
camps resulted in the notorious “death walk” of more than 500 miles, which
started from Kut al-Amarah and later was subjected to British Parliamentary enquiry.69
A popular history magazine provides interesting information about that
period. The Ottoman Army gained a victory in Kut al-Amarah, but it came
at a great cost. As the battles were becoming fiercer, a new infection began
to kill off the soldiers there. The air strikes of the British planes continued
unabated throughout the summer, and under the effect of the extreme heat
most of the soldiers were afflicted by trachoma. Nevertheless, the Ottoman
Army continued to have everyone work to make the adobe bricks that were
used in the construction of shelters for winter.70
In June 1917, in response to the incidents of cholera observed in Aleppo
and Pozantı, the 6th Army Command circulated the following orders to its
subordinate units:
1. The soldiers and units coming from Aleppo and Pozantı shall not be permitted to enter the town [Mosul] directly; they first shall be kept under observation in a military camp, to be set up on the left bank of the Tigris River,
where the soldiers with diarrhea as well as the soldiers suspected of it shall be
examined.
2. Contamination of the Tigris River, the only source of drinking and daily use
water, shall be prevented by applying measures to be determined in collaboration with the civilian medical authorities and the Municipality of Mosul.
3. The recruits in the army units, as well as the inhabitants of those neighborhoods of Mosul where cholera was recorded, shall be vaccinated.
4. In the army units, and the residential houses where cholera was seen, examinations shall be made in order to detect carriers of the disease.71
In July 1917, based on 4,001 feces analyses performed in the laboratory
of the army station hospital in Mosul, 293 individuals were found to be carrying cholera vibriones. Of those cases, 18 were troops from the 46th Division that came to Mosul via the route through Aleppo, while 27 of them
belonged to the self-standing supply units, which also followed the same
route. Eight cases were from the soldiers of the telegram company working
on the way to Nusaybin, 9 were deserters, and 63 were among the troops
from various detachments in Mosul. Though most of the latter belonged to
90
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Table 5.6. Laboratories in the army stations in Mosul, Kirkuk, Shikrat, and Nusaybin
(1917–1918)
Sample from the
patient
Amoebic case
Percent
10,648
112
01.05
October 1917
8,635
256
02.96
November 1917
4,508
381
08.45
December 1917
1,433
450
31.40
January 1918
1,046
215
20.55
910
197
21.64
Period
September 1917
February 1918
the detachments in Mosul, in fact they constantly were shuffling between
various army station posts.72
The biggest problem bedeviling the cities of Baghdad and Mosul in
1916–1917 was amoebic dysentery. Following the capture of Kut al-Amarah,
some British patients with chronic diarrhea and some Indian soldiers with
diarrhea, some of whom were in a state of cachexia, were found in the British Military Hospital. Those ailing British and Indian patients were returned
to their countries with the permission of the Army Command, and 300 out
of a total of 1,400 patients were transferred to Baghdad. In 1916, during a
sporadic amoebic dysentery epidemic, 2,660 cases were recorded, and 35 to
40€percent of the patients died. In 1917, some 3,039 cases of amoebic dysentery were encountered. During the last months of 1917 and into early 1918,
the dysentery epidemic continued on a large scale.73
In Kut al-Amarah, as early as March 1916, the medical companies, mobile hospitals, and Army Station Hospital in Kut admitted some patients for
malaria. The cases of malaria were recorded under two categories, namely
the common malaria and the malignant malaria; together, they exceeded
the cases of other infectious diseases according to the hospital statistics. For
instance, out of 250 patients whose blood analyses were completed in the
Army Station Hospital in Kut in April 1916, 10 were found to have malaria
parasites. During 1916, within the 6th Army as a whole, a total of 7,930
cases of malaria were recorded, 470 of which (5.9€percent) resulted in death.
In 1918, the death ratio increased to 11.4€percent. According to Abdülkadir
Noyan, the increase mainly was caused by the gradual deterioration of the
food supply for the troops. He remarked: “[Though] the troops are working
Ordeal with Diseases
91
hard, and getting tired, they receive insufficient food.” He added that “the
troops should have been provided with sufficient food and clothing.”74
The monthly statistical bulletins explain that venereal diseases and especially syphilis were widespread among the prostitutes in Baghdad and
Mosul between 1916 and 1918, and that some of the soldiers and officers
who had intercourse with them also caught those diseases.75 During the war,
bacillary dysentery affected all fronts, including several areas in Turkey.76
Some cases of plague were seen at the ports of İzmir and Istanbul during the
Great War.77
The Libyan Front
In Libya, no health units could be formed within the organizational structure of the Sunusi forces, fighting against the British in the east, nor within
the mujahedeen units resisting the Italians in western Tripoli (Homs, Tripoli, and Zouara fronts). During the Ottoman Army’s military expedition in
Libya, only four military doctors were available. In his memoirs, Lieutenant İhsan Aksoley, who was deployed in the headquarters of Prince Osman
Fuat in 1918, states that the most vital needs of the Army in North Africa
were medicines, doctors, and pharmacists. A doctor finally arrived much
later, and a pharmacist arrived shortly before the Mondros Armistice. He
also notes that no medicines, other than tincture of iodine and alcohol, were
available. The activities in Tripoli had to be terminated before the doctor
and pharmacist could start their duties.78 On this front, in an environment
where no medical services could be provided even to the humans, quite understandably, no veterinarians, veterinary equipment, and medicines were
in place for the treatment of the animals.79
The Last Epidemic
The greatest single epidemic in modern human history was the one of influenza that killed 21 million people at the end of the First World War.80 At the
end of the war, the world was shaken by this epidemic. It broke out during
the last months of 1917 in the center of China, around the city of Chung�
king. It then passed across China and into Japan, then moved south and
southeast until it reached India, Turkey, and the Near East. Another arm of
the epidemic swept across Russia via Siberia, and then moved from the Baltic coasts to America on merchant ships. In the United States, the first cases
of the disease were seen in the harbors of Boston and New York. In Europe,
the epidemic spread from the Baltic coasts to Western Europe, France, and
92
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
the coasts of the Atlantic Ocean. In that way, Western Europe was caught
between two fires. The first cases of the disease in France were seen in April
1918. Later on, Great Britain, Germany, Spain, Portugal, and Italy were affected by the disease. The epidemic spread to Switzerland by June, to Denmark and Norway by July, to Holland and Sweden by August. Within a few
weeks, it made its way into Greece and Turkey.81
Until the Great War, influenza had remained a “domesticated” pestilence with little clout and even less meaning. But starting in the spring
of 1918, the flu abruptly turned on adults and buried more than 15 million people in eighteen months. The death rate stunned physicians. It took
the battlefields of France fours years to kill 15 million men, but the flu did
the same work in much less time. In the United States alone, more people
died of the flu (550,000 adults) in 1918 than the U.S. Army’s combat losses
in both world wars, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War combined. In
Alaska, whole Indian villages perished.82
All ten of the largest-scale influenza pandemics, which have broken out
at different times since 1729, are found to have originated in Southeast Asia
and then followed the route from Asia to Europe toAmerica. In response to
the death of 20 million people in 1918, research into the causes of the epidemic was speeded up, and eventually the influenza virus, the main agent of
the disease, was singled out in 1933.83
The ability of the flu virus to mutate and change shape every ten to
fourteen years (the interval is not always this neat) also makes influenza
highly invincible. Scientists have looked hard for the strain that caused the
epidemic of 1918 but have never found it.84 While France and Spain held
each other responsible for the outbreak of that epidemic, the United States
accused Eastern Europe, while Western Europe accused the United States
for it. On the other hand, Allenby’s armies claimed that the retreating Turks
caused the epidemic.85 The influenza pandemic of 1918 was called “Spanish
influenza,” as the disease first originated in Spain.86
In 1918, the influenza epidemics swept through wide areas of Europe as
well as other continents, resulting in unprecedented levels of casualties. In
some countries, the epidemics took a particularly high toll. In India alone,
8 million people died from influenza. The number of deaths from the same
disease was 1.3 million in Africa, 1 million in North America, 1 million in
South America, and 300,000 in Japan. It was not possible to obtain exact
figures regarding the number of deaths in Siberia and Russia. According
to several estimates, a total of 20 million people lost their lives during the
influenza epidemic of 1918.87
Turkey, too, was afflicted by a severe influenza epidemic toward the end
Ordeal with Diseases
93
Table 5.7. Deaths from influenza in some countries
Country
1918
1919
1920
Britain
112,329
44,811
10,665
Germany
187,884
42,254
17,855
91,465
35,326
10,382
274,041
31,781
24,428
Holland
17,396
1,550
2,454
Sweden
27,379
7,341
2,853
147,114
21,335
17,825
France
Italy
Spain
of the Great War.88 One source, after stating that a total of 21,643,291 people
died during the influenza epidemic of 1918, noted that “that epidemic caused
a great loss in Turkey.”89
The great influenza epidemic of 1918 broke out in the Ottoman Army
for the first time on 6 August at the Army Station hospital in Nusaybin. An
epidemic disease (called Spanish influenza) swept through patients, doctors, and other hospital personnel, who experienced a burning sensation
in the nose and throat, followed by sneezing, coughing, and high fever.
It is believed that railway workers brought the disease to the area, and it
could not be contained since influenza is airborne and is transmitted easily
by the sneezing and coughing patients. It further penetrated into the army
automobile convoys and transportation units, as well as the people riding
the keleks (a kind of raft mounted on animal skins filled with air). Wellprotected places, such as the prison in Mosul, were affected from the disease
last. The death ratio from the disease remained at a level of about 3.5€percent.
The decline in humidity in August helped the disease lose its strength.90
As the Mondros Armistice was signed on 30 October 1918, the Directorate of Health in the Province of Aydın was waging a comprehensive struggle
against influenza, which had spread widely within the province. The disease
was so severe that the schools had to be closed for twenty days.91 Meanwhile,
some deaths due to influenza were recorded in the district of Seferihisar.92
The hardships the White Russian refugees were enduring further increased after the Commission of Refugees decided to transfer them. Many
of the refugees waiting to be transferred at the ports of Istanbul and Samsun
died of infectious diseases. At the port of Samsun alone, an average of one
hundred refugees per day died of Spanish influenza.93
94
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
The Situation In Istanbul And Anatolia
In 1918, as the first quarter of the twentieth century was coming to an end
and the Turks were entering the last phase of a ten-year period of wars in
their history, the situation in Anatolia was as follows. The inhabitants were
deprived of any kind of infrastructure or any means to lead a decent life.
The population largely was affected by various kinds of infectious diseases;
many people became ill, died, or became disabled. More than half of the
people living in Anatolia were afflicted with malaria, and at least one person in every few families had tuberculosis. Trachoma and syphilis were seen
as disasters affecting certain regions. In addition to cholera, typhus, and typhoid, which spread throughout the country, other types of infectious diseases continued to affect the people sporadically.94
With the conclusion of the First World War, the city of Istanbul was confronted with a new humanitarian duty of struggling against epidemics. The
epidemics were rampant especially in areas where the refugees coming from
Russia were settled. Despite the outstanding efforts of the doctors, scarlet
fever, typhus, plague, smallpox, cholera, and typhoid penetrated all around
after November 1920. In December of the same year, a cruel epidemic of
cholera breaking out in the Çilingir camps wiped out hundreds of people.95
In the novel, Yüzbaşı Selahattin’in Romanı (Captain Selahattin’s novel),
some cross-sections from the lives of the people were presented through the
eyes of the novel’s hero. It illustrates the everyday life of ordinary people
during the process of decay and dissolution toward the end of the war in
Istanbul. The large buildings in Anadoluhisarı were turned into hospitals.
The soldiers receiving treatment in the outpatient clinics of those hospitals
wandered around the streets every night, begging bread from the houses
nearby because they were not given sufficient food. Furthermore, it was rumored that their senior officers—the sergeants, doctors, and officers—were
stealing the already small amount of food supplies given to them. Many soldiers were dying from cold, hunger, and lack of care. What is more, all these
incidents were occurring before the eyes of the entire public. Many officers,
civil servants, soldiers, and tradesmen made a fortune in Istanbul by charging excessive prices for the goods they sold; on occasion they demanded
five hundred kuruş for an object they had bought for five kuruş. Whereas a
large part of the population was stricken by extreme poverty, a small group
accumulated immense wealth, which amplified debauchery and all kinds of
dishonorable conduct within the society.96
In 1918 a plague epidemic broke out in a prison in Trabzon, killing
twenty-five people.97 Dr.€Feridun Frik notes that malaria, typhoid, and
Ordeal with Diseases
95
Table 5.8. Deaths as found in the records of İzmir municipality
Disease
Turks
Jews
Armenians
Greeks
Total
Enteric disease
203
42
10
305
560
Tuberculosis
165
16
12
222
415
Pneumonia
139
29
106
180
454
Malaria
73
7
2
80
162
Bronchopneumonia
37
9
3
111
160
Smallpox
38
16
2
97
153
Malnutrition
40
–
–
89
129
Spotted fever
17
7
–
22
46
Children’s disease
21
8
–
10
39
Typhoid
10
3
–
25
38
Influenza
5
4
1
25
35
Plague
5
2
–
11
18
Acute Bronchitis
4
–
–
10
14
Infant deaths
5
–
–
8
13
Puerperal fever
5
–
–
3
8
Diphtheria
–
–
–
8
8
Erysipelas
–
2
–
3
5
Tetanus
–
1
–
2
3
Recurrent fever
1
–
–
1
2
768
146
136
1,212
2,262
Total
tuberculosis were the diseases he encountered most frequently while he was
a student at the Faculty of Medicine (1918–1923) and later while he was
working in the army.98 In the course of World€War€I, a disease known as the
“hookworm infection” became prevalent in and around Hopa—a town on
the Black Sea coast—during the Russian occupation, and then spread into
other areas.99
Throughout the occupation of Istanbul in the aftermath of World€War€I,
tuberculosis took the highest toll, although deaths among newborns and the
96
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
deaths due to typhus, typhoid, diphtheria, and influenza reached strikingly
high figures. In 1920 alone, a total of 2,640 inhabitants died of tuberculosis.100 In 1922, one-sixth of the 16,256 deaths in Istanbul were also caused by
tuberculosis.101 On the other hand, between 1917 and 1920 a total of 1,522 individuals were infected with recurrent fever in Istanbul, 15 of whom died.102
During the same period (1917–1920), a total of 313 patients were diagnosed
with smallpox in Istanbul, 183 of whom died.103 Ahmet Emin recalls how he
became ill with typhoid in 1922, on his return to Istanbul from Malta.104
Tuberculosis
During World€War€I, economic difficulties, poverty, and disastrous incidents of the war caused a sharp increase in the number of deaths from tuberculosis.105 In 1918 an organization called the Ottoman Society of Combat against Tuberculosis, under the chairmanship of Dr.€Besim Ömer Pasha,
was established with the aim of reducing the deaths from tuberculosis. After the occupation of Istanbul in 1920, however, the organization had to suspend its activities.106
According to the statistical data given in a pamphlet entitled Verem
Tehlikesi, Veremle Mücadele (Danger of Tuberculosis, Struggling with Tuberculosis), published in 1919, tuberculosis-related deaths constituted 10.8€percent of the total deaths in 1918 in Istanbul, which had a population of
940,000, which is a very high€percentage by any measure.107
The statistics pertaining to the period of 1901–1923 further show that
an average of 2,800 individuals were losing their lives due to tuberculosis
annually in Istanbul, which accounts for 15.8€percent of the total number
of deaths in the city. Between 1892 and 1914, a total of 14,700 individuals
died from tuberculosis in İzmir, which had a population of about 200,000.
In other words, the€percentage of deaths from tuberculosis in İzmir was
equal to that in Istanbul, which was 15.8€percent. In 1919, the number of
�tuberculosis-related deaths in Istanbul was three times greater than the
number of deaths from other diseases, which had to be reported to the relevant authorities.108
Typhus
Dr.€Feridun Frik notes that typhus was prevalent both within the army
and among the civilian population during the Great War.109 Cases of typhus already had been encountered in Istanbul in the wake of the Balkan
Ordeal with Diseases
97
Table 5.9. Data relevant to various diseases encountered in Aydin Province (March 1919)
Disease
Recovery
Death
Total
32
12
44
Tuberculosis
0
43
43
Puerperal fever
0
1
1
Meningitis
0
8
8
Smallpox
0
2
2
Recurrent fever
2
1
3
Typhoid
1
5
6
Measles
0
1
1
Plague
2
1
3
Erysipelas
0
1
1
Scarlet fever
0
1
1
Ordinary diseases
0
213
213
Contagious diseases
0
6
6
37
295
332
Spotted fever (Typhus)
Total
Wars. After World€War€I, it resurged again in Istanbul and spread all over
the country. In 1915 a typhus epidemic broke out in the School of Reserve
Officers in Yakacık, Istanbul, caused by the widely spreading lice.110 During the period of 1915–1916, typhus was also widely prevalent in Urfa, which
was located on the route of the convoys coming from the north.111 Finally,
in the third year of the war (1917), large-scale typhus epidemics were encountered on the Syrian and Iraqi fronts.112 Between 1917 and 1922, a total
of 10,806 people became ill with typhus in Istanbul, 1,181 of whom lost their
lives. In 1919 a public bath (hamam) was rented in Kasımpaşa, and two mobile and one stationary public baths were set up in Tophane, so that people
could bathe.113 When the typhus epidemic broke out in Istanbul in 1917, the
Mediterranean Fleet was not affected greatly, thanks to the doctors’ diligent
endeavors to make necessary arrangements with the hospitals nearby. For
instance, the common practice of giving uniforms of dead soldiers to others was abandoned in the case of typhus-related deaths.114 Typhus persisted
98
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
throughout the War of Liberation; during the stressful days of the Battle of
Sakarya, particularly the hospitals in Polatlı and Ankara were flooded with
thousands of typhus patients.115
Between 1919 and 1922, a total of 3,425 cases of typhus were encountered
in the armies of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, 552 of which resulted
in death.116 According to the statistical data published in Sıhhiye Mecmuası
(Medical Journal), only 333 cases of typhus were seen in Turkey in 1925. In
subsequent years, the number of typhus cases gradually decreased: 184 cases
in 1926; 179 cases in 1927; 106 cases in 1928; 117 cases in 1929; 254 cases in
1930; 181 cases in 1931; and 97 cases in 1932. A marked increase, however,
was observed in 1934, due to the outbreak of another epidemic of typhus in
which 3,943 cases were recorded.117
Trachoma
Trachoma had existed endemically only in the southern and eastern provinces of Turkey until the beginning of the Great War. The migrations caused
by the war, however, facilitated the spread of trachoma up into the Central
Anatolia. According to some records, around seven hundred children staying in the orphanages in Istanbul were diagnosed with trachoma in 1919.118
Throughout the war, epidemics of trachoma further spread all over Anatolia, causing many people to become blind.119 Other countries also encountered similar problems and took various measures against trachoma. In that
context, for instance, the United States declined to issue residence permits
to those wartime emigrants who were found or suspected to have the disease
upon medical examination. In the British and American armies, soldiers diagnosed with the disease were sent to treatment centers.120
Syphilis
As the war was coming to an end, a new wave of infectious diseases, including syphilis, ravaged Istanbul and other ruined towns and villages of Anatolia. Although the venereal diseases of gonorrhea, syphilis, cancroids, and
scabies were infrequent in Istanbul before 1914, they soared after the war began. Even Anatolia came under the threat of those diseases. The regulations
issued in 1915 with the aim of controlling venereal diseases found the existing norms “extremely liberal.” According to drafters of the new regulations,
ethical norms were insufficient. The primary purpose of those regulations
was to track the carriers of the VD and treat them before they transmitted
their illnesses to others.121
Ordeal with Diseases
99
During discussions on the health budget for the year 1918 in the Ottoman Cabinet, Şemsettin Bey, deputy from Ertuğrul, brought up the issue of
syphilis, underlining that “the country was being destroyed from inside by
a real enemy, and that the very existence of the nation was constantly being
threatened.”122 Fevzi Bey, the deputy from Diyarbakır, also pointed out that
syphilis was spreading not only in Istanbul, but also in other parts of the
country, including his own province, at an enormous speed.123
Just after World€War€I, Red Crescent health teams were dispatched to
several parts of Anatolia. The personnel who went to Trabzon kept very detailed notes on their journey as well as observations about the situation there
in their reports. The team, after stopping in İnebolu on 29 June 1919, arrived
in Giresun on 1 July. The first scene they witnessed was the coastal buildings
that were reduced to rubble by the bombardments. Hunger and poverty
prevailed in every corner of the city. Though the cases of recurrent fever were
infrequent in and around Giresun, a syphilis epidemic, gonorrhea, and scabies were widespread. The Giresun municipality doctor told the team members that about 20€percent of the people in Giresun were ill with syphilis.
The situation in Trabzon was no different. At the country hospital, which
was located in the center of the city and administered by the municipality,
one entire ward was allocated to patients of syphilis. The non-Muslims had
better conditions. The Greek Red Cross regularly examined and gave free
medicines to the non-Muslim patients. During their first days in Trabzon,
the Red Crescent team offered to work together with the Americans; but the
Americans responded by saying that although they did not discriminate on
the basis of race or religion, they would prefer to continue helping only the
Armenians and Greeks, since they needed help more than others. According to the reports of the Red Crescent team during their first days on duty, a
total of 270 malaria cases, 9 cases of syphilis, and many cases of scabies were
encountered in the polyclinic they opened in Trabzon. In Bayburt and its
environs, the districts and villages attacked by the Armenian militia needed
help desperately. When the Armenian militia had heard that the Ottoman
Army was approaching, they put thousands of Muslims seeking refuge in
Bayburt into large buildings and burned them alive.124
The Red Crescent team dispatched to Erzincan in 1919 had more or
less the same impressions as those of the team sent to Trabzon. A total of
15,000 patients were examined and treated at the outpatient clinics opened
by the Red Crescent team. According to statistics prepared by the team,
the diseases of malaria, scabies, recurrent fever, syphilis, and other skin diseases were frequent in the area. The Red Crescent team in Erzincan did
not discriminate between the local people, and provided underclothes and
100
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
provisions also to 78 Armenian and 40 Greek families living in the area. In
Harput, too, the Armenian and Turkish orphanages were provided with 500
sets of underclothes each.125
Malaria
In her book Türk’ün Ateşle İmtihanı (Turk’s Ordeal with Fire), Halide Edip
describes the epidemic of malaria, which spread all over Anatolia in the
1920s and also afflicted her, as follows:
We were all glad since none of us had caught a malign kind of malaria
which had diffused through Ankara. Later, I caught the most dangerous
type of that disease in Ankara, although I had survived through the severest
malaria epidemics in Syria.126
During the Balkan Wars and World€War€I, three quarters of the Ottoman population suffered from malaria. Other than distributing quinine to
patients, no measure could be implemented. During the war years, moreover, due to the difficulties encountered in importing quinine from European countries and the increase in prices, the amount of quinine distributed
to patients had to be further reduced.127 Whereas malaria existed as an endemic disease in the Ottoman Empire prior to World€War€I, it turned into
epidemics in various places after the war.128
According to the results of a study carried out during the war by Dr.€Tev�
fik Sağlam, the medical inspector of the 3rd Army, malaria affected parts of
the Black Sea coastal area extending from Tirebolu to the west of Canik Sanjak (a subdivision of the province in the Ottoman Empire), to certain parts
of Tokat and Amasya Sanjaks of Sivas province, to the Kuruçay district of
Erzurum, and to the provincial center and İncesu district of Kayseri.129 The
observations by the medical units of the Turkish Army indicate that malaria
was widely prevalent on the battlefields. During the course of the War of
Liberation, the rate of occurrence of malaria was 40€percent in the Ottoman
Army.130 A report prepared by Dr.€Ekrem Hayri in 1921, the general director
of hygiene, stated that a total of 172,000 cases of malaria were recorded in
and around Antalya; at the time, the population of Antalya was estimated to
be 200,000. During the same period, the rate of malaria reached 70€percent
in some parts of Anatolia.131 In 1924, a daily published in Antalya wrote
that the number of deaths, which had previously been twice the number of
births, showed a further increase in 1921 and became two and a half times
the number of births, causing a large decrease in population. The same daily
Ordeal with Diseases
101
also reported that in the villages of the Finike district of Antalya, the rate of
malaria among the population was 70.3€percent, while in some of the villages of Elmalı, another district of Antalya, the rate was 62.3€percent.132
Throughout the War of Liberation, the number of deaths from diseases
exceeded the number of soldiers who died on the battlefields. According to a
study on the casualties suffered during the two-year-long war, whereas 8,505
soldiers died in combat, 22,543 people died in hospitals.133
In December 1921, for instance, despite all measures taken before the
launch of the Grand Offensive, a total of 16,953 soldiers had to be admitted
to the hospital. That figure further increased to 29,193 in March 1922.134 As
of April 1922, the total number of ill soldiers was 27,834.135
In 1920, at the time of the establishment of the Ministry of Health, only
one bed per 4,100 persons was available in Anatolia.136 When the new Turkish Assembly, established on 23 April 1920 in Ankara, was in the process of
laying out the fundamentals of its health policy, it passed the 1921 Law on
Syphilis as part of its attempts to combat epidemic diseases.137
As pointed out by Dr.€Ömer Besim Pasha, who authored various studies on Turkey’s population policy, malaria continued to exist in Anatolia
in its severest form during the years immediately following World€War€I.
It not only reduced childbirths, but also greatly increased the number of
deaths.138 The research carried out by the medical units of the army during World€War€I had revealed the prevalence of malaria epidemics all over
Anatolia. After the conclusion of the war, soldiers returning to their homes
from battlefronts in Hijaz, Iraq, and other places with hot climates brought
with them malaria, particularly malaria tropic, and spread it throughout the
country.
In places where malaria reaches endemic proportions, the rate at which
it spreads is measured by the spleen size of people. If the ratio of individuals
having enlarged spleens is less than 10€percent in a certain area, malaria is
considered to be partially endemic there. Ratios of 10–25€percent indicate
that malaria is endemic at a medium level, while ratios of 25–50€percent
indicate highly endemic malaria. Ratios above 50€percent are accepted as
an indication of hyperendemic malaria. According to reports prepared by
the medical units for the period between 1917 and 1925, changes of about
80–90€percent had been recorded in the spleen indexes in Ankara, Balıkesir,
Denizli, Istanbul, Mardin, and Seyhan. During the period 1917–1926, the
spleen indexes measured in some of the cities were as follows: 90€percent in
Denizli, 80€percent in the Çekmece region of Istanbul, 40–90€percent in
Ankara, 20€percent in Bursa, and 70€percent in Eskişehir.139
During the War of Liberation, malaria was widespread among the
102
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Turkish soldiers (40€percent). That ratio was even higher among the civilians (50€percent). In some regions, the ratio of malarial patients even
exceeded the average: 70€percent around Samsun, 44€percent in Söke, and
50€percent among the laborers working on tunnel construction in the Taurus Mountains. Those figures were obtained based on tests made on the
blood samples of the people. In other places, the number of deaths due
to malaria epidemics was twice the total number of births.140 Malaria was
so widespread in Anatolia that even Mustafa Kemal Pasha had occasional
fevers, which meant his military doctor, Refik Saydam, had to accompany
him at all times.141 Indeed, the war increased the cases of malaria in Ankara.
When construction work started on the Yahşıhan railway line, the laborers
arriving from other places and suffering from malaria transmitted the infection even further in the region. In the years 1923 and 1924, almost everybody
in Ankara was affected with malaria.142
Infant Deaths
During the First National Medical Congress, held at the Grand National
Assembly between 1 and 3 September 1925 in Ankara, the subjects that received the most attention were the population policy, prevention of child
deaths, and the public health.143 A paper entitled “Infant Deaths,” presented
by Prof. Dr.€Asaf Derviş Pasha and Dr.€Hamit Osman, provided numbers
of deaths and births among the Muslims, Jews, and Armenians living in Istanbul, based on the official records. The authors noted that acute infectious
diseases of diphtheria, whooping cough, scarlet fever, and measles were the
prime causes of infant deaths. Syphilis also killed infants in their first three
months. In cities such as Adana and Mersin, malaria, too, was causing many
infant deaths. The paper also included information regarding the ratios of
births and infant deaths for various cities. It noted that compared to other
cities, the infant deaths were particularly high in Erzurum, which had a
cold climate, as well as in Mersin, which had a hot climate. It was also noted
that 95€percent of the infants were breast-fed. The death ratio was five times
greater among infants fed with artificial formulas than among those fed
with breast milk.144
The Ottoman armies fought five different wars between September 1911
and September 1922, where young people from Anatolia shed their blood in
Europe, Africa, and Asia. The poverty and deprivation caused by those wars
put its mark on the lives of people from all sectors of society throughout
Anatolia. The most destructive of those wars, however, were the ones waged
in Anatolia. In eastern Anatolia, the Great War had two dimensions: the
Ordeal with Diseases
103
Table 5.10. The epidemics and deaths in Turkey (number of casesâ•›/â•›number of deaths)
Disease
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
Scarlet fever
971╛╛/╛╛245
1,102╛╛/╛╛155
1,567╛╛/╛╛273
1,791╛╛/╛╛882
2,693╛╛/╛╛527
Smallpox
483╛╛/╛╛69
492╛╛/╛╛117
99â•›/â•›6
47â•›/â•›8
1,146â•›/â•›870
Measles
2,878â•›/â•›168
2,572â•›/â•›340
3,242â•›/â•›234
3,008â•›/â•›197
Puerperal fever
3,900â•›/â•›314
48â•›/â•›11
39â•›/â•›12
52â•›/â•›26
Diphtheria
336â•›/â•›56
567â•›/â•›74
790â•›/â•›113
1,120â•›/â•›189
889â•›/â•›135
Typhoid
607â•›/â•›59
751â•›/â•›63
974â•›/â•›154
982â•›/â•›738
1,058â•›/â•›106
Spotted fever
333â•›/â•›26
184â•›/â•›23
179â•›/â•›17
106â•›/â•›15
117â•›/â•›14
Recurrent fever
33â•›/â•›–
185â•›/â•›3
53â•›/â•›–
23â•›/â•›2
3â•›/â•›–
Yellow malaria
34â•›/â•›11
34â•›/â•›12
29â•›/â•›12
38â•›/â•›12
163â•›/â•›68
Amoebic
dysentery
56â•›/â•›2
711â•›/â•›22
126â•›/â•›15
398â•›/â•›43
494â•›/â•›33
Whooping cough
239â•›/â•›25
781â•›/â•›15
188â•›/â•›16
666â•›/â•›34
322â•›/â•›13
59â•›/â•›37
38â•›/â•›11
Russian occupation and the civil war. The defeat the Ottoman forces suffered on the Ottoman-Russian border between November and December
1914 was followed by the uprisings of the Armenians and the Nestorians in
Van in April 1915. During the same period, the Kurdish tribes, capitalizing
on the domestic chaos, conducted raids and attacked particularly the Christian communities. During the three years of war between the Turks and the
Russians, control over agricultural lands was not sustained long enough to
get the crops harvested. Every time the villagers had to move again, they
became vulnerable to hunger, enemy armies, and the incessant raids of the
Kurds; as a result, many villagers lost their lives.145
The Russian Army started to withdraw in November 1917, and an armistice was signed with the new Russian regime on 16 December 1917 in Erzincan. Armenian militia forces started a campaign to massacre the Muslim
people in the areas evacuated by the Russian Army in the Eastern front. The
Ottoman forces started a new offensive on 12 February 1918 to halt those
massacres. In the course of that expedition, some Turkish soldiers froze to
death. By the time the Turkish forces entered Erzurum on 12 March 1918,
the Armenian militia had massacred half of the civilian population.146
Ahmet Refik, after visiting the region in May 1918, reported his obser�
104
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
vations about Erzincan in his book entitled İki Komite İki Kıtal (Two Committees, Two Massacres):
Hunger and death were everywhere. Between the frightening rocks on the
banks of the mournfully purling Euphrates River, one could see a hungry
dog tearing the flesh of a Turk, killed and thrown onto the roadside by the
Armenians, or skulls of children with grinning teeth in the villages.
The entire Erzincan looks like a graveyard for the Turks. The neighborhoods of the city were in ruins. The destruction in the walls of the houses
indicated that the fiercest clashes between the Armenians and the Turks
had taken place there. The houses of both the Turks and the Armenians
were razed. The cemeteries of both the Turks and the Armenians also were
in a terrible condition. The fresh bodies lying in streets and inside wells,
which were still warm, and whose wounds were still bleeding, belonged
to the poor Turks shot dead by the Armenians. The courtyards of the Armenian houses known for their nice gardens with blossoming trees, and
well-╉decorated�paved courts were full of bloodstains. A very heavy smell
was coming out of the narrow wells in the gardens, making one dizzy. One
could see the poor Turks’ hair and pieces of their clothes which stuck on the
inner walls of those wells.
The ruined buildings, the burned down houses, and grounds near the
walls were full of dead Turkish bodies; pieces of arms, skulls, greasy leg
bones, and the corpses not yet decayed spread all around. The residents
were in great sorrow, exhaustion, and misery. The ones wandering around
in the marketplace were poor and hungry creatures, who no longer looked
like human beings. They had no shoes on, their faces were darkened under
the sun, and they were all in ragged clothes. Most of the shops were closed
down; and the remaining ones were selling only herbs as foodstuff for the
people. Except for the Army Command, bread was not available anywhere.
If the commander had not provided food, even the mutasarrıf (governor of
a sanjak) would surely die of hunger.147
By 1918, even those who were committing raids and plunders must have
fallen hungry, because practically no livestock was left by then to be seized.
The people grew entirely helpless and hunger-stricken, and the diseases of
cholera, typhus, influenza, and dysentery took the lives of many. Despite
the misery on both sides, one more fight was fought between Turkey and the
Republic of Armenia in 1919.148
The battles in the west were ignited by the Greek Army’s invasion of
İzmir in May 1919. The war extended to the areas beyond the battlefronts
Ordeal with Diseases
105
where the Turkish and Greek armies engaged each other. As had been the
case in eastern Anatolia, the Turco-Greek war soon turned into a civil war
between the two nations of the Ottoman Empire. This time, combatants
were the Muslims and the Greeks. Most of the deaths and destruction that
occurred in the course of the war resulted from the attacks conducted by
different Ottoman subjects, who aimed at taking revenge for the evil actions
performed or believed to be performed against them, either recently or centuries before. They failed to observe the laws of war in this conflict.149
6
UNBURIED CORPSES
Now snowflakes thickly falling in the winter breeze
Have cloaked alike the hard, unbending ilex
And the grey, drooping branches of the olive trees,
Transmuting into silver all their lead;
And, in between the winding lines, in No Man’s Land,
Have softly covered with a glittering shroud,
The unburied dead.
—â•›M alcolm Ross,
“The Unburied”
Much has been written about various episodes in history, characterized
by the extreme ruthlessness, unrestricted behavior, and oppressive aims of
fighters. Humanity has faced mass exterminations, conducted during times
of war, which continued through generations. Attila the Hun used to raze
the places he passed through in order to mark his victories. The concept
of “all-out war” was part of daily life for the people living in the medieval
towns surrounded by high walls, and a defeat always meant migration, destruction, and death.1
The Great War, which lasted for four long years from 1914 to 1918, demonstrated similar characteristics to previous wars. It was in many ways the
continuation of a recurrent pattern in history. Although it shared many
commonalities with other major wars in history, it still had unique features
as far as the territories occupied during the course of war, the technological
intensity of battles, and its comprehensiveness. This war is rightfully known
as the first “global war” in military history, and as a result the losses it caused
were incomparably higher than previous wars.
According to Eric Hobsbawm, the First World€War€Involved all major powers, and all European states except for Spain, the Netherlands, the
three Scandinavian countries, and Switzerland. What is more, troops from
106
Unburied Corpses
107
Table 6.1. French, German, Belgian, and American death ratios
Nationality
Deaths in combat (%)
Deaths due to diseases (%)
French
13.5
2.0
German
13.7
1.0
Belgian
8.5
3.0
American
4.5
1.7
overseas were sent to fight and work outside their own regions, a phenomenon not generally seen in previous wars. The Canadians fought in France; a
distant peninsula in the Aegean—“Gallipoli”—became part of the national
myth of the Australians and New Zealanders; and more significantly, the
United States acted against George Washington’s warning to avoid “European entanglements” and sent its soldiers to fight there, which determined
the course of twentieth-century history. Indians were deployed to Europe
and the Middle East, Chinese labor battalions were brought to the West,
and Africans served in the French army. Although military operations outside Europe were insignificant, except for the battles in the Middle East, the
naval war was once again global: the first naval battle was fought in 1914 off
the Falkland Islands, and several naval campaigns were decisive of the war’s
outcome, such as the fighting between German submarines and Allied convoys on and under the seas of the North and mid-Atlantic.2
The Casualties Of The Great War
According to a study carried out in 1920, the total number of deaths during
the war is estimated at 35 million. In addition to the battlefield deaths, epidemic diseases such as typhus and influenza took a heavy toll among both
troops and civilians. The influenza epidemics alone accounted for the lives
of millions of men and women. According to the same source, combatrelated�casualties were 13 million.3
The statistics in Table 6.1, published in Paris in 1925, provide valuable
information on the ratio of deaths that various armies suffered from battles
and diseases. These statistics, however, do not include the Ottoman army.4
One British source in 1934 claimed that the exact figures on human
losses during the Great War would never be established. Various factors
complicated obtaining correct figures. For instance, in some countries, such
as Russia and Turkey, statistical information gathered was unreliable. France,
108
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Table 6.2. Total war casualties according to Cruttwell
Country
Dead
Wounded
Prisoner
England
747,023
2,493,906
19,652
3,260,581
1,385,300
447,000
446,300
2,278,600
460,000
947,000
530,000
1,937,000
1,700,000
4,950,000
2,500,000
9,150,000
115,660
205,690
4,526
325,876
Germany
1,808,545
4,247,143
617,922
6,673,610
Austria-Hungary
1,200,000
3,620,000
2,200,000
7,020,000
325,000
400,000
1,565,000
2,290,000
France
Italy
Russia
USA
Turkey
Total
on the other hand, did not publish a total number of wounded. Germany
did not include the slightly wounded in its casualty lists. Many countries involved in the First World War could not ascertain the number of casualties
and prisoners. The borders of many countries, moreover, were changed after
the war. The number of recorded deaths was calculated at 10,004,771, while
the estimate of additional, unrecorded deaths was 2,991,800, which together
add up to 12,996,571. Deaths from diseases are included in this figure.5
As shown in Table 6.2, prepared based on information provided in
1934 by the abovementioned British source, Germany leads in terms of
the number of dead (1,808,545). It ranks second in terms of the numbers
of wounded (4,247,143) and prisoners (2,200,000), and third in total casualties (6,673,610). Russia ranks second in terms of the number of dead
(1,700,000), but it sits at the top of the list in terms of the numbers of
wounded (4,950,000) and prisoners (2,500,000), as well as in total casualties (9,150,000). In terms of the number of dead, Germany and Russia
are followed by France (1,385,300), Austria-Hungary (1,200,000), England
(747,023), Italy (460,000), and Turkey (325,000).6
The same source admits that the figures pertaining to Turkish losses
are incomplete. In another study published nine years later, Colonel A. G.
Butler of the Australian Army established that Turkey’s losses during the
war were greater than previously estimated. According to this 1943 study,
Turkey’s battle-related human losses were 948,447, whereas the losses occurring outside battles were 3,967,000. Turkey’s losses from epidemic diseases
Unburied Corpses
109
were not included in A. G. Butler’s tables, either. As in the British study, the
number of deaths was given as 325,000.7
These studies bring to mind several questions. In estimating the human
losses of war, should we take into account only those killed in combat? As
the case of World€War€I demonstrates, epidemics took the lives of not only
troops but also of a great many people living within the boundaries of the
Ottoman Empire during the war years. It is obvious that those deaths occurring due to epidemics need to be included in an estimation of the total
losses of that country. Indeed it would be useful to give figures on deaths
from epidemics separately, to better differentiate between deaths in combat,
either by wounds or by epidemic diseases.
According to William H. McNeill, “In the course of World€War€I, huge
waves of typhus, striking from time to time, were destroying armies, deserting prisons, and badly hitting houses of the poor. About 2–3 million people
lost their lives due to epidemics.”8 And Hanson Baldwin stated, “An enormous scale of destruction was brought to light by typhus, chickenpox, and
the plague. Hunger became more prevalent than ever. The views of babies
with swollen bellies made those who saw them lose their sleep.”9
During the Great War, the number of disease-related casualties among
troops of all the nations involved was about 1.5 million. The French journal
Drapeau estimates the number of casualties due to diseases at 3,115,000,
which is generally considered to be a highly inflated figure. In fact, epidemic
diseases did not cause such a big damage in Europe. The effects of epidemics
were felt most severely within the Ottoman Army.10 Within the European
continent, the other exception in that regard was the Serbian Army. In the
very early stages of the war, a typhus epidemic killed a large number of soldiers serving in the Serbian Army.
New advances in medicine, developments in the eradication of lice, and
improvised mobile hygiene measures in military units were the main factors
that helped reduce the number of deaths from epidemics in the West.
In the decade before World€War€I another important medical discovery
that altered the epidemiology of European armies profoundly was between
1909 and 1912, when the role of the louse in spreading typhus fever was
understood. This, together with a systematic immunization against other
common infections, was what made the unexampled concentration of millions of men in the trenches of northern France, in 1914–1918, medically
possible. Passing men and clothing through delousing stations became part
of the ritual of going to and returning from the front; and this prevented
110
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
typhus from playing the lethal role on the Western Front that it did, sporadically but dramatically, in the East. Even when typhus did break out on
the Eastern Front in 1915, disease losses in the ranks remained well below
the losses from enemy action, as long as organization and discipline remained intact.11
In his study on the Ottoman Army’s experience with deaths and desertions in 1914–1918, Eric Jan Zürcher emphasized that the ratio of deaths
among patients was about 50€percent in the Ottoman Army, whereas that
ratio was only 10€percent in the German Army.12
Another study, published by Tevfik Sağlam, the medical chief of the
Ottoman 3rd Army during the Great War, lends support to the assessment that epidemic diseases caused extreme damage to the Ottoman Army
compared to other armies. According to his study, during the four years
of World€War€I, the German Army suffered 1,651,072 deaths, 87€percent
of which were caused by wounds or other external factors, whereas epidemic diseases accounted for 11€percent of total deaths, corresponding to
177,162 individuals. The total strength of the German forces in the war was
6,400,000 men. That means, an average of 2,953 deaths per month occurred
due to diseases. When that figure is compared with that of the Ottoman 3rd
Army, it appears that the ratio of deaths from disease in the Ottoman Army
was nearly fifty times higher.13
According to information provided by the Military Health Administration of the Ottoman Armies, during the four years of the war, 47€percent
of the servicemen were hospitalized, 17€percent of whom died in the hospital.14 Colonel Butler’s study, entitled “Australian Army Medical Services in
the War of 1914–1918,” published in 1943, included detailed statistical data
regarding the casualties of the belligerents in the Great War. Colonel Butler
took the figures on the casualties from the military publications of the respective countries.15
Austro-Hungarian Casualties
When the numbers of dead, wounded, and prisoners of the participants in
the Great War are compared to their total populations, Austria-Hungary appears to have suffered the highest casualties. According to the official explanation made in late May 1918, the total casualties of the Austro-Hungarian
Army amounted to 4 million, consisting of 800,000 dead and 3.2 million
wounded. When 1.8 million prisoners are added to that figure, the total casualties reach 5.8 million.16
A total of 300,000 soldiers from the Austro-Hungarian Army died due
Unburied Corpses
111
Table 6.3. Total war casualties according to Colonel Butler
Allied
Countries
Number of
troops
Dead
Wounded
Prisoner
and missing
Total
casualty
Ratios
England
8,485,926
897,780
2,085,377
266,700
3,249,857
38.30
France
8,194,150
1,457,000
2,300,000
478,000
4,235,000
51.68
Russia
15,123,000
664,890
3,813,827
3,950,000
8,428,717
55.73
Italy
5,615,000
650,000
947,000
600,000
2,197,000
39.13
USA
2,040,000
51,606
234,300
4,500
290,406
14.24
Japan
800,000
300
907
3
1,210
0.15
Belgium
267,000
13,716
44,686
34,659
93,061
34.85
Serbia
707,343
45,000
133,148
152,958
331,106
46.81
50,000
3,000
10,000
7,000
20,000
40.00
Romania
750,000
335,706
120,000
80,000
535,706
71.43
Greece
261,890
5,000
21,000
1,000
27,000
10.31
Portugal
191,362
7,222
13,751
12,318
33,291
17.40
42,485,671
4,131,220
9,723,996
5,587,138
19,442,354
45.76
13,387,000
1,061,740
5,397,884
771,659
7,231,283
54.02
Austria
7,800,000
1,200,000
3,620,000
2,200,000
7,020,000
90.00
Turkey
2,850,000
325,000
400,000
250,000
975,000
34.21
Bulgaria
1,200,000
87,500
152,390
27,029
266,919
22.24
25,237,000
2,674,240
9,570,274
3,248,688
15,493,202
61.39
Montenegro
Total
AXIS
Countries
Germany
Total
to freezing and disease. The deaths from various epidemic diseases are broken down as follows: tuberculosis (43,000), enteric fever (24,000), cholera
(16,000), dysentery (11,000), and malaria (3,000).17 A Turkish source writes
that 171,601 individuals became ill with typhoid in the Austro-Hungarian
Army, 17,399 of whom (10.14€percent) died.18 Just as the Serbs in 1915–1916
and the Russians in 1917–1918, Austro-Hungarians suffered from epidemicrelated deaths both in the military and among the civilians.19 In the AustroHungarian Army, despite prolonged exposure to the epidemic of typhus
112
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Table 6.4. Austro-Hungarian casualties (1914–1918)
Dead
800,000
Wounded and ill
3,200,000
Prisoner
1,800,000
Total
5,800,000
Table 6.5. French casualties (1914–1918)*
Soldiers on the front
8,410,000
Combat deaths
674,700
Deaths from wounds
250,000
Wounded
2,300,000
Missingâ•›/â•›dead
225,300
Prisoner
252,700
Total casualties in battle
3,702,700
Deaths due to diseases
175,000
Recovered from diseases
800,000
Total casualties
4,677,700
*â•›From Butler, Australian Army Medical Services, 870, taken from Table 6.
raging in Serbia, disease-induced losses never exceeded 50€percent of the
losses from enemy action.20
French Casualties
The total French losses during the war are estimated at approximately 5 million, approximately 1,400,000 of whom were dead or missing. Of those casualties, 175,000 soldiers died of disease. In the French Navy, there were 4,000
who died from Spanish influenza, which together add up to 179,000.21 Of
the 124,991 soldiers who were infected with typhoid, 15,211 (12.17€percent)
died.22
By 1917, the French Army had suffered 1 million dead, and after another
disastrous offensive in Champagne in April, half of its servicemen under
arms refused to obey further orders to attack. The episode, loosely described
as mutiny, was in a sense a large-scale military strike against an operation
Unburied Corpses
113
which had no chance of success. By the conclusion of the war, four out of
nine Frenchmen under arms either died or were wounded.23 By November
1918, France had lost 1.7 million out of a population of 40 million.24
Russian Casualties
In the Russian Army, a total of 395,000 soldiers died from either freezing or
disease. Russian sources give the numbers of dead and wounded at about 1.7
million and 5 million respectively. Other sources estimate the actual number of dead at closer to 3 million.25 Typhus continued to plague Russia after
the war, as well; during the period 1918–1922, about 20 to 30 million cases
of typhus were recorded in that country.26 According to W. E. D. Allen and
Paul Muratoff, the operations against the Ottoman 2nd and 3rd armies during 1916 resulted in heavy costs for Russia’s Caucasian Army. Losses for the
period between June and September 1916 amounted to some 50,000 (mostly
in General Baratov’s forces), due mainly to sickness.27
Russian troops on the western sector of the front could rest in the comparatively clement valleys of the Kelkit and Karasu, but those on the Dersim
and Bingöl Mountain could only shelter in the wild alpine valleys of the Endres (at 1500–1700 m elevation) and the Ognot (at 1800–1900 m) In these
valleys the frost was as severe as on the upper ridges and the snow, piled in
great drifts by driving gales, lay even deeper. Despite their winter equipment, troops of the 2nd and 4th Plastun Brigades and 4th and 6th Rifle
Divisions suffered terribly; many patrols were frozen to death, and casualties from frostbite were heavy. All these units had fought hard and suffered
severe losses in the fighting of late summer, and by January 1917 their ranks
were gravely thinned. There were periods when the men of the 4th Caucasian Rifle Division were receiving only half a pound of bread daily and
horses only one and a half pounds of barley. There was no meat and no conserves, and men were boiling soup from the flesh of donkeys, cats, and dogs.
Only in February did headquarters find it possible to relieve this excellent
unit and bring it into reserve at Erzurum. Slightly better were the conditions of the 66th Infantry Division on the southern slopes of the Şerafettin
Mountains. But here, in March, typhus broke out, imported perhaps from
the neighboring town of Muş.28 As noted in General Maslovsky’s study, The
Caucasus Front, the Russian Army lost 100,000 of its soldiers in the winter
of 1917 due to hunger, illness, and severe cold. Even though the Russians’
depots were full of foodstuffs, the Russian troops had to eat the meat of
donkeys and dogs, due to the fact that none of the wheeled vehicles could be
used. Fahri Belen also notes that in the winter of 1917, the two armies lost a
total of 20,000 men because of cold, illness, and malnutrition.29
114
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Toward the middle of the war, the Russian army, whose exact casualties never were established, began to “vote for peace with its feet,” as Lenin
metaphorically put it. Without the military catastrophes that the Tsarist
army experienced in East Prussia, Poland, and the Ukraine, Lenin and his
comrades hardly would have achieved the political victory in the October
revolution in Petrograd in 1917.30
British Casualties
The Entente Powers deployed around 500,000 troops in Gallipoli in 1915,
some 410,000 of which were British and 79,000 were French. Of this total,
43,000 British officers and recruits either were killed, taken prisoner, posted
as missing, or died of wounds or disease. The total British casualties, including those evacuated sick, amounted to 205,000; French casualties were
47,000.31 According to another source, the total casualties of the British
Army in Gallipoli were 213,980. Of those, 145,154 died from diseases. Dysentery caused the highest number of deaths; it alone accounted for 29,728
deaths. It was followed by diarrhea with 10,373 fatalities. The number of
those who died from enteric fever was 9,423, whereas 15,000 men froze to
death during the extreme cold in November 1915. Some British soldiers, on
the other hand, died in accidents. According to the same source, the official figures for the Ottoman casualties are cited as 251,000. The Ottoman
records, however, are not reliable, and according to other sources, the total
Ottoman casualties were about 350,000.32
According to German General Hans Kannengiesser, in Gallipoli the
Entente deployed 539,000 expeditionary forces, whereas the Turkish defense lines involved 310,000 men. Where total British casualties, including
dead, wounded, missing, and prisoners, equaled 180,282 men (33€percent
of the forces), the Turks lost 165,371 men (53€percent). The sick, moreover,
numbered as high as 85,938 men on the Ottoman side, where similar figures
for the British forces were not available.33
During the Great War, the medical standards of the British Army were
clearly superior to its rivals. Some experts even defined the war as “the war
of engineers and doctors.”34 For instance, on the Gallipoli front, the equipment left behind by the retreating British forces clearly showed the superiority of the British Army. Liman von Sanders noted that the British forces
abandoned five small ships and more than sixty transportation boats on the
coast of the area extending from the Suvla Bay to Arıburnu. In addition,
many narrow-gauge railway cars, telephones, materials used in installing
woven wire, all kinds of tools, depots of medicines, various sorts of medical
equipment, water filters, ammunition used by infantry and artillery units,
Unburied Corpses
115
limbers, equipment used in parking vehicles, various kinds of weapons,
boxes full of hand grenades and machine-gun barrels, canned food, sacks of
flour and barley, and high piles of wood were left behind by the British. The
corpses of many horses killed by the British because they could not be taken
back on the ships were also strewn around.35 Although the British troops
were relatively well supplied, they suffered from other problems. The main
problems the British forces had to overcome were the heavy psychological
stress and very bad hygienic conditions caused by being tightly packed together in a narrow area.
Sir William Robertson, the British chief of staff, makes an important
confession, in his study entitled Soldiers and Statesmen, 1914–1918, with regard to the melting away of his soldiers due to diseases: In August 1915, even
before the intensification of the clashes, they already had lost 24€percent of
their strength due to diseases. According to the information communicated
by the medical officer, during the medical checks made of seven Anzac battalions in September (one month later), 50€percent of the troops had been
observed to have heart disorders, while 78€percent had been suffering from
diarrhea and 64€percent from dermal sores. From time to time, it was necessary to transfer a total of one thousand patients in one day. Though patient
care improved in October, by then the troops had been so physically and
psychologically worn out that they were not able to endure a battle lasting
more than twenty-four hours. In Sir Robertson’s words, “The British Army,
in its entire history, had never suffered from so many and bitter casualties
from infectious diseases.”36
In the above-mentioned historical study, the spreading of fatal diseases
all over Anatolia and the mass annihilations caused by them in the winter
of 1914–1915 and all through 1916 were explained in detail and proven by
documents.
Throughout the Great War, the British Empire suffered 3,260,581 casualties, of which 947,023 were dead or missing. When those figures were
disclosed to the British citizenry after the war, public opinion came to view
the war as a great disaster. An intense feeling of panic spread throughout the
country. Granted, Great Britain was able to overcome the trauma generated
by the war casualties more swiftly compared to its allies.37 Of the 1 million
soldiers lost by the British Empire during the war, 700,000 were recruited
from the British Isles, which had a total population of 50 million.38
The British chief of general staff notes that the ratio of the sick for the
British soldiers serving on the Mesopotamian front was very high: “When
the expenditures made for the ill in different camps in the East are added, the
numbers obtained become very high.” The figures on health expenditures
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
116
Table 6.6. British Army hospital admissions in November 1916
French Front
433
Egyptian Front
656
Salonika Front
1,036
Mesopotamian Front
2,135
Table 6.7. Casualties suffered up to October 1917â•›*
Deaths in combat and from wounds
1,138,768
Deaths from disease
85,088
Prisoners
387,979
Missing
263,043
Heavily wounded
652,021
Wounded
328,431
Slightly wounded
1,829,820
Other wounded
Total
315,263
5,000,413
*â•›From Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire, 354.
also indicate that compared to the other fronts, the British army fighting
on the Eastern front had a higher number of casualties due to diseases. The
same report also adds that “the number of deaths caused by disease on the
French Front was slightly more than the number of ill in Great Britain in
peacetime.”39
Syphilis was a major disease the British military medical personnel had
to cope with during the Great War. As a syphilis epidemic spread through
the British soldiers, the doctors initially failed to respond effectively, with
moral weakness, rather than medical reasons, causing the delay in intervening in the epidemic.40
German Casualties
Germany’s persistence to the very end, despite the loss of more than 2 million
people from a prewar population of 70 million, is all the more remarkable.41
The German Army lost 188,000 of its soldiers due to noncombat-related
Unburied Corpses
117
Table 6.8. German casualties according to Colonel Butler (1914–1918)
Number of soldiers on the front
13,387,000
Combat deaths
772,687
Deaths among wounded
289,053
Deaths from gas
Wounded
80,000
5,397,884
Missingâ•›/â•›prisoner
Total casualties in battle
771,659
7,311,283
Deaths due to diseases
150,000
Recovered from diseases
21,498,303
Total casualties
28,959,586
deaths. Excluding the deaths caused by accidents, suicides, or murders, the
number of soldiers dying from diseases was 150,000. As far as fatalities are
concerned, pneumonia ranked first among the various diseases (27,000
deaths). It was followed by tuberculosis (20,000), influenza (14,000), and
typhus (11,000).42 According to a Turkish source, 112,364 soldiers became ill
with typhus in the German Army, 11,405 of whom (10.15€percent) died.43
According to the German press, German war casualties (as of 1 November 1918) consisted of 1,600,000 dead, 203,000 missing, 618,000 prisoners,
and 4,064,000 wounded, adding up to 6,485,000.44 These figures show a
similarity with the figures given by another source (Wolf Bureau) about
the casualties suffered through 30 April 1919.45 The figures published in a
journal, Majority Socialist, on 6 January 1920 also are in compliance with
the above-mentioned figures. That journal further adds that the number of
casualties among German officers was 210,812.46
Casualties Of Other Countries In The Great War
According to an official statement made on 1 April 1920, the fatalities in the
U.S. Army were as shown in Table 6.9.47 The 325,876 casualties the U.S.
Army suffered are broken down as follows: 115,660 dead (including deaths
from diseases), 205,690 wounded, and 4,526 captive or missing. One of the
documents published by the medical section of the U.S. Army further notes
that a total of 60,000 deaths occurred due to diseases within the U.S. Army
and Navy during World€War€I.48
118
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Table 6.9. U.S. Army fatalities
Combat deaths
35,560
Deaths among wounded
14,720
Deaths due to diseases
57,460
Deaths from miscellaneous reasons
Total number of deaths
7,920
115,660
Table 6.10. Bulgarian casualties (1914–1918)
Number of soldiers on the front
768,000
Combat deaths
48,917
Death among wounded
13,198
Deaths caused by accidents
888 (?)
Deaths due to diseases
24,497
Missing
13,799
Wounded
Prisoner
152,390
10,623
In the Bulgarian Army, too, diseases took a heavy toll, with 24,000
deaths from various diseases. According to a document prepared by the Bulgarian War Cabinet, an even greater number of soldiers had to be called off
from combat zones because of illness.49
Italy joined the war nine months after Britain. Except for their involvement in operations in Salonika and later in France, their major military
operations were confined within the borders of Italy. Despite this fact, however, the number of casualties reached a figure as high as 460,000. This figure
equals half of the total casualties suffered by the British Empire in the entire
land and sea battles the British military fought.50 It was even speculated that
the Italian Army’s casualty figures during its eleven abortive offensives over
the Alps against the Austrian Army in May 1915 reached suicidal proportions: as many as one million. There came a point where the soldiers began
refusing to obey the orders given by their commanders. In the end, the Italian Army was demolished by a joint attack of the Germans and Austrians;
Unburied Corpses
119
Table 6.11. Casualties of Ottoman Empire according to a British source
Combat deaths
50,000
Deaths among wounded
35,000
Deaths due to diseases
240,000
Wounded
400,000
Total
725,000
Prisoners, deserters, missing
1,565,000
General total
2,290,000
Italy was then practically out of the war until the armistice. It lost 600,000
of its people out of a total population of 36 million.51
According to a British source, 53,000 individuals died of diseases in Italian hospitals. Another 32,000 died from diseases while waiting to be drafted
into the army. The total Italian casualties due to diseases were 85,000. On
the other hand, in the Romanian Army, 30,000 soldiers died from disease.
In the Belgian, Greek, and Portuguese armies, the numbers of deaths due to
diseases were 2,300, 16,994, and 1,002 respectively.52
Turkish Casualties
At the international level, the first statistics regarding Ottoman casualties
in the Great War was published in 1922 by British military authorities. According to those statistics, a total of 85,000 Ottoman soldiers died in combat and from wounds. Diseases took a further 240,000 lives, for a total altogether of 325,000 dead. When 400,000 wounded are added to that figure,
the total number of casualties reaches 725,000. The same study estimates the
number of prisoners, deserters, and missing at 1.5 million. Based on those
figures, the British military authorities claimed that the Ottoman Army suffered 2,300,000 casualties.53
A second foreign study on Ottoman Army losses in the Great War was
published by a French officer, Commandant Larcher, in 1926, whose estimates approximate those of the British statistics published in 1922. When
the Ottoman Army’s total losses of 2,300,000 are subtracted from the number of soldiers recruited throughout the war, it appears that at the time of the
signing of the Mondros Armistice in 1918, Turkey still had 560,000 soldiers
at its disposal. Larcher notes that those official figures are based on a decree
120
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
issued by the Ottoman government on 30 January 1919, and they could only
give a rough estimate of the losses. According to Larcher, given that in Gallipoli alone 55,000 soldiers died, the Ottoman total fatality figure of 325,000
may actually have been closer to 500,000 to 600,000. Larcher also remarks
that in Anatolia, 500,000 Muslim migrants coming from the East, 800,000
Armenians, and 325,000 Greeks lost their lives due to massacres, deportation, and the adverse living conditions in the labor battalions.54
Professor Hikmet Bayur discusses the statistical data made available by
Larcher. Bayur observes that since Lieutenant Colonel Nihat, who translated Larcher’s study into Turkish, corrected some of the factual mistakes
concerning Turkey, those figures might be assumed to be reliable (up to
the year 1928).55 It is not unusual that in the 1930s several translators of the
foreign studies on military history or the memoirs of foreign individuals
made some corrections or additions. As far as Larcher’s study goes, another
thing that catches one’s attention is that whereas the numbers of Armenian
and Greek losses are exaggerated unreasonably, the Turkish losses were remarkably lower compared to the actual figures. This makes us think that
as of 30 January 1919, the entire statistics regarding the four-year-long war
had not been gathered in the Turkish Military Archives yet (see Table 6.12).
The differences in figures provided by foreign and national studies could be
explained by the fact that in the early 1930s, the statistical data regarding the
deaths that occurred in the Great War could not be uncovered fully since the
documents being kept in separate folders in the Turkish Military Archives
had not yet been classified. That confusion in the data also continued in the
following decades.
In a speech he delivered at a conference held in 1950 at the Turkish
War Academy, Tevfik Bıyıklıoğlu stated that the Ottoman Army deployed
around 700,000 men in Gallipoli; of those, 190,000 were either killed or
wounded and another 70,000 became sick.56 Based on his research on the
documents available in the Turkish Military Archives, Fahri Belen argues
that the total Ottoman losses in Gallipoli amounted to 190,000, consisting
of 55,000 dead, 100,000 wounded, 10,000 missing, and 25,000 sick.57 Belen
also writes that the British losses in Gallipoli consisted of 43,000 dead and
72,000 wounded. When the French losses, which totaled 30,000, are added
to that, the overall losses of the Entente Powers are found to be 145,000.58
Apart from those studies, some figures also could be obtained from
various individuals’ memoirs or personal reflections on the wartime conditions. For instance, Münim Mustafa notes that a total of 21,498 Turkish
soldiers died due to illnesses at Gallipoli.59 However, the British author Alan
Unburied Corpses
121
Table 6.12. Total casualties of the Ottoman armies (1914–1918)
Under treatment
2,167,941
Disabled
891,364
Dead
501,091
3,560,396
Total
Table 6.13. Deaths in the nine Ottoman armies
Deaths from
diseases
Deaths from
wounds
Total
deaths
57,462
21,988
79,450
Second year of war
126,216
21,986
148,202
Third year of war
133,469
8,081
141,550
Fourth year of war
84,712
7,407
92,119
401,859
59,462
461,321
Years
First year of war
Total of four years
Moorehead states that at Gallipoli, the Ottoman side buried 76,000 of its
soldiers, 55,000 killed in battle and 21,000 died from disease. According
to Moorehead, apart from those who died, the Ottoman side had 100,000
wounded, and had to send 64,000 soldiers to the rear areas because of illness. When another 10,000 missing also are added, the Ottoman Army’s
cumulative casualties reach 250,000.60
A study published by the Turkish General Staff in 1935 argues that the total number of deaths in the Ottoman Army was 650,000, of which 240,000
were caused by various diseases.61 That figure confirms the estimations made
by Larcher in 1926 about the number of deaths.62 As stated, the first official
statistical data regarding the Ottoman Army’s casualties in the war was provided by a decree issued by the Ottoman government on 30 January 1919
(see Table 6.12). This decree stated that a total of 2,850,000 soldiers were
drafted into the army during the war. By November 1918, military force
available to the Empire had fallen to only 60,000 men. A total of 800,000
individuals, moreover, were disabled in the war. Most of the disabled were
unable to earn a living, and their number is high compared to the numbers
of disabled in other countries involved in the war.63 An article prepared
by the medical department of the Turkish General Staff and published by
122
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Dr.€Osman Şevki in the daily Tasvir-i Efkar on 15 December 1921 also included similar statistics.64 According to that article, the Ottoman fatalities
amounted to 500,000. A total of 891,336 soldiers and officers, moreover,
were discharged from the army due to various reasons, such as recreation,
weakness, or retirement.65
Ahmet Emin published a book in 1930 based on the data he obtained
from the Department of Health of the Ministry of National Defense, which
included very detailed statistical information.66 This study provides fatality
figures on nine different Ottoman armies that fought on different fronts.
When the figures about self-standing units and other fronts are also added
(64,100 deaths from diseases and 8,916 deaths from wounds), we obtain a
total of 466,759 deaths due to diseases and 68,378 deaths due to wounds.
Accordingly, the grand total of fatalities according to the military health
department is around 535,137. In evaluating these figures, one must bear in
mind that the author himself underlines that the losses in Gallipoli were
not included in these statistics. Based on the figures given by Ahmet Emin,
we see that in the Great War the Ottoman Army suffered 60,000 combat deaths, whereas another 400,000 died of diseases. The total fatalities of
the Ottoman Army, excluding those in Gallipoli, were as much as 460,000
men.67
The same source also gives valuable information as to the distribution
of the deaths caused by various diseases. As can be seen from Table 6.14, the
ratio of deaths caused by typhus and dysentery (especially typhus) was considerably high ( as much as one-third).
In addition to the records of the regular armies, various military formations and enlistment stations that served during the Great War reported
the following cases of sickness and death: Among the causes of sickness,
malaria came first, with 461,799 cases and 23,351 deaths. Next was dysentery
with about 147,000 cases and 40,000 deaths. The figures for intermittent fever were approximately 103,000 cases and 4,000 deaths; for typhus, 93,000
cases and 26,000 deaths; for syphilis, about 27,000 cases and 150 deaths.
According to Ahmet Emin, the total loss of life due directly to the Great
War is variously estimated at between 1.5 and 2.5 million. As narrated by Ahmet Emin, Rıza Nur, on the other hand, suggests a figure closer to 3 million.
Despite the disagreements on the exact figures, however, it is agreed that of
all the able-bodied men who were under arms during the war, only 10 to
20€percent returned to their villages. Yalman even contends that without the
mass desertions that took place during the last part of the war, the survival
of the Turkish nation might have become problematical.68
Unburied Corpses
123
Table 6.14. Distribution of deaths by various diseases
Disease
Number of
deaths
Number of
cases
Malaria
23,351
461,799
Dysentery
40,000
147,000
4,000
103,000
Typhus
26,000
93,000
Syphilis
150
27,000
Recurrent fever
Niall Ferguson in 1999 and Edward J. Erickson in 2001 published their
own estimates on the Ottoman military casualties. In The Pity of War, Niall
Ferguson calculates that Ottoman losses were around 804,000 dead, 400,000
wounded, and 250,000 prisoners. He also notes that this total of 1,454,000
is the most recent estimate; the actual number of Ottoman casualties may
range between a minimum of 970,000 and a maximum of 2,290,000.69
According to Edward J. Erickson’s own estimates, the Ottoman military
casualties were 771,844 dead or missing (comprised of 243,598 deaths in
combat, 61,487 missing in action, and 466,759 deaths from diseases), and
a total of 763,753 wounded, including 303,150 seriously wounded.70 Like
other scholars, Erickson adds a note of caution that the exact costs of defeat
in the First World War for Turkey remains hard to calculate. In spite of meticulous records kept by the wartime Turkish staff, none of Turkey’s official
histories contain consolidated casualty statistics for the entire war.71
As part of a research project, the records available in the Turkish Military Archives in Ankara were carefully analyzed in 2004. In particular, the
statistical data regarding the losses of the Ottoman Army due to diseases
were examined. It appeared that a special commission formed by the Army
Health Department at the end of the war prepared those statistics after careful consideration. It also appears that Ahmet Emin’s above-mentioned study
partially draws on those documents, but until the publication of the current
study, the information contained in those documents were not analyzed
systematically. Granted, those statistics still have some shortcomings: they
were prepared based on the records found in the military hospitals operated
by the Army Health Unit and contained information about the admissions
and discharges of patients only to those hospitals. They therefore do not
reflect the entire deaths caused by diseases because several undocumented
124
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Table 6.15. Ottoman military casualties according to hospital records (1914–1918)
Hospitalized
ill
Hospitalized
wounded
Deaths
from
diseases
Deaths
from
wounds
Caucasus front
628,953
60,983
116,290
2,968
–
Çapakçur front
377,316
41,754
67,414
–
–
Iraqi front
217,609
41,133
33,247
5,939
–
Syrian front
788,135
44,449
65,205
1,823
–
Gallipoli front
354,634
343,648
44,407
7,756
56,127
Galician front
7,115
10,326
124
522
3,859
Romanian front
17,511
13,106
809
681
2,132
Bosporus Strait’s
opening to Black Sea
18,525
29
615
3
1
Macedonian front
4,804
376
671
82
105
Casualties in Hijaz
8,571
36
1,166
9
–
Casualties in Asir
4,176
–
218
–
–
Casualties in Yemen
4,162
392
630
58
16
2,431,511
556,232
330,796
19,841
62,240
Fronts
Total
Combat
deaths
deaths or illnesses due to epidemics did not make it to this list. Notwithstanding, the statistics prepared by the army medical experts are no doubt
the most detailed and most reliable official records about the losses of the
Ottoman Army due to epidemics in the Great War.
According to those records, a total of 2,500,000 soldiers were admitted to hospitals on all fronts during the Great War. Whereas the numbers
on admissions might not be accurate because multiple records for a single
ill soldier are likely, the exact numbers on deaths could be estimated from
the hospital records. When the combat deaths (330,000) and deaths from
wounds (20,000) are added up, total deaths in hospitals comes to 350,000.
The statistical data documenting the deaths of Ottoman recruits due to
disease during the Great War also provide useful information on the regions
mostly affected by epidemic diseases and the extent and severity of those
diseases in the afflicted regions. The provinces in eastern and southeastern
Anatolia, as well as Syria and Iraq in the Middle East (outside the borders
Unburied Corpses
125
of today’s Turkey) were beset by epidemics most severely. Beyond question,
the epidemics also created numerous victims among civilians living in those
regions, as well as among the convoys of Muslim and Christian refugees,
who were uprooted by the war and had to take long and dramatic journeys
to reach their new areas of settlement.
In 1915, during the first year of war, the number of Ottoman Armenians
subjected to deportation due to security reasons was 500,000, whereas the
Russian Armenians who took advantage of the Russian invasion of East
Anatolia forced 1 million Muslims to flee from the Caucasus and East Anatolia to safer areas in central Anatolia. Those numbers indicate that during the entire course of the war, about 1.5 million Muslim and Christian
civilians were constantly on the move in the combat zones, such as the
Caucasus, Çapakçur (Bingöl), Iraq, and Syria, as well as in the central and
southern regions of Anatolia. When the 2 million recruits of the Ottoman
Army and the soldiers from the enemy forces are added to that figure, the
number of people in flux in these geographical areas exceeded 4 million. In
such a setting, deserters wandering around, new recruits and army units being dispatched to the frontlines, and civilians constantly displaced no doubt
created a very suitable breeding ground for the spread of epidemics.
Hospital records also include detailed statistical data on the 1st, 2nd,
3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th armies. Deaths from epidemic diseases are ranked
as follows: The 3rd Army deployed in East Anatolia (116,000 dead); the
5th Army deployed in Gallipoli (68,000 dead); the 2nd Army deployed in
Bingöl (67,000); the 4th army deployed in Syria (65,000 dead); the 6th
Army deployed in Iraq (42,000 dead); and the 1st Army deployed in the
Balkans (26,000 dead). Variations across years were encountered: the units
of the 3rd and 5th armies had the highest death rates in 1915 while mainly the
2nd and 3rd army units accounted for the greatest number of deaths in 1916
and 1917, and the 6th Army in 1918.
When the figures about deaths from diseases based on hospital records
on different fronts (330,000) are compared to aggregate figures based on
different armies (387,000), the latter exceeds the former by 57,000. That
difference might have arisen due to the difficulties of estimating the number
of deaths from disease on different fronts. An army headquarters might be
in a better position to maintain the records of losses occurring within its
units. When units from two different armies are assigned to the same front,
however, it might naturally be more difficult to estimate the losses according
to the armies.
According to hospital records, the Ottoman Army suffered 387,000
losses due to infectious diseases, excluding deaths among the army deserters.
Table 6.16. Deaths in hospitals among the 1st Army units (1914–1918)
Years
Admissions
due to
diseases
Admissions
due to
wounds
1914
77,491
3
813
1
1915
127,771
190,372
8,239
3,033
1916
27,605
4
945
1
1917
84,204
812
4,789
33
1918
88,147
524
11,313
20
Total
405,218
191,715
26,099
3,088
Deaths due
to diseases
Deaths due
to wounds
Table 6.17. Deaths in hospitals among the 2nd Army units (1914–1918)
Years
Admissions
due to
diseases
1914
35,159
–
517
–
1915
68,378
24,208
5,033
171
1916
111,939
15,916
26,298
2,539
1917
153,690
1,072
34,226
210
1918
8,250
554
1,340
2
377,416
41,750
67,414
2,922
Total
Admissions
due to
wounds
Deaths due
to diseases
Deaths due
to wounds
Table 6.18. Deaths in hospitals among the 3rd Army units (1914–1918)*
Years
Admissions
due to
diseases
Admissions
due to
wounds
Deaths due
to diseases
Deaths due
to wounds
1914
29,201
17,929
6,121
901
1915
327,329
23,016
54,463
530
1916
103,018
18,484
23,720
1,814
1917
139,110
1,614
21,864
342
1918
81,703
2,421
10,014
147
Total
680,361
63,464
116,182
3,734
* From Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire, F. 3-3.
Table 6.19. Deaths in hospitals among the 4th Army units (1914–1918)
Years
Admissions
due to
diseases
Admissions
due to
wounds
Deaths due
to diseases
Deaths due
to wounds
1914
40,986
592
441
105
1915
134,828
81
13,744
–
1916
278,835
10,362
20,605
341
1917
247,064
17,636
18,403
821
1918
120,101
14,795
12,014
556
Total
821,814
43,466
65,207
1,823
Table 6.20. Deaths in hospitals among the 5th Army units (1914–1918)
Years
Admissions
due to
diseases
Admissions
due to
wounds
Deaths due
to diseases
Deaths due
to wounds
1914
–
–
–
–
1915
136,548
144,802
28,009
1916
178,052
–
19,924
–
1917
167,696
3
13,673
–
1918
95,818
–
6,424
–
Total
578,114
144,805
68,030
4,151
4,151
Table 6.21. Deaths in hospitals among the 6th Army units (1914–1918)
Years
Admissions
due to
diseases
Admissions
due to
wounds
1914
21,049
–
1915
21,736
12,433
5,080
413
1916
59,408
11,967
7,938
1,280
1917
64,366
16,605
9,564
1,147
1918
52,267
892
11,851
86
Total
218,826
41,897
35,319
2,926
Deaths due
to diseases
886
Deaths due
to wounds
–
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
128
Table 6.22. Deaths in hospitals among the 7th Army units (1914–1918)
Years
Admissions
due to
diseases
Admissions
due to
wounds
Deaths due
to diseases
Deaths due
to wounds
1914
–
–
–
–
1915
–
–
–
–
1916
–
–
–
–
1917
4,350
5,206
158
398
1918
7,907
2,597
498
138
Total
12,257
7,803
656
536
No figures are available on the deserters who might have fallen ill from
infectious diseases, and eventually died. It is not unusual during wars that
army deserters, deprived of all medical services, including vaccinations, are
completely helpless against epidemics and act as agents of transmitting disease germs.
Even more than the deserters, migrants played a major role in transmitting diseases in the battlefields of Anatolia, the Caucasus, Syria-Lebanon,
and Mesopotamia. The ratios on military fatalities from diseases can be used
to make a rough estimate about the losses among Muslim and Christian
migrant groups who were constantly moving within the same geographical
area.
When the deaths from diseases in the Ottoman Army during the Great
War are broken down, typhus appears to be the most fatal one, followed by
dysentery and malaria. The death ratio among patients with typhus was just
over one-fourth (28€percent). For dysentery, the same ratio was about the
same (27€percent). Obviously, these ratios are quite high.
The military units literally melted away in the face of infectious diseases.
Striking examples of such cases during the Great War are well documented.
One is narrated by General Hans Kannengiesser, one of the German commanders of the Ottoman Army who served in Gallipoli:
A characteristic picture in this connection is given by a report of losses of
the 16th Army Corps, at the same time an indication of what the Ottoman War Office was continuously called upon to send reinforcements to
the Gallipoli front. Between the 14th October and 9th December, 1915, the
losses of the 16th Army Corps were 509 killed, 2,158 wounded, 3,386 sick
Unburied Corpses
129
Table 6.23. Deaths in hospitals (1914–1918)
Admissions
due to
diseases
Admissions
due to
wounds
Deaths due
to diseases
Deaths due
to wounds
1st Army
405,218
191,735
26,099
3,088
2nd Army
377,416
41,750
67,414
2,922
3rd Army
680,361
63,464
116,182
3,734
4th Army
821,814
43,466
65,207
1,823
5th Army
578,114
144,805
67,848
4,151
6th Army
218,826
41,897
35,319
2,926
7th Army
12,257
7,803
656
536
8th Army
18,065
5,589
978
182
9th Army
27,227
1,483
1,892
88
Thunderbolt Group
of Armies
15,840
28 (?)
6,344
1,071
3,155,138
542,020
387,939
20,521
Total
and 2,159 having a change of climate…↜making a total loss of 8,212 men
during a period of two months, from an army Corps of three Divisions
approximately 12,000 strong. In considering these figures it must be taken
into account that the bodily resistance of the Turks is generally much less
than that of the Europeans. The reasons for this, apart from climatic reasons, are insufficient nourishment and care of the body, the lack of any kind
of hygienic arrangements and the terrible amount of vermin.72
Tevfik Salim Sağlam, medical chief of the 3rd Army, discusses the reasons behind the tragic fate of the Ottoman soldiers on the Eastern front.
He, too, notes that such a huge amount of casualties was caused by four
factors: adverse climate conditions, the insufficiency of roads and lack of
transportation vehicles, inability to provide good clothing for the troops,
and the malnutrition of the troops.73
Adverse climate conditions
The 3rd Army’s sector was mostly a mountainous region with high altitudes, having long and severely cold winters. In winter, the temperature was
130
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
almost always below 0°C. In comparison, the plains and some of the valleys
also located in the 3rd Army sector were very hot in summer. In the early
summer of 1915, it was said that on the very same day, a soldier became ill
due to the excessive heat in the valley, while another soldier froze to death
in the mountains.
Insufficiency of roads and lack of transportation vehicles
Other than a few paved roads, the 3rd Army had no roads available in its sector. The closest railway station to the front was in Ulukışla, which was about
900 kilometers away from Erzurum. The troops were transferred on foot.
As the Black Sea was not controlled by the Turks, even in the coastal areas
major seaborne transportation was impossible. Goods and supplies between
proximate coastal areas could only be transferred by small motorboats or
sailboats at great risk. The 3rd Army had almost no motor vehicles. Only on
the paved road extending from Ulukışla to Erzurum could some trucks be
operated. Even the automobiles allocated to high-level officers could rarely
be used due to the insufficiency of roads, or the lack of gasoline and other
supplies. Therefore, oxcarts, packhorses, camels, and donkeys were the only
available means to transport provisions and ammunition. At times, as discussed before, even those primitive means were unavailable, and the food
and ammunition had to be carried long distances on the backs of the soldiers and civilians.74 Similarly, a few cars, sent to the 3rd Army sector from
Istanbul for the transportation of the ill and wounded, could never be used
due to lack of roads, gasoline, and other needed supplies for automobiles.
The ill and wounded had to be carried mostly in carts and on packhorses,
but most of the time on foot.75
Poor clothing for the troops
The troops of the 3rd Army never could be dressed suitably for the severe climate conditions of the region. When the Ottoman Empire entered the war
in November 1914, some of the soldiers stationed in the plains of Erzurum
were still in their local clothes and had no military greatcoats. Even then,
no vehicle could be found to bring the greatcoats from the military depot
in Gümüşhane to Erzurum. The acting commander-in-chief ordered that
three out of six depot battalions in Erzincan should be sent to Gümüşhane
so they could wear the uniforms to be sent from Trabzon by the inspectorate
of the army station. Each soldier, moreover, would wear five military greatcoats in order to transport them to Erzurum. Difficulties in the supply of
clothes could not be overcome during the entire period of the war, which no
doubt played a major role in the frequent occurrence of “the problems and
Unburied Corpses
131
diseases connected with cold, such as local freezing, death from freezing,
pneumonia, and the like.”76
Malnutrition of troops
The problems encountered in the food supply for the 3rd Army could never
be eliminated. As the war progressed, the diminishing food stocks and unavailability of transportation vehicles turned the food supply for the army
into an ever-growing problem.
The factors related to food supply in the area set the limits to military concentration on that front. Even when large numbers of troops were brought
to the area, the difficulties encountered in supplying foods, as well as the
adverse climate conditions, forced the authorities to decrease the strength
of the army to affordable levels. Even the well-dressed and strong-looking
recruits of the 5th Army Corps, who were assigned to the 3rd Army Front
on their return from Gallipoli, soon became undistinguishable from the 3rd
Army’s own recruits.77…↜The huge number of illnesses encountered among
the 3rd Army troops, therefore, was the result of the miserable conditions
endured by the troops, who were dressed unsuitably and fed insufficiently
in the middle of a long and bloody war, carried out in a harsh climate,
and in an area where the roads and means of transportation could rarely
be found. It should always be kept in mind that as long as those conditions
remained the same, any military concentration in that area would have the
same fate with the 3rd Army.78
The same historical records also indicate that the 3rd Army suffered the
greatest number of losses due to epidemic diseases. Apart from the tragic incident where many soldiers were frozen to death at the very beginning of the
war, the same army was afflicted with further losses in subsequent years under the continuous “attacks” of infectious diseases. Table 6.24, prepared by
Tevfik Sağlam, summarizes the effects of the epidemics succinctly. The table
clearly shows that during the course of bloody battles on the 3rd Army front,
the diseases also ravaged the forces, and the sick soldiers were consuming the
efforts of the Army’s medical unit much more than the wounded.79
Between the years 1915 and 1918, within a period of 42.5 months, 9,001
soldiers of the 3rd Army were killed in the battles while a total of 109,562€soldiers died due to diseases or wounds in hospitals. In other words, the
number of deaths due to diseases was 27.8 times greater than those due to
wounds and 12 times greater than those that occurred in the course of fighting. Given the total strength of the 3rd Army, it appears that approximately
132
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Table 6.24. The ill and wounded in the 3rd Army (1915–1918)
Year
Sick
Wounded
Total
1915 (10 months)
206,793
8,939
215,902
1916
136,722
31,200
167,942
1917
139,110
1,654
140,764
81,703
2,421
84,124
564,328
44,214
608,732
Admissions due
to diseases
Monthly
average
Daily
average
1915 (10 months)
209,793
20,979
688
1916
136,722
11,394
375
1917
139,110
11,593
381
81,703
9,078
297
567,328
13,349
433
1918 (9 months)
Total (42.5 months)
Table 6.25. Admissions to hospitals from the 3rd Army
Year
1918 (9 months)
Total (42.5 months)
2.5€percent of that strength was lost due to diseases and 0.08€percent (eight
in ten thousand) due to wounds. The ratio of those killed in combat was
.19€percent (19€per ten thousand). Those figures unequivocally show that
the losses caused by diseases rather than the casualties suffered in combat
wore down the 3rd Army. In the German Army, on the other hand, 78.8€percent of deaths occurred in fighting or due to wounds while 12.2€percent of
them were caused by diseases. The monthly ratio of deaths due to diseases
in the Ottoman Army, 2.5€percent, is 54 times greater than in the German
Army.80
During the same period, the number of admissions to hospitals in the
3rd Army was 567,328, which makes an average 13,349 patients per month,
and 433 per day. In other words, each month 12€percent of the total strength
of the army was hospitalized.81 The largest number of casualties due to infectious diseases occurred in 1915, when the number of wounded admitted
to hospitals was 8,939—an average of 894 wounded per month and 29€per
day.82
Unburied Corpses
133
The figures from Turkish and foreign sources discussed so far all point
the same direction: during World€War€I, Turkey was the only country in
which deaths from disease well exceeded combat fatalities. In the course of
that war, one-third of the recruits fell victim to disease. Furthermore, only
about 10 to 20€percent of the young people drafted into the army were able
to return to their homes after the war.
7
UNEXPECTED RESULTS
Sad scenes of exodus all along the road.…Those poor women and children, having loaded a few dirty quilts on an oxcart, and driving one
or two scrawny cows and calves in front of them, are going barefoot
toward unknown horizons. Similar scenes were repeated after every
retreat of the Army.
[January 1915] The large convoy of refugees is going toward Erzu�
rum. There are men old, disabled, or carrying their mothers on their
backs. Women have their children wrapped in quilts on their shoulders, and babies in their arms. Small children are trying to walk behind
the oxcarts. If you asked them, they would not know where they are
going. They are trying to protect their lives and honor from the Russian troops and from the attacks of the Armenians. Only God knows
how many of those poor people are dying under the ruined roofs in the
empty villages.
The Governor of Erzurum estimates the number of deaths up until now at 15,000.
—â•›A ziz Samih,
Büyük Harpte Kafkas Cephesi Hatıraları
Emphasizing the unimaginably strong link between epidemics and
mass destruction in both classical and modern history, one expert defines a
great disaster as “a common denominator in the process of bringing a dramatic character to the calamities badly affecting the Ottoman subjects.” He
further states that “there is one and only one single factor which could turn a
drama into a tragedy, and a high mortality ratio into a mass destruction, and
it is the disease of the plague.” The disaster he was referring to took place in
the Ottoman city of Akka in the late eighteenth century, where “all the conditions which could enable mass annihilation of a people came together,”
such as “extreme poverty, hunger, drought, a high concentration of refugees
and troops, and the like.”1
134
Unexpected Results
135
The disaster at Akka, described by Daniel Panzac, which occurred on
a small scale there, indeed turned into a real tragedy of huge dimensions
for millions of people, both servicemen and civilians, during the Balkan
Wars and the Great War. The Balkan Wars adversely affected the Ottoman
Empire in every respect. The epidemics that broke out in Anatolia in the
aftermath of the Balkan Wars continued to prevail during the Great War not
only in Anatolia, but also in Palestine and Syria.2 The huge number of casualties caused by epidemics that spread from Edirne to Istanbul, and then
to the whole of Anatolia, is especially noteworthy. The Muslim subjects of
the Empire, still remembering the sufferings caused by the Balkan Wars, became distressed when the Caliph (Sultan) declared a jihad at the beginning
of the Great War. Instead of a general feeling of excitement, usually seen in
such events, there was a frightening silence in the air, caused by the contemplation of the imminent hardships.
In his book Death and Exile, Justin McCarthy describes the story of a
bloody tragedy as well as a historical truth. He states the following:
The deaths of Muslims, like the deaths of Armenians in the same period,
occurred primarily while they were refugees. There are few descriptions of
the well being of the eastern Anatolian and Caucasian refugees, whether
Muslim or Armenian, but one can assume their condition to have been
worse than that of refugees in Europe and western Anatolia in the same
period. During World€War€I, there were no established refugee camps for
Muslim refugees from the east. The government Refugee Commission did
what it could to offer succor to the refugees, but how much could a government that could not even clothe its own soldiers do for a million refugees.
Moreover, the refugees from the east moved through the worst terrain in
Anatolia. The region contained neither adequate roads nor railroads. Many
areas that received refugees could only be reached by horseback and pack
animals. Even had food been available, transportation conditions would
have insured that little of it reached the refugees.
By looking at a map of Anatolia and considering the economic state of
its regions, one can see that refugees from Van, Erzurum, or Bitlis would
have been forced to make long journeys before they found adequate transportation facilities, large population centers, or fertile fields. For most, such
journeys were impossible.
On the eastern Anatolia front in World€War€I and then later during
the Turco-Armenian War there was such a mass of peoples on the move
that contemporary accounts give the impression that the peoples of eastern Anatolia and the southern Caucasus were all refugees.…↜The majority
136
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
of eastern Anatolians, both Muslims and Christians, either died or were
forced from their homes.3
The common characteristic of those migrations caused by the war was an
“impulse to get protected from massacres.” On that issue, Justin Â�McCarthy
quotes a British document, what he calls “one of the rare honest European
accounts of the refugees, a British Military report from Baku (1 July 1919).”
The report stated that “during the war Armenians fled from Muslim areas
and Muslims from Armenian areas. Both groups ‘fled to avoid massacres
and from massacres.’” 4
W. E. Allen and Paul Muratoff also illustrate this feeling well in their
study:
Natural difficulties were made worse by the fact that the Young Turk policy
of deporting the Armenian population of the surrounding areas had been
carrying out only too effectively. At the beginning of the war Ottoman supplies had been drawn from the fertile and well-cultivated upland basins
of Eleşkirt, Erzurum, Muş and Mamahatun. All these had fallen into the
hands of the Russians, while the Armenian cultivators had been driven off
from the valley of the Murat-Çay and the great plain round Harput. At
the same time the Turkish peasants had, at the approach of the Russians,
trekked into the interior of Anatolia. The eastern vilayets had been depopulated to the extent of about seventy-five per cent of their inhabitants (and
they have never since recovered their former degree of prosperity).5
Armenian Convoys And The Epidemics
Besides the “spontaneous” migrations stemming from wars, “planned” and
forced population displacements due to security reasons were also common
throughout history. The most disputed example of the latter is no doubt the
one imposed on the Armenians. In the spring of 1915, the Ottoman government used its constitutional powers and decided on the relocation of some
of its Armenian subjects to Syria.6
The weekly military intelligence report for the week of 14–21 September
1915, prepared by the British Army Command in Egypt, compares the events
of 1894–1896 during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid to the events that took
place in 1915. The report identifies an important distinction between the
two periods in its following assessment: unlike the events of 1894–1896, the
“deaths” occurring in 1915 started after the “victims” were sent into exile,
many of whom lost their lives from starvation and disease.7
Unexpected Results
137
Another nuance that needs to be taken into account is the fact that
a considerable portion of the Armenians subjected to deportation by the
Ottoman government during the Great War consisted of individuals who
had joined foreign armies as “volunteers,” in particular the Russian Army.
In addition, a large number of Ottoman Armenians are found to have migrated to other countries and become citizens of those countries.8
The biggest problem faced by the Armenian convoys was fatal epidemics, which had always accompanied wars and intensive migrations throughout history. One disease, for instance, which emerged among the Ottoman
Armenians who migrated via the Mediterranean route, was called “Maladie
Armenienne” (the Armenian Disease) first by the French doctors who diagnosed it widely among the Armenians in Marseille. When the same disease
was also seen among the Jews and other peoples living around the Mediterranean basin later, the name was changed to the “Periodic Disease.”9
Deaths among the Armenians due to epidemics were not limited to
the Armenians living in the Ottoman provinces. According to the information communicated to the UK Foreign Office from American sources, each
month one-seventh of the Armenian refugees in the Caucasus were losing
their lives due to various reasons (hunger, typhus, and cholera).10 According to a ciphered telegram, 30€percent of the population living in Yerevan
became severely ill with Spanish influenza, and as a result, a total of 1,870
individuals lost their lives in the streets, in their homes, and in the civilian hospitals between 24 December 1919 and 4 January 1920. A significant
number of deaths also occurred in the provincial areas of Armenia, causing
the death of 20€percent of the entire population.11 Based on those numbers
regarding the death rates in and around Yerevan, it would be reasonable to
expect that great numbers of people living in the cities and rural areas of
Anatolia and other parts of Caucasus also lost their lives.
The Armenian convoys deported from eastern Anatolia in fact encountered infectious diseases long before reaching their new places of settlement, while they were still in Anatolia. For instance, in a note sent to the
Governorate of Konya on 2 November 1915, it was stated that out of 200
Armenians, 50 were severely ill and 150 were slightly ill, mainly from dysentery and malaria. The governorate was requested to put the Armenians into
empty houses in the town immediately.12
Kress von Kressenstein, one of the important witnesses of the war,
observed the infectious diseases borne by the Armenian deportees moving along the River Euphrates in Aleppo in 1915. Around the same time,
troops coming from the north were also traveling through Aleppo en route
to Palestine, and infectious diseases were posing a great danger to these
138
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
military units. According to hygiene specialists, recurrent fever and typhus
epidemics were threatening the Syrian front in 1915. Though Cemal Pasha
attempted to improve the conditions of the Armenian deportees somewhat,
it was of no avail: his efforts to send food to the Armenian convoys bore no
significant results since even the Turkish troops had a grave shortage of food
supplies at the time.13
German Commander General Goltz recounts the following about
the Armenian convoys sent on 22 November 1915 to the places where they
would be resettled under the government’s relocation plan. He tells how
those convoys passed through the Taurus Mountains, and what happened
to them afterward:
The longest tunnel was passed through the next morning. After that, the
convoy started to descend toward the Syrian Plain.
At this point, the sad view of the Armenian deportees strikes the eye.
The plan is to settle them at the southern foot of the Taurus Mountains.
However, since it was impossible to provide sufficient humanitarian care to
such a large number of people, they are living in an endless misery.
We are witnessing an enormous disaster involving an ethnic group.
Many people are dying on the way, and are abandoned there for a long
time, unburied. Though one is saddened when he sees the entire scene,
there is nothing to be done for them. The disasters caused by this ominous
war are innumerable; and it is impossible to foresee what disasters those
people will be enduring in the coming days.14
A dysentery epidemic broke out among the Armenian deportees upon
their arrival in Syria, which was aggravated by the food and water shortages.
That epidemic posed a significant problem not only for the Armenian deportees themselves, but also for the 4th Army forces stationed there. With
the vaccines supplied by the efforts of Neşet Ömer, director of hygiene in
Jerusalem, urgent measures could be undertaken against the epidemic. In
1915, out of the total strength of 142,802 of the 4th Army, 6,430 were admitted to hospitals, 159 of whom died.15
Spotted fever afflicted Syria and Palestine mainly in winter months.
Even though the spotted fever did not affect the German units because of
the preventive methods implemented, combined with the impact of evercontinuing problems of hunger and exhaustion, it took a heavy toll among
the Ottoman units.16
As the war progressed further, the epidemics also escalated in Aleppo.
The typhus epidemic spread by the Armenian convoys being transferred
from East Anatolia caused growing distress within the army and among the
Unexpected Results
139
local people. In order to alleviate the problems, the half-built French hospital in the neighborhood of Cemile was completed in 1915 within a period
of one week by a labor battalion of five hundred men, who in fact had been
tasked to construct the military barracks in Aleppo. Upon completion, the
hospital was put into service with a bed capacity of 850.17
On the Syrian front, the typhus epidemic also caused many losses
among the troops and within the labor battalions. In Aleppo, the disease
spread largely among the Armenian convoys deported to the region, as
well as among the troops. In order to struggle against the epidemic, strict
measures were adopted; a medical crisis center headed by Cemal Pasha was
formed, which enforced compulsory isolation and treatment.18
A ciphered telegram, dispatched from the Ministry of the Interior on 17
October 1915 to the director of immigrants in Aleppo, talked about the cases
of spotted fever and dysentery among about 20,000 migrants in Hama,
which killed about 70 to 80 people each day. The same communiqué ordered local officials to dispatch the migrants promptly to their final places
of settlement.19
As the statistics prepared after the British Army established its control
over Mesopotamia show, large numbers of deaths due to epidemics continued to occur in the Armenian and Syrian refugee camps. The most widely
seen illnesses among the refugees were dysentery, diarrhea, pneumonia, and
bronchitis.20
As of 1 October 1919, a total of 39,191 refugees were held in the Ba’quba
refugee camp; 5,089 of these refugees lost their lives, 2,161 left the camp, and
369 were taken to the Farm of Jasmiyah to work there, while another 2,117
individuals were taken into the newly formed Assyrian Battalions.21 Of the
refugees in the Ba’quba refugee camp, 14,612 were Armenians—519 were
from Istanbul, 675 from Cilicia, 10,341 from Van and the Caucasus, 547 from
Bitlis, and 2,530 from Azerbaijan, according to their own statements.22
On 1 July 1920, a British vice-consul in Hamadan had communicated
the statistical data provided to him by an Armenian doctor serving in the
American hospital there. The data were related to the patients referred to
the hospital because of diseases like malaria, influenza, bronchitis, and
dysentery.23
Conditions On The Mesopotamian Front
Bacillary dysentery, which is known to be widespread in Syria, was also encountered during the Balkan Wars and the Great War due to the movement
of troops and people.24 Before the Great War, dysentery had rarely been encountered in cities such as Istanbul, İzmir, Ankara, and Bursa; but after the
140
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Table 7.1. Deaths that occurred in the Ba’Quba Refugee Camp (September 1918–October
1919)*
Months
Armenians
Syrians
September
193
75
69
69
130
268
October
768
675
318
521
604
1,443
November
515
462
231
363
383
977
December
379
451
225
351
254
830
January
196
265
134
172
154
460
February
115
130
69
100
76
245
March
73
102
50
57
68
175
April
53
54
31
38
38
107
May
49
50
30
23
46
99
June
53
50
36
30
38
104
July
52
74
54
34
38
126
August
76
65
44
42
55
141
September
56
58
35
32
41
114
2,578
2,511
1,326
1,832
1,931
5,089
Total
Men
Women
Children
Total
*â•›From UK ARCHIVES, T 161â•›/50, Table 2, dated 1 October 1919, 34.
commencement of the war, it became more prevalent in those cities and in
the whole of Anatolia.25
In the years of 1916 and 1917, typhus was widespread in the city of
Birseba within the army units and among the local people.26 The headquarters of “Operation Lightning” was transferred from Nablus to Nasıriyah on
17 December 1917. At that time, a typhus epidemic emerged in Nasıriyah
due mainly to the lack of measures against lice at the frontlines and the insufficiency of hospital infrastructure. The spread of typhus from Damascus
to other places could not be prevented, which significantly decreased the
strength of the military units.27
Although the city of Aleppo had great strategic importance especially
for the battles taking place in Iraq, Palestine, and Sinai, the health conditions there posed a great threat to the troops. The hospitals in the area were
in a much worse situation than in Palestine. The attempt to put all typhoid
Unexpected Results
141
patients into one hospital could not be achieved because the Muslims did
not want to leave their women in hospitals. Nor could medical checks in
houses be conducted because the people viewed this as interference with
their privacy. As a result, Cemal Pasha’s efforts in this regard yielded limited
results. Kress von Kressenstein provided interesting details regarding the
conditions prevailing in hospitals: “One hospital had no doors and windows which would protect patients against cold; in another one, 30 patients
were using the same glass to drink water. Another hospital accommodating
500 patients had only three body thermometers.”28
Infectious diseases also found breeding ground in the labor battalions in
Syria, which had around twenty thousand men. Since the members of these
battalions were deprived of any care and had weak bodily constitutions, epidemics of typhoid, typhus, and cholera spread very easily among them; on
an average day, a minimum of five hundred soldiers were hospitalized.29
In January 1915, a health commission consisting of three German Navy
doctors reached the conclusion that the most widely seen epidemics within
the army were recurrent fever and typhus. As a result of this discovery, urgent measures were taken, baths and autoclaves were put into service, water
channels were repaired, and a vaccination campaign was initiated against
typhoid and cholera. The reports published in Germany about these studies were full of praises for 4th Army Commander Cemal Pasha, who had
achieved great success in his efforts to struggle against infectious diseases.30
For one, Kress von Kressenstein, who closely observed Pasha’s extraordinary
efforts in this area, praised “Cemal Pasha’s awareness and energy with regards
to the improvement of medical services” and emphasized that that awareness manifested itself most visibly in the case of measures he took to protect
the individuals deported from eastern Anatolia against diseases. After the
assassination of Cemal Pasha in 1922 by Armenian militants in Tbilisi, von
Kressenstein noted, “All of the Germans who had worked together with
Cemal Pasha would speak highly of his organizational talents.”31
In order to supplement the Central Military Hospital in Damascus,
which was located in the 4th Army sector, the Mezze neighborhood was
entirely evacuated and turned into an infectious diseases hospital with one
thousand beds. In Aleppo, too, a very large building was turned into a hospital, and a church and a mosque were temporarily used as hospitals in order
to meet the growing demand for hospitals.32
The 4th Army also set up a hospital for the Armenian convoys arriving in Aleppo. Dr.€Altunian from Aleppo was assigned as the chief doctor of that hospital. The 4th Army also founded two orphanages and put
them under the direction of Dr.€Altunian’s daughter and a German nurse.
142
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Another orphanage for one thousand Armenian children was opened in the
Aya Tura Abbey in Lebanon. Dr.€Captain Lütfi, who was an eye specialist,
was assigned as the director of that orphanage. Since the 4th Army directly
assumed the responsibility for taking care of orphans, it opened a fourth
orphanage in Damascus.33
Muslim Convoys And The Epidemics
The Muslim people of the areas occupied by the Russians following the retreat of the 3rd Army migrated to the inner parts of Anatolia. In 1916 and
1917, especially after the fall of Bayburt, Trabzon, and Erzincan, the army
had to deal with a huge wave of refugees. Since no civilian organization existed to take care of the health problems of such a large number of people,
the army also had to assume that responsibility beginning in mid-July 1916.
Out of 5,424 refugees who became ill and were taken to refugee hospitals,
2,300 recovered and 1,529 died. According to Tevfik Sağlam, “Since civilian
authorities could not take proper measures for the transfer and settlement of
the refugees, much of the suffering, which could in fact have been prevented
to a certain degree, could not be avoided.”34
Turkish writer Halide Edip describes some scenes of the great misery
she witnessed in Konya in 1916, while she was traveling to the Syrian front
together with Hamdullah Suphi, upon the invitation of Cemal Pasha:
The train station in Konya was full of scenes of suffering. Refugees from
Eastern Anatolia with their families and their bundles engulfed the station.
They were standing together closely under the station lamps, in ragged but
brightly colored clothes. They were waiting for the train with their eyes
looking empty and meaningless; the eyes of those who were uprooted, and
had to migrate. A strange smell of misery and helplessness coming from
them. No, that smell isn’t coming only from the physical dirt; crowds in a
spiritual misery have a smell of their own.35
Justin McCarthy identifies two waves of Muslim migrations during the
Great War, which took place at different times in the eastern provinces of
the Ottoman Empire. The first period of Muslim migration was sparked by
the Armenian uprising in Van, and ended with the retreat of the Russians
in the summer of 1915. The second wave started with the Russian offensive
in 1916, which was more successful than the previous one, and resulted in
the Russian occupation of the entire province of Erzurum, as well as large
Unexpected Results
143
parts of the provinces of Van, Diyarbakır, Ma’muret’ül Aziz, and Trabzon.
As a result of the Russian occupation as well as the clashes between the
Muslims and Armenians, many of the peaceful Muslim and Christian inhabitants in the rural areas started to migrate in search of security. Because of
those migrations, the cities held more firmly by the Ottoman Army in the
south and in the west were flooded by these refugees. The luckiest among
those refugees were the ones who could reach the Trabzon province on the
north and Erzurum province on the northeast, since they later could move
farther into the central and western Black Sea regions, where control of the
central government was more firmly established and security conditions
were better. Some of those refugees were sent to central Anatolia, similar to
the procedure applied to those coming from the southern part of Trabzon
province and from the Erzurum province. Those coming from the provinces
farther east were less lucky since they had to flee southward to the provinces
of Elazığ, Diyarbakır, and Van, where they could receive little help. Most of
those refugees migrated in various stages. After leaving their homes, they
moved to safer areas, only to stay there until the next forward movement of
the Russians and Armenians, and then they had to flee again. Most of the
refugees from around Erzurum had to go to places such as Maraş or Adana,
which meant a journey of more than 600€km on foot.36
The Turkish military medical records relevant to the period between 15
August 1916 and 18 December 1917 reveal that cholera epidemics broke out
among the Muslim refugees, posing a great threat to the army: “In the wake
of the retreat of the Army, an enormous wave of migration started, which
surpassed the capacity of the civilian authorities. The Army, therefore, had
to assume the responsibility for the refugees.…↜The duty of struggling with
epidemic diseases encountered among the civilians living in the Army sector
was given to the Army’s Chief Medical Officer.”37
The problems encountered in the resettlement of the Muslim people
migrating toward the inner parts of the country, and the conducts and behavior of the civilian authorities that exaggerated those problems somewhat, were well documented in the reports prepared by the military medical
units. General Fevzi Çakmak, acting commander of the army, who was on
an inspection tour in the Black Sea region, stated the following in a telegram
he dispatched to the Ministry of the Interior on 5 May 1917:
During my inspections around Samsun, I saw the refugees in impoverished
conditions. Based on a medical inspection I had instructed to be carried
out, we found out that the people living in the districts and villages were a
144
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
breeding ground for infectious diseases and therefore creating a great risk
for the military personnel who were sent to Ordu. They are not provided
with any food or shelter. Even the children and women are on the run under miserable conditions. Naturally, no sanitary measures could be put into
practice; and they are spreading infections to various towns and villages as
they randomly wander around.38
In his report from October 1917, the army medical chief states the
following:
Many people from the District of Alucra are departing for coastal areas together with their families, hoping to find something to eat there. The Governorates of Karahisar Sanjak and Sivas Province could not care for these
people.…The conditions of the refugees arriving in the coastal areas are
heartbreaking too. Though it is not possible to give an exact figure, obviously the losses of our country, in terms of human lives and material, are
enormous.39
When the defterdar (the official who heads a provincial treasury) of Trabzon delayed aid to the refugees on the pretext that he had not yet received
the money sent for that purpose on 19 December 1917, Vehib Pasha, the 3rd
Army commander, sent the following telegram to the defterdar, to be communicated to Cavit, the minister of finance:
Please communicate my order to your Minister Cavit. If he were also in
Trabzon, he would do nothing but follow my order. Those migrants and
refugees who are dying from hunger are not the sons of Israel; they are all
Muslims. I am strictly determined to resort to any measures, when necessary the use of force, in order to allow those people to live. The orders
of your Minister cannot contravene my orders. That should be understood
very well.40
The chief doctor of the Recovery House in Çorum stated in his report
dated 22 December 1917 that the refugees, especially the women and children, were living in great misery. Four women had frozen to death during
the last four days and both the governorate and the municipality had been
completely indifferent to the suffering of those people.41
In a telegram he sent to the 3rd Army’s chief medical officer, the governor of Çorum referred to the extraordinarily severe winter conditions as
an excuse for the failure to help the refugees; but he also confessed another
bitter fact.
Unexpected Results
145
A winter as severe as this year’s has not been encountered for many years,
the effects of which are beyond imagination. On the roads to Merzifon,
Çorum, Yozgat, and Ankara, one could see many animal corpses, as well as
dead human bodies, all frozen to death. Some exhausted soldiers are also
seen among those dead. Since it is absolutely impossible to bring firewood
from the mountains, some of the local people and most of the government
workers and refugees were left without any wood. The government offices
have no wood either. On the other hand, the refugees continue to come to
Çorum via Amasya and Merzifon. Yesterday, another convoy of refugees arrived from Niksar. They are naturally in great poverty. In fact, even the basic need for food and clothing of the refugees living in destitution in town
can not be met sufficiently.42
Deportation Of The Greeks And The Epidemics
In January 1917, the Supreme Command Headquarters of the Ottoman
Armies deemed it necessary to relocate the Greeks living in the coastal areas
of Trabzon Province behind a line extending 50€km south of the coastal areas. Due to severe winter conditions and the lack of transportation means
available to those refugees, that decision also led to the outbreak of a great
misery. When the military authorities learned that about 1,500 people had
gathered in a village called Pürk, located on the plain of Suşehri, some of
whom were ill, they immediately sent doctors to the village; about 200 sick,
150 of whom had fever, were separated and placed under treatment. The
army could only provide limited support for those people in the form of
treating and feeding the sick among them.43
When the Greeks revolted in December 1917 and burned down Bafra,
the Army Command ordered that the Greeks living in Bafra and Samsun be
sent to the interior toward Ankara. Upon that order, health stations for the
refugees were immediately set up in Kavak, Havza, and Merzifon, where the
migrating people had to undergo medical examination. Here, those with infectious diseases as well as lice on their bodies were cleaned, and their clothes
were disinfected. Moreover, all of the refugees were vaccinated against smallpox, cholera, and typhoid. Refugees’ feces were examined in Merzifon and
Çorum to verify any vibrione-bearing individuals among them.44
Epidemics In Syria, Mesopotamia, And Anatolia
According to Donald Matthew’s findings, the spread of diseases is least
likely in those places where most of the population lives in rural areas and
small towns, with little communication between them.45 Although that
146
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
observation might be true under normal conditions, several extraordinary
factors play a role in the spread of diseases in times of war. The migrations
caused by fighting take the lead among these conditions. Moreover, the diffusion of epidemics is also affected by other factors such as geographical location and climate conditions. For instance, the conditions in swamps and
rivers are accepted as the major source of malaria. As early as the first century b.c., Varro emphasized the dangers posed by swamps.46
The strip of land lying between the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, which
varies between 1 and 7€km in width, remains underwater only during flood
seasons. However, the land between Korna and Basra, as well as the delta
portion, consists entirely of marshes. The Garaf Canal (Shattul Hay), serving as a spillway draining the excess water of the Tigris River to the Euphrates and connecting the two rivers to each other, separates from the
Tigris River near Kut al-Amarah. It cuts the plains of Lower Mesopotamia
lying between the two rivers in a north-south direction. Then it splits into
many branches before flowing into the marshes in the Nasıriyah region. In
summer, a large part of its bed becomes dry. In the Lower Mesopotamia,
many canals and swamps, similar to the Euphrates River, surround the Tigris River. In the lands of Lower Mesopotamia, innumerable small lakes
and swamps can be seen along the rivers Tigris and Euphrates. As the level
of the water rises during the flooding season, it is impossible to determine
the boundaries of those swamps, whereas in July and August and on into
autumn, those swamps become smaller and shallower as a result of intense
evaporation. Some of them even dry up completely. Generally, the swamps
are covered with rushes. Plenty of canals connect the swamps to each other
and to the rivers. This large marshy area is called the Sinpha Swamp, extending from south of the Euphrates River to east of Nasıriyah to Basra. The area
starting from south of Hille and extending along the right bank of the Euphrates River to Qurnah is also covered with swamps of various sizes. There
are also other swamps located on either bank of the Euphrates River after
passing Al-el-Gharbi, the largest among them being the Ebu Kelam Swamp.
Southeast of Kut al-Amarah are the swamps of Samargha and the Large Huwaiza, also called el-Azim, into which the Karha River flows. North of Kut
al-Amarah there is the Suwaija Swamp. The largest marshlands of Iraq are
located south of Kut al-Amarah, in the area extending from the Qadir Tomb
to Basra and covering the lower beds of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. This
large area is almost entirely covered with marshlands, with the exception of
the few small strips of dry land, which could be found along the banks of the
Euphrates and Tigris rivers. In general, those marshlands remain wet during six months of the year (between November and June), becoming dry in
Unexpected Results
147
August and expanding again after November. In such areas, the escalation of
malaria is quite natural and unavoidable; so are large casualties suffered by
the military units.47
Dr.€Abdülkadir Noyan, the medical chief of the 6th Army, provided the
following information regarding the hygiene conditions in Mosul:
Anyone who observes the environmental conditions and the inhabitants of
Mosul will easily appreciate that in a city where nobody knows the meaning of hygiene, even the military would remain helpless in establishing order and control, let alone the civilian authorities. The only source of drinking and utility water for both the local people and the soldiers is the Tigris
River. In almost every neighborhood of the city by the river, while the dirtiest clothes and objects are being washed on the riverbank, drinking water is
also supplied from the river. Many houses have no toilet. The inhabitants,
therefore, are using the streets and roofs as toilets. One could smell human
faeces in the dusts of the city, which form clouds in the blowing wind. One
could see toilets or toilet pits only in the houses of the people with higher
educational level. The foodstuff being sold in market places are covered
with flies in almost every season of the year.48
Malaria is a commonly encountered infection in Syria and Mesopotamia, particularly in the areas lying between 45 degrees north and 40 degrees
south latitudes. This tropical disease has a closed transmission cycle. For the
human-to-human transmission of malaria, the involvement of mosquitoes
is necessary. Therefore, malaria can easily turn into an epidemic in marshlands, which have suitable temperature conditions for the breeding of the
anopheles type of mosquito.49 During the war years, malaria epidemics escalated in Syria following the arrival of the convoys, which came in automobiles via the route of the Taurus Mountains and the plains of Adana.50
Recognizing that malaria was a disease threatening the very existence
of the local people during the Great War, a German bacteriology laboratory
was transferred to the Taurus Mountains region in July 1917. That place was
chosen because Pozantı was located at the crossroads of the routes leading
to Palestine and Mesopotamia. By locating the lab in that area, the military
units going south could be subjected to a last medical check. It also would
be helpful in the fight against malaria, which was prevalent in that region,
too, by applying medical checks on the troops returning to Anatolia. In
some of the villages in Anatolia in those days, 75 to 90€percent of the children between the ages of one and five were reported to have died from
malaria. The vast marshlands in the Taurus Mountains region particularly
148
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Table 7.2. Infectious diseases and deaths recorded
in the hospitals of Pozantı (August 1917–July 1918)
Malaria
2,798
188 deaths
Recurrent fever
244
19 deaths
Dysentery
202
82 deaths
Typhus
156
18 deaths
Typhoid
10
5 deaths
Cholera
7
5 deaths
Smallpox
3
1 deaths
facilitated the spread of malaria even further. Moreover, it was observed
that the malaria was causing greater damage in the mountainous regions
than in the plains. In the summer of 1916, a severe epidemic of malaria
broke out in Çamlıhan and Belemedik in the Taurus Mountains region. At
the time of the epidemic, thousands of soldiers and railway workers were in
the area. In Çamlıhan, 53.3€percent of the soldiers in one German military
unit of 689 men caught malaria. When the German mobile bacteriology
laboratory arrived in Pozantı in August 1917, the malaria epidemic was at its
height.51
Table 7.2 shows the distribution of the deaths from various infectious
diseases, which occurred in the seven military hospitals in the Taurus Mountains region between August 1917 and July 1918.52
Typhus and cholera were other epidemic diseases that affected the convoys struggling to exist under the hard conditions of migration and deportation. The Ottoman government, as a result, had to appropriate new
resources to facilitate the struggle against the epidemics. For instance, the
bill the government submitted to the Assembly of Deputies on 16 October
1915 regarding funds to be allocated for the fight against the cholera epidemics seen in Istanbul as well as in certain other provinces53 was passed by the
Senate. According to that bill, a further sum of 3 million kuruş was allocated
for that struggle, in addition to the 8 million kuruş which formerly was approved to be spent in three different installments.54
In 1915 a cholera epidemic broke out in Anatolia. In 1916 a total of 31,465
soldiers were checked for cholera in a mobile laboratory set up by the Germans in Ankara55 on 23 November 1916 in response to the outbreak of cholera in that city, where large numbers of military personnel were stationed.56
Unexpected Results
149
Dr.€Abdülkadir Noyan, the medical chief of the 6th Army, also could
not escape from the typhus epidemic:
When I arrived in Baghdad on 12 November 1915 and started to inspect the
hospitals as well as the military units in the city centre, I saw many patients
with dysentery and malaria. However, I became ill before examining the
type of the dysentery encountered here. No cases of spotted fever were observed in Baghdad during the summer and the first months of the autumn.
That disease was diagnosed here first in the two patients sent to the Central
Military Hospital in Baghdad on 16 December, by the 15th Division, which
was dispatched from Erzurum. Around the same time, a soldier from Hijin
Cavalry Regiment, which came from Aleppo, was also found to have spotted fever. It therefore appears that the typhus was brought to the 6th Army
by the troops from Erzurum and Aleppo.57
Dr.€Abdülkadir Noyan goes on recall the following from his memoirs:
The Jewish School, close to the Central Military Hospital in Baghdad, was
allocated for typhus patients. A total of 12 cases of spotted fever were reported in the hospital statistics from November 1915. By December, the
number of patients increased to 128; and in February [1916] a total of 744
cases were reported, which indicated an alarming escalation in the occurrence of the disease. Cases of typhus also were seen among the doctors. It
was necessary to initiate an urgent program for struggling against lice.…↜It
was the rainy and the coldest season of Iraq. A large epidemic of spotted
fever was likely.58
Moreover, among the Russian prisoners of war transferred to Baghdad,
spotted fever was recorded in 1916.59 In April 1917, cases of typhus were observed in Tikrit.60
Külz notes that the “Genius Epidemicus” was relatively mild in Mesopotamia. Indeed, the typhus epidemics seen in Mesopotamia generally were
not as severe as epidemics elsewhere.61 For cholera, however, the situation
was completely different. The first case of cholera encountered in the Mosul area was an army deserter who was captured on the second day of July
1916.62 Because the mobile bacteriology laboratory set up in July 1917 by the
Germans in Pozantı was sent back to Istanbul after the war ended, the troops
returning home from the south brought cholera to Anatolia.63 The answer
to the question of how the cholera reached Mosul in July 1917 is important,
for it also would reveal the main source of cholera on the eastern front.
150
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Dr.€Noyan gives an important clue regarding the origin of the cholera
epidemic (Pozantı-Tarsus) which broke out in Mosul in 1917:
The investigations made within the 46th Division showed that all its troops
were in good health condition when the division left Istanbul. When they
reached Tarsus via the land route, some cases of diarrhea started to be seen
among the troops. The patients were left at the hospitals of the army stations along the way. Since no cases of cholera were diagnosed among the
troops in any of those hospitals, the units continued their journey over land
until they reached Derbisiye. They left many patients with diarrhea at the
hospitals on their way. From almost each battalion, 60–70 patients of diarrhea were left behind.
Since the military doctors in the units did not receive reports of any
diagnosed cases of cholera from the hospitals, the cases of cholera remained
unnoticed. As the ill soldiers were left behind at the hospitals, luckily, the
disease did not escalate into an epidemic among the troops. As soon as the
145th Regiment of the above mentioned Division arrived in Mosul, bearers
of cholera vibrione were detected among the soldiers having diarrhea. As a
precaution, all of the soldiers were checked to diagnose carriers of cholera
among them. A great disaster, thus, was prevented by separating the vibrione-bearers from the others.64
One of the reasons leading to the sudden outbreak of cholera epidemics is water contamination.65 The epidemics of cholera are mostly seen in
and around places close to flowing water sources such as rivers, streams,
brooks, or canals. The severity of an epidemic depends on the population
density in the area, as well as the nutrition and physiological conditions of
the people.66 In Baghdad, as well as in many other settlement centers in
Iraq, the Tigris River is the main source of water for drinking and for daily
utilization. At the places where the Tigris River passes through, there are certain points used constantly by the local people for obtaining water and for
cleaning purposes. The water usage habits in the region are reflected in the
saying: “flowing water does not get dirty.” However, the Tigris River, which
naturally was contaminated while passing through large settlement centers,
caused great epidemics during the war by spreading the infections of cholera
and dysentery, as well as the amoeba and bacilli dysentery. Microorganisms
borne by the troops caused the cases of cholera observed in Baghdad. The
troops went there from Syria through the Jerabulus-Euphrates route, which
was the most direct between Syria and Baghdad.67
In eastern Anatolia, the cholera which initially came from Russia
Unexpected Results
151
emerged in Erzurum in 1915 and spread through contacts, whereas in Trabzon it became widespread due to contaminated waters. That epidemic
spread later to the coastal areas and to the Sivas province as a result of migrations. Throughout 1916, cholera persisted mostly in the form of isolated
cases or small-scale epidemics. In 1917 it was seen in Sivas, Trabzon, Canik,
Kayseri, and Ankara. The total number of admissions to hospitals in the
above-mentioned places due to cholera was 192 in Sivas, 110 in Trabzon, 56
in Canik, 5 in Kayseri, and 21 in Ankara.68
The cholera epidemic was brought to Sivas on 7 March 1916 by the
migrants, and from there it spread to Kayseri. Again from Sivas, it was transmitted to Tokat and Amasya; it also spread along the Black Sea coast as a
result of the movements of the immigrants. Cases of cholera were observed
in Giresun, Ordu, Fatsa, Ünye, and Samsun, all located on the Black Sea
coast.69 In October 1916, a small-scale cholera epidemic broke out in the Recovery House in Merzifon. During that epidemic, twenty-seven admissions
and eleven deaths due to cholera were recorded within a period of twelve
days.70
Another outbreak of cholera occurred in İzmir in the summer of 1916.
That disease, which had been diagnosed sporadically at various army stations for months, turned into an epidemic in İzmir and took a heavy toll
among people from all segments of society in a very short time. Rahmi Bey,
the governor of İzmir, recognized the imminent danger in time, however,
and granted full authority to German Major Dr.€Rodenwalt to fight against
the cholera outbreak. In addition to their service in İzmir, the German doctors also were sent to the province of Aydın where they participated in the
efforts to contain the cholera, spotted fever, and malaria epidemics.71
A ciphered telegram sent by the Governorate of Trabzon to the Ministry of the Interior on 14 July 1916 stated that the cholera was spread by
refugees arriving from Giresun.72 In mid-June 1917, when the 9th Division approached Bayburt, a cholera epidemic broke out among its troops.
Sending those troops into the battlefield could have risked spreading the
epidemic within the whole army. The division was sent to the combat zone
after intensive efforts by bacteriologist Hulusi, who separated about five
hundred carriers from the rest of the troops through medical examinations.
Although the danger of a new cholera epidemic arose on the return of the
division from the battle due to fatigue and other difficulties caused by the
war, the efforts expended by Dr.€Tevfik Sağlam prevented the diffusion of
the epidemic and the likely damage it could have caused.73
From March 1917 on, cholera cases were on the rise again, mainly due to
the deportation of Greeks from the coastal areas to the interior, who carried
152
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
the disease as they went.74 Another factor contributing to the spread of that
cholera epidemic was the decision to forbid the refugees from returning.
Because the refugees returning back to their homes were falling into deep
misery, and many of them were dying on the roads even before reaching
their homes, and the areas allocated for the resettlement of refugees were
entirely full, the civil authorities issued an order forbidding further migrations and ordering the refugees to remain at their current locations.
However, since the opportunities for making a living were very limited in
İspiye, Giresun, Ordu, Fatsa, and Ünye, the people moved in large convoys
to Terme, Çarşamba, and Samsun, despite the orders. Because migration
was forbidden officially, the Government did not take necessary measures
to facilitate those migrations. As a result, immigrants entirely got out of
control, and people became dispersed in various villages in an uncontrolled
manner. Only after the Deputy Army Commander and the Army Medical
Chief took serious action regarding this matter that the migrants could be
returned to their destinations in regular convoys, and receive some medical
services. Because of the initial uncontrolled movements of the refugees, the
epidemic existed until October 1917, mostly along the coastal areas.75
The 3rd Army sector remained safe from cholera for about nine months.
But in July 1918, the disease broke out again in Batum, which was brought
from Tbilisi, and spread among the people creating another epidemic. In
August, cases of cholera began to be encountered in Samsun, having been
brought there by the Greeks who moved from Sohumkale to Çarşamba.
Throughout September, the cholera epidemics continued in both cities.76
Epidemics of bubonic plague broke out in Baghdad during the spring
of 1915, and also in Beirut in October of the same year.77 Another 22 cases
of recurrent fever were encountered in Baghdad between 15 December 1915
and 7 January 1916. By March of 1916, the number of recurrent fever cases
increased to 629. As a precaution, obtaining blood samples from each soldier having a high fever and sending those samples to laboratories was rendered compulsory in military units and hospitals. Since a sufficient number
of microscope slides was not available in the medical depot, window glasses
were cut in the form of slides and were distributed to hospitals and military
units.
In 1916, insufficient nutrition and drinking of uncontrolled waters
caused an escalation in recurrent fever at the Iraqi front. According to the
6th Army’s hospital records, within a period of four months between November 1915 and March 1916, 107 of 264 typhoid patients died. In 1916,
Unexpected Results
153
Table 7.3. Deaths in the 6th Army attributed to recurrent feverâ•›*
Ratio of deaths due to recurrent fever
17%
December 1915–November 1916
1,644 persons
November 1916–November 1917
2,141 persons
*â•›From Noyan, Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla, 63.
Table 7.4. Deaths in Baghdad and Mosul attributed to typhoidâ•›*
Period
Number of
patients with
typhoid
Number of
deaths
Percent
November 1915
7
–
–
December 1915
15
10
66.7
January 1916
74
35
47.3
February 1916
138
62
44.9
12
4
33.3
March 1916
*â•›From Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, 9: 400.
in ten months until the end of December, 11 out of 33 typhoid patients
died. In 1917, a total of 8 out of 15 patients with typhoid died within twelve
months. In 1918, the total number of patients with typhoid dropped to only
two. Though the hospitals recorded the above-mentioned statistical data for
cases of typhoid, Dr.€Noyan was of the view that those were in fact cases of
typhus. According to him, epidemics of typhoid were rare because of the
successful vaccination campaign against typhoid.78
In the 3rd Army sector, venereal diseases showed an enormous escalation in the years of 1916 and 1917, “which was particularly common in
coastal areas and among refugees. The fight against venereal diseases proved
to be unsatisfactory.”79 An increase was also observed in smallpox epidemics between July 1916 and June 1917. Those cases were caused largely by the
enormous number of admissions to hospitals among the refugees, who then
transmitted the disease to the army personnel.80
From 1917 on, the duty to protect the civilians from infectious diseases
was given to the army units. According to the records of the 3rd Army, a
total of 1,417,014 civilians were vaccinated against smallpox, which corresponds to 44.8€percent of the total population then living in that area.81
154
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Meaningful results were obtained from analyses of the amoebic dysentery in the Mesopotamia region, within the 6th Army sector. In January
1918, tests in the Mosul hospitals on eighty-five dysentery patients having
amoeba in their feces revealed that thirty of those patients had dysentery as
the primary sickness, twenty of whom were troops from the heavy machine
gun units who recently had joined the army sector. It was also established
that those soldiers caught the disease “during their travel which lasted for
7–8 days on the desert road between Nusaybin and Mosul.” The other ten
patients were soldiers already deployed in Mosul. As for the remaining fiftyfive patients, their illnesses were connected to the amoebic dysentery that
they previously experienced. It was understood that eighteen of them had
caught the same disease once, twenty-three of them twice, fifteen of them
three times, one of them four times, and three of them five times before.82
Another important finding obtained from the medical records per�tain�
ing to the sector of the 6th Army concerns the distribution of dysentery
cases and the death ratios of patients in different regions. The hospitals kept
track of the ratios of the soldiers coming from Anatolia, Syria, and Iraq
who caught amoebic dysentery. The results show that the disease was most
common among the soldiers coming from Anatolia and Rumelia, and that
the death ratio among them was also higher. The soldiers coming from Iraq
were mostly appointed to the station commands to carry out some routine
work, and some of them had meals in their homes. Since they also were
used to the climate and local traditions, they rarely became ill.83 Thus, these
results also indicate that people coming to the region from other places,
such as the Armenian deportees from eastern Anatolia, were at greater risk
of catching infectious diseases and dying.
British Blockade And The Deaths From Hunger
Of the many disastrous events encountered in the Ottoman territories during World€War€I, both on and off the battlefield, two were particularly important in terms of the high human cost: locust infestations, and famines.
Although the locust infestations were not directly related to the war, they
had serious effects on both the army and civilians by causing famine and
hunger.
Before World€War€I, the Ottoman territories had twice been infested
with locusts, in 1850 and 1880.84 Daniel Panzac writes that the mystery surrounding those locust infestations was partially solved in 1920–1925. According to the information included in Panzac’s study, the locust species
of Schitorceca gregaria belongs to the Acrididas family, in the Oaliferes class
Unexpected Results
155
of the orthoptera order of insects. The locusts of this species live alone and
change their locations at night by moving short distances. In certain ecological conditions, such as abundant rainfall, high temperature, soft alluvial
soil, special kinds of plant communities, and desert areas, they reproduce in
unbelievably large numbers. When a large number of them come together
and reach a certain population density (the details of that process are not
yet sufficiently known), they begin to live in swarms, which are carried long
distances by hot winds that allow migration from one place to another. They
move during the day, and descend to ground in the evening. The locusts are
about 7–8 cm long and can reach a population density of 200 insects per
square meter. That indicates a density of 200 million locusts per square kilometer. Considering that sometimes locust swamps are seen to spread across
an area of dozens of square kilometers, it could be said that the density of locust populations in these limited swampy areas creates a real catastrophe.85
In the course of the eighteenth century, a total of seven periods of drought
occurred in Syria as a result of locust infestations. Various parts of Syria were
affected more than others, but deprivation caused by those infestations was
high.86
During the First World War, enormous groups of locusts caused great
tragedies in the Ottoman territories. For instance, the infestation of Moroccan locusts in 1914 greatly damaged the crops. The next year, another type of
locust known as the Sudanese locust infested the cultivated lands. A commission was established to exterminate the insects. In order to implement
the decisions of the new commission, an organization for combating locusts
was set up jointly with the Ministry of War. Thirteen of the labor battalions
were assigned to carry out the work.87
The Ottoman Assembly of Deputies, following long debates during its
sessions held on 11 June, 13 June, and 20 June 1914, passed the bill on the
locust extermination.88 Another bill was passed on 19 February 1916, which
introduced awards of 250–1,000 kuruş to anyone who would provide timely
information about locust infestations to the authorities.89 In 1918, the issue
of the extermination of locusts and combating them was brought before the
Assembly of Deputies once again. In 1917, intensive locust infestations had
been recorded within the boundaries of the Çeşme District and Manisa Sanjak (a sanjak is a subdivision of a province), as well as in Alaşehir; it reached
such a high level that Saruhan Deputy Mustafa İbrahim Bey once said, “my
province is famous for its locusts.”90 Despite all the measures taken at the
beginning of the war, the crops for the year 1915 were badly damaged by locusts.91 In 1914 and in subsequent years, many places in the country were afflicted with losses caused by locusts, including Karesi, Kütahya, Karahisar-ı
156
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Salip, Istanbul, Burdur, Denizli, Aydın, İzmir, Menteşe, Antalya, Karaman,
Halep, Urfa, and Zor.92 Furthermore, just as the war was beginning, Syria
was very badly hit by an unbelievably intense locust infestation.93
Cemal Pasha, the general governor of Syria and the commander of the
4th Army, wrote the following:
In mid-April we encountered an unexpected disaster. Syria was wholly covered with locusts. The infestation was so intense that by the end of May and
June, it was impossible to see even a single tree, the leaves of which had not
been eaten up by locusts, in Syria. The greedy locusts consumed the grains,
which had not yet eared. Being badly upset by this natural disaster, we were
pessimistically thinking how we would spend this year.94
Next year, the problem was further deepened by a new disaster. In June
1916, a hot wind blowing constantly from the east for one week badly affected the grains grown in Havran, Humus, and Aleppo, reducing the yield
of wheat that year.95
Famines can be caused by a number of things, mostly involving natural
disasters such as floods, fires, droughts, earthquakes, epidemics, and excessively hot or cold weather conditions. Famines also are closely related to political and social events. For instance, famines can occur in a certain region
that remains within an area of fighting between great powers, or in areas
located on the routes of moving armies, or at times while a battle is taking
place. During periods of widespread banditry, revolts, or internal disorders
caused by a variety of reasons in the country, the inhabitants might have to
suspend agricultural activities and leave the area, or their crops might be destroyed. Such incidents are in most cases followed by a famine. On the other
hand, after long-lasting famines, it generally takes a long time for the people
to resume their normal lives.96
In the reports sent by the French consul in Aleppo (dated 1 September
1757, 3 March 1758, and 6 September 1758), it was stated that most of the
residents of Mosul, Diyarbakır, and Urfa had migrated to other places due
to a famine, and they had to sell all of their children, particularly their girls,
in Aleppo for prices less than two kuruş, or half a kuruş. No comparable
poverty had been observed elsewhere before. Since the living conditions
deteriorated even further in Aleppo in the winter, every day about fifteen
to twenty poor people were dying on the streets from hunger and cold. The
population decreased dramatically under the effect of the “malign fever,
causing the body to decay.” Typhus, dysentery, and infections related to
malnutrition found a very suitable breeding ground.97
Unexpected Results
157
During World€War€I, the supply of foodstuff was severely limited in the
Ottoman Empire as a result of several factors such as the closure of trade
routes, the insufficiency of the transportation system within the country,
the reduction of agricultural production, the lack of an organization for coordinating food supply, and the rapid consumption of the stocked supplies.
The crisis was felt only in the big cities in the beginning, but later escalated
further and badly affected the rural areas.98 As in every other corner of the
Ottoman Empire, in the region controlled by the 4th Army, too, the prices
of various goods exceeded the values of banknotes or gold. That situation
was the result of partly the rules of economics, and partly the groups that
emerged under war conditions to take advantage of others’ suffering.99
An officer who had been assigned to a duty within the 6th Army during
the war wrote later, in 1942, the following about the dimensions of the food
supply crisis:
From November on, one of the biggest hurdles was the food supply.…↜A
while ago, the 13th Army Corps already had reduced the amount of barley given to the animals to half. Later, even supplying that amount became
very difficult. As the animals, especially the horses used in pulling the gun
carriages, became very tired and unable to do the same work any more, two
guns were withdrawn from each battery at the front lines. Furthermore,
the cavalry brigade within that army corps had to be sent to Mosul on November 2 due to severe shortage of food supply. Also, by getting the approval of the Army, some new arrangements were made in the deployment
of those Army corps. On the Tigris Front, the food supply crisis caused the
withdrawal of 5,812 men and 1,819 animals from the supply forces, and 139
officers, 3,217 rifles, 45 machine guns, and 16 field artilleries from the combatant force.100
In late 1917, and at the beginning of the following year, the food supply
crisis continued very severely. As time passed, that crisis caused even bigger
and more distressing problems, which forced the armies and army corps
to ignore all kinds of military rules. They were obliged to reduce to minimum levels the strength of even the units fighting at the frontlines, and to
dispatch their reserves to very remote areas behind the front. Even those
measures were not effective in saving the troops from hunger…↜.
Increased rates of diseases, deaths, and desertions among troops were
the natural consequences of that crisis. Besides, many soldiers eating grass
due to hunger were poisoned. The soldiers were so tired and exhausted that
it was impossible to use them even for digging graves for those who died of
hunger, let alone making them carry out their routine duties. The dead were
158
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
just thrown into holes, which were covered with stones and bushes. Here,
I can’t help telling my memories about the ill and exhausted soldiers who
were taken to hospitals. They were complaining to the high-ranking officials inspecting the hospital and to the doctors by saying: “We stayed alive,
though we were wounded many times in the Caucasus and Iraqi fronts, and
now, are you going to kill us with hunger?” The words of the soldiers made
the inspectors and others listening to them shed tears of sadness. It was possible to see soldiers killing their friends just for a piece of bread. Again, there
were many soldiers, who deserted from the army in order to find something
to eat, by forming convoys and going into areas well behind the front, most
of the time taking their arms and equipment with them…↜.
As the civilians living in areas controlled by the Army were faced with
the same trouble of hunger, the death ratio among them was high too. Due
to hunger, uprisings and robberies became common in various places.
In the face of that terrible crisis, the Army resorted to several measures
such as reducing the number of troops and animals. At the same time, it
applied to the Lightning Group of Armies and to the Supreme Command
Headquarters requesting them to provide the 2nd Army with five million
kilograms of food supply. In response, the Supreme Command Headquarters advised purchase of provisions from the inner parts of Iran in cash. The
Lightning Group of Armies, however, even did not take that request into
consideration.101
The following lines from the “situation report” prepared by Kara Kemal, Istanbul representative of the Union and Progress Party, offers a great
insight into the dimensions of the crisis, which suddenly broke out at the
beginning of the war and challenged Istanbul significantly:
While the declaration of the war caused stagnation in our foreign trade,
the mobilization launched in the country prioritized the needs of the army,
which was considered to be a sacred institution, over the daily needs of the
people. Most of the transportation vehicles, and all of the foodstuff and
commodities waiting in the port were confiscated by the military authorities as part of the efforts to meet the needs of the mobilized army. Unfortunately, since we used to import most of our basic needs, even the most trivial ones, from Europe and to supply even wheat, our basic element of food,
partially from Anatolia, but mostly from Romania, Russia, and even from
Marseilles, after the declaration of mobilization, flour became the most
badly needed commodity in the country. A flour shortage started to be felt
in Istanbul, especially after the Dardanelles was closed to traffic, and Russia
Unexpected Results
159
entered the war. Other factors also exacerbated the problem and as a result
the shortages became severer: most parts of the railways in Anatolia were
allocated to military transportation purposes, the flour prices increased in
Romania, and the army continued to confiscate goods for itself.102
Besides the war, other disasters such as famines, hail, floods, infestations
of locusts, and epidemics adversely affected yields, and contributed to food
shortages throughout the war.103
Turkish Commander Ali Fuad, who was working under Cemal Pasha
in the 4th Army, tells the following about the people dying of hunger in
Beirut, then an Ottoman province:
At nights, the peace and silence in Beirut could be disturbed only by the
whimpers of those dying of hunger. In fact those voices would not last
long, as the poor people would die soon. Before dawn, while the city was
still asleep, the dead from the night were collected and heaped on carts by
employees of the municipality, and then were carried to a ditch opened to
bury all of them together. The streets were cleaned of corpses long before
the sun began rising gloriously over Lebanon’s mountains, which are almost
always covered with snow.
Some nights, the whimpers on the street were suppressed by the music coming out of the luxurious houses brilliantly shining in electric light.
Quite possibly, in those large houses the rich merchants were happily showing off their wealth, or the expensive nightgowns and diamonds of their
wives. Indeed, they were making their wealth by selling the wheat set apart
from the provisions of the armies fighting at the Sinai Front or Medina;
or they were running the railway cars being used in the shipment of that
wheat to Lebanon and Beirut, though those railway cars were needed for
transportation at the Sinai or Hijaz Fronts.
When the Acting Commander-in-Chief came, a banquet was given in
his honor in the garden of the Municipality, which lasted about an hour.
While the guests were eating and drinking, none of them heard the voices
of hungry people shouting “juan,” “juan” (we are hungry, we are hungry).
Nor did the guests see those poor people’s hands, trembling and puckered
from hunger, extended over the iron fences around the garden, begging for
a small piece of bread.104
In her memoirs, Halide Edip also emphasizes that hunger was the biggest problem causing difficulties for Cemal Pasha during his tenure as the
general governor in Syria and the 4th Army Commander.105 General Ali
160
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Fuad, who was one of the closest witnesses of the period, draws attention to
a different aspect of the problem:
Britain’s position was of particular importance. It is an interesting fact that
whereas the coasts of Hijaz, encouraged by Britain to revolt against the
Ottoman Empire, was excluded from the British blockade, and the Muslim cities in that area could find all kinds of food sent by Britain at cheap
prices, the Christian people of Lebanon were not even allowed to receive
a shipload of wheat sent by the King of Spain. The British sank the barges
and the sailboats bringing provisions for the Lebanese people from other
ports of Syria.106
In his memoirs, Cemal Pasha, Commander of the 4th Army, writes that
the food supply crisis that broke out in May and June 1916 escalated rapidly
to reach terrible dimensions in the months of August and September, and
“due to malnutrition many inhabitants looked like skeletons”:
Though I previously had written that I would not use the army’s food
stocks for relieving hunger among the local people, in view of the miserable conditions they are in, I could not help providing assistance to them
within our limits. I provided one year’s food supplies to all state schools,
American School in Beirut, the families that are citizens of the states we are
fighting, the spiritual leaders of Maronites and other sects, state officials, as
well as the public and private hospitals, either free, or at a reasonable price.
Especially for the Maronite Patriarch, and for the orphanages and religious
organizations under his patronage, I provided three hundred thousand kilograms of grain free of charge in 1916. In 1917 too, I provided grains and
monetary assistance to them.
This aid, however, was of little help for the huge population of Beirut
and Jabal Lubnan (Mount Lebanon). I intended to secure private relief to
be extended from outside, for example from Spain or the USA. To that
end, I had Maronite Patriarch write a letter to his Holiness the Pope, and
had our Ambassador to Switzerland presented it to the Pope. I also communicated our requests for relief to Mr.€Wilson, the US President, through
Dr.€Blis, the President of the American University. I repeatedly wrote to
Istanbul, and noted that five to ten thousand tons of grains and medical
supplies should immediately be sent to Beirut from any source whatsoever,
and through anyone, be that the King of Spain, the American President,
or the Pope. I told that otherwise, the innocent people in Beirut would fall
into a deep misery, and that it would be impossible to prevent terrible mass
deaths due to hunger or epidemics. Once, a very small amount of aid was
Unexpected Results
161
sent to Jaffa by the American Zionists in order to be distributed among the
poor living in Jerusalem; compared to the huge need that amount was a
joke. Besides, those who brought that comical amount of aid also had many
printed materials with them for Zionist propaganda. That was of course a
very inappropriate behavior.
One day, again, we were informed that two thousand tons of grains were
about to be sent to Beirut through the initiatives of the King of Spain and
the American President. We even were told that the ships carrying the food
already had reached Alexandria. At that point, however, the Entente Powers
intervened, claiming that we would seize the grain as soon as they reach Beirut, and would use them towards the needs of the Army. The Entente Powers refused to release the ships before securing a guarantee that all the grains
would be distributed to the civilians. After intense correspondence, eventually…↜they asked me if I would give permission to the presence of the Pope’s
Representative to Beirut, as well as one or two Americans in a commission to
be established for the distribution of the grains, when they reached Beirut.
I immediately replied by saying: “Once those grains reach here, I can
form a delegation consisting only of American, British, and Italian members for their distribution. I even can accept one or two individuals to be
assigned by the Entente Powers to inspect the distribution. My only wish is
to get the grains here as soon as possible so that the people could be saved
from hunger. Because I have become very tired of seeing everyday those innocent people dying on the streets.”
My answer also was communicated by Enver Pasha to Mr.€Elkuse, the
US Ambassador, which also proved ineffective. On the contrary, the blockade imposed by the navies of the Entente Powers was further intensified.
Then, I made an attempt to use sailing ships for carrying foodstuff to Lebanon and Beirut from the coasts of Syria. However, I had not taken into account the activities of the enemy’s spies. The navy ships of the enemy were
taking pleasure in hunting those sailing ships and sinking them.
In those days, I opened an orphanage in Aya Tura Abbey, in Jabal Lubnan (Mount Lebanon), to provide shelter to a thousand Armenian children.
Also, I was supplying foodstuff from the army’s stocks to many Armenian
orphans and widows in Damascus.107
As a general rule, epidemics and famines mutually trigger each other.
The epidemics can also emerge in the aftermath of natural disasters like
floods and earthquakes.108 As discussed so far, hunger caused by the war
conditions was quite widespread within the boundaries of the Ottoman
Empire. To give yet another example, in the “Political and Economical
Intelligence Brief ” dated 15 September 1918, prepared for the British War
162
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Cabinet, it was noted that in the winter and spring of 1917, hundreds of
Armenians died of hunger in Damascus.109
The situation in Mesopotamia during the winter of 1917–1918 was depicted very clearly by a German source:
A general state of utmost deprivation could be seen all over Mesopotamia.
During the winter months of 1917–1918, masses of people lost their lives
from hunger. Even cannibalism was observed. An Arab couple was found
out to be selling the meat of the children they were stealing and killing.
Between the dates of 1 September 1917 and 13 April 1918, a total of 12,735
Turkish officers and soldiers died due to malnutrition.110
Another German source states that from January 1918 on, thirty to sixty
individuals were dying every day of hunger in Mosul.111 Memoirs of a Turkish officer also include similar observations:
Hunger was prevailing everywhere. We were collecting foodstuff from the
civilians either for free, or by paying their costs to prevent hunger among
soldiers; this however further contributed the shortages among the local
people. In Mosul, the price of bread first increased to one silver mecidiye
(one lira), and later to three liras. The people could not afford to buy bread.
Incidents of death from hunger started to be encountered. Nothing could
be done for those women, men, children, and elderly people dying on the
streets, moaning bitterly. About 10–12 people were executed for selling the
flesh of dead children in butcher’s shops as sheep or lamb meat, or serving
those meats in the restaurants.112
According to a document from the British Archives, the year of 1914–1915
was recorded as a period of rapid escalation of infectious diseases in eastern
Anatolia as well as in the Caucasus and Iran. Unfortunately, as it also was
seen in the case of Urumia, the deaths occurring from epidemics in the area
were presented as a massacre of the Christians by the Muslims as part of the
war propaganda efforts. The British admitted that fact later.113
Another document from the British Archives notes that Gordon Paddock, the American consul in Tabriz, denied the reports that a massacre
took place around Urumia; he instead clarified that a typhoid epidemic in
the region caused the death of many local people and American missionaries, as well as many Armenians living in the villages nearby.114
Justin McCarthy reaches the following conclusion: “Judged on the basis
of the general wartime mortality of the Ottoman eastern provinces, more
Unexpected Results
163
than one-half of the internal refugees in eastern Anatolia must be dead.” He
also adds the following:
The precise numbers of Muslim dead are not in themselves important; their
importance lies in their depiction of the enormity of the Muslim loss in the
east. In the provinces in which the war was primarily fought, Van, Bitlis,
and Erzurum, at least 40€percent of the Muslims were dead at the war’s end.
The depth and breadth of the suffering that such figures imply is beyond
comprehension. The death rate is well beyond that of most of the great disasters in world history, such as the Thirty Years’ War and the Black Death.
Of course, Muslims were not the only ones to die. The Armenian death rate
was at least as great, and Armenian losses cannot be ignored. But the world
has long known of the suffering of the Armenians. It is time for the world
to also consider the suffering of the Muslims of the east and the horror that
it was. Like the Armenians, Muslims were massacred or died from starvation and disease in stupefying numbers. Like the Armenians, their deaths
deserve remembrance.115
Joseph Pomiankowsky, the Austrian-Hungarian Empire’s military attaché to Istanbul, also is of the opinion that a minimum of one million
Muslims, including many military personnel, died during the Great War
as a result of the infectious diseases transmitted by the internally displaced
Armenians:
The deportation of the Armenians in Anatolia by the Government of the
Young Turks suddenly left the country deprived of its tradesmen, craftsmen, merchants, and agriculturists. As a shortage of grains, animals, and
all kinds of provisions arose within the country soon, it became very difficult to find food supplies for the Turkish military units constantly moving within Anatolia. In Armenia [i.e., Turkey’s eastern provinces claimed
by the Armenians], about a hundred thousand Turkish troops were badly
afflicted by hunger. On the other hand, the convoys of the Armenians, being deprived of any basic facilities, such as hygiene and medical services,
spread the infectious diseases wherever they went. The infection of spotted
fever, also brought by those convoys, caused the death of around one million Muslims.116
One German source describes the Ottoman soldiers suffering from insufficient nutrition as the “weak bodies and sunken cheeks” and “hungry
ghosts.”117
164
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
A German doctor named Liebert wrote the following from Elazığ: “It
can be easily seen how fragile those weakened and feeble individuals are.
Taking or not taking them to surgery doesn’t change anything. They are dying anyway.”118
Eric Jan Zürcher also writes that among both the Armenian and the
Muslim refugees, many fell victim to infection, especially typhus: “Particularly in winters, eggs of the lice were easily transmitted onto the clothes and
other personal belongings, and caused typhus. That disease was killing the
deported Armenians, Muslim migrants and others.”119
According to Zürcher, excluding the losses that occurred on the battlefields, one-seventh of the total strength of the army at mobilization capacity
died due to various diseases such as malaria, dysentery, and typhus.120
8
UNARMED WARRIORS
Professor H. Braun, a German doctor, delivered a lecture at Istanbul University on 18 November 1933, entitled “Microbiology, Parazitoloji,
and Epidemics.” After defining some basic concepts, he gave his audience
a tour d’horizon by providing information on a vast range of subjects, from
the causes of epidemic diseases, to the importance of hygiene in daily life,
to the unbelievable impact of diseases on the course of history. Toward the
end of that “historical lecture,” the voice of the German professor was echoing in the lecture-hall:
At a time when hygiene was not yet established as a science, the famous
French Philosopher J.€J. Rousseau said the following: “Hygiene should be
treated as a virtue, rather than a scientific discipline.” Though somewhat
exaggerated, those words entail an element of truth in them.
The two basic components of hygiene, namely scientific and ethical,
should be observed both in education, and in practical life. A doctor should
possess immense knowledge, and should always be ready to make sacrifices
without expecting any benefit in return. The famous Viennese internist
Dr.€Nothnagel once finished his first lecture with the following sentence:
“Only a good person can be a good doctor.” This is especially true for the
doctors involved in the struggle against infectious diseases. The main desire
of true doctors is to help patients and serve the public good.1
The performance of the Turkish doctors in their struggle against infectious diseases during the wars of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth
century, and during the Balkan Wars and the First World War, present some
very bright, as well as very bitter, examples of the history of Turkish medicine.
165
166
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
In his book called Başımıza Gelenler (What Happened to Us), Mehmet Arif,
the former first secretary of the Ottoman Extraordinary Commissariat in
Egypt, provides the following assessment about the typhus epidemic that
broke out during the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877–1878:
The condition of our troops in Erzurum worsened due to typhus. In addition to the patients already being treated in our hospital, the doctors examined every day about three to four hundred patients coming from the
fortifications on the frontlines. An average of 100–150 of those patients was
being hospitalized. The number of deaths increased so much that religious
personnel in the hospital, though working non-stop from the morning till
the evening, became unable to wash and shroud all of the dead [according
to Islamic tradition]. As a result, the corpses of the dead soldiers had to be
piled one over the other like a heap of wood. At one point, even it became
impossible to find shrouds for the dead, and some of the corpses had to
be buried in their underclothes. Then, some of the tradesmen helped us
by providing, on credit, sufficient amount of cloths to be used as shrouds.
What was even worse was that many of doctors, who already were insufficient to meet the demand, also caught the disease. Many of our doctors,
of every rank, from the chief doctor to the young ones at the rank of captain, lost their lives. About twenty to twenty-five doctors were taking care
of eight to ten thousand patients.2
During the Ottoman-Greek War of 1897, which followed the OttomanRussian War of 1877–1878, “The military encampments turned into graveyards due to infectious diseases.” In the war of 1897, the Ottoman Army
lost some 30,000 men as well as many doctors. Among the doctors who
died during that war was Dr.€Major Hasan Zühtü Nazif, who had attended
courses on microbiology at the Pasteur Institute in Paris in 1892.3
The struggle against infectious diseases during the Balkan War was discussed in Chapter 2 in this study.4 An interesting detail regarding the War
of Tripoli should be mentioned here. The Red Crescent Organization’s 1913
yearbook reports a typhoid epidemic that broke out in 1911, during the War
of Tripoli. While the Ottoman, German, and British medical organizations
were jointly struggling against that epidemic in the region of Garian, two
doctors from the German Red Cross, as well as two nurse’s aides from the
Red Crescent, lost their lives. None of the Red Crescent doctors from the
Ottoman minorities went to Tripoli to serve there during the war.5
At the start of the Ottoman-Russian battles on the eastern front on 29
October 1914, the medical conditions in the 3rd Army were as follows:
Unarmed Warriors
167
The establishment of the army stations at the rear could not be completed
yet. The hospitals in those army stations were lacking sufficient number of
beds and medical equipment. The army, deprived of the means of disinfection, was vulnerable to epidemics at any moment. Indeed, the first signs of
an epidemic already had been observed.
After the beginning of the war, two battles took place in Köprüköy
within three weeks, which were very bloody. By 26 November, a total of
139 wounded officers and 5,646 soldiers were brought to the hospitals in
Hasankale and Erzurum. Then, a period of one month until the battle of
Sarıkamış passed in relative calm. In general, during the intensive military
movements made in the course of war, diseases and epidemics are encountered rarely. This situation is in fact temporary and might be misleading.
The severest diseases and epidemics occur during the calm periods that follow a tiring and intensive war involving a lot of movement. That was the
case encountered here too. A terrible misery was prevailing everywhere.
Spotted fever [typhus] became widespread. The doctors also were falling
sick due to illness one after another.6
The medical organization on the Caucasian front consisted of one medical company in each division, and three mobile hospitals in each of the
army corps. The cavalry divisions had no medical companies or mobile hospitals. The battalions on the front, as well as the gendarmerie battalions, had
no medical units, either, other than the medical infrastructure established
in the field. In Erzurum, a 900-bed hospital was subordinated to the fortified post command, and a total of 1,950 beds were available in the hospitals
located within the entire sector of the army stations at the rear (250 beds in
Trabzon, 300 in Bayburt, 500 in Erzincan, 200 in Elazığ, 200 in Diyarbakır,
200 in Van, 200 in Muş, and 100 in Bitlis). For an army with the strength
of 189,000 men, a total of 4,650 beds were prepared, 1,800 on the frontlines
and the mobile hospitals, and 2,850 at the rear. The most crucial hospitals at
the rear, given their proximity to the front, were those in Erzurum, Bayburt,
and Trabzon. The total bed capacity of those hospitals was 1,650.7
By March 1915, all of the mobile hospitals had become entirely full, and
no free beds were available for wounded soldiers in case of war.8 The 3rd
Army’s core strength was concentrated in the north, around Erzurum. It was
expected that Erzurum would have to shoulder the biggest burden, which
indeed turned out to be the case during the war. Considering the centrality
of Erzurum to the Ottoman war plans, previously a total of ten to twenty
thousand beds were calculated to be necessary there. Despite those prewar
diagnoses, only nine hundred beds could be made available in Erzurum,
168
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
whereas the hospital in Erzincan had only five hundred beds. Bitlis Hospital, on the other hand, was a station hospital of secondary importance.
As for the hospitals in Muş, Elazığ, and Diyarbakır, they would be able to
meet only the local needs and admit only the soldiers being transferred to
other places. Of the fourteen newly established station posts, only the ones
in Erzincan, Kelkit, and Bayburt were appointed doctors. None of those
posts had any medical establishment. No medical unit could be set up on
the roads to be used in the transfer of ill and weak soldiers. The detachment,
which was ordered to be formed in Bayburt to carry out the mission of
transferring the ill, could not be formed. Meanwhile, the medical detachment having the same transfer assignment in Erzurum could receive only
eight carriages after 5 November, all of which were in need of repair. There
were three medical depots in Erzurum. The medical depot of the station was
not yet operating. As of 6 November, the medical detachment of the 17th
Division had twenty-nine horses, twenty-two mules, and ten animals used
for riding, while the 1st mobile hospital of the 9th Army Corps had twentyfour two-wheel carriages, and forty-eight oxcarts.9
On the Caucasian front, a particularly important problem was the
shortage of war packages. The war packages sent from Istanbul (36,700 for
the infantry, 1,794 for the artillery units) were not only inadequate, but also
most of them did not even reach the area.10
Research For The Diagnosis And Treatment Of Diseases
Although recurrent fever had been known since the ancient times, it was
differentiated from typhus in 1843, and its spirochetes were identified in patients’ blood samples in 1868.11 In Turkey, Dr.€Süleyman Numan was the
first to classify recurrent fever in 1905.12 As with typhus, lice play an important role in the human-to-human transmission of recurrent fever. In
the case of armies, it was found out in 1909 that lice were responsible for
the transmission of typhus. Outbreaks of recurrent fever and trench fever,
in 1910 and 1917, respectively, were also understood to be transmitted by
lice.13 Recurrent fever was widespread throughout the world, and during
World€War€I it was encountered in Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland,
the Balkans, and Russia, as well as in the Far East, in India and China, and
in North Africa and Central America.14 In untreated cases, the death ratio
from that disease could be as high as 50€percent.15
Ekrem Kadri notes that in the national and international medical literature, “louse typhus” (typhus exanhematicus), “epidemic typhus,” and
Unarmed Warriors
169
“spotted fever” are used interchangeably.16 It is also known that during the
Great War typhus was called “spotted typhoid” or “army fever.” In the past,
typhus used to be confused mostly with typhoid. Some of the diseases referred to as typhoid were likely to be typhus.17 During the Balkan Wars, the
first case of spotted fever (typhus) in Istanbul was diagnosed in the Gülhane
military hospital.18 Dr.€Major General Abdülkadir Noyan explains how a
typhus epidemic that broke out in 1904 was diagnosed to be typhoid:
An epidemic of a feverous disease broke out in Karaköse. A medical delegation headed by Dr.€First Lieutenant Haydar was sent from Istanbul to diagnose the disease. Although the delegation members reached the decision
that the disease was typhoid, it was rather unusual. An outbreak of typhoid
was impossible at that time of year—under severe winter conditions. Indeed, the disease in question was showing all typical symptoms of “typhus
exanhematicus,” a louse-borne disease. Unfortunately, at that time typhus
was not yet known or understood.19
In order to conclude the debate among the Ottoman doctors about the
distinction between typhoid and typhus, the Ministry of War set up a medical commission in March 1913. That commission, composed of Dr.€Ferik
Hacı Emin Pasha, the field medical inspector, as well as Dr.€Fevzi Pasha,
Dr.€Neşet Ömer, Dr.€Selim Ali, Dr.€Server Kamil, and Dr.€Abdülkadir
Noyan, reached the decision that the epidemic disease seen in the army was
typhus and rejected the diagnoses of typhoid made by other doctors.20
A cholera epidemic also spreading to the Bulgarian Army hastened the
signing of a ceasefire between the Ottomans and the Bulgarians on 3 December 1912. Around the same time, cases of typhus were seen in the trenches
of the Ottoman Army along the Çatalca line. The military doctor Tevfik
Sağlam, who worked at the Yassıviran Hospital, later described the situation
in the hospital as follows: “The patients lay side by side on mattresses placed
on the floor very close to each other. They have their own clothes on them.
Their bodies are covered with lice.”21
Although he had diagnosed the disease as measles on his first encounter,
Dr.€Sağlam later thought—when his friend Dr.€Şekip Habip also became ill
showing the same symptoms—that it could in fact be typhus. After a short
while, he caught the disease, too.22 In his book Büyük Harpte 3: Ordu’da
Sıhhi Hizmet (Medical Services in the 3rd Army during the Great War),
Dr.€Sağlam writes the following about the dispute regarding the diagnosis
of infectious diseases:
170
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
It was not easy to have everyone agree that the cases of illness were spotted
fever (typhus). Some of the doctors, including several well-known medical
experts, were claiming insistently that the disease was typhoid. In order to
have them recognize the real nature of the disease, I had to carry out an intensive study, based on clinical findings, blood analysis results, and autopsy
findings. My opponents had to accept my thesis, after a conference held at
the Faculty of Medicine on 1 May 1913. The text of my speech in the conference was published in 1913 in pamphlet form.23
The discussions between the Ottoman doctors about the diagnosis of typhus were quite normal at that time.
Dr.€Noyan took part in the struggle to control spotted fever encountered among the labor battalions in Kandıra in March 1915. He successfully
got the typhus epidemic under control within only ten days through the
“bakery method” he developed there, and described his method in a report
he sent to the field medical inspectorate. He also offered the method of
operation to the army.24 The bakery method was then rapidly put into the
form of a simple project, and a pamphlet was published about it entitled
“Oven of Disinfection through the Flow of Hot Air.”25
He later published the following observations about how he came to
develop this new method:
I was assigned to Kandıra on 3 March 1915 in order to combat an epidemic
of spotted fever which had broken out among the labor battalions there.
When I arrived in Kandıra, I found more than 3,000 members of the labor battalion busy chopping wood, who were in civilian clothing, and who
seemed to be in a miserable condition. Almost all of them were dirty and
were infested with lice. Every day, I was encountering 10–15 new cases of
spotted fever I had no means to combat against. The patients were being
treated in a hospital, which seemed rather like an infirmary. Some of them
were also transferred to the Military Hospital in İzmit. The death ratio was
very high among the patients. Under those conditions, I seriously wondered what to do.
When I was wandering around in the market place of Kandıra, I saw
plenty of bakeries. They reminded me of my first place of appointment—
Serviburnu—after becoming a doctor. I remembered how I had had hardbaked breads, as well as their sacks, cleaned in the military ovens to fight
against cholera in the Quarantine Establishment in Serviburnu.
I became very relieved when it occurred to me that I could use the
bakeries in Kandıra as hot air stoves for disinfection, and could have the
Unarmed Warriors
171
soldiers cleaned in the baths to be set up in tents. I immediately talked to
the Kaymakam (district governor) of Kandıra, and the Commander of the
labor battalion. Leaving sufficient number of bakeries to meet the needs
of the people, I had three bakeries located side by side to each other emptied. The market place was located on a straight, long, and wide street. I
had three baths set up in tents just across the bakeries. There was plenty of
wood. Water was going to be boiled in large cauldrons to be placed beside
the tents of bath.
Since it was my idea to clean the clothes and other belongings of
the soldiers by using that method, and I was the first one to implement,
I worked together with the bakers in heating the ovens and adjusting the
temperature. I personally measured the temperature by throwing a white
paper into the oven and then closing its door. When the temperature was
high, the paper would become black. In that case, it would be necessary to
open the door of the oven for a while in order to lower the temperature. If
on the other hand, the paper was found to have a yellowish color, then wet
sackcloth was spread at the floor of the oven and the objects to be sterilized were put on those cloths by using the bakers’ peels. In the beginning,
I implemented all these steps personally, with the help of the bakers and
some soldiers. Later, when I served in Çanakkale and Iraqi fronts, I saw in
many places military units building field ovens and combating lice by the
method of dry-heating.26
A very intensive campaign was launched against epidemics of spotted
fever and recurrent fever from the very moment they were encountered.
Initially, disinfection was carried out in field ovens (Noyan’s method) and in
tandirs (ovens consisting of a clay-lined pit or an earthen jar buried in the
ground). In 1916, Ahmet Fikri invented the method of vapor chest, which
formed the very basis of the fight against lice. Cleaning houses were set up at
various places, and eventually the army was successful in getting rid of lice.
As a result, spotted fever and recurrent fever no longer turned into new epidemics. Very severe epidemics of cholera, however, broke out several times
both within the army, and among the civilian population, which mostly
broke out as a result of contacts between individuals. In two cases, through,
they were transmitted through water. Through an intensive struggle based
on diagnosing the carriers and waging extensive vaccination campaigns, the
army was saved from a great disaster. As a result of the measures implemented, cholera ceased to be a threat to hinder the movement of the army
in some places. An effective struggle also was carried out against the diseases
of typhoid and dysentery.27
172
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Dr.€Hüseyin, the chief doctor of Tokat Hospital, also invented a mobile
barrel of vapor in 1916. The barrel, manufactured in Tokat, was mounted on
two wheels, to be pulled by a horse or an ox.28
The following was written by Guze about the availability of disinfection
means in other military units: “It was impossible to dispatch the mobile
hot-air stoves to many of the units, as they could never be taken through the
snow-covered passages. The units stationed in the Aras Valley and around
Erzurum at least had the chance of making use of the hot water springs in
Hasankale and Erzurum.”29
In 1917, still another simple device was invented by Dr.€Ahmet Lütfi,
the consultant of hygiene for the 4th Army Corps, subordinated to the 2nd
Army. That device, which was called a “vapor boiler” by its inventor, could
be used in places where no hot air stoves or vapor chests were available for
disinfection.30
Ottoman doctors’ successful work in the field of military medicine and
in combating infectious diseases during the long years of war should also be
underlined here.31
Reşat Riza
Three doctors, who separately instigated typhus vaccination within the
Ottoman Army during the Great War—namely, Dr.€Tevfik Sağlam,
Dr.€Server Kamil, and Dr.€Abdülkadir Noyan—stated that they borrowed
the idea of vaccination from Dr.€Reşat Rıza. The first typhoid vaccination in
Turkey was applied in Gülhane Military Hospital by Dr.€Rıza and Dr.€Mustafa. Dr.€Rıza was also a key figure in the search for a typhus vaccination in
Turkey. One year before the publication of an international study on typhus
in 1916, he had drawn the shape of the rickettsia that caused typhus in his
notebook, but had not published it. Dr.€Rıza first developed the idea of preparing a prophylactic vaccine against typhus by using the blood of patients
who had the disease. He proved the harmlessness of the vaccine by experimenting it on himself and Dr.€Musa Kazım. On 25 April 1915, Dr.€Rıza and
Dr.€Mustafa Hilmi submitted a report pertaining to the results of their joint
study to the field medical inspectorate, entitled “An Experiment of Vaccination against Spotted Fever.” That report was presented before the Supreme
Medical Assembly in July, which approved it for publication in the Sıhhiye
Mecmuası (Medical Journal). Dr.€Rıza’s and Dr.€Mustafa’s studies were both
published the same year.32
The vaccines produced from the blood of patients following Dr.€Rıza’s
research were tested in the 3rd and 6th armies. Although the efforts of
Unarmed Warriors
173
vaccination performed by using those vaccines produced positive results,
they remained of limited value. The three doctors executing the tests, Hayri,
Recai, and Süfyan, died in quick succession in March 1915, with an interval
of one week between their deaths.33
The first vaccine against typhus containing Rickettsia prowazekii was
used in the Ottoman Army. The method for preparing that vaccine was
designed by Dr.€Rıza. Considering the fact that the typhus agent exists in
the blood when the patient has a fever, and that it dies at the temperature
of 60°C when heated for one hour, this distinguished microbiologist proposed to inject 5 cc of blood taken from typhus patients during the feverish
stage of the disease and heated at 50 to 60°C for one hour after defibrination. The same method was also implemented by Dr.€Sağlam in early 1915
and by Dr.€Noyan in 1916, yielding positive results in both cases.34 The
Germans first studied and tested Dr.€Rıza’s method of vaccine preparation
at the Romanian front.35 In subsequent studies carried out in Germany, the
vaccine was modified and it was syringed three times. No definite findings,
however, could be obtained regarding the immunity provided by the vaccine. It was thought to be due to the fact that the blood used in the preparation of the vaccine was taken from patients after they had recovered from
the disease.36 The method of vaccination used previously by the Ottoman
doctors was based on injecting the blood of individuals who had recovered,
or still were recovering, from the disease, either to patients or for prophylactic purposes to healthy individuals, because no medicines were available
against typhus€then.37
The Ottoman Army had no institution of vaccination in 1914.38
Dr.€Captain Hamit Osman, the bacteriologist of the army station hospitals in Erzincan, Dr.€Hamdi Suat, who was assigned by the General Directorate of Health as the inspector of communicable diseases, and the Red
Crescent delegation used the method of vaccine preparation developed by
the Ottoman doctors against typhus after some modifications. Dr.€Osman
vaccinated 20 soldiers on 9 March with the blood he had taken from patients newly recovered from spotted fever and still convalescing. He used
that blood without inactivating it. None of the soldiers vaccinated by him
caught typhus, whereas 4 of the 8 soldiers who lived under the same conditions with the others but were not vaccinated, caught the disease. After
evaluating these results, Dr.€Osman decided to obtain the blood to be used
for vaccination from patients at the beginning stage of the disease—within
the first ten days. He vaccinated 112 persons with that blood, again without inactivating it. The results were again positive. Then, Dr.€Osman vaccinated 304€individuals with the unheated blood taken from typhus patients
174
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
during the most acute stage of the disease. Out of those 304 individuals,
114 remained healthy, while 190 of them caught typhus. Based on his own
vaccination efforts, Dr.€Suat gave the same figures as 310 and 136, respectively, and stated that 49 individuals died due to typhus. On 9 May 1915,
Dr.€Osman went on leave from Erzincan to Istanbul due to severe family
problems, and there remained in a hospital for one and a half years due to
a mental disorder. He, therefore, could not personally follow the health
conditions of some of the individuals he had vaccinated. The fate of these
individuals was followed instead by Dr.€Captain Ahmet Hamdi who was
sent to Erzincan. In 1919, because of the special conditions following the armistice, the vaccination studies were highly questioned, and the directorate
of health made a decision to investigate the matter as well as the methods of
applying the vaccinations. The results of that investigation were published
in a report.39
Turkish military doctor and typhus specialist Abdülkadir Noyan vaccinated all of the officers and doctors in Baghdad with the vaccine he had developed. However, Dr.€Noyan’s vaccination caused much dispute among the
German doctors and hygiene specialists. While some of them accepted the
benefits of the vaccine, others questioned its effectiveness. Marshal Goltz’s
doctor refused to vaccinate the German marshal, and a few weeks later both
the marshal and the doctor lost their lives. On the other hand, all of the vaccinated soldiers and officers remained healthy.40
Hamdİ SuaT
Before the war, Dr.€Hamdi Suat, one of the first interns at the Gülhane MiliÂ�
tary Hospital, was sent to Germany where he successfully defended a thesis
on “bubonic plague.” On his return to the Gülhane Military Hospital, he
set up and directed a laboratory for pathologic anatomy. This distinguished
medical figure, described by Tevfik Sağlam as a “great patriot,” joined the
Red Crescent’s medical delegation voluntarily when World€War€I broke out,
and he went to Erzurum. He continued his studies on typhus there, during
the fiercest stages of the war.41
Besides serving as a military doctor, Suat also carried out significant
research on typhus throughout the war. Although he was dismissed from
the university during the University Reform in 1932, he did not display his
disappointment openly, and accepted Dr.€Refik Saydam’s offer to work at
the Gureba Hospital, where he was able to continue his studies.42
During the Great War, Dr.€Suat performed some tests in Erzurum by
using vaccines prepared with serums, which were kept on ice for 24€hours
Unarmed Warriors
175
after being taken from typhus patients when they reached the acute phase of
the disease. The results of the research he carried out in Erzurum were published in 1916 in Zeitschrift für Hygiene und Infektionkrankheiten.43
Ekrem Şadi wrote the following about Dr.€Suat:
Students of the Military School of Medicine were assigned to various duties; first and second year students at the rank of medical corporal, and students of higher grades at the ranks of medical sergeant. I was also assigned
as medical corporal first at Beykoz, Serviburnu, and later at the Hospital in
sheds at Yeşilköy. I was given appointed to the shed allocated for typhus patients. The Chief Doctor of the hospital was Dr.€Major Hulusi. When I was
there, I heard once that Dr.€Major Tevfik Sağlam and Dr.€Major Hamdi
Suat had come to the hospital, and by using scissors, cut out typhus exanthemas from the backs of the typhus patients, to analyze them. Then I was
assigned to the Beylerbeyi hospital where the seriously wounded soldiers
were treated. The doctors working in that hospital were retired military
doctors of the ranks of lieutenant colonel or colonel.”44
Dr.€Sağlam, who was a colleague of Dr.€Suat, explains the following
about the results obtained from the tests completed in 1915 on a vaccine,
which was developed by the Ottoman doctors in order to combat an epidemic of spotted fever that broke out in the 3rd Army sector during the
Great War: “I was talking to Dr.€Reşat Rıza about the measures to be taken
against the severe epidemic of spotted fever that existed in the 3rd Army
sector before my departure to join the 3rd Army in February 1915. He offered me to use a vaccine—to be prepared according to the method he was
planning—on the 3rd Army.” Under the existing conditions, however, the
vaccine could not be applied widely. It had to be prepared by using blood
taken from patients infected with spotted fever. Therefore, in order to apply
the vaccine, a patient with spotted fever was needed. The blood taken from
one patient was only sufficient to create vaccine for a maximum of two to
four individuals. Consequently, the vaccine was applied only on the individuals at greatest risk during epidemics, such as doctors or nurse’s aides.
I personally prepared the first vaccine for spotted fever on 28 March 1915 in
Hasankale, and applied it to 9 officers, 5 of whom were doctors, who volunteered for it. Later on, my associates vaccinated 510 individuals in Erzurum,
130 in Bayburt, and 156 in Sivas. Together with the ones I had vaccinated
earlier, a total of 805 individuals were vaccinated. None of those individuals
showed any symptoms to indicate a transmission of the disease caused by
176
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
the vaccine. Later on, the harmlessness of the vaccine was further proven
when used in the 3rd Army, and [later] during the War of Liberation. The
vaccine was causing minimal reaction in the soldiers vaccinated.
As for the immunity provided by the vaccine, results of comparative
studies have proven that the vaccine developed immunity against the disease. However, since those results are based on observations that covered a
period of no longer than about 3–4 months, it has not been possible to acquire an accurate idea about the duration of that immunity. In my personal
opinion, that vaccine is perfectly effective for the time being [as of 1941],
and therefore it should be applied to the individuals at the greatest risk of
catching the disease by the time a superior treatment is developed.
Dr.€Tevfik Sağlam went on to note that:
As I write these lines [1941], many foci of spotted fever continue to exist in
our country. Unless those foci are completely eliminated, and the people
are completely cleaned of lice, spotted fever will continue to threaten us in
any future mobilization and war, causing terrible disasters. In order to get
rid of the spotted fever, we should eradicate the lice in our country.45
The above-mentioned studies were published and took their places
within the scientific literature.46
İbrahim Tali And Tevfİk Sağlam
Dr.€İbrahim Tali and Dr.€Tevfik Sağlam had very bright professional careers
as medical administrators within the army during the war, and are recognized as two important figures in Turkish medical history.
Dr.€Tali was appointed as the deputy chief of the Army Department of
Health during the general mobilization declared in 1914, and served in that
position for five months until his promotion to the rank of colonel in June
1915. He served first in Çanakkale and Seddülbahir, and later on the front
in Diyarbakır. When the army headquarters he was serving in was renamed
the Inspectorate of the Caucasus Group of Armies, he became its medical
inspector. After the abolition of this headquarters, he returned to Istanbul
and was assigned to the duty of inspecting the health conditions of the ill
and wounded officers and soldiers being treated in Germany. During his
stay in Germany, he attended two medical congresses on infectious diseases
and surgery, and represented the Turkish Military Medical Organization
together with other Ottoman doctors. Later, he was assigned as the medical
Unarmed Warriors
177
chief of the Eastern front which was established in June 1920 to coordinate
the military expedition against Armenia.47
Dr.€Sağlam also earned an honorable place in Turkish medical history,
particularly for his intensive efforts in the 3rd Army sector during the war.
He designed several research projects and was involved actively in their implementation. Guze, who was the 3rd Army’s chief of staff, wrote that the
Army’s medical chief was a “very capable person.” According to German
Major Guze, Dr.€Sağlam “had done everything which could be done under
the conditions of those days.”48
Turkish Medical Publications In War Time
Dr.€Akil Muhtar and Dr.€Besim Ömer, who were the chief of board of the
Civilian School of Medicine and the chief of the General Health Council,
respectively, published a 233-page study on the cholera epidemics that occurred within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire in 1912, entitled “A
Guide for the Measures to Be Taken against the Disease of Cholera.”49 Ziya
Nuri translated into Turkish Henrique da Rocha Lima’s 1915 study on typhus in 1916.50 A considerable increase was observed in the number of scientific articles on infectious diseases published in the Journal of Darülfünun
Faculty of Medicine (Istanbul) in 1916. This trend continued during the years
of 1917 and 1918.51
Dr.€Server Kamil published the results of the studies he carried out by
using the “Weil Felix” method in Sivas in 1916. In an attempt to develop a
serum for the treatment of one particular disease, he conducted experiments
on goats and calves.52
The results of research carried out by German hygiene specialists in the
Ottoman Empire during the Great War were published in various German
medical journals in the Weimar Republic, and after 1933. To give a specific
example, one could mention Prof. Hans Ziemann’s book, also written on
the subject of tropical diseases. In that book, called Malaria and Black-water
Fever, Prof. Ziemann details his experiences in southern Anatolia, Syria, and
Palestine during his assignment there as the medical advisor to the Ottoman
armies in Palestine.53
According to the records pertaining to 1909, a total of 600 doctors,
130 pharmacists, 170 midwives, and 200 vaccination officers were serving
in the Ottoman Empire, about half of whom were non-Muslims.54 When
the mobilization was declared in 1914, the military doctors were distributed throughout the army, according to the importance of the various army
corps.55
178
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Table 8.1. Ottoman medical officers shown according to their ranksâ•›*
Rank
1914
Brigadier general
1915
1916
1917
1919
Death
Resignation
1
1
2
2
4
–
–
Colonel
11
12
12
13
11
1
4
Lieutenant colonel
26
53
80
58
102
7
17
267
317
428
449
436
45
39
1,198
1,030
811
800
808
278
77
First lieutenant
143
129
141
72
102
3
14
Lieutenant
–
–
–
101
–
7
Major
Captain
–
*â•›From ATASE Archives, from no. 1↜/63, box 1327, file 11, fih. 1–116, 1–117, in Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, 9:613.
According to Ahmet Emin, the number of physicians serving in the
entire health service amounted to 2,555. According to the official figures,
2,998,321 men were enrolled in the army during the four years of war. Although the total soldiers under arms never exceeded 1,200,000 at any one
time, the medical staff were still extremely insufficient compared to those
numbers. The 1,202 active army surgeons were broken down as follows:
1,173 Turks, 9 Greeks, 17 Armenians, and 3 Jews; whereas the 1,353 reserve
surgeons were composed of 528 Turks, 331 Greeks, 229 Armenians, 116 Jews,
and 79 Catholic Maronites. The army medical corps suffered heavy losses
during the Great War: 163 active surgeons and 186 reserve officers lost their
lives either during the fighting or due to sickness, amounting to a 13.66€percent casualty rate.56
Dr.€Tevfik Sağlam set off from Istanbul for Erzurum on 17 February
1915, together with Mahmut Kamil Pasha, who was assigned as the commander of the 3rd Army, and started his duty as the medical chief of the
army on 14 March. On his way to Erzurum, he observed the medical situation and organization along the main line of the army stations, extending
from Ulukışla to Erzurum. Upon his arrival at Erzurum, he received the
following information from his predecessor, Dr.€İbrahim Tali, on the medical situation in general: “Various diseases, particularly spotted fever and
recurrent fever have caused the death of many doctors and pharmacists,
and most of those who have recovered from those diseases are either at
the stage of convalescence, or they are still in a very weak condition.” As
of mid-March 1915, the 3rd Army had a total of 255 doctors, 194 of whom
were healthy, whereas 42 were sick and under treatment in the hospital, 12
Unarmed Warriors
179
were convalescing, and 7 were on sick leave and were sent to other places
for a temporary change of environment. Furthermore, a total of 21 doctors
from the army corps either had been taken as prisoners by the enemy or
were missing. Most of the 44 new doctors, who were sent from Istanbul and
started their duties in Erzurum after their journey between February 20 and
March 5, soon became ill with spotted fever.57
The Ottoman Army put into place an interesting practice. Süleyman
Numan, the field medical inspector general, understanding the difficulties
borne by the doctors in Erzurum and appreciating the intensive efforts they
spent despite all the difficulties and the diseases afflicting most of them, had
promised to implement an exchange program between the doctors in Erzurum and in Istanbul. It was indeed disturbing to see those self-sacrificing
individuals fulfilling their duties in a devoted manner although they just
had recovered from illness and hardly had the power to stand. Besides the
doctors, many officers had only recently recovered from spotted fever and
were in need of sick leave and a temporary change of environment. Because
the epidemic was still raging, however, replacing the doctors and officers
who had recovered from spotted fever with new ones from Istanbul meant
that almost all of those new personnel would catch the disease after a short
while, that about one-third of them would lose their lives, and that the rest
would not be able to work for a long time. These considerations forced the
army authorities to make a tough decision: the army eventually agreed to
keep the officers, and particularly the medical officers, who had recovered
from spotted fever and had therefore gained a permanent immunity against
that disease in their present posts, and not to call them back to Istanbul.
Regardless of their suffering and desire to go back, they were kept and spent
their convalescence period where they were stationed, resuming their duties
after recovering. Although that particular military decision put a heavy burden on the shoulders of those personnel who had the disease, it also saved
many new people from becoming ill and losing their lives.58
Under war conditions, some people could demonstrate unusual behavior. When the acting commander-in-chief Enver Pasha was visiting a
hospital after the disastrous defeat of the Ottoman Army in Sarıkamış, he
observed the tragic conditions of the patients, many of whom were lying
together on the ground. These scenes made him angry and led him to accuse
the doctors, thinking that they were responsible for that tragedy. He ordered
tearing of the epaulets of Major İbrahim, who was the chief doctor at the
hospital. The doctor, who was sent back to his unit as a private and on foot,
died from sorrow on his way.59
Just as other Ottoman officers were fighting against the enemy, the
180
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Table 8.2. Medical officers who died from diseaseâ•›*
Yearâ•›/â•›Months
Deaths
1914 months 1–6
3
1914 months 7–12
7
1915 months 1–6
101
1915 months 7–12
12
1916 months 1–6
67
1916 months 7–12
24
1917 months 1–6
45
1917 months 7–12
12
1918 months 1–6
16
1918 months 7–12
5
*â•›Quoted from Kızılay Archives in Çapa, Kızılay Hilal-I Ahmer
Cemiyeti, 120–121.
Ottoman medical officers were also involved in an intensive war; theirs was
against a different kind of enemy, diseases. During that war, they never hesitated to sacrifice their own lives. From the Red Crescent delegation sent in
1915 to Erzurum, Dr.€Mustafa Şakir, Dr.€Mehmet Emin, research assistants
Dr.€Tacettin and Dr.€Hasan Selahaddin, nurse’s aides Fehim and Cevdet,
and privates at the medical service named Mehmet (son of Mustafa) and
Halil (son of Tahir), all lost their lives from disease.60
Many of the German medical personnel serving within the 2nd Army
also became ill and would never see their homeland again. During the typhus epidemic in February 1916, a total of 42 Ottoman doctors lost their
lives due to that disease alone.61 Of the 163 medical officers who died on
the Eastern front, there were 125 doctors, 24 pharmacists, 1 dentist, 6 surgeons, and 7 final-year students from the Faculty of Medicine. There were
124 Muslims, 19 Greeks, 17 Armenians, and 3 Jews.62
On the marble monument erected in 1946 by Dr.€General Nahit
Tunaşar, then medical chief of the 3rd Army, at the entrance of the Marshal
Fevzi Çakmak Military Hospital in Erzurum, are the names of a total of 164
conscripted medical officers who died during World War I.
Different figures exist regarding the number of Ottoman medical
Unarmed Warriors
181
officers who died while fighting against infectious diseases, particularly typhus, during the period of 1914–1917. According to one source, the number
was 215.63 Another list published in 1997 gives the same number as 301.64 Because the names of some of the Ottoman medical officers listed in the first
source mentioned, published by Mazhar Osman, were not included in the
second source, we could reach the conclusion that the number of martyrs
among medical officers was more than 301.65
Efforts To Supply Humanitarian Aid In World€War€I
On 4 February 1918, the acting commander-in-chief sent a telegram to the
3rd Army Command saying that, “in view of the massacres conducted by
the Armenians and the Georgians, the 3rd Army is afforded the freedom to
carry out offensive operations to protect our people living in the area, on the
condition that such moves should not violate the truce made with the Russians.” Upon receiving this message, the army moved forward on 12 February in the direction of Erzincan-Bayburt. During the course of that movement, the army recaptured several towns: Erzincan on 13 February, Bayburt
on 19 February, Mamahatun on 22 February, Trabzon on 24 February, Erzurum on 12 March, Ardahan on 3 April, Van on 8 April, Batum on 14 April,
Kars on 25 April, Gümrü on 15 May, and finally Karakilise on 26 May. At
the end of May, an agreement was signed in Batum with the Azeris, Georgians, and Armenians. At that time, the numbers and conditions of the Russian and Georgian army personnel in Batum were as follows: 12 officers,
158 wounded soldiers, 11 wounded officers, and 180 ill soldiers. Also available were 46 doctors, 11 pharmacists, 24 medical noncommissioned officers,
and 274 nurses and privates in the medical service. All of those personnel
were released. Only the doctors among them, who previously had served as
field medical officers, were assigned to the medical services of the other prisoners of war. They were also used in the fulfillment of various other medical duties. Other medical personnel were given the freedom to choose either to stay in Batum or to return to the Caucasus or elsewhere at the first
opportunity.66
The Red Cross delegation in Batum was not formed as a hospital delegation; it rather consisted of smaller delegations accountable to the Russian Red Cross, and had carried out activities on the front and at the rear
before the arrival of the Ottoman forces. As the members of the delegation
were eager to continue their activities after the control of the city passed to
the Ottoman army, they were offered the opportunity to organize themselves under the auspices of a hospital. In addition, as they were not paid by
182
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
their headquarters, the Ottoman government decided to pay their salaries
as long as they continued to work in the service of the Ottoman Army. Of
the doctors taken into the service of the Ottoman army, or who continued
to work for the Red Cross, the chief doctors were paid a salary equivalent to
the salary of a major in the Ottoman Army, while other doctors were paid
a salary equivalent to that of a captain (including any extra payments and
increases in salaries).67
After the disaster caused by the epidemics in 1915, the Chief Doctor’s
Office of the Army also was given the responsibility to combat the infectious diseases affecting civilians living in the 3rd Army sector. As of 1917, the
army was directly involved in the health conditions of the people living in
the area, including refugees. The children, who were orphaned as a result of
the migrations, were taken under the protection of the army, which saved
the lives of many of them.68 Within a period of ten months, the 3rd Army’s
health organization assumed the care of 17,116 children.69
As a result of the huge wave of migration in the wake of the fall of Erzincan, many children were abandoned along the roadsides, parentless and in
miserable conditions. Under the orders of the Army Command, those children were taken into the custody of the army health authorities, and were
provided with food and shelter starting from Suşehri on 28 July 1916. Of the
first group of children taken under care, the ill were treated by the military
whereas the healthier ones were sent to Sivas. By the end of July 1917, more
than 700 children were gathered in Sivas under this program. The ongoing
demand made expansion of the organizational structure for these activities
necessary. On 28 August 1917, the following order was sent from the 3rd
Army High Command to the Army Corps Commands: “The little homeless
children wandering around in hunger and misery, or sleeping at inappropriate places within the army corps sector, shall be taken to hospitals and
treated in order to save their lives. Following their recovery, those who have
parents shall be returned to their parents, and the rest shall be sent to the
station hospitals in the interior.” In October 1917, on the orders of the Army,
Talas and Zencidere hospitals admitted 200 and 100 children respectively,
and later on, other hospitals also admitted more children. Within a period
of nine months, the 3rd Army cared for a total of 16,416 children, providing
them with clothes, food, and medical services; 1,527 of these, unfortunately,
died. As of April 1918, some 5,403 children were still under the care of the
army’s health organizations.70
The 3rd Army, upon the request of the Chief Doctor’s Office, presented
a new proposal to the Supreme Command Headquarters on 9 June 1918
regarding the future of the orphaned children:
Unarmed Warriors
183
Currently 5,000 orphans are being cared for by the 3rd Army’s health organization, half boys and half girls. Those who are old enough to attend junior reserve officer schools already do so. The rest have been sent to the recovery houses in Merzifon, Talas, and Zencidere. Allocation of these houses
to these children would mean that their lives will be saved from absolute
poverty. This practice will also benefit the Army; the boys could be raised to
become future military officers, and the girls to become the nurses for the
military hospitals. Should this proposal be found acceptable, we consider
that it would be necessary to appoint a high-ranking officer as director to
each of these institutions. In addition, sufficient number of teachers, governesses, and medical personnel to ensure the health of the children, as well
as maids to do the housework and personnel to care for the infants will be
required. It also is considered appropriate to put the administration of those
houses under the authority of the Ministry of War. This arrangement would
be the best option to respond to the difficulties to be encountered by those
houses during the gradual withdrawal of the 3rd Army’s back-up forces stationed at the rear. We firmly believe that if this proposal is approved, our
country will have 5,000 well-educated young men and women in 10–15
years’ time. Our intention is that our country will benefit enormously from
these young people. I therefore kindly request you to order necessary measures for the realization of this important and beneficial project.71
Unfortunately, following the signing of the Mondros Armistice, this
valuable humanitarian project could not be realized.
During the war years, several other humanitarian projects were carried
out in the 4th Army sector, too, under the efforts and guidance of Cemal
Pasha. Those activities focused mainly on children. Novelist Halide Edip,
who personally participated in the efforts to find orphan children and bring
them under the protection of the 4th Army sector, explains the following:
I have rarely felt the same spiritual self-satisfaction as I did during my efforts
for the Aya Tura Orphanage. It was because those in great suffering were all
children. All of them were in an unbelievable state of helplessness and misery, and they had done nothing to deserve being in that condition. When
the group coming from Istanbul started to work here, in the first week of
January, the orphanage was unbelievably dirty and deprived of resources.
Nothing was in order. The administration of the orphanage was entrusted
entirely to two good-hearted but incapable women, a few men, and a dozen
soldiers. More than five hundred of the eight hundred children were ill. Every child, the beds (some of them were being used by three children), and
184
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
everything was infested with lice. Even when you were walking along the
stone corridor, you would step on the lice flowing along the corridor.…↜The
children, small, older, ill, or healthy, could no longer be defined as young
human beings. Just like animals, they were relieving themselves anywhere,
publicly, in their beds, in other places. It was impossible to tell the boys
from the girls by looking at their faces or clothes…↜.
Seeing these conditions had made the people from Istanbul astonished,
even scared. However, they still attempted to do something about the almost unendurable situation. First of all, the Director requested a hot air
drying stove, and started to use it for disinfection. He spent every effort to
boil everything, which could be boiled. In those days, our best chance was
to have someone like Doctor Lütfü with us. He was sent from the front to
help us. Through his efforts, all the lice were eradicated, and the filthiness,
which had become virtually an epidemic of different diseases, was cured as
much as possible, though the children remained in their previous strange
condition.…↜I had stated that if the parents of the children in the orphanage
came and proved their identities, I would give them their children.…↜Many
Armenian women came and claimed their children. However, since very
few Kurds or Turks were living in Beirut and Lebanon in general, no one
came from among them.72
Edip recounts a very touching scene of a meeting, which reminds us of
the fact that the war was full of very dramatic stories and suffering of people
and families of every nationality and religion living in a wide area:
On my last visit to Aya Tura, as I was walking out the door, a man with a
woman near to him came close to me. Looking at their clothes and faces,
they did not seem to be from an Arab region. They asked me at which orphanage the Kurdish children were being kept. They took a neatly folded
paper out of their pocket and showed it to me. They had come from Erzurum. They had moved from there when the Russian army led by General
Antranik occupied the city. During their fleeing, they had lost their son,
Hasan. After losing their son, they had walked from Anatolia to the Arab
region, and had asked for their son at every orphanage along the way. On
the paper in their hand, various orphanages wrote the following sentence:
“Hasan was not brought here.” Ours was the last orphanage that they
could ask for their child. When Dr.€Lütfü went into the orphanage with
that piece of paper in his hand, my heart was also pounding as fast as that
couple’s. After half an hour, Dr.€Lütfü came back. He was holding the hand
of a little boy, who seemed quite clean, having nice clothes on, and carrying
Unarmed Warriors
185
a bundle in his hand. I still remember clearly. It was evening time. Beneath
the sky’s scarlet colors of the sunset, the father and mother knelt down and
raised their arms. The child came running, and threw himself into the arms
of his parents. There, a father called Ramazan, son of Abdullah, met his lost
son again.
Edip goes on to tell the following:
As I was returning back to Istanbul in March, together with a group of
teachers after the schools were closed for vacation, Dr.€Lütfü Bey and
many teachers remained in Aya Tura. I requested Dr.€Bliss and his son-inlaw Mr.€Dodge to put Aya Tura under the protection of the Red Cross as
soon as the military operation starts in the area. Thanks to the Kaymakam
(district governor) Kemal’s efforts, enough food supply for the next four
months was available. I also requested them to put the Armenian children
in Aya Tura under the protection of the Red Crescent. They promised to do
so, and kept their promise.73
9
EPILOGUE
An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.
—â•›Ben Franklin
The Turkish military doctor Osman Şevki made the following assessment of the Ottoman Muslim community:
The cities were dirty, and the people were unaware of observing hygienic
measures. As they had no knowledge about diseases, they did nothing to
avoid them. The people believed that both health and illness were dependent on God’s will, and trying to be protected from disease would be tantamount to defying God’s authority. The entire country had become a nest of
infectious diseases, particularly the plague.1
Kiesling, who also had in-depth knowledge of the Middle East, explains
that the typhus epidemics which occurred during the Great War had a lot
to do with the Muslims’ tendency to refrain from killing insects. He goes on
to add that the dirtiness also contributed to the rapid spread of the disease
to wide areas.2
Writing In 1837, Moltke made interesting observations on the Balkan
people’s ways of approaching disease:
The Turks believed that saying the name of a disease loud would invite that
disease and infect them. The disease of plague was called “scamp.” They
thought that if they avoided saying the actual name, plague, they would
be protected from that disease. Whereas, the Greeks believed that Panaiya
would have mercy on them and not send any illness. Bulgarians viewed the
disease as a witch. For example, a Bulgarian woman could be heard saying
“the witch of the night has taken my man and children, leaving me alone.”3
186
Epilogue
187
Another well-known Turkish medical authority, Professor A. Süheyl
Ünver, also wrote that the Turks’ fatalism caused them not to take any measures even in the face of the most lethal epidemics:
The fatalism of the Turks makes them believe that human beings can never
change their fate which is determined unalterably by God. So they see the
measures taken by the Europeans not only as useless, but also as an immense sin. None of them, however, appear to feel disgusted while caring
for their beloved ones who became ill, and they never abandoned the sick
to their fate.4
In the early twentieth century, some strange practices prevalent in
Otto�man society regarding diseases were even reflected in the minutes of
parliamentary debates. Speaker Ahmet Rıza’s address during discussions on
the health budget for the year 1918 in the Meclis-i Ayan (Ottoman Senate
House) was revealing:
Mr.€Director claims that during this year typhus has slowed down in our
country compared to the previous year, and he tries to prove his claims by
presenting numerous graphics and statistics. Indeed, the disease appears to
have decreased among the civilians compared to the previous year, but it
has increased within the Army. The increase was almost twofold. Although
that gentleman is the Director General of Health, he doesn’t seem to be
taking into account the situation in the Army. We should remember that
the army members are also our citizens, and we should be concerned about
their health.
Speaker of the Senate Rıza continued his speech by explaining the reasons behind the decrease in typhus cases in the cities under Ottoman rule:
The decline in the typhus in our country is related to two factors. I would
request Mr.€Director to correct me if I am wrong. One of those reasons
is, as Mr.€Director also admitted, the doctors’ tendency to hide the cases
of typhus. Mr.€Director says that when typhus is encountered in a house,
our own doctors do not record it as typhus. That means we don’t know the
exact number of patients with typhus. Furthermore, as stated by Mr.€Director again, the patients’ families also prefer to call doctors who they think
will hide the disease. What could be their reason for doing this? It could
only be because they think that if the doctor informs the official authorities
188
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
about the disease, the patient would immediately be taken to a hospital.
And, considering the current situation of our hospitals, who wants to go
to a hospital? It would be equal to accepting to die! Of course, both the
patient and the patient’s families prefer to hide the cases of typhus because
they reason that: “let’s hide the disease from the government authorities
and the Directorate of Health. If they hear about the disease they will immediately take the patient to an unspeakable place by taking them on a
very bad stretcher, and they will kill the patient there.” So, the information
given about the low number of cases of typhus must be based on the two
reasons I’ve just told you.5
Rıza also said the following about the inadequacy of the statistical data
presented by Dr.€Adnan Adıvar, the general director of health, and about the
deaths occurring within the army due to typhoid:
I’m not claiming that these are all lies. The point I am making is that those
authorities don’t have sufficient means to record information. In fact, they
admit it too. Therefore, I could say that the information they have presented to us is not wrong, but rather inadequate.
The actual number of patients might be ten times more than what we
are told. Furthermore, they only have talked about civilian hospitals, and
please forgive me for using that term, civilian patients. Nothing has been
said about the military patients. In fact, the largest number of illnesses and
deaths from infections are seen among the members of the army. This year,
the illnesses of the civilians appear to have been more benign than those affecting the military personnel. Every day many deaths are occurring in the
army due to diseases. Mr.€Director said that only 6 cases of disease were encountered in Heybeliada. This is not true. The disease exists on Heybeliada,
and on the other islands.6
Achievements And Failures
Staff Lieutenant Colonel Köprülülü Şerif, who took part in the Battle of
Sarıkamış, had a significant assessment regarding the sources of failures:
“Unless the civilian administration is run through a modern and scientific approach, the military organization cannot be maintained properly
in case of a mobilization. Therefore, every preparation should be made in
peacetime.”7
The Ottoman Empire could not put into practice this principle when
the general mobilization was declared on 20 July 1914. It would, however,
Epilogue
189
be unfair to say that the state authorities did not take any measures. As a
matter of fact, just before the beginning of the Great War, various kinds of
infectious diseases had become widespread over most of Istanbul. Typhoid,
cholera, and smallpox were prevalent in the neighborhoods of Kartal, Tuzla, Yakacık, Soğanlık, Maltepe, Ayastefanos, and Makriköy in that city. In
order to prevent the spreading of those diseases to the army units, as a precautionary measure, the troops were stationed in tents, which were set up in
areas quite far away from towns and cities.8 Moreover, the cruises between
Yalova and Istanbul were cancelled temporarily,9 and the Quarantine Establishment in Sinop was prepared to be ready for the ships sailing to the Black
Sea.10 Following the declaration of mobilization, the Office of the Army
Medical Chief, in cooperation with the 2nd Army, started to combat the
infectious diseases encountered in the northern Anatolia region.11
At the beginning of 1915, the major activities of the Ottoman Army’s
medical units involved not only the treatment of the ill and wounded, but
also the fight against infectious diseases, which were spreading through the
rear areas of the 3rd Army sector and Istanbul and its environs.12 It needs to
be noted that these measures could be taken and implemented only in and
around Istanbul. No significant and effective measure could be taken in
other Anatolian cities, along the transportation routes, and particularly on
the battlefields.
In the wake of the Ottoman Army’s retreat in eastern Anatolia in 1916,
the people living in the areas evacuated by the army poured into the roads,
creating extremely miserable scenes. Since there was no civilian organization in place to deal with the health needs of the hundreds of thousands of
refugees, the military doctors had to assume the duty of providing for the
medical examinations and treatment of those people. After the Russian occupation of Erzincan, the first station for examining and quarantining the
refugees fleeing from Karahisar and Erzincan was set up on 27 July 1916. At
various stations established for the same purpose, a total of 65,778 individuals were examined, 22,499 of whom were given the first cholera vaccine,
9,607 were given the second dose of cholera vaccine, and 11,999 were vaccinated against smallpox.13 During the same year, when infectious diseases
such as plague, tuberculosis, typhus, cholera, recurrent fever, dysentery, typhoid, paratyphus, and syphilis began to spread all over the country, the
Ottoman government allocated an additional amount of 3 million kuruş to
the special budget for contagious and infectious diseases.14
On 7 January 1917, the General Directorate of Health assigned the primary responsibility for fighting against infectious diseases in the provinces
of Ankara, Sivas, Erzurum, and Trabzon, as well as in the sanjaks of Niğde,
190
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
Kayseri, and Canik to the 3rd Army’s Office of Medical Chief. At a time
when almost all of Anatolia was suffering from epidemics, an extremely
insufficient struggle was being carried out against them. The General Directorate of Health had no capabilities to conduct an effective struggle against
those epidemics. The army, as a result, had to get involved actively in securing the health conditions in the military sector. However, “no matter how
much the army cleans itself from the infections, unless the villages and the
people living in the same area are cleaned too, the soldiers in contact with
those people would eventually catch diseases, or the soldiers from the supply units passing through those villages would render the army vulnerable
to those diseases.”15 The migrations, on the other hand, served as a catalyst
for spreading diseases such as cholera, spotted fever, and even smallpox.
Tasking the army with the responsibility to combat against epidemics affecting the civilian population was indeed an appropriate decision. Those
parts of Trabzon and Erzurum provinces which were not occupied by the
Russian forces, as well as the provinces of Ankara and Sivas, and the sanjaks
of Niğde, Kayseri, and Canik fell within the 3rd Army sector. These were the
main areas where the army units carried out intensive struggle against infectious diseases of many kinds: the louse-borne diseases such as spotted fever
and recurrent fever, the diseases that are transmitted by agents found in the
intestines, such as typhoid, paratyphoid, cholera, and dysentery, and other
infectious diseases such as smallpox, diphtheria, measles, and scarlet fever.
Malaria and syphilis, too, were endemic in the area.16
Despite the extensive efforts spent during World€War€I, the medical
services on the frontlines remained far from responding effectively to the
needs because of the difficulties caused by the war, as well as many other
challenges. The large distances between the fronts also amplified problems
due to logistical issues. Great difficulties were encountered in transferring
patients, medical personnel, medicines, and the necessary medical equipment needed for treatment. Poor roads and primitive means of transportation also complicated the transfers. Not only munitions, but also medical
supplies were used up. The tents used as shelters by soldiers were worn out.
What is more, as those tents were badly ventilated and dark inside, they
were having a bad effect on the health of the soldiers.17
Another adversity of the Great War that affected the medical conditions
in the Ottoman Empire was the suspension of imports of medicines and
medical equipment. This crucial historical fact was underlined by the German pharmacist Helmut Becker, who studied the situation in the Ottoman
Empire in terms of the services provided by the hospitals, and the hygiene
conditions as of 1914.18
Epilogue
191
Military Hospitals
Liman von Sanders observes the following about the situation in the Ottoman military hospitals prior to the war:
Most of the Turkish military hospitals were in terrible conditions. An extreme dirtiness and all kinds of bad odors made the overcrowded hospital
wards virtually unendurable to stay in. Clinic patients of internal and external diseases were being placed in the same wards, and even were sometimes
lying in the same beds. Since the number of beds was insufficient, most
of the patients were lying on cushions, or on army blankets placed on the
floor in closely spaced rows in the corridors.
Most of those soldiers, already in a weakened condition, were dying
even before receiving any treatment. Because I openly expressed my displeasure of the situation during my visits to such hospitals, and even reported the doctors who caused the problems to the Ministry of War, I made
a fame for my fussiness.19
Dr.€Abdülkadir Noyan, too, provides valuable insight into the conditions of the military hospitals in Mosul and Baghdad, which were located in
the 6th Army’s sector. Writing in December 1915, he also recorded striking
examples that reveal the inadequacies of those hospitals:
The situation of the hospitals in Mosul was terrible. The patients were lying
on mattresses placed on the floor side by side. Nor were they sorted according to their diseases. The patients as well as the hospital beds were infested
with lice. I had to sit on those beds to examine the patients one by one. Most
of the patients were showing symptoms of spotted fever. I prepared a long
report in order to inform the Field Medical Inspectorate of the situation.
Since the Military Central Hospital and the Red Crescent Hospital
in Baghdad were unsatisfactory for treating the ill and wounded, after the
Selmanpak Battle, new hospitals were established in large summer palaces,
called “Kasır,” on the banks of the Tigris River. Five hospitals, having a total bed capacity of 1,300, were opened in those Kasırs. I visited all of those
hospitals. The most damaging infectious disease I encountered among the
patients in every hospital was spotted fever and dysentery. The patients carrying those diseases were put into the Jewish School.20
A note the military hospital in Mosul sent to the 6th Army Command
in February 1916 stated that the reason why the army suffered a large number
192
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
of deaths was not due to the fact that the patients were not treated in the
hospital. Rather, the real cause of the deaths was the fact that the troops arriving from Istanbul, or from other places far away from Iraq, had to walk
for months in the rain. The reserve soldiers, who were not used to walking
such long distances, were particularly affected. Those long walks in the rain
naturally invited many diseases. For example, battalions of the 6th Regiment had a total of twelve hundred men when setting off from Istanbul. By
the time they reached Mosul, however, they had had to leave half of their
men at various locations along the road. Another reason for the high number of deaths occurring in the military hospital was, according to the same
report, the lack of medical personnel. The hospital doctors were also ill. A
doctor serving in Baghdad died because of an illness around that time. A
doctor and a pharmacist in Nusaybin became ill with typhoid. One of the
civilian doctors in Mosul was being treated for spotted fever. The number of
patients per doctor was about two hundred.21
During the retreat of the Ottoman Army in eastern Anatolia in the face
of the Russian offensive, mentioned earlier, the insufficiency of transportation made the suffering of the patients in hospitals particularly acute. A
total of 18,080 patients needed to be transferred from Erzurum to Erzincan
during the coldest days of February before the occupation of Erzurum by
the Russians. Dr.€Nazım Şakir, who was tasked to oversee necessary preparations for that transfer, reports the following:
Since ill and wounded from the front were flowing constantly, we could
not sleep for three days. Especially I will never forget the difficulties we met
during our ceaseless efforts to load patients wrapped in quilts onto carts to
send them to Erzurum in a severe snowstorm in our last night in Erzurum.
When we left Erzurum to go to Erzincan via the route of Ilıca, Yeniköy,
and Tercan the next day, I did not see any of those carts on the road. I was
saddened thinking that they must have died in temperatures below minus
twenty degrees. In addition, the sorrow I felt at leaving our country to the
enemy was making my heart bleed.22
Commenting on the same incidents, Dr.€Tevfik Sağlam wrote the following in his report from March 1916:
Although we were obliged not to leave many patients back in Erzincan, our
means for the transfer of patients were insufficient. Under those conditions,
we had to send most of the patients from Erzincan to Sivas on foot. Despite
Epilogue
193
the establishment of medical centers at close distances to each other along
the road, those distances could still take a minimum of 15–20 days given
the walking speeds of the patients. These patients could be given nothing
more than bread and hot soup at those centers. Those limited means put
them into an unavoidable misery on the roads. The ill and wounded sent to
Sivas under those conditions were usually very exhausted when they arrived
there. Even in Sivas, despite all the efforts of the chief doctor, the miseries
of the patients did not cease because of the lack of care and assistance that
should have been provided by the governorate. As a result, large numbers of
patients remained in great deprivation, and their health conditions deteriorated further.23
German Doctors In Ottoman Armies
During the Great War, several German military doctors and health specialists were serving in the Ottoman armies. The German medical team sent
to Trabzon under very adverse conditions in January 1915 consisted of five
doctors and six nurse’s aides. After working for five months in Trabzon, the
team went to Istanbul and carried out its duties there until the signing of the
Truce.24 During 1915 and 1916, three German doctors served in Erzincan,
one of whom died from typhus. The other two continued to work until they
became very ill and were unable to work any longer. Two nurse’s aides served
in Erzurum at a time when the typhus epidemic was very severe.25 During
the period of 1914–1918, the main priority of several Red Cross teams serving
on the battlefields was to fight against typhus, and a number of them died as
a result of the adverse conditions they were working in.26
The German doctors provided a great contribution especially in the
field of bacteriology. A German Mobile Bacteriology Laboratory, which arrived in Ankara in the fall of 1916, was located in a place equidistant to each
of the six hospitals in the city. The mobile laboratory remained in Ankara for
eight months, and during that time a total of 10,190 individuals underwent
medical examination there. Ninety€percent of the patients examined in that
laboratory consisted of army members who were either ill or checked voluntarily in the laboratory, while 10€percent consisted of civilians. In addition,
those examinations provided information about the situation in the hospitals. The disease causing the greatest number of deaths within the army was
typhus. Though a specific study was not performed regarding the civilians,
many of them were also losing their lives from typhus. During the first six
months of 1917, about 51€percent of the cases of typhus in hospitals resulted
194
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
in death. Recurrent fever was the next most fatal disease in Ankara. About
the same time, the bacteriologists were expecting an outbreak of malaria
around Ankara.27
It appears that German doctors also had political and military duties
during the Great War. A typical example of the political duties carried out
by the German doctors between the years of 1915 and 1918 is illustrated in a
note written regarding the appointment of a German doctor to the medical
office of the railways administration in Konya. That note, sent on 25 July
1915 to the German Navy Headquarters, emphasized the following: “Appointment of the German doctors to such positions will make it possible
to influence large numbers of people.” Therefore, the German authorities
deemed it appropriate to appoint a naval doctor, Dr.€Börnstein, who was a
gynecologist and surgeon, to that position in the railways administration.
Although Dr.€Börnstein’s main duty was to fight against typhus, he was also
caring for the general health of the civilian population.28
“One Million Patients Of Typhus”
Andre Raymond observed the spread of infectious diseases in Cairo in the
years 1718, 1759, 1785, and 1789. Al-Budayri also observed the same phenomenon in Damascus in 1743 and in Aleppo in 1787. Hunger was a very key factor in accelerating the spread of dysentery and typhus.29 A similar effect of
hunger was also observed in the Ottoman Empire during the Great War. A
significant correlation exists between typhus and extreme poverty. Typhus
epidemics have broken out mostly during periods when people not only
had little to eat, but also had very limited opportunities to clean themselves
up and were living in adverse conditions.
An authoritative source refers to the large number of Ottoman casualties suffered on the Caucasian front due to diseases and hunger as follows:
Despite the very serious losses at Dardanelles, the effective strength of the
Ottoman army reached its maximum in November 1915: 800,000. By 1
March 1917 it had fallen to 400,000 and it never again exceeded this total
(200,000 in March 1918). In the summer of 1916, out of a total of fiftytwo Ottoman divisions, twenty-six were fighting the Russians. Out of the
400,000 lost by the Turks during the period November 1915 to March 1917,
not less than 300,000 must be accounted to the campaigns against the Russians (including prisoners and casualties from epidemics and desertion). If
the losses at Gallipoli seriously shook the military power of the Ottoman
empire and prevented, at a crucial moment, the mounting of any effective
Epilogue
195
offensive against the Transcaucasia frontier, the subsequent losses against
the Russians in 1916 were decisive in destroying the remaining strength of
the Ottoman army and prepared the way for the British victories in Iraq in
1917–18 and in Palestine in 1918.30
With the beginning of the war in 1914, the entire Ottoman territories
became susceptible to the outbreak of epidemics. During the four-year-long
war, louse-borne diseases—typhus being the most significant one—were
encountered most frequently in the country and accounted for the greatest
number of losses. Being caused by a certain type of rickettsia, it starts with a
headache and high fever and causes exanthema on the skin. It lasts for about
two weeks and can often be fatal especially for the elderly people. For centuries, typhus has caused the death of large numbers of people. In medical
literature, various names have been used for typhus: spotted fever, classical
typhus, and European typhus. In the Ottoman Empire, typhus was mostly
confused with typhoid and was frequently referred to as typhoid fever.31
Rickettsiae, the agents of typhus, have been the insidious enemies of
humanity throughout history, always hiding themselves during healthy and
strong periods in the history of various societies, then reappearing during
their weakened times. Therefore, typhus epidemics have broken out during wars, migrations, and other conditions that cause people to be thrown
into deep poverty. As a result, typhus came to be considered an infectious
disease, widespread throughout the world, turning into epidemics during
times of war, extreme poverty, and hunger. Those are times when human
societies mostly are uncared for, become susceptible to diseases, and are
unable to implement the basic rules of hygiene. The underdeveloped countries, in that sense, can never completely get rid of typhus. In the epidemiology of typhus, the louse, which is one of the human parasites, appears as the
most important means of transmission. A connection between typhus and
the weather also has been widely recognized in the literature. In the cold
months of autumn, the number of patients starts to increase. The epidemics spread even further toward the end of winter, reaching their maximum
level in the months of February and March. After that, a gradual decrease is
noted in the number of patients. Lice, the main agent spreading the disease,
do not like light, hot environments, and open air. Due to the fact that during the cold seasons people are in greater contact with each other, and many
of them live together in the villages, in houses, or in barracks, the rickettsiabearing lice can easily cause epidemics and pandemics. During the Great
War, a minimum of one million people caught typhus.32
Typhoid is another important infectious disease raging widely during
196
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
wartime, and it is closely related to the hygienic conditions of water and
food supplies. It, too, is common within the armies. Throughout history,
typhoid epidemics of various scales of severity have been observed in the
course of almost every war. Typhoid epidemics are also connected to seasonal
conditions. The infection appears in early July and rapidly spreads through
August. After reaching its peak level in October, it starts to decrease.33
Recurrent fever, one of the diseases most frequently encountered during the Great War, has been in existence since very early times. It has been
confused mostly with typhus and thought to be a mild type of typhus. One
thing that adds to that confusion is the fact that the epidemics of recurrent
fever generally start at almost the same time as typhus epidemics. This is
mainly because the conditions preparing the ground for outbreaks of recurrent fever are the same as the ones seen in the cases of rickettsia infections.
Lice and ticks also transmit recurrent fever.34
Carriers Of Death
Another way through which diseases spread during the years of the Great
War was by the movement of prisoners of war, deserters, and refugees. The
Ottoman soldiers, transferred to India or Siberia after being taken prisoner by the British in Iraq and by the Russians in the Caucasus respectively,
were severely hit by typhus. Especially many among those who were carried
on trains to Siberia died during the long voyage due to lack of any medical
care and medicine. Their dead bodies quickly hardened because of the extremely cold weather after being thrown out on the rails like logs, and were
devoured by the wolves and dogs.35
The deserters from the Ottoman Army also played a crucial role in
spreading infectious diseases. Since the number of deserters reached very
high figures, they posed severe and permanent dangers. In 1938, General
Ali Fuat Cebesoy explained the reasons leading to the increase in desertions
(from 30 to 50€percent) in 1916–1917 as follows:
1. After two years passed since the beginning of the war, nobody was given
home leave.
2. Although the battles incessantly continued in unendurably hot or cold
weather conditions, none of the essential needs of the soldiers could be met,
in even a simple and primitive way. Moreover, food was scarce and of low
quality. Most of the time, even, no food could be served. To put it briefly,
unimaginable misery and deprivation were prevalent.
Epilogue
197
3. Excluding the battles of Çanakkale, none of the Ottoman units fighting on
the front was exchanged with other units from time to time; on the contrary,
those units were kept permanently at the trenches with the intention of holding the fronts with a smaller force.
4. Though the armies were constantly losing in strength because of illnesses and
desertions, further officers and soldiers were being drawn from them in order
to set up new organizational structures.36
The soldiers sent from their units to other places for medical reasons
and the deserters were carrying the disease to the interior. Diseases spread
along the main line on which the military stations were located, and also on
the roads between Erzurum-Kiğı-Palu-Maden-Diyarbakır and ErzurumErzincan-Harput-Diyarbakır, as well as in the surrounding villages.
The winter of 1916–1917 arrived early and was bitterly cold. To the
Ottoman 2nd and 3rd armies, this particularly severe winter proved disastrous and accelerated their disintegration, which had begun as a result of
their failures in the field. Deserters became a social problem of the first
order. Those who could not get work in the villages—and they found a less
friendly welcome as the hard highland winter came down on the pauperized
peasantry—took to the hills where they formed armed bands whose only
livelihood lay in brigandine. In October at least fifty thousand deserters
were wandering in the rear of the Third Army. Actual number of troops
had fallen to less than thirty thousand despite the fact that the contingents
of the 53rd Division issued new drafts to fill in gaps in the different corps.
Heavy snowfall at last checked desertions and many men returned to take
advantage of the meager rations they could find in their units. The number
of soldiers under Vehib Pasha’s command again began to grow, but typhus
and cold offset these again.37
Refugees were the most dramatic victims of the war. They could also
be seen as the unluckiest sector of society, considering the very heavy losses
they suffered and the role they played in the transmission of infectious diseases. As discussed in Chapter 7, Joseph Pomiankowsky, the then Austrian
military attaché in Istanbul, made interesting remarks on the role of the Armenian convoys deported to Syria in spreading infectious diseases.38 Similar
to the diffusion of typhus to the 4th Army sector by the Armenians, who
were settled in Syria, Muslim refugees escaping from the Russian forces in
1916 also brought the same diseases to the places they took shelter in. The
spread of typhus rapidly accelerated after the Russians occupied Erzurum
on 16 February 1916, Bitlis on 3 March, Muş immediately after that, Trabzon
198
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
on 18 April, Bayburt on 15 July, Gümüşhane on 20 July, and Erzincan on 24
July.39
With the arrival of the Armenian deportees in Syria in September 1915,
the typhus epidemic, which previously had been confined to Gazze and
Aliye, spread all over the 4th Army sector. At that time, Dr.€Mühlens, the
medical consultant of the 4th Army, was in Germany, and Dr.€Galip, the
medical chief of the 4th Army, was undergoing medical treatment in Istanbul. Therefore, Dr.€Neşet Ömer, the chief of the Red Crescent team in
Suez, was appointed as the acting medical consultant of the 4th Army at the
rank of major. After he took office, Dr.€Ömer convened all the doctors and
briefed them about typhus. He also ordered the publication of booklets in
Turkish and Arabic on the measures to be taken. Aleppo was divided into
eighteen medical zones, and two doctors were appointed to each of them.
Nine military detachments having the duty of cleaning individuals were appointed to a cleaning station. There, each day around three thousand individuals were cleaned and those infected with typhus were separated and sent
to the hospital for epidemic diseases. Those measures bore some fruits, and
the incidence rate for typhus, which previously had been 250 cases per day,
was decreased to a level of 10 cases per month.40
Critical Questions
Justin McCarthy believes that the ratio of Turkish widows, according to the
1927 census in Turkey, offers a good indicator of the military and civilian casualties suffered by the Turks during the Great War (1914–1918) and the War
of Liberation (1919–1922). According to McCarthy’s calculations, the provinces where the ratio of widows was higher than 30€percent among the entire
adult female population were located in the areas on the route followed by
the advancing Greek army, in western and central Anatolia where the battles had taken place. None of the other countries involved in the Great War
suffered as much as Anatolia. Britain, France, and Germany did indeed experience a real and drastic “lost generation.” Nonetheless, a population increase was recorded in the case of both the United Kingdom and Germany
between the years of 1911 and 1922, whereas a decrease of only 1€percent occurred in France. On the other hand, Anatolia lost 30€percent of its population: 10€percent through emigration to other countries and 20€percent due
to death.41
These figures naturally raise the following question: What led the Ottoman military and civilian elites to join World€War€I? A study published by
the Turkish General Staff in 1970 offers significant insights to this question.
Based on a detailed analysis of each component of overall fighting power,
Epilogue
199
the study argues that as of 1914, given its combat power the Ottoman Army
was not in a situation to initiate a war, nor to sustain a war on its own should
it find itself in a war. Its geopolitical and strategic position, however, made
it impossible for the Ottoman Empire to remain neutral in a world war.
Given the inevitability of being drawn into war, the Ottoman policy�makers
reasoned that the most prudent course of action in the case of a world war
would be to ally with a strong European country that would willingly provide sufficient support and equip the Ottoman Army. “To that end, after
negotiations with each of the blocs, eventually an alliance was formed with
Germany.”42
This account of the Ottoman Empire’s decision to join the war on the
side of Germany in 1914 is succinct and reasonable. Nonetheless, the debate
on the outcomes of that war, and the complete dissolution of a very large
empire, has been going on for many years. An unequivocal explanation of
why the Ottoman Empire took that course of action, which would satisfy
everyone, is unlikely to be offered, as various individuals and organizations
have their own views on the subject. No doubt, disagreements also may
arise regarding the total numbers of military and civilian casualties suffered
due to various incidents that occurred during the war. Such disagreements
are likely to be settled over time through new and more elaborate scientific
studies. It is also hoped that through a fresh evaluation of history in light of
the new findings obtained, we would also develop a better insight into the
causes of those casualties.
Based on my research, in this study I have shown that an extremely
high number of deaths occurred in Anatolia, Syria, the Thrace, and Iraq,
particularly due to diseases. The study has also illustrated the connection
between various epidemics that accompanied different wars. For instance,
the typhus epidemic of 1915 that spread all over the region was a result of
dispatching large number of troops at the end of the Balkan Wars. Despite
a decline in the number of cases of typhus, after the general mobilization
was declared at the beginning of World€War€I, severe typhus epidemics
quickly resumed.43 The movement of refugees, deportees, and deserters was
the main factor behind the spread of the disease during the Great War. In
particular, the discharged soldiers coming from Erzurum and its vicinity,
where that disease was endemic, played the major role. In fact, every individual living in Anatolia in 1915 was at great risk, since typhus and cholera
existed everywhere and were spread both by the deportees and by the Ottoman troops.
Moreover, throughout the book I have endeavored to show that not
only the dead, but also those who survived had to endure hardships and
miseries of war and epidemics. For one example, Mrs. Christie, the director
200
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
of the Tarsus American School, recounts her experiences with contagious
disease epidemics in her notes from 13 November and 28 November 1915.44
Mrs. Christie and William L. Nute could not escape the epidemics that
spread all over Tarsus. As they did not trust the doctors in Tarsus, they went
to the Missionary Hospital in Adana for treatment.45 Most of the people of
any nation and religion living in the Ottoman territories under the war conditions, however, were not as lucky as the teaching staff of the Tarsus American School. Lieutenant Ragıp Bey, the son of the chief clerk from Kayseri,
witnessed the following scene in Suşehri on 30 March 1915:
In a ruined garden located in a high place at the entrance to the city, we saw
the bodies of many Turks, who lost their lives due to illness and poverty.
They were lying on snow, either naked, or in very old clothes. Since no
organization to deal with their burial was available, they were still lying on
the ground, arousing feelings of distress in those who see them. Because of
that frightful scene, we started to lose our courage.46
Epidemic Casualties
According to Dr.€Major General Ekrem Şadi, those who died from illness
during the Great War constituted 18.3€percent of all the dead.47 During the
war, a total of 25 million individuals became ill with typhus, 6 million of
whom lost their lives.48 The severest epidemics of typhus were encountered
on the Ottoman eastern front.49 Within the 3rd Army fighting on the eastern front, out of a total 12,642 individuals who became ill during 1915–1918
with dysentery, 5,942 lost their lives.50 Malaria was another disease causing
many deaths. While three quarters of the Ottoman population was already
suffering from malaria, the outbreak of the war further increased the seriousness of the problem posed by that disease. Within a period of four years,
a total of 412,000 soldiers became ill with malaria, 20,000 of whom died.51
As was discussed in Chapter 4, a study has showed unequivocally that
the Sarıkamış Battle was one of the main factors in triggering the spread
of infectious diseases at the beginning of the Great War. The disaster of
Sarıkamış lasted for eighteen days, between 22 December 1914 and 9 January
1915. The army virtually melted away due to complete exhaustion and severe
cold as it was fighting against the enemy under great difficulties. When the
9th and 10th army corps finally made it to Sarıkamış, they consisted of a
handful of exhausted soldiers. When the intelligence arrived on 29 December indicating that the Russians were in retreat, the Ottoman Army could
not find the power to start an offensive. It was so cold that even the feet of
Epilogue
201
the army’s chief of staff, the medical chief, and the first aide-de-camp were
frozen. “The winter and the deprivation, which perished several divisions,
certainly did the same to the medical companies and the mobile medical
units.”52 During the severe epidemics that spread in the aftermath of the
Sarıkamış Battle, 53€percent of the typhus patients, 52€percent of the typhoid
patients, 37.6€percent of the dysentery patients, and 29€percent of the recurrent fever patients lost their lives.53
Dr.€Tevfik Sağlam, the medical chief of the 3rd Army, offers the following assessment in regard to the medical services and organization:
[Based on our experience at the Battle of Sarıkamış], the most important
point which should be underlined is that medical precautions had been
ignored entirely before launching such an important military operation,
which was carried out during the coldest days of winter and under the most
adverse conditions. The orders given for carrying out the military preparations and for starting the offensive in Sarıkamış contained no reference to
the medical pre-arrangements. During the military operation, the medical
services on the front became completely out of control. The operation was
destined to end in a disaster, and that disaster indeed happened. The failure to appreciate the value of establishing a hospital system, which would
operate in good order both on the frontline and at the rear areas, and arranging roads to be used for transportation during the planning stages of
military campaigns has always been punished by such a disaster.54
For Dr.€Sağlam another lesson of the Sarıkamış Battle was the following: in such a military operation, many wounded and many ill would certainly be inevitable, especially during severe winter conditions. Indeed, the
army was besieged entirely by infectious diseases:
The medical organization at the rear, however, was far from responding to
the needs. No arrangement was made to set up roads to be used in the
transfer of the ill and wounded. To sum up, before launching such a largescale military operation, the medical issues were never given sufficient
attention.55
İsmet İnönü also offers valuable observations on how a typhus epidemic
spread throughout the army immediately after the Battle of Sarıkamış:
We suffered heavy casualties at the Battle of Sarıkamış, and had to retreat
and go back to our positions on the border. Immediately after the battle,
202
The ottoman army, 1914–1918
our army fell entirely into the clutches of typhus. In those days, typhus was
accepted as a great disaster which could happen at times of war.56
Even after the tragic experience of the disaster of Sarıkamış, while a
military buildup in Erzurum was being planned, the orders given contained
no reference to medical measures or medical organization. The only order
was the following: “after the disasters suffered previously, gather the troops
and provide military training for them.” However, no thought seems to be
spent “on the disasters which could occur as a result of a military campaign
carried out under such adverse conditions, and on how many of the troops
gathered in this way the army could use effectively.”57
In December 2004, in commemoration of the ninetieth year of the
Sarıkamış disaster, General Hilmi Özkök, the chief of general staff, issued
a message. The message included an important lesson derived from the
Sarıkamış experience: “When evaluated in terms of the management science, the Sarıkamış incident constitutes a very good example that illustrates
well the distinctions between fantasy and truth, and between unmanageable
and manageable risks.”58 The risk management referred to by the chief of
staff certainly pertains to the infectious diseases that broke out in the aftermath of the Sarıkamış Battle. The Supreme Command Headquarters of the
Ottoman Armies failed to take into account that important factor during
the planning phase of the campaign.
As this study demonstrated, other armies that fought in the Great War
also suffered significant casualties. In the case of the Ottoman Empire, however, the numbers, as well as the level of the suffering due to the epidemics,
were beyond comparison. To reiterate yet another example, we could look
at a joint American-Armenian report prepared in 1918 regarding the deaths
that occurred during the typhus epidemic in 1915, which reflects the bitter
truth very clearly:
In 1915 Typhus fever caused the death of around 200,000–300,000 people.
Several hundred of the physicians sent by the Turkish government to cope
with it became infected and died. In Erzurum region, where around 60,000
to 100,000 people died, soap, water, and fuel could hardly be obtained anywhere during the epidemic.59
A report Senator Henry Cabot Lodge submitted to the American Senate, dated 13 April 1920, emphasized that the male population between 20
and 35 years of age was strikingly low in Anatolia, due to the fact that only
about 20€percent of the Turkish villagers recruited into the army were able
Epilogue
203
to return back to their homes, and that the number of Ottoman soldiers
who died from typhus alone was as high as 600,000.60
My research has helped lift a “blackout of war” that has been imposed
for ninety years on the academic literature concerning the military and civilian losses caused by infectious diseases in Anatolia, Syria, Mesopotamia,
and the Caucasus. It also provides new insight into the medical conditions
at the Ottoman battlefronts in the Great War, as well as the medical status
of the civilian populations under war conditions. The findings put forth
in this study are thought provoking, and are full of bitter lessons for anyone longing for the establishment of a sound cooperation between nations
and governments around the world. As the study has shown, the egregious
disasters did not afflict narrowly defined “national” communities. Rather,
the devastation of World€War€I, including the diseases and epidemics that
sprang from it, affected every nation that was involved in the conflict. Instead of casting blame on one nation or another, let every nation and every
government heed the lessons to be learned from the bitter and tragic consequences of the Great War.
appendix 1
A TESTIMONY OF THE TURKISH
RESERVE OFFICER ON TYPHUS
EPIDEMIC AT OTTOMAN ARMY,
IN 1915**
“Our Armies Were Defeated by the Winter Cold and Typhus”
Interviewer: Mr.€Cindoruk, you are a man who fought on those fronts,
under the most merciless conditions of war. I know that your life could be
the subject of an entire book, but now, in a short conversation between us,
I would like to discuss, at least a small part of your past experiences. Particularly I should like to listen to your memories about what happened to
our armies fighting on the East Anatolian Mountains, and about your experiences there. When did you join the army?
Mr.€Cindoruk: My dear son, I was called to the military service in 1915,
when I was 20 years old. I was a student then at the high school of Cartography within the Darülfünun (university). First, I was taken to the drill
ground in Yakacık. There, I started to receive military training.
Interviewer: The drill ground in Yakacık, was it something like today’s
reserve officer schools? How were the conditions then?
* Vasfi Cindoruk, who had fought in the Great War, was born in Istanbul in 1895.
He was drafted into the Army in 1915, when he was a student of cartography at the
School of Engineering. He lost one eye because of typhus. After the war, he could
not continue his university education since his school had been closed. However,
he became a topographical engineer by taking the external examinations. Following the foundation of the Republic, he worked as a topographical engineer, and prepared the development plans of various cities. He also worked together with the
well-known German Architect Jansen, who had prepared the development plans
for Ankara. In 1960, he retired from his duty as the director of the Cartography
Department of Vilayets Bank. This historical interview was done with his nephew
Emin Çölaşan, and was first published in the Turkish daily newspaper, Hürriyet.
Vasfi Cindoruk, who was the father of Hüsamettin Cindoruk, the ex-speaker of the
Turkish Grand National Assembly, died on 1 April 1990. / HÖ.
205
206
appendix 1
Mr.€Cindoruk: As you also know, we were then allies with the Germans.
We had Turkish and German commanders there, but in general we disliked the German officers. One day, a German Lieutenant Colonel named
Herr€Rabe gathered all of us together and, apparently he was angry about
something, he shouted at us, “You ass,” In response, all of us standing there
on the drill ground, as if it had been planned beforehand, shouted back at
him saying, “You’re the ass.” Eventually, some of our friends were arrested
for “provoking others to revolt.” I mean we were not very fond of the German officer.
Interviewer: What did you eat and drink at the drill ground? What sort
of food were you given by an Empire fighting on so many different fronts?
Mr.€Cindoruk: Our foods! Suffice to say that may God protect not only
us, but also our enemies from experiencing those things again. In the mornings, tea with a thin layer of oil on it was served to us in a cauldron. Each of
us could drink only one glass of tea. Since the cauldrons were never washed
up, and the tea put in them had a layer of oil on it as I just told you. We used
to drink that tea with a few slices of bread. We had called the tea given us as
the “chestnut juice.”
Interviewer: Were you eating nothing else for breakfast?
Mr.€Cindoruk: Nothing at all. Of course the ones who had some money
were buying something like bread and cheese. We were given cabbage stew
or fava bean soup at lunch and dinner. Though they sometimes added some
meat to the fava bean dish, it had plenty of water, and we used to see the
fava bean bugs and worms floating on its surface. That’s why we used to call
that meal as the “fava bean soup.” Once a week, we were given haricot beans
with meat. That was a lavish meal for us. Sometimes we were given olives
and bread at lunch.
Interviewer: Was that all, sir? You’re saying that the soldiers who would
soon be sent to the battlefront to fight were being fed like that?
Mr.€Cindoruk: What would you expect under those conditions, during
those days, my child? The enemies were attacking us on many fronts at the
same time. How could a country such as ours, being in great destitution,
give more than that?
A Testimony of the Turkish Reserve Officer
207
Interviewer: In the Great War, all of the males were drafted. Was your
family affected much when you were taken into the military service?
Mr.€Cindoruk: My elder brother Ali Selim Bey, sixteen years older than
me, was a military doctor. He served first on the Yemeni Front. On his
return from Yemen in 1914, he was appointed to the 2nd Army Corps headquarters, in Edirne. When that Army Corps was transferred to the Gallipoli
Peninsula in order to fight in the war, my brother also went there. Ahmet
Şadi Bey, my other brother, was 7 years older than me. He was a last year student in Darülfünun’s (university) Faculty of Law. When the war broke out,
he was immediately taken to the drill ground. As a candidate officer (reserve
officer candidate), he was appointed to a regiment located at the Selimiye
Barracks. He was given a half-day leave on Fridays. When he came home on
one of his leaves, it was one of the last days of April, he told us that his unit
was going to be sent to one of the battlefronts on a ship, and he would be
leaving on 1 May. He said he didn’t know where they would be sent.
That morning, our father gave me and my younger brother Hasan Kemal some money and told us to give it to our brother who was going to the
front. We went to Üsküdar, where we saw the ship docked and being loaded.
While the troops were boarding the ship, we tried to give our brother the
money sent by our father. He took only two mecidiye (Ottoman silver coins)
of that money upon our insistence. He said to us: “Take the rest to our father; our family needs that money.” I still hear very clearly speaking with my
brother that day. I feel deep inside me the tragic destiny and all the sufferings of my elder brother Ahmet Şadi Bey. We later learnt that his regiment
had been transferred to Gallipoli, and from there, without giving a rest,
sent to Anafartalar. On 6 May, when his identification tag was brought to
us, we understood that he had become a martyr. Imagine the situation of
our family then. One of the sons is a military doctor in Gallipoli. The other
martyred in Anafartalar, and then, I was also sent to the front. I am telling
you all this as an answer to your question. That war had affected our family
like that. We also lost our father a short while before I left for the front.
Interviewer: Were you sent to the Eastern Front directly from Istanbul?
Mr.€Cindoruk: No. Before leaving, we trained the raw recruits at a place
near to Istanbul. Then we went to Bandırma by ship, and continued by train
to İzmir. One day, we were told that our division would go to the Caucasian
Front. We went to Manisa and took the train there, and then we headed for
the Eastern Front.
208
appendix 1
Interviewer: How many days did it take to reach the Caucasian Front?
Mr.€Cindoruk: I’ll tell you. It took precisely 57 days. We went as far as
Ulukışla by train. There, the railway ended. The train that took us there was
running on wood, since it was impossible to find coal in those days. Therefore, we had to gather sticks and twigs all the way along to use them as fuel
in our train. Or, we were taking to the train board fences, hedges, and everything that could be burned, almost everywhere we passed through. Indeed
it was not easy to find such fuel for our train, since a great many military
convoys that had passed through the same places before us had already used
them up. We were actually walking faster than the train; therefore, it took
about 15–20 days to reach Ulukışla. From there on, we started walking.
Interviewer: Were you carrying the necessary equipment yourselves?
Mr.€Cindoruk: The transportation columns in the carriages were carrying
light things. The heavy equipment was loaded on trucks in Ulukışla. Our
other ally, the Austrian Government, had sent those trucks. I saw trucks
there for the first time in my life. After we passed through the Gülek Pass
by walking and went down the mountain, we got on a train once more and
reached a station called Mamure. At that place, there was a mountain called
Gavur Mountain. We restarted walking there. We set up a camp with tents
at the top, near the village of Hasanbeyli. The next day, we walked down
the mountain, to İslahiye. Then, we continued walking until we reached
Diyarbakır. Meanwhile, two soldiers who had deserted from their units were
captured. The regiment commander ordered the whole regiment into formation for fighting, made a speech, and then had those two deserters tied to the
telegraph poles and executed by shooting. The court martial was convened
after the execution of those deserters and signed the decision of execution.
Anyway…↜then we set off again from Diyarbakır, and after a four-day walk
towards the north, we arrived in Palu. After walking further for a few days,
we eventually reached our front. Our whole journey had lasted 57 days.
Interviewer: Where was the exact location of your front?
Mr.€Cindoruk: It was located at a place called “Karir” then. Today, it
is called the top of the Şerafettin Mountains. We took up position at a
place with an altitude of 2,500–3,000 metres. Though we took up a position
against the Russians, there were also Armenians against us. They were stabbing our army in the back.
A Testimony of the Turkish Reserve Officer
209
Interviewer: They were acting in cooperation with the Russians, weren’t
they?
Mr.€Cindoruk: Of course they were, and the Armenians were even more
dangerous than the Russians, since they were stabbing us in the back.
Interviewer: What was the season when you took up your positions?
Mr.€Cindoruk: As soon as we arrived at the front, winter set in. First, it
was snowing in the form of dust. Later, the thickness of the snow reached
the height of a man. There was a terrible cold. In fact, very few clashes occurred with the Russians when I was there. Only once we attacked them.
Interviewer: Why weren’t you fighting?
Mr.€Cindoruk: The Russians had also taken up positions on the mountains opposite us, but my son, it was impossible to fight under those weather
conditions. Nevertheless, the Russians were in much better conditions compared to us, and the difficulties they had to endure were probably one thousandth of ours. We were learning how from the Russians who were taken
prisoner by our forces. In those severe winter conditions, our troops only
had çarıks (a type of sandal made of rawhide) on their feet. Many of our
soldiers were frozen to death, and the feet of so many of our soldiers were
amputated.
Interviewer: Why were their feet amputated?
Mr.€Cindoruk: Their feet were becoming gangrenous. The frozen feet were
becoming gangrenous. Let me give you an example. Our positions were at
the top of the mountain. On the ridge of mountain just opposite us, the
positions of the Russians were located. There was a river passing between us.
That river was just between the positions of ours and the Russians. Therefore, both of the parties were sending their reconnaissance patrols to the
river. Our soldiers were always begging us to be sent on that mission, which
was the most dangerous of all, with the hope of killing an enemy soldier,
should a clash occur. That was because they could take the boots, the greatcoats, and the furs of the enemy soldiers who would be killed. Or they could
take the sugars, chocolates, and other foods from the pockets of the enemy.
There was nothing else our soldiers could do then. Under those conditions,
I served as the aide-de-camp of the battalion commander.
210
appendix 1
Interviewer: Were the conditions very bad, sir?
Mr.€Cindoruk: My child, just imagine a mountaintop in Eastern Anatolia in the midst of winter. Then, add to that scene an army, lacking even
proper boots and weapons to give its troops. Of course we did not have then
anything like a thermometer with us. However, it was so cold that when
we spit, we used to see our saliva immediately freezing. Tears that came to
our eyes because of cold were freezing as soon as they came out of the inner
corner of our eyes and were sticking on the surface as they were falling. The
inner parts of our noses used to freeze down to our lungs. Naturally under
those conditions the military duties could not be fulfilled properly. All the
officers, including myself, were trying to do our best at least to protect the
soldiers from becoming frozen. But what could be done for those soldiers
who lacked proper clothing?
Interviewer: What were their clothes like?
Mr.€Cindoruk: They were just terrible. If we were defeated on that front,
we were defeated not by the enemy, but by the snow, the winter, and the typhus. Most of the soldiers had çarıks on their feet. As to their uniforms, they
were provided by Germany to be worn in summer. There was nothing on
their feet, like shoes or boots. We were wearing only greatcoats and because
of the lice, we were wearing them with difficulty.
Interviewer: What were the officers’ shoes?
Mr.€Cindoruk: Our shoes were good, but I was feeling great pity for the
soldiers. Imagine my child, how difficult it was to have those simple shoes
on one’s feet in snow. It was terrible and I think of the merciless people
who caused all this. I still feel a very deep sorrow whenever I remember our
soldiers there. Therefore, I blame Enver Pasha a lot. Under such conditions,
our soldiers were running away, only to be killed in the ambushes set up
by the Armenians and Kurds just for taking our soldiers’ weapons. Those
mountaintops had witnessed many bitter events in those days, especially
after the severe winter set in.
Interviewer: Was the Ottoman Administration in Istanbul unaware of
the adverse conditions you were in?
Mr.€Cindoruk: While we were at the front, Enver Pasha came for an inspection. At the time he came, the thickness of snow exceeded the height of
A Testimony of the Turkish Reserve Officer
211
a man. Our commander İzzet Pasha, the commander of the 2nd Army, said
to Enver Pasha, “Sir, the Russians have withdrawn to the Pasinler Plain to
remain there until the end of winter. They left only some small detachments
against us. Under your orders, we could also withdraw our army to the
Murat Valley, and remain there during the winter. It is impossible to fight
here under the existing weather conditions. At least we could save our soldiers from getting totally annihilated.” Hearing that proposal, Enver Pasha
said: “You cannot know, Pasha. Russians could come here hiding under the
sheepskin, and occupy all these territories. Then, we’ll lose all the country.”
That was the response of Enver Pasha; İzzet Pasha could say no more. Then,
as you know, our armies were completely annihilated.
Interviewer: How were the sentries’ duties being arranged in such cold
weather?
Mr.€Cindoruk: We had shortened the durations of watches to 15 minutes. We were sending two soldiers together on duty. However, many of
our soldiers still froze to death in the cold of probably minus 40 degrees
centigrade.
Interviewer: I wonder where you sheltered during those severe winter
days, and at the top of a mountain. Where and how were you sleeping?
Mr.€Cindoruk: Each squad was digging an underground shelter of its
own. It was like a cave; we were digging the ground and entering into the
cave, which we made. In that long and narrow hole under the ground, 10–15
persons could take shelter.
Interviewer: Were those shelters completely covered?
Mr.€Cindoruk: Only the doors were open. If we could find a canvas tent,
we hung it on the door. The canvas tent did not let in the snow, though it
did not protect us from the cold.
Interviewer: Was there anything like beds in those shelters?
Mr.€Cindoruk: Oh, my son. How could we have beds there? During all
those months we spent there, we could see beds only in our dreams. Everybody was spreading their greatcoats on the earth and lying on them.
That was the only thing you could do. The bodies of the people lying there
warmed each other. Or, we were trying to get warmed with our breath.
212
appendix 1
Interviewer: I suppose you didn’t have anything like a stove?
Mr.€Cindoruk: We didn’t have any. We were sometimes burning sticks and
twigs, if we could find them. Of course, they produced too much smoke,
but we were willing to have the smoke, instead of being frozen.
Interviewer: How were you washing or cleaning yourselves under such
conditions?
Mr.€Cindoruk: We had great difficulty in doing that. We were bringing
snow from outside and putting it into a cauldron. If we could find some
sticks and twigs we were burning them in order to heat the cauldron a little
bit and melt the snow. We were using that water only to wash our hands and
faces. We were not able to clean ourselves any further. We did not have any
hot water for months.
Interviewer: Did you spend all day in those underground shelters at the
top of the mountain?
Mr.€Cindoruk: Unless we were on duty, we spent all day in those shelters,
many of us together in such a small place. None of us could go outside
in that very severe cold. Under those conditions, naturally the lice spread
and increased in number. The dirtiness and all those adverse conditions invited the lice. Besides the cold weather, a second factor which destroyed our
armies there was typhus. As you know, typhus is a fatal disease transmitted
by lice.
Interviewer: How did the people become infested with lice?
Mr.€Cindoruk: The soldiers brought the lice there. I don’t know where
they were brought the lice. In fact, the lice were already widespread in our
country then. In the underground shelters, everyone easily became infested
with lice. It was impossible to protect yourself. You could never clean yourself completely from the lice on your body. Even in that cold weather, I had
to take off my jacket. They were plenty. You cannot imagine at all. When
you stroked one side of your shirt or jacket, you could see hundreds of lice
falling to the ground. Then we were crushing them with our feet, but they
were too many to be eradicated by crushing. You cannot imagine how badly
they could bother you and make you itch. One could go insane.
A Testimony of the Turkish Reserve Officer
213
Interviewer: What were you eating and drinking under those conditions?
Mr.€Cindoruk: That was another tragedy. A total of 27,000 animals were
sent to the front from the rear, and were frozen to death before reaching the
front. Therefore, the army had to seize all the flour which could be found
in the area. Everyone was given a hundred grams of flour each day, and that
was all. When we lit a fire in the underground shelter, we were placing a thin
piece of sheet iron on the fire in order to bake a kind of bread with the flour
wetted with snow.
Interviewer: Were the officers eating the same thing?
Mr.€Cindoruk: There was no difference in that regard between the officers
and the soldiers. We were eating the same things as the soldiers.
Interviewer: Were the officers given meat from time to time?
Mr.€Cindoruk: We were never given any meat, but if the 27,000 animals
I have mentioned had reached the front without being frozen, their meat
would have been fried and preserved. If it had been done, we wouldn’t have
a shortage of food for quite a long time.
Interviewer: To tell the truth, Sir, what you’re telling me makes my hair
stand on end. Once more, I see very clearly the enormous costs paid to
bring this country to the present.
Mr.€Cindoruk: May God never show again the miseries of those days to
our country, or to anybody.
Interviewer: How was the transportation to the front carried out?
Mr.€Cindoruk: Camels were being used for transportation. In fact, we
know camels as animals living in warm climates, don’t we? But in those
days, the camels had proven to be more resistant to the severe cold than the
horses and the mules.
Interviewer: Then, you had also caught typhus, didn’t you?
Mr.€Cindoruk: That’s right. As I told you before, typhus is a contagious
and fatal disease transmitted by lice. It is also called as spotted fever. In
214
appendix 1
those days, typhus could not be cured. It was starting with a severe nausea.
Then the body temperature increased. I showed the same symptoms when
I caught the disease. In the beginning, my body temperature was not very
high, it was around 38°C. There was no doctor on the mountain, in our
post, but there was a pharmacist. When he informed the commander of
my situation, I was sent down the mountain accompanied by a soldier sent
to accompany me. We walked down. The horses belonging to our division were waiting at the foot of the mountain. In order to keep them in a
warmer place, a cave to be used as a stable had been dug out on that side of
the mountain. The animals had been given more food than us. Imagine that
under those conditions, an animal could be more valuable for the army than
a soldier at the front. Anyway, together with the soldier, I set off for Lice on
the back of a horse.
Interviewer: What was there in Lice?
Mr.€Cindoruk: There was a stone-built school building in Lice. The building had been turned into a military hospital. There was a very terrible winter. First, we went down the mountain and arrived in Çapakcur. It took two
days to reach Çapakcur on horseback. Then, we continued our way and
crossed the Murat River. In that severe cold, there was only my uniform on
me while passing the Murat River through a ford, which was not very deep.
We spent two more days on the road, and finally reached the military hospital in Lice. I later learnt that two military doctors with typhus had arrived
there before me. One of them was Captain Nail Bey; and the other was a
Jew, the name of whom I had forgotten. I learnt that both of them had died.
When I first arrived in that hospital, there were a few young officers also ill
with typhus like me. I witnessed the deaths of all of them. I heard that after
my departure, the chief doctor of the hospital had also died of typhus.
Interviewer: Sir, you have just mentioned a military doctor who was a
Jew. Were the members of minority groups taken to the military service
then?
Mr.€Cindoruk: Members of certain professions needed by the army were
taken. For instance, there were not many Turkish doctors then. Therefore,
doctors belonging to the minority groups were taken to the Army. The Chief
Doctor of the hospital in Lice was a Jew named Jak Efendi, and the Doctor
Major who treated me in the hospital was an Armenian. I don’t remember
his name now. I learnt from others that I had been treated in that hospital
for two months.
A Testimony of the Turkish Reserve Officer
215
Interviewer: Don’t you remember the days that you received treatment
in the hospital?
Mr.€Cindoruk: I remember only our arrival in that hospital, and my last
days there. They told me later that I had lost my consciousness immediately
after our arrival. The soldier who accompanied me to the hospital continued
to stay there with me. He told me later that one night I had unconsciously
stepped down the stairs of the hospital and lain on the snow outside. My
body temperature had been 40–41 degrees centigrade then. After I had lain
on the snow for a few€hours, I had been found and taken inside by the soldier accompanying me. Lying on the snow had decreased my body temperature somewhat and saved me from dying. When they told me all this later, I
didn’t believe at first, but when I saw that all the typhus patients were dying
in the hospital, I believed that unconsciously going and lying in the snow
had saved my life. Of course that had happened because of God’s will.
Interviewer: Was typhus the most widespread of the infectious diseases?
Mr.€Cindoruk: Typhus was the disease which caused the largest number
of deaths within our Army. Besides that, plenty of deaths occurred because
of the cold, and there were also many who froze to death. During a period of
2–3 years, the Ottoman armies were defeated by irresponsibility, cold, and
typhus. About a hundred thousand young citizens of this country had been
lost on our front only. History books also write the same thing.
So, my son. Our division was 17,000 strong when it first arrived at the
Eastern Front. On our way back, we were only 2,000. Particularly the cold
and the typhus had caused the death of totally 15,000 officers and soldiers
from our division alone. All those people had died for nothing. Even now,
whenever I remember those days, I feel a deep sorrow. I cannot understand
the reason for what happened there. Therefore I blame the late Enver Pasha
a lot. May God’s mercy be upon the souls of all who died.
Appendix 2
Reconstruction in Turkey
A Series of Reports
Compiled for
the American Committee of
Armenian and Syrian Relief
218
appendix 2
Reconstruction in Turkey
219
220
appendix 2
Reconstruction in Turkey
221
222
appendix 2
Reconstruction in Turkey
223
224
appendix 2
Reconstruction in Turkey
225
226
appendix 2
Reconstruction in Turkey
227
228
appendix 2
Reconstruction in Turkey
229
230
appendix 2
Reconstruction in Turkey
231
Notes
Chapter 1. Introduction
1. Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York: W.
W. Norton, 1999), 197.
2. William H. McNeill, A World History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967),
172.
3. Ralph Jackson, Roma İmparatorluğu’nda Doktorlar ve Hastalıklar, trans. Şenol
Mumcu (Istanbul: Homer B., 1999), 126, 131. For original edition, see Ralph Jackson, Doctors and Diseases in the Roman Empire, 4th ed. (London: British Museum
Press, 1995).
4. M. F. Flinn, “Avrupa ve Akdeniz Ülkelerinde Veba,” trans. Necmiye Alpay, Tarih ve
Toplum 39 (March 1987): 25–26.
5. Arif Müfid Mansel, Ege ve Yunan Tarihi, 6th ed. (Ankara: TTK Pub., 1995), 321.
6. Feda Şâmil Arık, “Selçuklular Zamanında Anadolu’da Veba Salgınları,” AÜDTCF
Tarih Dergisi 15, no.€26 (1990–1991): 57.
7. H. Braun, Mikrobiyoloji, Parazitoloji ve Salgınlar Bilgisi, trans. Vefik Vassaf (Istanbul: Yaltırık Pub., 1936), 277–278.
8. Andrew Nikiforuk, The Fourth Horseman: A Short History of Epidemics, Plagues and
Other Scourges (London: Fourth Estate, 1991), 10.
9. J. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, in John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 360–361.
10. Tostantin Mutusis, “Mikrop Harbi,” Istanbul Tıp Fakültesi Mecmuası, no.€3 (1952):
1158–1159.
11. Nikiforuk, The Fourth Horseman, 11.
12. Jean-Noël Biraben, Les hommes et la peste en France et dans les pays europeens et Méditerranéens, in Daniel Panzac, La Peste dans l’Empire Ottoman 1700–1850 (Leuven:
Edi�tions Peeters, 1985), 187.
13. Ibid., 187.
14. Helmut Becker, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı Cephesinde Askerî Tababet ve EczaÂ�cılık
(Istanbul, 1983), 6.
15. Salim Koca, “Türklerin Göçleri ve Yayılmaları,” Türkler (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Pub.,
2002), 1:654.
16. UK FO 424/67 – Confidential (3598), 267–269, from no.€612/1: Bilâl€N. ŞimÂ�
şir, Rumeli’den Türk Göçleri, Belgeler (Ankara: TTK Pub., 1989), vol.€1, doc. no.€185,
322–325.
17. Ekrem Kadri Unat, “Kış ve Bulaşıcı Hastalıklar,” Dirim 55 (7–8) (July–August
1980): 249.
233
234
notes to pages 5–11
18. Inci Hot, Sıhhiye Mecmuası’na Göre Ülkemizde Bulaşıcı Hastalıklarla Mücadele,
1913–1996 (Istanbul University, Unpublished Thesis, 2001), 188.
19. Keegan, A History of Warfare, 361.
20. E. K. Unat et al., Unat’ın Tıp Parazitoloji, 5th ed. (Istanbul: Cerrahpaşa Tıp FaÂ�külÂ�
tesi Vakfı Pub., 1995), 258.
21. A. Weiss, “Le typhus exanthematique pendant la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale en
particulier dans la camps de concentration,” in Ekrem Kadri Unat, “Birinci Dünya
Harbinde Türk Ordusu’nda Tifüs Savaşı,” Cerrahpaşa Tıp Fakültesi Dergisi 20, no.€2
(April 1989): 256.
22. Yurkens, “Lekeli Tifo Epidemiyolojisi,” in Mustafa Karatepe, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda
Kafkas Cephesi’nde Tifüsle Mücadele (Istanbul University, Unpublished Thesis, 1999),
p.€46–47.
23. Ahmet Özdemir, “Milli Mücadele’de Üserâ Taburları,” Atatürk Yolu 5 (May 1990):
141.
24. Ekrem Şadi Kavur, “Askeri Hekimliğin Sıhhiye Hizmetlerinde Bir Etüd,” Dirim 49,
no.€8 (August 1973): 194–195, 378.
25. Tolga Ersoy, Tıp, Tarih, Metafor, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Öteki Pub., 1996), 142–143.
26. M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774–1923 (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1966),
p.€314. For the Treaty of Alliance, see M. S. Anderson, ed., The Great Power and
the Near East, 1774–1923: Documents of Modern History (London: Edward Arnold,
1970), 157.
27. Sarkis Karayan, “An Inquiry into the Number and Causes of Turkish Human Losses
during the First World War,” The Armenian Review 35, no.€3–139 (August 1982): 284.
28. Ibid., 286.
29. Erik J. Zürcher, “Between Death and Desertion: The Experience of the Ottoman
Soldier in World€War€I,” Turcica, no.€28 (1996): 235–258. See also Zürcher, ed., “The
Ottoman Conscription System in Theory and Practice,” in Arming the State: Military Conscription in the Middle East and Central Asia, 1775–1925 (London: I. B. Taurus, 1999), 89–94.
30. Stanford J. Shaw, Idea to Realization: My Study of Ottoman History (Ankara: Türkiye
Bilimler Akademisi Pub., 2003), 72.
Chapter 2. Between Two Fires
1. Mehmet Yavuz Erler, “XIX: Yüzyıldaki Bazı Doğal Âfetler ve Osmanlı Yönetimi,”
Türkler, vol.€13 (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Pub., 2002), 764.
2. Panzac, La Peste dans l’Empire Ottoman, 11.
3. Ibid., 13, 38–39.
4. Quoted from William Witmann, Travels in Turkey, Asia Minor, Syria and Across the
Desert into Egypt During the Years 1799, 1800 and 1801 in Company with the Turkish
Army, and the British Military Mission (London, 1803), in Şefik Görgey, İngiliz Cerrah William Witmann’ın 19. Yüzyıl Başında Istanbul, Yafa ve Mısır’daki Gözlemleri,
Uygulamaları ve Raporları (Istanbul University, SBE, Unpublished Thesis, 1989),
28, 30, 35, 39.
5. Kemal Özbay, Türk Asker Hekimliği Tarihi ve Asker Hastahaneleri (Istanbul, Yörük
Pub., 1976), 1:29.
notes to pages 11–18
235
6. Osman Şevki, Osmanlı Tababeti, Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları Eserinin Müsveddeleri,
vol.€2, no.€16 (Istanbul: Akşam Pub., n.d.), 55.
7. Osman Şevki, “Kırım Muharebesi,” Askerî Tıbbiye Mecmuası 1, no.€4 (March 1919),
115–117, in Oya Dağlar, “Kırım Savaşı’nda Orduların Sağlık Durumu ve Bir Belge,”
Tıp Tarihi Araştırmaları 12 (2004): 50.
8. Kemal Özbay, “Tarihte Lekeli Humma-Tifüs ve Ordularımızda Tahribatı,” Dirim
54, no.€3–4 (March–April 1979): 114; and Özbay, Türk Asker Hekimliği, 1:41.
9. Unat, “Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Ordusu’nda Tifüs Savaşı,” Cerrahpaşa Tıp
Fakültesi Dergisi 20, no.€2 (April 1989): 255.
10. Özbay, “Tarihte Lekeli Humma,” 114.
11. Joseph O. Baylen & Alan Conway, Soldier-Surgeon: The Crimean War Letters of
Dr.€Douglas A. Reid, 1855–1856, in Dağlar, “Kırım Savaşı’nda Orduların,” 42n3.
12. M. Zühdi Berke, Tıbbî Viroloji (Ankara, 1974), 2:1285.
13. Osman Şevki, Osmanlı Tababeti 3, Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları Eserinin Müsveddeleri, 81–82.
14. Ekrem Şadi Kavur, “Askerî Hekimliğin Sıhhiye Hizmetlerinde Bir Etüd,” Dirim 48,
no.€2 (February 1973): 96.
15. Arslan Terzioğlu, “Kırım Harbi Esnasında Osmanlı Hastahaneleri ve Dünya
Hastahaneciliğine Etkileri,” Toplumsal Tarih 85 (January 1991): 42.
16. Özbay, Türk Asker Hekimliği, 1:39.
17. Aziz Kalyan, ed. Kırım Savaşı (Istanbul: Milliyet Pub., 1975), 78.
18. S. Payzın et al., Sağlık Hizmetinde Mikrobiyoloji II, Özel Mikrobiyoloji (Ankara: Tıp
Fakültesi Pub., 1968), 660.
19. Özbay, “Tarihte Lekeli Humma,” 114.
20. Şevki, Osmanlı Tababeti 3, 86.
21. Nedim İpek, Rumeli’den Anadolu’ya Türk Göçleri (Ankara: TTK Pub., 1999), 89–90.
22. Bilâl N. Şimşir, Rumeli’den Türk Göçleri, Belgeler (Ankara: TTK Pub., 1989), 427,
406–408.
23. İpek, Rumeli’den Anadolu’ya, 91.
24. Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims,
1821–1922 (Princeton, N.J.: Darwin Press, 1996), 80.
25. İpek, Rumeli’den Anadolu’ya, 92.
26. Ekrem Şadi Kavur, “Askerî Hekimliğin Sıhhiye Hizmetlerinde Bir Etüd,” Dirim 48,
no.€3 (March 1973): 148.
27. Şevki, Osmanlı Tababeti 3, 87, 90.
28. Özbay, “Tarihte Lekeli Humma,” 115.
29. [Major G. v. Hochwaechter], Türklerle Cephede, trans. Fahri Çeliker (Ankara: Askerî
Tarih Bülteni Eki, August 1979), no.€8: 47, 50, 51–52, 55, 57–58, 61–62.
30. Ekrem Kadri Unat, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda 1910–1913 Yıllarındaki Kolera
Salgınları ve Bunlarla İlgili Olaylar,” Yeni Tıp Tarihi Araştırmaları 1 (1995): 58.
31. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Makendonya’dan Ortaasya’ya Enver Paşa (Istanbul: Remzi
B., 1971), 2:363.
32. Alemdar, 90–155, from 11 November 1912, in Ahmet Halaçoğlu, Balkan Harbi
Sırasında Rumeli’den Türk Göçleri, 1912–1913, (Ankara: TTK Pub., 1995), 97.
33. Kızılay Arşivi, File no.€211 (4 December 1912), in Halaçoğlu, Balkan Harbi Sırasında,
96.
236
notes to pages 18–24
34. Dersaadet’in 1913 Senesine Mahsus Sıhhî İstatistiki, Şehremaneti Dergisi (Istanbul,
1913), in Halaçoğlu, Balkan Harbi Sırasında, 99.
35. Ekrem Şadi Kavur, “Askerî Hekimliğin Sıhhiye Hizmetlerinde Bir Etüd,” Dirim 48,
no.€4 (April 1973): 193.
36. Seyhülislam Cemaleddin Efendi, Siyasî Hatıralarım, trans. Ziyaeddin Engin (Istanbul: Tercüman 1001 Temel Eser, 1978), 110.
37. A. Nazilmof, Bulgar Süvari Tümeninin Harekâtı (Ankara: Genelkurmay Pub., 1935),
155–156.
38. Abdülkadir Noyan, Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla Savaşlarım (Ankara: Tıp
Fakültesi Y., 1956), 3–5.
39. Abdülkadir Noyan, “İntani ve Salgın Hastalıklara Karşı Tıbbın Eski ve Yeni
Durumu,” Istanbul Tıp Fakültesi Mecmuası, no.€4 (1947): 13–14.
40. Behiç Onul, İnfeksiyon Hastalıkları, 5th ed. (Ankara: Tıp Fakültesi Pub., 1974), 688.
41. Ekrem Şadi Kavur, “Askerî Hekimliğin Sıhhiye Hizmetlerinde Bir Etüd,” Dirim 48,
no.€4 (April 1973): 193–194.
42. Cemil Topuzlu, İstibdat-Meşrutiyet-Cumhuriyet Devirlerinde 80 Yıllık HatıraÂ�laÂ�rım,
2nd ed., ed. Hüsrev Hatemi-Aykut Kazancıgil (Istanbul: Cerrahpaşa Tıp Fakültesi
Pub., 1982), 118, 125.
43. Osmanlı Hilâl-i Ahmer Mecmuası, in Seçil Karal Akgün and Murat Uluğtekin,
Hilâl-i Ahmer’den Kızılay’a (Ankara, 2000), 1:121.
44. Ahmet Zeki İzgöer, “Osmanlı’nın Yıkılışı Öncesinde Hind Hilâl-i Ahmer YarÂ�dımÂ�
ları ve Dr.€Ensari’nin Faaliyetleriyle İlgili Bazı Notlar,” Yeni Tıp Tarihi Araştırmaları
8 (2002): 18.
45. Zekeriya Türkmen, “Balkan Savaşlarında Hilâl-i Ahmer Cemiyetinin Osmanlı
Ordusuna Yönelik Sağlık Hizmetleri,” Belleten 68, no.€252 (August 2004): 483–518.
46. Nazilmof, Bulgar Süvari Tümeninin Harekâtı, 155–156.
47. Noyan, Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla, 9.
48. Unat, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda, 1910–1913,” 62.
49. Leon Trotsky, Balkan Savaşları, trans. Tansel Güney (Istanbul: Arba Pub., 1995),
257.
50. Ibid., 320.
51. Noyan, Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla, 13–14.
52. Ibid., 15–17.
53. Ibid., 17–18.
54. Ibid., 18–20.
55. Ibid., 22.
56. Aydemir, Makedonya’dan Ortaasya’ya, 2:364–365.
57. Noyan, Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla, 10.
58. Unat, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda 1910-1913,” 64.
59. Rıfat N. Bali, “Edirne Muhasarası Sırasında Tutulmuş Bir Günlük-I,” Tarih ve
Toplum, no.€190 (October 1999): 43; no.€191 (November 1999): 16; no.€193 (January
2000): 34.
60. Noyan, Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla, 29–30.
61. Ibid., 23–24.
62. Ibid., 38–39.
notes to pages 25–33
237
63. Operatör Cemil Paşa, Canlı Tarihler (Istanbul: Türkiye Pub., 1945), 8:81 ff.
64. Ekrem Şadi Kavur, “Askerî Hekimliğin,” Dirim 48, no.€4 (April 1973): 194.
65. Özbay, Türk Asker Hekimliği, 1:123.
66. Ekrem Kadri Unat, “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Bulaşıcı Hastalıklarla Savaş,”
Cerrahpaşa Tıp Fakültesi Dergisi 12 (Sp.€Issue, 1981): 384.
67. Nuran Yıldırım, “Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Koruyucu Sağlık Uygulamaları,”
Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi 5:1332.
68. “Emraz-ı Sariye Mücadelesi,” in Hot, Sıhhiye Mecmuası’na Göre, 4.
69. BOA DH UMVM File 11/43, no.€3, in Mehmet Temel, “Birinci Dünya Savaşı ve
Mütareke Yıllarında Türkiye’deki Bulaşıcı ve Zührevî Hastalıklara Karşı Alınan
Önlemler,” Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi 3, no.€8 (1998): 332–336.
Chapter 3. Under the Crescent
1. Jorge Blanco Villalta, Atatürk, Translated from Spanish by William Campbell
(Ankara: TTK Pub., 1991), 104.
2. Yusuf Halaçoğlu, Osmanlılarda Ulaşım ve Haberleşme (Menziller) (Ankara: PTT
Pub., 2002), 7.
3. Ahmet Emin, Turkey: In the World War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1930), 86.
4. Turkish Military History Council, Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, İran-Irak
Cephesi (Ankara: Genelkurmay Pub., 1979), vol.€3, part 1, 800.
5. Necmi Seren, “Yılların Ötesinden,” Harp Tarihi Mecmuası, no.€210 (June 1982): 77.
6. Jonathan S. McMurray, Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of the Baghdad Railway, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001), 118.
7. İ. Hakkı Sunata, Gelibolu’dan Kafkaslar’a (Istanbul: T. İş Bankası Pub., 2003), 243.
8. ATASE, no.€6/4517, box 5240, H-3, in Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi,
1:577–578.
9. Münim Mustafa, Cepheden Cepheye, 2nd ed. (Istanbul: Arma Pub., 1998), 15–17,
146.
10. Noyan, Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla, 50.
11. Cavid, Harb-i Umumi Vesaikinden Irak Seferi, İttihad Hükümeti’nin Hayâlât ve
Cehâlet-i Siyâsiyessi, in Orhan Avcı, Irak’ta Türk Ordusu, 1914–1918 (Ankara: Vadi
Pub., 2004), 268–269.
12. Necdet Sakaoğlu, “Bir Osmanlı Neferinin I. Dünya Savaşı Anıları,” Tarih ve Toplum
11 (November 1984): 49–50.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Tevfik Sağlam, Cihan Harbinde 3: Orduda Sıhhî Hizmete Ait Küçük Bir Hulâsa
(Istanbul: Askerî Tıbbiye Pub., 1940), 3.
16. Noyan, Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla, 50.
17. Seuber, Yıldırım, trans. Kaymakam Nihat (Istanbul: Askerî Pub., 1932), 16.
18. Hamdullah Suphi [Tanrıöver], “Boğa Dağları,” Türk Yurdu, vol.€7(14), no.€156 (1918)
(Ankara: Tutibay Pub., 2000), 139, 140.
19. Seuber, Yıldırım, 32.
238
notes to pages 33–43
20. Sunata, Gelibolu’dan Kafkaslar’a, 251.
21. Kress von Kressenstein and Friedrich Freiherr, Mit den Türken zum Suezkanal (Berlin: Borhut-Verlag, 1938), 255, 265.
22. Noyan, Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla, 57–59.
23. von Kressenstein and Freiherr, Mit den Türken, 122.
24. Liman von Sanders, Türkiye’de Beş Yıl, trans. M. Şevki Yazman (Istanbul: Burçak
Pub., 1969), 303.
25. The original old Turkish words used in the title were “iaşe and ibate,” which meant
“providing food and shelter.”
26. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, Birinci Dünya Harbi, İdarî Faaliyetler ve Lojistik
(Ankara, Genelkurmay Pub., 1985), 9:577.
27. Ekrem Şadi Kavur, “Askerî Hekimliğin Sıhhiye Hizmetlerinde Bir Etüd,” Dirim 48,
no.€6 (June 1973): 288.
28. Aziz Samih, Büyük Harpte Kafkas Cephesi Hatıraları (Ankara: Büyük ErkânıÂ�harÂ�biye
Y., 1934), 3–4.
29. ATASE Archives, no.€5/3771, box 4156, H. 7 from F. 1-129: Birinci Dünya HarÂ�bi’nde
Türk Harbi, 1: Annex-1.
30. Noyan, Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla, 77–78.
31. Akşin Somel, “Türk Ordusu ile Filistin’de,” Toplumsal Tarih, no.€66 (June 1989): 58.
32. ATASE Archives, K. 3612, D. 41/30, in Avcı, Irak’ta Türk Ordusu, 270.
33. Özbay, “Tarihte Lekeli Humma,” 118.
34. Onul, Infeksiyon Hastalıkları, 329.
35. Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, 1:575.
36. ATASE Archives, A. 1-217, D. 517, F. 2-2.
37. Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, 1:34.
38. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 14.
39. von Sanders, Türkiye’de Beş Yıl, 68.
40. Ibid., 69.
41. Fahri Belen, 20: Yüzyılda Osmanlı Devleti (Istanbul: Remzi Pub., 1973), 279.
42. ATASE Archives, no.€4/3671, box 2950, in Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, 1:54.
43. Samih, Büyük Harpte Kafkas, 43.
44. Arif Baytın, İlk Dünya Harbinde Kafkas Cephesi (Istanbul: Vakit Pub., 1946), 127.
45. von Sanders, Türkiye’de Beş Yıl, 303.
46. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 16.
47. von Kressenstein and Freiherr, Mit den Türken, 205.
48. Samih, Büyük Harpte Kafkas, 11.
49. Carl Mühlmann, Das Deutche-Türkische Waffenbündis İm Weltkriege (Leipzig,
1940), from p.€256: Veli Yılmaz, 1 nci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk-Alman İttifakı ve Askerî
Yardımlar, (Istanbul: Cem Pub., 1993), 220.
50. Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, 1:192.
51. Ibid., 2:653–654.
52. Guze, Büyük Harpte Kafkas Cephesindeki Muharebeler, trans. Hakkı, Askerî Mecmua,
no.€20 (January 1931): 60–61.
53. Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, 1:60.
54. Sağlam, Cihan Harbinde 3. Ordu’da, 6.
55. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 18.
notes to pages 43–61
239
56. Ibid., 26–27.
57. Ibid., 28.
58. von Sanders, Türkiye’de Beş Yıl, 158–159.
59. Ibid., 159.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid., 160.
62. Becker, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı, 26.
63. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 14.
64. Ibid., 49–50.
65. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, 9:577.
66. Hafız Hakkı Paşa, Bozgun (Istanbul: Tercüman 1001 Temel Eser, n.d.), 58.
67. Salih Mayakuşu, Golç Paşa’nın Hatıratı, in Faruk Yılmaz, ed., İmparatorluk Döneminde Türk-Alman İlişkileri (Ankara: Berikan Pub., 2004), 62.
68. Goltz Paşa’nın Hatırası ve Hâl Tercümesi, trans. E. General Pertev Demirhan (Istanbul: Askerî Pub., 1953), 35. For German edition, see General Pertev Demirhan, Generalfeldmarschall Freiherr von der Goltz (Göttingen: Göttinger Verlagsanstalt, 1960).
69. Kolonel Lamouche, Türkiye Tarihi, trans. Galip Söylemezoğlu (Istanbul: Kanaat K.,
1943), 2:468n3.
70. From Mayakuşu, Golç Paşa’nın Hatıratı, 163–164.
71. Noyan, Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla, 53–54.
72. Belen, Birinci Cihan Harbinde Türk Harbi, 4:83.
Chapter 4. Epidemic Disaster
1. İlhan Selçuk, Yüzbaşı Selâhattin’in Romanı (Istanbul: Remzi Pub., 1975), 1:118.
2.
Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, 1:536.
3. Ibid., 535–536.
4. Fevzi Çakmak, Büyük Harpte Şark Cephesi Hareketleri (Ankara: Genelkurmay Pub.,
1936), 80.
5. Sağlam, Cihan Harbinde 3. Ordu’da, 6.
6. von Sanders, Türkiye’de Beş Yıl, 6.
7. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 78.
8. Ibid., 79.
9. Guze, Büyük Harpte Kafkas Cephesindeki Muharebeler, trans. Hakkı (Istanbul: Askerî Pub., 1931), 60–61.
10. von Sanders, Türkiye’de Beş Yıl, 68.
11. Sağlam, Cihan Harbinde 3. Orduda, 7.
12. Karatepe, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda, 66–67.
13. Ibid., 67–76.
14. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 79–80.
15. Samih, Büyük Harpte Kafkas, 35.
16. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 12.
17. Nâzım Şâkir, “Birinci Cihan Harbinde Erzurum ve Sağlık Organizasyonu Anıları,”
in Nusret Karasu-Nihat Özyardımcı, ed., Çeşitli Yönleri ile Erzurum ve Çevresi
(Ankara: Ulusal Verem Savaş Derneği Y., 1968), 41–42.
18. Ibid., 92.
240
notes to pages 61–66
19. Server Kâmil, Kafkas Cephe-i Harbinde Lekeli Humma (Sivas: Matbaa-i Vilayet,
1916), 4.
20. T. İsmail Gökçe and S. Necati Üster, Tevfik Sağlam, 1882–1963 (Istanbul: Akgün
Pub., 1968), 2:92.
21. İsmail Gökçe, “Erzurum Anılarımdan Çizgiler,” Çeşitli Yönleri ile Erzurum ve
Çevresi, 50.
22. Sağlam, Cihan Harbinde 3. Orduda, 9.
23. Ibid., 13.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., 13–14.
26. Ibid., 90–92.
27. Özbay, “Tarihte Lekeli Humma,” 118.
28. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 93–97.
29. Ibid., 98–101.
30. Ibid., 125–127.
31. Becker, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı, 25.
32. von Sanders, Türkiye’de Beş Yıl, 57.
33. Becker, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı, 27.
34. BOA DH-KMS, from box no.€21, no.€9, in Mehmet Temel, “Birinci Dünya Savaşı,”
330.
35. BOA DH İD, from box no.€165, no.€8, in Temel, “Birinci Dünya Savaşı,” 33.
36. BOA DH-KMS, from box no.€31, no.€11, in Temel, “Birinci Dünya Savaşı,“ 330.
37. BOA DH-UMVM, from box no.€11/5, no.€10, in Temel, “Birinci Dünya Savaşı,“
330.
38. Temel, “Birinci Dünya Savaşı,” 331.
39. Lütfi Aksu, Lekeli Humma (Ankara: Ulusal M., 1943), 7.
40. Özbay, “Tarihte Lekeli Humma,” 116.
41. Zühal Özaydın, “Osmanlı Hilâl-i Ahmer Cemiyeti’nin Kuruluşu ve Çalışmaları,”
Türkler, vol.€13 (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Pub., 2002), 685.
42. American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, The One Hundred and
Fifth Annual Report, Connecticut, October 26, 1915, in Hikmet Özdemir et al., Ermeniler: Sürgün ve Göç (Ankara: TTK Pub., 2004), 103–104.
43. Nil Sarı and Zühal Özaydın, “I. Dünya Savaşında Osmanlı Hilâl-i Ahmer Cemiyeti,” 2. Türk Tıp Tarihi Kongresi, Istanbul, 20–21 Eylül 1990 (Ankara: TTK Pub.,
1999), 164.
44. Aydın Ayhan, “1914 Yılında Balıkesir’de Tifüs Salgını ve Müdafaa-yı Milliye
Cemiyeti’nin İki Sağlık Beyannamesi,” Tıp Tarihi Araştırmaları 9 (August 1999):
221–228.
45. From Karasi Journal of 11 January 1915 and Nu. 38, in Ayhan, “1914 Yılında
Balıkesir’de Tifüs Salgını,” 223–224.
46. Hilmar Kaiser, “Denying the Armenian Genocide: The German Connection,” Journal of the Society for Armenian Studies 9 (New York, 1999): 38.
47. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 78.
48. Gökçe and Üster, Tevfik Sağlam, 1882–1963, 2:79.
49. Hüsamettin Tugaç, Bir Neslin Dramı (Istanbul: Çağdaş Y., 1975), 27, 34.
notes to pages 66–78
241
50. Guze, Büyük Harpte Kafkas, 98.
51. Becker, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı, 77.
Chapter 5. Ordeal with Diseases
1. Murat Çulcu, ed., Mehmed Fasih Bey’in Günlüğü (Istanbul: Denizler Pub., 2002),
173–174.
2. Noyan, Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla, 46.
3. James, Gallipoli, 214.
4. Aydın Ayhan, “Çanakkale Savaşları’nda Yaralanmalar ve Hastalıklar,” Tıp Tarihi
Araştırmaları 11 (2003): 99.
5. Onul, Infeksiyon Hastalıkları, 303.
6. James, Gallipoli, p.€221, 222.
7. C. F. Aspinall-Oglander, Military Operations Gallipoli (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1932), 2:114–115, 117–118, 122, 366.
8. Ian Hamilton, Gallipoli Dairy (London: Edward Arnold, 1920), 1:364.
9. Osman Öndeş, “Bir Savaşın Sonrası,” in Ian Hamilton, Gelibolu Günlüğü (Turkish
edition, Istanbul: Hürriyet Y., 1972), 292.
10. Hamilton, Gallipoli Dairy, 1:387.
11. James, Gallipoli, 303.
12. Hamilton, Gallipoli Dairy, 2:170.
13. James, Gallipoli, 311.
14. Hamilton, Gallipoli Dairy, 2:248.
15. Ekrem Şadi Kavur, “Askerî Hekimliğin Sıhhiye Hizmetlerinde Bir Etüd,” Dirim 48,
no.€5 (May 1973): 243.
16. Hamilton, Gallipoli Dairy, 2:262.
17. Aspinall-Oglander, Military Operations Gallipoli, 2:433–434.
18. James, Gallipoli, 335–336.
19. Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, vol.€5, book 1, 272–274.
20. Ibid., vol.€V, book 2, 432–433.
21. Sarı and Özaydın, “I. Dünya Savaşında,” 165.
22. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, 9:300.
23. Aptülahat Akşin, Atatürk’ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi (Ankara: TTK Pub.,
1991), xii.
24. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, 9:300.
25. ATASE Archives, A. 1-217, D. 517, F. 2-3.
26. Aspinall-Oglander, Military Operations Gallipoli, 2:367n1.
27. Kavur, “Askerî Hekimliğin Sıhhiye Hizmetlerinde Bir Etüd,” Dirim 49, no.€7
(July 1973): 335.
28. Özbay, “Tarihte Lekeli Humma,” 118.
29. ATASE Archives, A. 1-217, D. 517, F. 2-4.
30. Ibid.
31. Birinci Dünya Harbi, vol.€7, part 1, 106–109.
32. Ibid., vol.€7, part 2, 164–165.
33. Ibid., vol.€7, part 3, 74–75.
242
notes to pages 78–91
34. ATASE Archives, A. 1-217, D. 517, F. 2-5.
35. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 106.
36. Ibid., 106–107.
37. Ibid., 107–108.
38. Ibid., 109–110.
39. Ibid., 110.
40. Ibid., 111.
41. Ibid., 102–105.
42. Ibid., 105.
43. Ibid., 65.
44. Ibid., 117.
45. Ibid., 120–121.
46. Ibid., 122–124.
47. Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, 6:782.
48. ATASE Archives, from no.€5/13796, box 4116, H-1, file H-1, F-1–73, in Birinci Dünya
Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, 6:784–785.
49. Ibid., A. 1-217, D. 517, F. 2-3.
50. Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi, Sina-Filistin Cephesi, vol.€4, part 1, 679–680.
51. Ibid., 680–681.
52. Seuber, Yıldırım, 42.
53. Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi, vol.€4, part 1, 681.
54. Becker, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı, 54–55.
55. Ibid., 42.
56. Necmi Seren, “Yılların Ötesinden,” Harp Tarihi Mecmuası, no.€211 (July 1982): 75 ff.
57. ATASE Archives, from no.€4/10832, box 3709, F. 1, 34 and no.€4/11007, box 3772,
box H-7, F-1, in Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, vol.€4, part 2, 752.
58. Ibid.
59. Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, vol.€3, part 1, 800.
60. ATASE Archives, from K. 3698, D. 1/235-4, F. 1-1; F. 1-162, in Avcı, Irak’ta Türk
Ordusu, 269.
61. ATASE Archives, A. 1-217, D. 517, F. 2-1.
62. Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, vol.€2, part 2, 325–326.
63. ATASE Archives, A. 1-217, D. 517, F. 2-2.
64. George Buchanan, The Tragedy of Mesopotamia (Edinburg: 1938), 5–7.
65. Ibid., 20–22.
66. ATASE Archives, from K. 3612, D. 42/30, F. 10, in Avcı, Irak’ta Türk Ordusu, 267.
67. Ismail Hakkı Süerdem, Anılarım, ed. Orhan Avcı (Ankara: Bilge Pub., 2004), 49.
68. ATASE Archives, from K. 3649. D. 208/140, F. 4-30, in Avcı, Irak’ta Türk Ordusu,
101.
69. Sir William Robertson, Soldiers and Statesmen, 1914–1918 (London: Cassell and
Company Ltd., 1926), 2:63 ff.
70. Sakaoğlu, “Bir Osmanlı Neferinin,” 52.
71. Noyan, Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla, 68–69.
72. Ibid., 69.
73. Ibid., 74–75.
74. Ibid., 79–81.
notes to pages 91–96
243
75. Ibid., 91–92.
76. Payzın et al., Sağlık Hizmetinde Mikrobiyoloji II, 1020.
77. Ibid., 742.
78. ATASE Archives, box 250, General İhsan Aksoley’in Anıları, in Birinci Dünya
Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, 6:824.
79. Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, 6:825.
80. Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel, 202.
81. Bahaddin Serhan, “Savaştan da Öldürücü Bir Salgın!” Yakın Tarihimiz 3 (March
1983): 23–24.
82. Nikiforuk, The Fourth Horseman, 146.
83. F. Tezok, E. Gümrükçü, and M. Sağlam, “1971 Hong-Kong Gribinin Memleketimizdeki Özellikleri,” Mikrobiyoloji Bülteni 6, no.€1 (January 1972): 91–92.
84. Nikiforuk, The Fourth Horseman, 148.
85. David Fromkin, Barışa Son Veren Barış, trans. Mehmet Harmancı (Istanbul: Sabah
Pub., 1993), 378.
86. Ibid.
87. Serhan, “Savaştan da Öldürücü Bir Salgın!” 25.
88. ATASE Archives, from no.€5/13796, box 4116, file H, 1, F. 1-73, in Birinci Dünya
Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, 6:791.
89. Kavur, “Askerî Hekimliğin Sıhhiye Hizmetlerinde Bir Etüd,” Dirim 49, no.€7 (July
1973): 336.
90. Noyan, Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla, 86–89.
91. Ahenk, 1 November 1918, in Engin Berber, Yeni Onbinlerin Gölgesinde Bir Sancak:
İzmir (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Pub., 1997), 100.
92. Anadolu, 22 November 1918, in Berber, Yeni Onbinlerin Gölgesinde, 101.
93. Meclis-i Âyan Zabıt Ceridesi, D. 3, İ. 5, C. 1 (Ankara, 1990), 157, in Tuncay Öğün,
Vilayât-ı Şarkiye Mültecileri, 1915–1923 (Ankara: Babil Pub., 2004), 76.
94. Nükhet Yürür Kutlay, “Refik Saydam’ın Sağlık Politikası ve Hıfzısssıhha
Merkezi’nin Bu Politikadaki Yeri,” Yeni Tıp Tarihi Araştırmaları 4 (1998): 191.
95. Ali İhsan Türkkan, ed., “Istanbul İşgal Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı Raporları (VII),”
Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi 30 (July 1999): 58–59.
96. Selçuk, Yüzbaşı Selahattin’in Romanı, 1:372.
97. Becker, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı, 20.
98. Feridun Erik, “Türkiye’de Bulaşıcı Hastalıklar,” Dirim 56, no.€9–10 (September–
October 1981): 306.
99. Vekâletin On Yıllık Mesaisi, 41–42.
100. The Orient, 7/21 (April 21, 1920), in Nur Bilge Criss, İşgal Altında Istanbul,
1918–1923, 3rd ed. (Istanbul: İletişim Pub., 2000), 57.
101. Frank A. Ross, C. Luther Fry, and Elbridge Sibley, The Near East and American Philanthropy, in Criss, İşgal Altında Istanbul, 57.
102. “Emraz-ı Sariye Mücadelesi,” no.€13 (1338–1922), in Hot, Sıhhiye Mecmuası’na Göre,
206.
103. Ibid., 184.
104. Ahmet Emin Yalman, Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim, Geçirdiklerim (Istanbul: Yenilik
Pub., 1970), 322.
105. Ekrem Kadri Unat, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Son 40 Yılında Türkiye’nin
244
notes to pages 96–101
Tüberküloz Tarihçesi Üzerine,” Cerrahpaşa Tıp Fakültesi Dergisi 10, no.€4 (October
1979): 277.
106. Hot, Sıhhiye Mecmuası’na, 107.
107. Besim Ömer, Verem Tehlikesi, Veremle Mücadele, in İnci Hot, Dr.€Besim Ömer
Paşa’nın Anne ve Çocuk Sağlığı Açısından Ülkemiz Nüfus Meselesi Hakkındaki
Görüşleri (Istanbul University SBE, unpublished thesis, 1996), 45.
108. Unat, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Son 40 Yılında,” 274.
109. Erik, “Türkiye’de Bulaşıcı Hastalıklar,” 306.
110. Necmi Seren, “Yılların Ötesinden,” Harp Tarihi Mecmuası, no.€209 (May 1982): 79.
111. Hans-Lukas Kieser, “Bir Misyoner Hastahanesinin Çevresindeki Küçük Dünya:
Urfa, 1897–1922,” in François Georgeon-Paul Dumont, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda
Yaşamak, trans. Maide Selen (Istanbul: İletişim Pub., 2000), 278.
112. Onul, İnfeksiyon Hastalıkları, 408.
113. “Emraz-i Sariye Mücadelesi,” Sıhhiye Mecmuası, no.€13 (1338–1922), in Hot, Sıhhiye
Mecmuası’na Göre, 133.
114. Becker, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı, 19.
115. Özbay, “Tarihte Lekeli Humma,” 119.
116. Becker, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı, 19.
117. Hot, Sıhhiye Mecmuası’na Göre, 133–134.
118. Ibid., 25.
119. Ekrem Kadri Unat, “Türkiye’de Atatürk Döneminde Bulaşıcı Hastalıklarla Savaş
için Kuruluşlar ve Çalışmalar,” Türkiye’de Atatürk Döneminde Bulaşıcı Hastalıklarla
Savaş Toplantısı, Cerrahpaşa Tıp Fakültesi Atatürk Haftası, 18–28 Mayıs 1981 (Istanbul, 1982), 17.
120. Hot, Sıhhiye Mecmuası’na Göre, 13, 17.
121. Zafer Toprak, “Istanbul’da Fuhuş ve Zührevî Hastalıklar, 1914–1933,” Tarih ve
Toplum, no.€39 (March 1987): 39–40.
122. Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi, Term 3, Year of Session 4, 2:489.
123. Ibid.
124. Kızılay Archives, from box 265-1/1919, in Çapa, Kızılay (Hilâl-i Ahmer Cemiyeti),
214–218.
125. Kızılay Archives, from box 33 (1919), in Çapa, Kızılay (Hilâl-i Ahmer Cemiyeti),
218–220.
126. Halide Edip Adıvar, Türk’ün Ateşle İmtihanı (Istanbul: Çan Pub., 1962), 158.
127. Dr.€Zeki, “Hıfzıssıha Şubesi’nin 1332 Senesi Zübde-i Mesaisi,” in Hot, Sıhhiye
Mecmuası’na Göre, 38.
128. İ. Arıkan, “25 Yıllık Sıtma Mücadele Tarihçemiz,” Dirim 25, no.€35 (1950): 102–104.
129. Tevfik Salim, “333 Senesinde Üçüncü Ordu Mıntıkasında Yapılacak Emrâz-ı Sariye
Mücadelesi Hakkında Proje,” in Hot, Sıhhiye Mecmuası’na Göre, 40.
130. Sağlık Hizmetlerinde 50 Yıl (Ankara: Sağlık Bakanlığı Pub., 1973), 104–105.
131. Ibid.
132. Ayhan Yücel, “Türkiye’de Sıtma Savaşı,” Türkiye’de Atatürk Döneminde Bulaşıcı
Hastalıklarla Savaş Toplantısı, Cerrahpaşa Tıp Fakültesi Atatürk Haftası, 18–28 Mayıs
1981 (Istanbul, 1981), 45–46.
133. Cevdet Timur, Türk İstiklâl Harbi (Ankara, 1975), 7:559.
134. Ibid., 2:286.
notes to pages 101–110
245
135. Ibid.
136. Vekâletin 10 Yıllık Mesaisi, Sıhhiye Mecmuası Fevkalâde Nüshası (29 October 1933), 3.
137. Meliha Özpekcan, “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Sağlık Politikası, 1923–1933,” Yeni Tıp
Tarihi Araştırmaları 7 (2001): 112, 127 ff.
138. B. Ömer (Akalın), Nüfus Siyaseti ve Küçük Çocuklarda Vefayat, in Zuhal Özaydın
and İnci Hot, “Dr.€Ömer Besim Paşa’nın Ülkemiz Nüfus Siyaseti Hakkındaki
Görüşleri,” Tıp Tarihi Araştırmaları 9 (August 1999): 216–217.
139. Onul, Infeksiyon Hastalıkları, p.€859.
140. Orhan Özkan, “Atatürk Döneminde Sağlık Politikası,” Atatürk Dönemi Sağlık
Politikası ve Türkiye’nin Ekonomik Gelişmesi Semineri (Ankara: AÜSBF Pub., 1982),
195.
141. Andrew Mango, Atatürk (London: John Murray, 1999), 274–275.
142. Talat, “Ankara’da Sıtma ve Mücadele Teşkilatı,” Sıhhiye Mecmuası 5, no.€31–32
(1930): 1312–1313.
143. Zuhal Özaydın, “Büyük Önder Atatürk’ün Himayelerinde Yapılan I. Millî Türk Tıp
Kongresi,” Tıp Tarihi Araştırmaları 7 (June 1998): 221 ff.
144. Ibid., 225 ff.
145. Justin McCarthy, Muslims and Minorities (New York: New York University Press,
1983), 118–119.
146. Aydemir, Makendonya’dan Ortaasya’ya , 3:373. For a remarkable testimony, see M.
Derviş Kuntman, Bir Doktorun Harp ve Memleket Hatıraları (217 Sayılı Silahlı
Kuvvetler Dergisi’nin Ek Kısmı), 85th Anniversary, no.€1 (March 1966).
147. Ahmet Refik, Kafkas Yollarında İki Komite İki Kıtal, ed. Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu
(Istanbul: Temel Pub., 1998), 214–215.
148. McCarthy, Muslims and Minorities, 119.
149. Ibid., 120.
Chapter 6. Unburied Corpses
1. Leon Rabinowicz, Nüfus Meselesi, trans. Alâettin Cemil (Ankara, 1930), 199–200.
2. Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991 (London: Abacus, 1994), 23.
3. Rabinowicz, Nüfus Meselesi, 200.
4.
Journal de la Societe de Statistique de Paris (December 1925), in Halûk Cillov, Nüfus
İstatistikleri ve Demografinin Genel Esasları (Istanbul: İktisat Fakültesi Pub., 1960),
304.
5. C. R. M. F. Cruttwell, A History of the Great War, 1914–1918 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, [1934] 1964), 630.
6. Ibid., 630.
7. Butler, Australian Army Medical Services, 879, taken from Table 9.
8. Hans Zinsser, Rats, Lice and History, in William H. McNeill, Plagues and Peoples
(New York: Anchor Books, 1977), 194–195.
9. Baldwin, World€War€I, 156.
10. Türkkaya Ataöv, Deaths Caused by Disease: In Relation to the Armenian Question
(Ankara: SBF Pub., 1985), 4.
11. Clement Pirquet, ed., Wolksgesundheit ik Krieg, in McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, 252.
246
notes to pages 110–119
12. Zürcher, “Between Death and Desertion,” 244.
13. Sağlam, Cihan Harbinde 3. Orduda, 10.
14. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, 9:578.
15. See Butler, Australian Army Medical Services.
16. Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War, The War
Office, March 1922 (reprinted by Naval & Military Press, 1999), 356.
17. Quoted in Ataöv, Deaths Caused by Disease, 3.
18. Onul, İnfeksiyon Hastalıkları, 735.
19. McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, 252.
20. Ibid., 328n84.
21. Quoted in Ataöv, Deaths Caused by Disease, 3.
22. Onul, İnfeksiyon Hastalıkları, 735.
23. Keegan, A History of Warfare, 361.
24. Ibid., 365.
25. Quoted in Ataöv, Deaths Caused by Disease, 3.
26. S. Stuart Starrit, The Life of Nansen (London: Religions Tract Society, n.d.), 132.
27. W. E. D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1953), 439.
28. Ibid., 440–441.
29. Belen, 20. Yüzyılda Osmanlı, 300–301.
30. Keegan, A History of Warfare, 361.
31. Aspinall-Oglander, Military Operations Gallipoli, 2:484.
32. John Terraine, The Great War, 1914–1915 (London: Arrow Books Ltd., 1967),
104–105.
33. Hans Kannengiesser Pasha, The Campaign in Gallipoli, translated from the German
(London: Hutchinson Pub., 2nd impression, 1927), 259.
34. Becker, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı, 58.
35. von Sanders, Türkiye’de Beş Yıl, 125.
36. Robertson, Soldiers and Statesmen, 136.
37. Quoted in Ataöv, Deaths Caused by Disease, 3.
38. Keegan, A History of Warfare, 365.
39. Robertson, Soldiers and Statesmen, 1:301.
40. R. S. Morton, Venereal Disease, in McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, 252.
41. Keegan, A History of Warfare, 365.
42. Quoted in Ataöv, Deaths Caused by Disease, 3.
43. Onul, İnfeksiyon Hastalıkları, 735.
44. Ibid., 355.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire, 353.
48. Quoted in Ataöv, Deaths Caused by Disease, 3.
49. Ibid., 355.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
notes to pages 120–136
247
54. Commandant M. Larcher, La Guerre Turque dans la Guerre Mondiale (Paris: Etienne Chiron, Berger-Levrault, 1926), 602.
55. Hikmet Bayur, Türk İnkılâp Tarihi, vol.€3, part 4 (Ankara: TTK Pub., 1983),
787n99.
56. Tevfik Bıyıklıoğlu, Çanakkale Muharebelerine Dair Konferans (Istanbul: 1950), 50.
57. Belen, 20. Yüzyılda Osmanlı, 271, fn.
58. Ibid.
59. Mustafa, Cepheden Cepheye, 136.
60. Alan Moorehead, Gallipoli (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1956), 361.
61. General Maslofski’nin Umumî Harpte Kafkas Cephesi Eserinin Tenkidi, trans. Nazmi
(Ankara: Genelkurmay Pub., 1935), 47–48.
62. Larcher, La Guerre Turque dans la Guerre Mondiale, 602.
63. Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire, 353.
64. Ibid.
65. Tasvir-i Efkâr, no.€1867, in Türk Asker Hekimliği Tarihi, 1:316.
66. Emin, Turkey: In the World War, 252–253.
67. Ibid., 253.
68. Ibid.
69. Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 295, 299.
70. Edward J. Erickson, Ordered To Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First
World War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2001), 211.
71. Ibid., 208.
72. Kannengiesser Pasha, The Campaign in Gallipoli, 241.
73. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 69–71.
74. Ibid., 69–70.
75. Ibid., 70.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid., 70–71.
78. Ibid., 71.
79. Ibid., 69.
80. Ibid., 73–76.
81. Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, 2:776.
82. Sağlam, Cihan Harbinde 3. Orduda, 9–10; also see Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk
Harbi, 2:732.
Chapter 7. Unexpected Results
1. Panzac, La Peste dans l’Empire Ottoman, 44.
2. Becker, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı, 3.
3. McCarthy, Death and Exile, 218–219.
4. (US 867.00/1063) cited in McCarthy, Death and Exile, 250n194.
5. Allen and Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields, 437.
6. No reference has been made here to the decision taken by the Ottoman Empire
during the Great War for the deportation of some Armenians to Syria and the
implementations made to that end. That subject has been mentioned only within
the context of the discussions with regards to the epidemic diseases. /HÖ.
248
notes to pages 136–145
7. UK ARCHIVES, WO 157/695, September 14–21, 1915, Cairo.
8. Özdemir et al., Ermeniler: Sürgün ve Göç.
9. Hilmi Bayar, “Bir Ailevî Akdeniz Humması (Periyodik Hastalık)”, Dirim 60,
no.€1–2 (January–February 1985): 55.
10. UK ARCHIVES, FO 608/79; the cipher sent from Dr.€H. T. Main, the American
Commissioner in the Caucasus to Charles V. Vickrey (New York) on the date of 14
April 1919.
11. UK ARCHIVES, FO 248/1277.
12. BOA, Dahiliye from Cipher no.€57/337, in Bülent Bakar, Ermeni Tehciri ve
Uygulaması (Marmara University TAE, Unpublished Thesis, 2003), 122–123.
13. Becker, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı, 44.
14. Mayakuşu, Golç Paşa’nın Hatıratı, 127.
15. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, 9:301.
16. Seuber, Yıldırım, 37.
17. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, Suriye’de Modern Sağlık Müesseseleri, Hastahaneleri ve Şam
Tıp Fakültesi (Ankara: TTK Pub., 1999), 20–21.
18. Özbay, “Tarihte Lekeli Humma,” 118.
19. Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler, 1915–1920 (Ankara: Devlet Arşivleri Pub., 1994), 108.
20. UK ARCHIVES, T 161/50, “Statistics for the year, 1918–1919,” 36–38.
21. UK ARCHIVES, T 161/50, 35.
22. Ibid.
23. UK ARCHIVES, FO 248/1277.
24. Ziya Öktem, “Basilli Dizanteri Aşılarının Şimdiki Vaziyeti Hakkında,” Istanbul Tıp
Fakültesi Mecmuası, no.€16 (April 1941): 2061.
25. Abdülkadir Noyan, İç Hastalıkları Ders Kitabı, İntan Hastalıkları (Istanbul: Mazlum
Pub., 1943), 168.
26. Becker, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı, 46.
27. Ibid., 55.
28. Kress von Kressenstein and Friedrich Freiherr, Mit den Türken zum Suezkanal (Berlin: Otto Schlegel, 1938), 134–135.
29. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, 9:302.
30. Becker, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı, 42.
31. Ibid., 62–63.
32. İhsanoğlu, Suriye’de Modern Sağlık Müesseseleri, 9, 17.
33. Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi, 4:701.
34. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 52.
35. Halide Edip Adıvar, Mor Salkımlı Ev, 5th ed. (Istanbul: Özgür Pub., 2004),
227–228.
36. McCarthy, Death and Exile, 222.
37. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 38.
38. Ibid., 53.
39. Ibid., 54.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., 55.
42. Ibid.
notes to pages 145–154
249
43. Ibid., 56.
44. Ibid.
45. Donald Matthew, Ortaçağ Avrupası, trans. Mehmet Ali Kılıçbay (Istanbul: İletişim
Pub., 1988), 154.
46. Albert S. Lyons and R. Joseph Petrucelli, Çağlar Boyu Tıp, trans. Nilgün Güdücü
(Istanbul: Roche, 1997), 549.
47. Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi, 3:27, 29–31.
48. Noyan, Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla, 71.
49. Onul, İnfeksiyon Hastalıkları, 858, 859.
50. Seuber, Yıldırım, 39.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., 79n141.
53. Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi, Term 3, Year of session 1, 1:557 ff.
54. Ibid., 515–516.
55. Becker, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı, 25.
56. Ibid., 38.
57. Noyan, Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla, 54.
58. Ibid., 54–55.
59. Ibid., 56.
60. Ibid., 60.
61. Becker, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı, 27.
62. Noyan, Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla, 69.
63. Ibid., 60.
64. Ibid., 70.
65. S. Payzın et al., Sağlık Hizmetinde Mikrobiyoloji 2, 916.
66. Behçet Onul, “Kolera,” Sağlık Dergisi 40, nos. 1–2 (1966): 10–12.
67. Noyan, Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla, 65 ff.
68. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 64.
69. Ibid., 113.
70. Ibid., 114.
71. von Sanders, Türkiye’de Beş Yıl, 171–172.
72. BOA DH-KMS, from box no.€44/2, no.€3, in Temel, “Birinci Dünya Savaşı,” 332.
73. Çakmak, Büyük Harpte Şark Cephesi, 257.
74. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 114.
75. Ibid., 114–115.
76. Ibid., 115.
77. Becker, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı, 29.
78. Noyan, Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla, 85–86.
79. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 65.
80. Ibid., 117.
81. Ibid., 117–118.
82. Noyan, Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla, 75–76.
83. Ibid., 76.
84. “Çekirgeye Karşı,” Tanin, 16 February 1916, in Tuncay Öğün, Birinci Dünya
Savaşı’nda Kafkas Cephesinin İaşesi, 110.
250
notes to pages 155–164
85. Panzac, La Peste dans l’Empire Ottoman, 41–42.
86. Ibid., 42.
87. Zafer Toprak, İttihad–Terakki ve Cihan Harbi, 1914–1918 (İstanbul: Homer Pub.,
2003), 98.
88. Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi, Term 3, year of session 1, vol.€1 (İçtimai Fevkalâde),
225–239, 247–248, 388–390.
89. Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi, Term 3, year of session 2, vol.€2, 86–89.
90. Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi, Term 3, year of session 5, vol.€1, 56–59.
91. “Ticaret ve Ziraat Nazırıyla Mülâkat,” Tanin, February 25 1916, in Tuncay Öğün,
Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Kafkas Cephesinin İaşesi, 111.
92. “Çekirge İtlâfı”, İkdam, from 12 February 1331, in Öğün, Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda
Kafkas Cephesinin İaşesi, 112.
93. Belen, 20: Yüzyılda Osmanlı Devleti, 241.
94. Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, 312.
95. Ibid., 315.
96. Orhan Kılıç, “Osmanlı Devleti’nde Meydana Gelen Kıtlıklar,” Türkler 10:718.
97. Panzac, La Peste dans l’Empire Ottoman 1700–1850, 42–43.
98. Öğün, Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Kafkas Cephesinin İaşesi, 296 ff.
99. Bayur, Türk İnkılâp Tarihi, vol.€3, part 3, 360.
100. Kurmay Albay Hulusi Baykoç, “Kafkas ve Irak Cephesinde Beşinci Kuvve-i Seferiye” (52. Tümen), Askerî Mecmua, no.€60 (1 June 1942): 46–47.
101. Ibid., 47–49.
102. Abdullah Saydam, “Birinci Dünya Savaşı Sırasında Istanbul Halkının Geçim
Sıkıntısı,” Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi 19 (August 1998): 66–67.
103. Toprak, İttihad–Terakki ve Cihan Harbi, 1914–1918, 97.
104. Ali Fuad Erden, Birinci Cihan Harbinde Suriye Hatıraları (Istanbul: Halk Pub.,
1954), 282–283.
105. Memoirs of Halide Edib (New York: The Century Co., 1926), 389.
106. Erden, Birinci Cihan Harbinde Suriye Hatıraları, 247.
107. Cemal Paşa, Hatırât, 317–319.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid.
110. Helmut Becker, Åskulap Zwischen Reichsadler und Halbmond (Herzogenrath: Verlag
Murken-Altrogge, 1990), 316.
111. Ibid.
112. Selçuk, Yüzbaşı Selahattin’in Romanı, 1:342.
113. UK FO, 248/1192, report dated 5 January 1918 from John L. Caldwell to E. S. Scott.
114. UK FO, 248/1192, report dated 6 May 1915.
115. McCarthy, Death and Exile, 223, 230; also see McCarthy, Muslims and Minorities,
133–137.
116. Joseph Pomiankowsky, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Çöküşü, trans. Kemal Turan
(Istanbul: Kayıhan Pub., 1990), 147.
117. Becker, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı, 10.
118. von Sanders, Türkiye’de Beş Yıl, 184–185.
119. Zürcher, “Between Death and Desertion,” 244.
120. Ibid., 257.
notes to pages 165–173
251
Chapter 8. Unarmed Warriors
1. H. Braun, “Sarî Hastalıkların Devlet ve Halk İçin Ehemmiyeti,” Üniversite
Konferansları I, 1933–1937 (Istanbul: University Pub., 1939), 103–108, 110.
2. Mehmet Arif, Başımıza Gelenler (Istanbul: Harp Akademileri Pub., 1969), 117.
3. Ekrem Kadri Unat, “Görev Kurbanı İki Mikrobiyoloğumuz,” Türk Mikrobiyoloji
Cemiyeti Dergisi 9, no.€61 (1979): 62.
4. See Chapter 3 of this study, entitled “Under the Crescent.”
5. Zuhal Özaydın, Osmanlı Hilâl-i Ahmer Cemiyeti Salnamesi (Istanbul University,
Unpublished thesis, 1987), 64–65 and 155.
6. Sağlam, Cihan Harbinde 3. Orduda, 4.
7. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 6.
8. Ibid., 17.
9. Ibid., 6–7.
10. Ibid., 8.
11. Payzın et al., Sağlık Hizmetinde Mikrobiyoloji 2, 702.
12. Ayhan Yücel, “Bitlerle Bulaşan Hastalıklar,” Bit ve İnsan (Istanbul: Cerrahpaşa Tıp
Fakültesi Pub., 1993), 29.
13. Unat et al., Unat’ın Tıp Parazitolojisi, 175.
14. Karatepe, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Kafkas, 6.
15. Ayşe Wilke, Güner Söyletir, and Mehmet Doğanay, İnfeksiyon Hastalıkları (Istanbul: Nobel Tıp Pub., 1996), 551.
16. Unat, “Birinci Dünya Harbinde,” 255.
17. Karatepe, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Kafkas, 1, 13.
18. Tevfik Salim Sağlam, “Gülhane Tarihçesinden Bir Kısım” (simplified and republished by İlter Uzel), Tıp Tarihi Araştırmaları 3 (1989): 90.
19. Abdülkadir Noyan, “Erzurum Hatıralarımdan,” Çeşitli Yönleri ile Erzurum ve
Çevresi, ed. Nusret Karasu-Nihat Özyardımcı (Ankara: Ulusal Verem Savaş Derneği
Pub., 1968), 35.
20. Noyan, Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla, 16.
21. İsmail, Gökçe, and Üster, Tevfik Sağlam, 1882–1963, 2:67.
22. Ibid.
23. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 78n1.
24. Abdülkadir, “Fırın ve Çadır Hamamı ile Tathirat,” Sıhhiye Mecmuası 3, no.€7 (1915):
39–41.
25. Sıcak Hava Cereyanıyla Tathirat Fırını (Dersaadet: Matbaa-i Askeriye, 1916).
26. Noyan, Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla, 39–41.
27. Sağlam, Cihan Harbinde 3. Orduda, 8.
28. Ahmet Lütfü, “Lekeli Hummaya Karşı Mücadele”, in Unat, “Birinci Dünya Harbinde,” 261.
29. Guze, Büyük Harpte Kafkas, 61.
30. Lütfü, “Lekeli Hummaya Karşı Mücadele,” in Karatepe, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Kafkas,
46–47.
31. Aykut Kazancıgil, Osmanlılarda Bilim ve Teknoloji (Istanbul: Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar
Vakfı Pub., 1999), 283.
32. Ibid.
33. Özbay, “Tarihte Lekeli Humma,” 119.
252
notes to pages 173–180
34. Ekrem Kadri Unat, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda İnsanın Bulaşıcı Hastalıklarına
Karşı Yapılan Koruyucu Aşılar,” Dirim 53, no.€11–12 (November–December 1978):
369.
35. Süheyl Ünver, “Dr.€Reşat Rıza’nın Hayatı ve Mikrobiyolojideki Çalışmaları
Hakkında,” Mikrobiyoloji Bülteni 20, no.€3–4 (1967): 119, 121.
36. Ziya Öktem, “Epidemik Lekeli Humma ve Aşıları,” Istanbul Tıp Fakültesi
Mecmuası, no.€13 (July 1940): 1735.
37. Becker, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı, 29.
38. Sağlam, Cihan Harbinde 3. Orduda, 3.
39. Reşat Rıza, Refik, et al., “Lekeli Humma Aşısı Hakkındaki Münakaşa ve Meclis-i
Sıhhî Ali’de Mütehassısından Müteşekkil Komisyonun Bu Babdaki Mukarreratı,” in
Unat, “Birinci Dünya Harbinde,” 261–262.
40. Pertev Demirhan, Generalfeldmarschall Freiherr von der Goltz (Gottingen: Gottinger
Verlagsanstalt, 1960), 229.
41. Kâzım İsmail Gürkan, “Hamdi Suat Aknar,” Ölümünün 10: Yıldönümünde Hamdi
Suat Aknar, 1873–1936 (Istanbul: Tıp Fakültesi TTE Pub., 1946), 5.
42. Sağlam, Pratik Doktor 16, no.€3 (1946), special edition, 4.
43. Ibid.
44. Ekrem Şadi Kavur, “Askeri Hekimliğin Sıhhiye Hizmetlerinde Bir Etüd,” Dirim 48,
no.€5 (May 1973): 243.
45. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 88–89.
46. For examples, see Lekeli Tifoya Ait Raporlar, Matbaa-i Askeriye, 1335 ve Tevfik
Sağlam, Arch. Schiffs-u Trop.€1925, Bd. 23.
47. Fethi Tevetoğlu, Atatürk’le Samsun’a Çıkanlar (Ankara: 1971), 141 ff.
48. Guze, Büyük Harpte Kafkas, 61.
49. Ülfiye Barlas, Ord. Prof. Dr.€Âkil Muhtar Özden ve Dünya Tıp Literatürüne Girmiş,
Buluş Kabul Edilen Çalışmaları (Istanbul University, Unpublished thesis, 1999), 32.
50. Henrique Da Rocha Lima, “Lekeli Hummaya Dair Taharriyat,” trans. Ziya Nuri,
Darülfünun Tıp Fakültesi Mecmuası 1, no.€4 (September 1916).
51. For a review of the various subjects covered in those studies, see Sait Naderi ve Gülten Dinç, “Darülfünun Tıp Fakültesi Mecmuası (1916–1933) ve Dizini,” Tıp Tarihi
Araştırmaları 12 (2004): 206 vd.
52. Kamil, Kafkas Cephe-i Harbinde, 55.
53. Becker, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı, 73n18.
54. Feridun Erik, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Son Yıllarında Sağlık İşleri Yönetimi,”
Dirim 54, no 9–10 (September–October 1979): 305.
55. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, Birinci Dünya Harbi, İdarî Faaliyetler ve Lojistik
9:144.
56. Emin, Turkey: In the World War, 252.
57. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 15–16.
58. Ibid., p.€80, and Tevfik İsmail Gökçe, “Erzurum Anılarımdan Çizgiler,” Çeşitli Yönleri ile Erzurum ve Çevresi, ed. Nusret Karasu-Nihat Özyardımcı (Ankara, Ulusal
Verem Savaş Derneği Pub., 1968), p.€52.
59. Özbay, “Tarihte Lekeli Humma,” 118.
60. Quoted from Kızılay Archives in Akgün, Hilâl-i Ahmer’den, 1:214–215; and Osmanlı
notes to pages 180–190
253
Hilâl-i Ahmer Mecmuası, no.€3 (November 15, 1921), 61–62, in Çapa, Kızılay (Hilâli Ahmer Cemiyeti), 120–121.
61. von Sanders, Türkiye’de Beş Yıl, 184; Çapa, Kızılay (Hilâl-i Ahmer Cemiyeti), 120–121;
and Becker, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı, 27.
62. Erik, “Türkiye’de Bulaşıcı Hastalıklar,” 311.
63. Şahap Erkoç and Aykut Kazancıgil, “Osmanlı Ordusu’nda I. Dünya Savaşı’nda
3 Teşrinisani 1330–3 Nisan 1333 Tarihleri Arasında (1914–1917) Şehit olan Sağlık
Subaylarının Listesi,” Tıp Tarihi Araştırmaları 10 (June 2001): 73–88.
64. Adnan Ataç, 20. Yüzyılda Şehit Olan Türk Sağlık Subayları (Ankara: GATA Pub.,
1997).
65. For the names of the martyred medical personnel (between the years of 1914 and
1918) that were inscripted on the monument in front of Fevzi Çakmak Hospital in
Erzurum, see Çeşitli Yönleri ile Erzurum ve Çevresi, 55–58.
66. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 60.
67. Ibid.
68. Sağlam, Cihan Harbinde 3. Orduda, 8.
69. Ibid., 10.
70. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 56–57.
71. Ibid., 57–58.
72. Adıvar, Mor Salkımlı Ev, 259–261, 281.
73. Ibid., 281–282.
Chapter 9. Epilogue
1. Şevki, Osmanlı Tababeti 3, 42.
2. Becker, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı, 25.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5.
Meclis-i Âyan Zabıt Ceridesi, Term 3, Year of Session 4, 2:49–50.
6. Ibid., 55.
7. Köprülülü Şerif (İlden), Sarıkamış, ed. Sami Önal (Ankara: T. İş Bankası Pub.,
2001), 35–36.
8. BOA DH İD, from box no.€164-1, no.€2; also from box no.€165, no.€16 and no.€17,
in Temel, “Birinci Dünya Savaşı,” 332.
9. BOA DH İD, from box no.€157, no.€5, in Temel, “Birinci Dünya Savaşı,” 332.
10. Ibid.
11. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, 9:145.
12. Ibid., 299.
13. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 167.
14. BOA, MV. Maz., Def. 243, no.€9, in Mehmet Temel, “Mütareke Dönemi
Istanbul’unda Sosyal Yaşam ve Sorunlar,” Türkler, 14:166.
15. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 61.
16. Ibid.
17. Cafer Ulu, “Savaş Zamanı Osmanlı Sağlık Politikası: I. Dünya Savaşı Örneği,” Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi 42 (July 2000): 94–95.
254
notes to pages 190–201
18. Becker, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı, 3.
19. von Sanders, Türkiye’de Beş Yıl, 25.
20. Noyan, Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla, 50.
21. ATASE Archives, from K. 3672 D. 314/37, F. 2-9, in Avcı, Irak’ta Türk Ordusu,
270–271.
22. Şâkir, “Birinci Cihan Harbinde Erzurum,” 44.
23. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 153.
24. Becker, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı, 16.
25. Guze, Büyük Harpte Kafkas Cephesindeki Muharebeler, 61.
26. Ibid., 16.
27. Becker, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı, 38.
28. Ibid., 22.
29. Panzac, La Peste dans l’Empire Ottoman, 45.
30. Allen and Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields, 439.
31. Hot, Sıhhiye Mecmuası’na Göre, 126–127.
32. Onul, İnfeksiyon Hastalıkları, 407–410, 449.
33. Ibid., 733, 735.
34. Ibid., 823.
35. Özbay, “Tarihte Lekeli Humma,” 118.
36. Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Birüssebi-Gazze Meydan Muharebesi ve Yirminci Kolordu (Ankara:
Genelkurmay X. Şube Pub., 1938), 18.
37. Allen and Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields, 436–437.
38. Pomiankowsky, Osmanlı Imparatorlugu’nun Çöküşü, 147. See and compare in German edition: Joseph Pomiankowsky, Der Zusammenbruch des Ottomanischen Reiches
(Zürich: Amalthea Verlag, 1928), 165.
39. Unat, “Birinci Dünya Harbinde,” 259.
40. Ibid.
41. McCarthy, Muslims and Minorities, 120–121.
42. Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, 1:195.
43. “Emrâz-i Sâriye Mücadelesi,” Sıhhiye Mecmuası, in Unat, “Birinci Dünya Harbinde,” 258.
44. Carmelite Christie and Sarah Brewer, Typed transcript of her personal diary with
entries from October 1, 1915 to December 31, 1919, in Alan Alfred Bartholomew, Tarsus American School, 1888–1988: The Evolution of a Missionary Institution in Turkey
(Ph.D. dissertation, Bryn Mawr College, 1989), 117n21.
45. Ibid., 118n22.
46. Başkâtipzade Ragıp Bey, Tarih-i Hayatım, ed. M. Bülent Varlık (Ankara: Kebikeç
Pub., 1996), 57.
47. Kavur, “Askerî Hekimliğin Sıhhiye Hizmetlerinde Bir Etüd,” Dirim 49, no.€7 (July
1973): 334.
48. Ünver, “Dr.€Reşat Rıza’nın Hayatı,” 118.
49. Karatepe, I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Kafkas, 1.
50. Yıldırım, “Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e,” 5:1328.
51. Ibid., 5:1330.
52. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 10–11.
53. Kavur, “Askerî Hekimliğin Sıhhiye Hizmetlerinde Bir Etüd,” 335.
notes to pages 201–203
255
54. Sağlam, Cihan Harbinde 3, Orduda, 6–7.
55. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 13.
56. Sabahattin Selek, ed., İsmet İnönü’nün Hatıraları, Genç Subaylık Yıllarım 1884–1918
(Istanbul: Burçak Pub., 1969), 142.
57. Sağlam, Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da, 14.
58. Quoted from the message of General Hilmi Özkök, the chief of general staff, issued
in commemoration of the martyrs of Sarıkamış on the ninetieth anniversary of the
Sarıkamış disaster.
59. See Appendix 2: Reconstruction of Turkey, A Series of Reports, Compiled for the
American Committee of Armenian and Syrian Relief, ed. William H. Hall (for private distribution only, 1918).
60. Henry Cabot Lodge, “Situation in Near East,” 13 April 1920, American Congress,
66th Congress, session 2, Document no.€266 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1920).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Unpublished Documents
Turkish Military Archives, in Ankara, Turkey:
ATASE Archives, A. 1-217, D. 517, F. 2-1.
ATASE Archives, A. 1-217, D. 517, F. 2-2.
ATASE Archives, A. 1-217, D. 517, F. 2-3.
ATASE Archives, A. 1-217, D. 517, F. 2-4.
ATASE Archives, A. 1-217, D. 517, F. 2-5.
ATASE Archives, K. 1110, D. 517, F. 2-1 and 5.
ATASE Archives, K. 1110, D. 517, F. 2-1.
ATASE Archives, No. 6/13962.
ATASE Archives, No. 4/3671.
ATASE Archives, No. 5/13796.
UK Archives (formerly Public Record Office) in London:
UK ARCHIVES, FO 248/1192.
UK ARCHIVES, FO 248/1277.
UK ARCHIVES, FO 608/79.
UK ARCHIVES, T 161/50.
UK ARCHIVES, WO 157/695.
UK ARCHIVES, FO 248/1192.
Published Sources
Abdülkadir. “Fırın ve Çadır Hamamı ile Tathirat,” Sıhhiye Mecmuası 3, no. 7 (Istanbul,
1915).
Adıvar, Halide Edip. Mor Salkımlı Ev, 5th ed. Istanbul: Özgür Pub., 2004.
———. Türk’ün Ateşle İmtihanı. Istanbul: Çan Pub., 1962.
Ahmet Emin. Turkey: In the World War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930.
Ahmet Refik. Kafkas Yollarında İki Komite İki Kıtal. Edited by Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu.
Istanbul: Temel Pub., 1998.
(Akalın), Ömer B. Nüfus Siyaseti ve Küçük Çocuklarda Vefayat. In Zuhal Özaydın and İnci
Hot, “Dr.€Ömer Besim Paşa’nın Ülkemiz Nüfus Siyaseti Hakkındaki Görüşleri,” Tıp
Tarihi Araştırmaları 9 (August 1999).
———. Verem Tehlikesi, Veremle Mücadele. In İnci Hot, Dr.€Besim Ömer Paşa’nın Anne
ve Çocuk Sağlığı Açısından Ülkemiz Nüfus Meselesi Hakkındaki Görüşleri. Istanbul
University SBE, Unpublished thesis, 1996.
257
258
bibliogr aphy
Akgün, Seçil Karal, and Murat Uluğtekin. Hilâl-i Ahmer’den Kızılay’a. 2 vols. Ankara,
2000.
Aknar, Suat. 1873-1936. Istanbul: Tıp Fakültesi TTE Pub., 1946.
Aksu, Lütfi. Lekeli Humma. Ankara: Ulusal M., 1943.
Akşin, Aptülahat. Atatürk’ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi. Ankara: TTK Pub., 1991.
Allen, W. E. D., and Paul Muratoff. Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the
Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828–1921. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953.
Anderson, M[atthew] S[mith]. The Eastern Question, 1774–1923. London: St Martin’s Press,
1966.
Anderson, M. S., ed. The Great Power and the Near East, 1774–1923: Documents of Modern
History. London: Edward Arnold, 1970.
Arık, Feda Şâmil. “Selçuklular Zamanında Anadolu’da Veba Salgınları,” AÜDTCF Tarih
Dergisi 15, no. 26 (1990–1991).
Arıkan, İ. “25 Yıllık Sıtma Mücadele Tarihçemiz,” Dirim 25, no. 35 (1950).
Aspinall-Oglander, C. F. Military Operations Gallipoli. Vol. 2. London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1932.
Ataç, Adnan. 20. Yüzyılda Şehit Olan Türk Sağlık Subayları. Ankara: GATA Pub., 1997.
Ataöv, Türkkaya. Deaths Caused by Disease: In Relation to the Armenian Question. Ankara:
SBF Pub., 1985.
Atatürk’ün Hatıra Defteri. Ankara: TTK Pub., 1999.
Avcı, Orhan. Irak’ta Türk Ordusu, 1914–1918. Ankara: Vadi Pub., 2004.
Aydemir, Şevket Süreyya. Makendonya’dan Ortaasya’ya Enver Paşa. Istanbul: Remzi B., 1971.
Ayhan, Aydın. “1914 Yılında Balıkesir’de Tifüs Salgını ve Müdafaa-yı Milliye Cemiyeti’nin
İki Sağlık Beyannamesi,” Tıp Tarihi Araştırmaları, 9 (August 1999).
———. “Çanakkale Savaşları’nda Yaralanmalar ve Hastalıklar,” Tıp Tarihi Araştırmaları,€11
(2003).
Bakar, Bülent. Ermeni Tehciri ve Uygulaması. Marmara University TAE, Unpublished
thesis, 2003.
Bali, Rıfat N. “Edirne Muhasarası Sırasında Tutulmuş Bir Günlük-I,” Tarih ve Toplum, 190
(October 1999).
———. “Edirne Muhasarası Sırasında Tutulmuş Bir Günlük-II,” Tarih ve Toplum, 191
(November 1999).
———. “Edirne Muhasarası Sırasında Tutulmuş Bir Günlük-IV,” Tarih ve Toplum, 193
(January 2000).
Barlas, Ülfiye. Ord. Prof. Dr.€Âkil Muhtar Özden ve Dünya Tıp Literatürüne Girmiş,
Buluş Kabul Edilen Çalışmaları. Istanbul University, Unpublished thesis, 1999.
Bartholomew, Alan Alfred. Tarsus American School, 1888–1988: The Evolution of a Missionary
Institution in Turkey. Ph.D. dissertation, Bryn Mawr College, 1989.
Başkâtipzade Ragıp Bey. Tarih-i Hayatım. Edited by M. Bülent Varlık. Ankara: Kebikeç
Pub., 1996.
Bayar, Hilmi. “Bir Ailevî Akdeniz Humması (Periyodik Hastalık),” Dirim 60, nos. 1–2
(January–February 1985).
Baykoç, Hulusi, “Kafkas ve Irak Cephesinde Beşinci Kuvve-i Seferiye (52. Tümen),” Askerî
Mecmua, no. 60 (1 June 1942).
Baylen, Joseph O., and Alan Conway. Soldier-Surgeon: The Crimean War Letters of
Dr.€Douglas A. Reid, 1855–1856. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1968.
bibliogr aphy
259
Baytın, Arif. İlk Dünya Harbinde Kafkas Cephesi. Istanbul: Vakit Pub., 1946.
Bayur, Hikmet. Türk İnkılâp Tarihi, vol.€3, part 4. Ankara: TTK Pub., 1983.
Becker, Helmut. Åskulap Zwischen Reichsadler und Halbmond. Herzogenrath: Verlag
Murken-Altrogge, 1990.
———. I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı Cephesinde Askerî Tababet ve Eczacılık. Istanbul, 1983.
Belen, Fahri. 20. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Devleti. Istanbul: Remzi Pub., 1973.
Berber, Engin. Yeni Onbinlerin Gölgesinde Bir Sancak: İzmir. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt
Pub., 1997.
Berke, M. Zühdi. Tıbbî Viroloji. Vol. 2. Ankara, 1974.
Biraben, Jean-Noël. Les hommes et la peste en France et dans les pays europeens et Méditerranéens, in Daniel Panzac, La Peste dans l’Empire Ottoman 1700–1850. Leuven: Editions
Peeters, 1985.
Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, Kafkas Cephesi, 3. Ordu Harekâtı. Ankara: Genelkuurmay Pub., 1993.
Bıyıklıoğlu, Tevfik. Çanakkale Muharebelerine Dair Konferans. Istanbul, 1950.
Braun, H. “Sarî Hastalıkların Devlet ve Halk İçin Ehemmiyeti,” in Üniversite KonferansÂ�
ları€I, 1933–1937. Istanbul: University Pub., 1939.
———. Mikrobiyoloji, Parazitoloji ve Salgınlar Bilgisi. Translated by Vefik Vassaf. Istanbul:
Yaltırık Pub., 1936.
Braun, H., and Ömer Özek. “Epidemik Lekeli Hummanın Etiyoloji ve Serolojisi,” Istanbul
Tıp Fakültesi Mecmuası, no. 4 (1943).
Buchanan, George. The Tragedy of Mesopotamia. Edinburg, 1938.
Butler, A. G. Australian Army Medical Services in the War of 1914–1918. Canberra: Australian
War Memorial, 1943.
Çakmak, Fevzi. Büyük Harpte Şark Cephesi Hareketleri. Ankara: Genelkurmay Pub., 1936.
Çapa, Mesut. Kızılay (Hilal-I Ahmer Cemiyeti), 1914–1925. Ankara Üniversitesi TİTE,
Unpublished thesis, 1989.
Cebesoy, Ali Fuad. Birüssebi-Gazze Meydan Muharebesi ve Yirminci Kolordu. Ankara:
Genelkurmay X. Şube Pub., 1938.
Cemal Paşa. Hatırât. Edited by Metin Martı. Istanbul: Arma Pub., 1996. [English edition:
Djemal, Memories of a Turkish Statesman, Hutchinsons, 1922].
Cillov, Halûk. Nüfus İstatistikleri ve Demografinin Genel Esasları. Istanbul: İktisat Fakültesi
Pub., 1960.
Criss, Nur Bilge. İşgal Altında Istanbul, 1918–1923. 3rd ed. Istanbul: İletişim Pub., 2000.
Cruttwell, C. R. M. F. A History of the Great War, 1914–1918. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
[1934] 1964.
Çulcu, Murat, ed. Mehmed Fasih Bey’in Günlüğü. Istanbul: Denizler Pub., 2002.
Dağlar, Oya. “Kırım Savaşı’nda Orduların Sağlık Durumu ve Bir Belge,” Tıp Tarihi
Araştırmaları, no. 12 (2004).
Da Rocha Lima, Henrique. “Lekeli Hummaya Dair Taharriyat” (trans. Ziya Nuri), Darülfünun Tıp Fakültesi Mecmuası 1, no. 4 (September 1916).
Demirhan, Pertev. Generalfeldmarschall Freiherr von der Goltz. Gottingen: Gottinger Verlagsanstalt, 1960.
Diamond, Jared. Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. New York: W.€W.
Norton, 1999.
Erden, Ali Fuad. Birinci Cihan Harbinde Suriye Hatıraları. Istanbul, 1954.
260
bibliogr aphy
Erickson, Edward J. Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War.
Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2001.
Erik, Feridun. “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Son Yıllarında Sağlık İşleri Yönetimi,” Dirim
54, nos. 9–10 (September–October 1979).
———. “Türkiye’de Bulaşıcı Hastalıklar,” Dirim 56, nos. 9–10 (September–October, 1981).
Erkoç, Şahap, and Aykut Kazancıgil. “Osmanlı Ordusu’nda I. Dünya Savaşı’nda 3
Teşrinisani 1330–3 Nisan 1333 Tarihleri Arasında (1914–1917) Şehit olan Sağlık
Subaylarının Listesi,” Tıp Tarihi Araştırmaları, no. 10 (June 2001).
Erler, Mehmet Yavuz. “XIX. Yüzyıldaki Bazı Doğal Âfetler ve Osmanlı Yönetimi,” Türkler.
Vol. 13. Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Y., 2002.
Ersoy, Tolga. Tıp, Tarih, Metafor. 2nd ed. Ankara: Öteki Pub., 1996.
Ferguson, Niall. The Pity of War. New York: Basic Books, 1999.
Flinn, M. F. “Avrupa ve Akdeniz Ülkelerinde Veba” (trans. Necmiye Alpay), Tarih ve
Toplum, no. 39 (March 1987).
Fromkin, David. Barışa Son Veren Barış. Trans. Mehmet Harmancı. Istanbul: Sabah Pub.,
1993. [English edition: A Peace to End All Peace, New York: Henry Holt and Company,
1989].
General Maslofski’nin Umumî Harpte Kafkas Cephesi Eserinin Tenkidi. Trans. Nazmi.
Ankara: Genelkurmay Pub., 1935.
Gökçe, T. İsmail. “Erzurum Anılarımdan Çizgiler.” In Nusret Karasu and Nihat
Özyardımcı, eds., Çeşitli Yönleri ile Erzurum ve Çevresi. Ankara: Ulusal Verem Savaş
Derneği Pub., 1968.
Gökçe, T. İsmail, and S. Necati Üster. Tevfik Sağlam, 1882–1963. Vol. 2. Istanbul: Akgün
Pub., 1968.
Goltz Paşa’nın Hatırası ve Hâl Tercümesi. Trans. E. General Pertev Demirhan. Istanbul: Askerî Pub., 1953. For German edition, see: General Pertev Demirhan, Generalfeldmarschall
Freiherr von der Goltz. Göttingen: Göttinger Verlagsanstalt, 1960.
Görgey, Şefik. İngiliz Cerrah William Witmann’ın 19. Yüzyıl Başında Istanbul, Yafa ve
Mısır’daki Gözlemleri, Uygulamaları ve Raporları. Istanbul University, SBE, Unpublished thesis, 1989.
Gürkan, Kâzım İsmail. “Hamdi Suat Aknar.” In Ölümünün 10: Yıldönümünde Hamdi Suat
Aknar, 1873–1936. Istanbul: Tıp Fakültesi TTE Pub., 1946.
Guze. “Büyük Harpte Kafkas Cephesindeki Muharebeler” (trans. Hakkı), Askerî Mecmua,
no. 20 (January 1931).
Hafız Hakkı Paşa. Bozgun. Istanbul: Tercüman 1001 Temel Eser, n.d.
Halaçoğlu, Ahmet. Balkan Harbi Sırasında Rumeli’den Türk Göçleri, 1912–1913. Ankara:
TTK Pub., 1995.
Halaçoğlu, Yusuf. Osmanlılarda Ulaşım ve Haberleşme (Menziller). Ankara: PTT Pub.,
2002.
Hamilton, Ian. Gallipoli Diary. London: Edward Arnold, 1920. 2 vols.
Hobsbawm, Eric. The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991. London:
Abacus, 1994.
Hochwaechter, Major G. v. Türklerle Cephede. Trans. Fahri Çeliker. Ankara: Askerî Tarih
Bülteni Eki (August 1979), no. 8.
Hoehling, Adolph A. The Great Epidemic. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1961.
bibliogr aphy
261
Hot, İnci. Dr.€Besim Ömer Paşa’nın Anne ve Çocuk Sağlığı Açısından Ülkemiz Nüfus
Meselesi Hakkındaki Görüşleri. Istanbul University SBE, Unpublished thesis, 1996.
———. Sıhhiye Mecmuası’na Göre Ülkemizde Bulaşıcı Hastalıklarla Mücadele, 1913–╉
1996. Istanbul University, Unpublished thesis, 2001.
İhsanoğlu, Ekmeleddin. Suriye’de Modern Sağlık Müesseseleri, Hastahaneleri ve Şam Tıp
Fakültesi. Ankara: TTK Pub., 1999.
İpek, Nedim. Rumeli’den Anadolu’ya Türk Göçleri. Ankara: TTK Pub., 1999.
İzgöer, Ahmet Zeki. “Osmanlı’nın Yıkılışı Öncesinde Hind Hilâl-i Ahmer Yardımları ve
Dr.€Ensari’nin Faaliyetleriyle İlgili Bazı Notlar,” Yeni Tıp Tarihi Araştırmaları 8 (2002).
Jackson, Ralph. Roma İmparatorluğu’nda Doktorlar ve Hastalıklar. Trans. Şenol Mumcu.
Istanbul: Homer B., 1999. For original edition, see: Ralph Jackson, Doctors and Diseases in the Roman Empire. 4th ed. London: British Museum Press, 1995.
James, Robert Rhodes. Gallipoli. London: B. T. Batsford Ltd., 1965.
Kaiser, Hilmar. “Denying the Armenian Genocide: The German Connection.” Journal of
the Society for Armenian Studies 9. New York, 1999.
Kalyan, Aziz, ed. Kırım Savaşı. Istanbul: Milliyet Pub., 1975.
Kâmil, Server. Kafkas Cephe-i Harbinde Lekeli Humma. Sivas: Matbaa-i Vilayet, 1916.
Kannengiesser Pasha, Hans. The Campaign in Gallipoli. Translated from the German by
Major C. J. P. Ball. 2nd impression. London: Hutchinson, 1927.
Karatepe, Mustafa. I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Kafkas Cephesi’nde Tifüsle Mücadele. Istanbul
University, Unpublished thesis, 1999.
Karayan, Sarkis. “An Inquiry into the Number and Causes of Turkish Human Losses During the First World War,” The Armenian Review 35, no. 3-139 (August 1982).
Kavur, Ekrem Şadi. “Askeri Hekimliğin Sıhhiye Hizmetlerinde Bir Etüd,” Dirim 49, no. 8
(August 1973).
———. “Askeri Hekimliğin Sıhhiye Hizmetlerinde Bir Etüd,” Dirim 48, no. 5 (May 1973).
———. “Askerî Hekimliğin Sıhhiye Hizmetlerinde Bir Etüd,” Dirim 48, no. 2 (February
1973).
———. “Askerî Hekimliğin Sıhhiye Hizmetlerinde Bir Etüd,” Dirim 48, no. 3 (March 1973).
———. “Askerî Hekimliğin Sıhhiye Hizmetlerinde Bir Etüd,” Dirim 48, no. 4 (April 1973).
———. “Askerî Hekimliğin Sıhhiye Hizmetlerinde Bir Etüd,” Dirim 48, no. 6 (June 1973).
———. “Askerî Hekimliğin Sıhhiye Hizmetlerinde Bir Etüd,” Dirim 49, no. 7 (July 1973).
———. “Askeri Hekimliğin Sıhhiye Hizmetlerinde Bir Etüd,” Dirim 49, no. 8 (August
1973).
Kazancıgil, Aykut. Osmanlılarda Bilim ve Teknoloji. Istanbul: Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı
Pub., 1999.
Keegan, John. A History of Warfare. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993.
Kılıç, Orhan. “Osmanlı Devleti’nde Meydana Gelen Kıtlıklar,” Türkler. Vol. 10. Ankara:
Yeni Türkiye Y., 2002.
Kieser, Hans-Lukas. “Bir Misyoner Hastahanesinin Çevresindeki Küçük Dünya: Urfa,
1897–1922.” In François Georgeon-Paul Dumont, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda
Yaşamak. Trans. Maide Selen. Istanbul: İletişim Pub., 2000.
Koca, Salim. “Türklerin Göçleri ve Yayılmaları.” Türkler. Vol. I. Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Pub.,
2002.
Köprülülü Şerif. Sarıkamış. Edited by Sami Önal. Ankara: T. İş Bankası Pub., 2001.
262
bibliogr aphy
Kuntman, M. Derviş. Bir Doktorun Harp ve Memleket Hatıraları. 217 Sayılı Silahlı Kuvvetler Dergisi’nin Ek Kısmı, 85th Anniversary, no. 1 (March 1966).
Kutlay, Nükhet Yürür. “Refik Saydam’ın Sağlık Politikası ve Hıfzıssıhha Merkezi’nin Bu
Politikadaki Yeri,” Yeni Tıp Tarihi Araştırmaları 4 (1998).
Lamouche, Kolonel. Türkiye Tarihi. Trans. Galip Söylemezoğlu. Istanbul: Kanaat K., 1943.
2 vols.
Landry, Adolphe. Traite de Demographie. Paris: Payot, 1949.
Larcher, Commandant M. La Guerre Turque dans la Guerre Mondiale. Paris, 1926.
Lodge, Henry Cabot. “Situation in Near East.” 13 April 1920. American Congress, 66th Congress, session 2, doc. no. 266. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1920.
Lyons, Albert S., and R. Joseph Petrucelli. Çağlar Boyu Tıp. Trans. Nilgün Güdücü. Istanbul: Roche, 1997. [English edition: Medicine: An Illusrated History/Par le Dr.€Albert€S.
Lyons et le Dr.€R. Joseph Petrucelli].
Mango, Andrew. Atatürk. London: John Murray, 1999.
Mansel, Arif Müfid. Ege ve Yunan Tarihi. 6th ed. Ankara: TTK Pub., 1995.
Matthew, Donald. Ortaçağ Avrupası. Trans. Mehmet Ali Kılıçbay. Istanbul: İletişim Pub.,
1988.
Mayakuşu, Salih. Golç Paşa’nın Hatıratı. Istanbul: Askerî Pub., 1932. ’den: Edited by Faruk
Yılmaz. İmparatorluk Döneminde Türk-Alman İlişkileri. Ankara: Berikan Pub., 2004.
McCarthy, Justin. Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821–1922.
Princeton, N.J.: The Darwin Press, 1996.
———. Muslims and Minorities. New York: New York University Press, 1983.
McMurray, Jonathan S. Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of
the Baghdad Railway. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001.
McNeill, William H. Plagues and Peoples. New York: Anchor Books, 1977.
———. A World History. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.
Meclis-i Âyan Zabıt Ceridesi. Term 3, year of session 4, vol.€2.
Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi. Term 3, year of session 1, vol.€1.
Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi. Term 3, year of session 1, vol.€1 (İçtimai Fevkalâde).
Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi. Term 3, year of session 2, vol.€2.
Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi. Term 3, year of session 4, vol.€2.
Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi. Term 3, year of session 5, vol.€1.
Mehmet Arif. Başımıza Gelenler. Istanbul: Harp Akademileri Pub., 1969.
Memoirs of Halide Edib. New York: The Century Co., 1926.
Moorehead, Alan. Gallipoli. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1956.
Müderrisoğlu, Alptekin. Sarıkamış Dramı. Vol. 2. Istanbul: Kastaş, 1988.
Mühlmann, Carl. Das Deutche-Türkische Waffenbündis İm Weltkriege. In Veli Yılmaz, 1 nci
Dünya Harbi’nde Türk-Alman İttifakı ve Askerî Yardımlar. Istanbul: Cem Pub., 1993.
Mustafa, Münim. Cepheden Cepheye. 2nd ed. Istanbul: Arma Pub., 1998.
Mutusis, Tostantin. “Mikrop Harbi,” Istanbul Tıp Fakültesi Mecmuası, no. 3 (1952).
Naderi, Sait ve Dinç, Gülten. “Darülfünun Tıp Fakültesi Mecmuası (1916–1933) ve Dizini,
Tıp Tarihi Araştırmaları 12 (2004).
Nazilmof, A. Bulgar Süvari Tümeninin Harekâtı. Ankara: Genelkurmay Pub., 1935.
Nikiforuk, Andrew. The Fourth Horseman: A Short History of Epidemics, Plagues and Other
Scourges. London: Fourth Estate, 1991.
Noyan, Abdülkadir. “Erzurum Hatıralarımdan.” In Çeşitli Yönleri ile Erzurum ve Çevresi,
bibliogr aphy
263
edited by Nusret Karasu-Nihat Özyardımcı. Ankara: Ulusal Verem Savaş Derneği
Pub., 1968.
———. İç Hastalıkları Ders Kitabı, İntan Hastalıkları. Istanbul: Mazlum Pub., 1943.
———. “İntani ve Salgın Hastalıklara Karşı Tıbbın Eski ve Yeni Durumu,” Istanbul Tıp
Fakültesi Mecmuası, no. 4 (1947).
———. “Sıtma Üstüne Konferans,” Istanbul Tıp Fakültesi Mecmuası, no. 3 (1947).
———. Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla Savaşlarım. Ankara: Tıp Fakültesi Y., 1956.
Öğün, Tuncay. Vilayât-ı Şarkiye Mültecileri, 1915–1923. Ankara: Babil Pub., 2004.
Öktem, Ziya. “Basilli Dizanteri Aşılarının Şimdiki Vaziyeti Hakkında,” Istanbul Tıp Fakültesi Mecmuası, no. 16 (April 1941).
———. “Epidemik Lekeli Humma ve Aşıları,” Istanbul Tıp Fakültesi Mecmuası, no. 13
(July 1940).
Öndeş, Osman. “Bir Savaşın Sonrası.” In Ian Hamilton, Gelibolu Günlüğü. Turkish edition: Istanbul: Hürriyet Y., 1972.
Onul, Behçet. “Kolera,” Sağlık Dergisi 40, nos. 1–2 (1966).
Onul, Behiç. Infeksiyon Hastalıkları. 5th ed. Ankara: Tıp Fakültesi Pub., 1974.
Operatör Cemil Paşa. Canlı Tarihler. Vol. 8. Istanbul: Türkiye Pub., 1945.
Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler, 1915–1920. Ankara: Devlet Arşivleri Pub., 1994.
Özaydın, Zuhal. “Büyük Önder Atatürk’ün Himayelerinde Yapılan I. Millî Türk Tıp Kongresi,” Tıp Tarihi Araştırmaları 7 (June 1998).
———. Osmanlı Hilâl-i Ahmer Cemiyeti Salnamesi. Istanbul University, Unpublished
thesis, 1987).
———. “Osmanlı Hilâl-i Ahmer Cemiyeti’nin Kuruluşu ve Çalışmaları.” In Türkler
Vol.€13. Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Pub., 2002.
Özaydın, Zuhal, and İnci Hot. “Dr.€Ömer Besim Paşa’nın Ülkemiz Nüfus Siyaseti
Hakkındaki Görüşleri,” Tıp Tarihi Araştırmaları 9 (August 1999).
Özbay, Kemal. “Tarihte Lekeli Humma-Tifüs ve Ordularımızda Tahribatı,” Dirim 54,
nos.€3–4 (March–April 1979).
———. Türk Asker Hekimliği Tarihi ve Asker Hastahaneleri. Vol. 1. Istanbul: Yörük B.,
1976.
Özdemir, Ahmet. “Milli Mücadele’de Üserâ Taburları,” Atatürk Yolu 5 (May 1990).
Özdemir, Hikmet, et al. Ermeniler: Sürgün ve Göç. Ankara: TTK Pub., 2004.
Özkan, Orhan. “Atatürk Döneminde Sağlık Politikası.” In Atatürk Dönemi Sağlık Politikası
ve Türkiye’nin Ekonomik Gelişmesi Semineri. Ankara: AÜSBF Pub., 1982.
Özpekcan, Meliha. “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Sağlık Politikası, 1923–1933,” Yeni Tıp Tarihi
Araştırmaları 7 (2001).
Panzac, Daniel. La Peste dans l’Empire Ottoman 1700–1850. Leuven: Editions Peeters, 1985.
Payzın, S., K. Özsan, N. Aksoycan, H. Ekmen, and M. Akman. Sağlık Hizmetinde Mikrobiyoloji 2, Özel Mikrobiyoloji. Ankara: Tıp Fakültesi Pub., 1968.
Pomiankowsky, Joseph. Der Zusammenbruch des Ottomanischen Reiches. (Zürich: Wien,
Amalthea Verlag, 1928.
———. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Çöküşü. Trans. Kemal Turan. Istanbul: Kayıhan Pub.,
1990.
Rabinowicz, Leon. Nüfus Meselesi. Trans. Alâettin Cemil. Ankara, 1930.
Reconstruction of Turkey, A Series of Reports, Compiled for the American Committee of Armenian and Syrian Relief. Edited by William H. Hall. For private distribution only, 1918.
264
bibliogr aphy
Robertson, Sir William. Soldiers and Statesmen, 1914–1918. Vols. 1–2.London: Cassell and
Company Ltd., 1926.
Ryan, Charles S. Under the Red Crescent: Adventures of an English Surgeon with the Turkish
Army at Plevna and Erzurum, 1877–1878. London: John Murray, 1897.
Sağlam, Tevfik. Büyük Harpte 3. Ordu’da Sıhhî Hizmet. Istanbul: Askerî M., 1941.
———. Cihan Harbinde 3. Ordu’da Sıhhî Hizmete Ait Küçük Bir Hulâsa. Istanbul, Askerî
Tıbbiye Pub., 1940.
———. “Gülhane Tarihçesinden Bir Kısım.” Simplified and republished by İlter Uzel. In
Tıp Tarihi Araştırmaları. Vol. 3. Istanbul, 1989.
Sağlam, Tevfik. Pratik Doktor. Year 16, no. 3 (1946).
Sağlık Hizmetlerinde 50 Yıl. Ankara: Sağlık Bakanlığı Pub., 1973.
Sakaoğlu, Necdet. “Bir Osmanlı Neferinin I. Dünya Savaşı Anıları,” Tarih ve Toplum 11
(November 1984).
Şâkir, Nazım. “Birinci Cihan Harbinde Erzurum ve Sağlık Organizasyonu Anıları.” In
Çeşitli Yönleri ile Erzurum ve Çevresi, edited by Nusret Karasu-Nihat Özyardımcı.
Ankara: Ulusal Verem Savaş Derneği Pub., 1968.
Salim, Tevfik. Lekeli Tifo. Istanbul: Kader M., 1929.
Samih, Aziz. Büyük Harpte Kafkas Cephesi Hatıraları. Ankara: Büyük Erkânıharbiye€Y.,
1934.
Sarı, Nil-Özaydın, Zühal. “I. Dünya Savaşında Osmanlı Hilâl-i Ahmer Cemiyeti,” In
2.€Türk Tıp Tarihi Kongresi, Istanbul, 20–21 Eylül 1990. Ankara, TTK Pub., 1999.
Saydam, Abdullah. “Birinci Dünya Savaşı Sırasında Istanbul Halkının Geçim Sıkıntısı,”
Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi 19 (August 1998).
Selçuk, İlhan. Yüzbaşı Selahattin’in Romanı. Istanbul: Remzi Pub., 1975.
Selek, Sabahattin, ed. İsmet İnönü’nün Hatıraları, Genç Subaylık Yıllarım 1884–1918. Istanbul: Burçak Pub., 1969.
Seren, Necmi. “Yılların Ötesinden,” Harp Tarihi Mecmuası, no. 209 (May 1982).
———. “Yılların Ötesinden,” Harp Tarihi Mecmuası, no. 210 (June 1982).
———. “Yılların Ötesinden,” Harp Tarihi Mecmuası, no. 211 (July 1982).
Serhan, Bahaddin. “Savaştan da Öldürücü Bir Salgın!” Yakın Tarihimiz 3 (March 1983).
Seuber. Yıldırım. Trans. Kaymakam Nihat. Istanbul: Askerî M., 1932.
Şevki, Osman. “Kırım Muharebesi,” Askerî Tıbbiye Mecmuası 1, no. 4 (March 1919).
———. Osmanlı Tababeti, Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları Eserinin Müsveddeleri. Serial 2,
no.€16. Istanbul: Akşam Pub., n.d.
———. Osmanlı Tababeti 3, Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları Eserinin Müsveddeleri. Serial 3,
no.€12. Istanbul: Akşam Pub., n.d.
Seyhülislam Cemaleddin Efendi. Siyasî Hatıralarım. Trans. Ziyaeddin Engin. Istanbul:
Tercüman 1001 Temel Eser, 1978.
Shaw, Stanford J. Idea to Realization: My Study of Ottoman History. Ankara: Türkiye Bilimler Akademisi Pub., 2003.
Sıcak Hava Cereyanıyla Tathirat Fırını. Dersaadet: Matbaa-i Askeriye, 1916.
Şimşir, Bilâl N. Rumeli’den Türk Göçleri, Belgeler. Vol. I. Ankara: TTK Pub., 1989.
Somel, Akşin. “Türk Ordusu ile Filistin’de,” Toplumsal Tarih, no. 66 (June 1989).
Starrit, S. Stuart. The Life of Nansen. London: The Religions Tract Society, n.d.
Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War, the War Office,
March 1922. Reprinted by the Naval & Military Press, 1999.
bibliogr aphy
265
Süerdem, İsmail Hakkı. Anılarım. Edited by Orhan Avcı. Ankara: Bilge Pub., 2004.
Sunata, İ. Hakkı. Gelibolu’dan Kafkaslar’a. Istanbul: T. İş Bankası Pub., 2003.
Suphi, Hamdullah. “Boğa Dağları,” Türk Yurdu 7(14), no. 156 (1918). Ankara: Tutibay Pub.,
2000.
Talat. “Ankara’da Sıtma ve Mücadele Teşkilatı,” Sıhhiye Mecmuası 5, nos. 31–32 (1930).
Temel, Mehmet. “Birinci Dünya Savaşı ve Mütareke Yıllarında Türkiye’deki Bulaşıcı
ve€ZühÂ�revi Hastalıklara Karşı Alınan Önlemler,” Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları
Dergisi 3, no. 8 (1998).
———. “Mütareke Dönemi Istanbul’unda Sosyal Yaşam ve Sorunlar,” Türkler. Vol.€14.
Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Y., 2002.
Terraine, John. The Great War, 1914–1915. London: Arrow Books Ltd., 1967.
Terzioğlu, Arslan. “Kırım Harbi Esnasında Osmanlı Hastahaneleri ve Dünya HastahaneciÂ�
liğine Etkileri,” Toplumsal Tarih 85 (January 1991).
Tevetoğlu, Fethi. Atatürk’le Samsun’a Çıkanlar. Ankara, 1971.
Tezok, F., E. Gümrükçü, and M. Sağlam. “1971 Hong-Kong Gribinin Memleketimizdeki
Özellikleri,” Mikrobiyoloji Bülteni 6, no. 1 (January 1972).
Timur, Cevdet. Türk İstiklâl Harbi. Vol. 7. Ankara, 1975.
Toprak, Zafer. “Istanbul’da Fuhuş ve Zührevî Hastalıklar, 1914–1933,” Tarih ve Toplum€39
(March 1987).
———. İttihad–Terakki ve Cihan Harbi, 1914–1918. İstanbul: Homer Pub., 2003.
Topuzlu, Cemil. İstibdat-Meşrutiyet-Cumhuriyet Devirlerinde 80 Yıllık Hatıralarım. 2nd ed.
Edited by Hüsrev Hatemi-Aykut Kazancıgil. Istanbul: Cerrahpaşa Tıp Fakültesi Pub.,
1982.
Trotsky, Leon. Balkan Savaşları. Trans. Tansel Güney. Istanbul: Arba Pub., 1995.
Tugaç, Hüsamettin. Bir Neslin Dramı. Istanbul: Çağdaş Y., 1975.
Türkan, Ali İhsan, ed. “Istanbul İşgal Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı Raporları (7),” Belgelerle Türk
Tarihi Dergisi 30 (July 1999).
Turkish Military History Council. Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, İran-Irak Cephesi.
Ankara: Genelkurmay Pub., 1979.
Türkmen, Zekeriya. “Balkan Savaşlarında Hilâl-i Ahmer Cemiyetinin Osmanlı Ordusuna
Yönelik Sağlık Hizmetleri,” Belleten 68, no. 252 (August 2004).
Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, Birinci Dünya Harbi, İdari Faaliyetler ve Lojistik. Vol.€9.
Ankara: Genelkurmay Pub., 1985.
Ulu, Cafer. “Savaş Zamanı Osmanlı Sağlık Politikası: I. Dünya Savaşı Örneği,” Belgelerle
Türk Tarihi Dergisi 42 (July 2000).
Unat, Ekrem Kadri, “Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Ordusu’nda Tifüs Savaşı,” Cerrahpaşa
Tıp Fakültesi Dergisi 20, no. 2 (April 1989).
———. “Görev Kurbanı İki Mikrobiyoloğumuz,” Türk Mikrobiyoloji Cemiyeti Dergisi€9,
no. 61 (1979).
———. “Kış ve Bulaşıcı Hastalıklar,” Dirim 55, nos. 7–8 (July–August 1980).
———. “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda 1910–1913 Yıllarındaki Kolera Salgınları ve Bunlarla
İlgili Olaylar,” Yeni Tıp Tarihi Araştırmaları 1 (1995).
———. “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda İnsanın Bulaşıcı Hastalıklarına Karşı Yapılan Koruyucu Aşılar,” Dirim 53, nos. 11–12 (November–December 1978).
———. “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Son 40 Yılında Türkiye’nin Tüberküloz Tarihçesi
Üzerine,” Cerrahpaşa Tıp Fakültesi Dergisi 10, no. 4 (October 1979).
266
bibliogr aphy
———. “Türkiye’de Atatürk Döneminde Bulaşıcı Hastalıklarla Savaş için Kuruluşlar ve
Çalışmalar.” In Türkiye’de Atatürk Döneminde Bulaşıcı Hastalıklarla Savaş Toplantısı,
Cerrahpaşa Tıp Fakültesi Atatürk Haftası, 18–28 Mayıs 1981. Istanbul, 1982.
———. “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Bulaşıcı Hastalıklarla Savaş,” Cerrahpaşa Tıp Fakültesi
Dergisi 12 (Sp. Issue, 1981).
Unat, E. K., A. Yücel, K. Altaş, and M. Saması. Unat’ın Tıp Parazitolojisi. 5th ed.
Cerrahpaşa: Tıp Fakültesi Vafkı Pub., 1995.
Ünver, Süheyl. “Dr.€Reşat Rıza’nın Hayatı ve Mikrobiyolojideki Çalışmaları Hakkında,”
Mikrobiyoloji Bülteni 20, no. 3–4 (1967).
Vekâletin 10 Yıllık MesaisiI. Sıhhiye Mecmuası Fevkalâde Nüshası, October 29, 1933.
Villalta, Jorge Blanco. Atatürk. Trans. William Campbell. Ankara: TTK Pub., 1991.
von Kressenstein, Kress, and Friedrich Freiherr. Mit den Türken zum Suezkanal. Berlin:
Borhut-Verlag, 1938.
von Sanders, Liman. Türkiye’de Beş Yıl. Trans. M. Şevki Yazman. Istanbul: Burçak Pub.,
1969. [English edition: Liman von Sanders, Five Years in Turkey. U.S. Naval Institute,
1927].
Wilke, Ayşe, Güner Söyletir, and Mehmet Doğanay. İnfeksiyon Hastalıkları. Istanbul:
Nobel Tıp Pub., 1996.
Witmann, William. Travels in Turkey, Asia Minor, Syria and Across the Desert into Egypt
during the Years 1799, 1800 and 1801 in Company with the Turkish Army, and the British
Military Mission (London, 1803).
Yalman, Ahmet Emin. Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim, Geçirdiklerim. Istanbul: Yenilik Pub.,
1970.
Yıldırım, Nuran. “Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Koruyucu Sağlık Uygulamaları.” In TanziÂ�
mat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi. Vol. 5. Istanbul: İletişim Y., 1985.
Yılmaz, Faruk. İmparatorluk Döneminde Türk-Alman İlişkileri. Ankara: Berikan Pub., 2004.
Yılmaz, Veli. 1 nci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk–Alman İttifakı ve Askerî Yardımlar. Istanbul: Cem
Pub., 1993.
Yücel, Ayhan. “Bitlerle Bulaşan Hastalıklar.” In Bit ve İnsan. Cerrahpaşa: Tıp Fakültesi
Pub., 1993.
———. “Türkiye’de Sıtma Savaşı.” In Türkiye’de Atatürk Döneminde Bulaşıcı Hastalıklarla
Savaş Toplantısı, Cerrahpaşa Tıp Fakültesi Atatürk Haftası, 18–28 Mayıs 1981. Istanbul,
1981.
Zürcher, Erik J. “Between Death and Desertion: The Experience of the Ottoman Soldier in
World€War€I,” Turcica 28 (1996).
———. “The Ottoman Conscription System in Theory and Practice.” In Arming the State:
Military Conscription in the Middle East and Central Asia, 1775–1925. Edited by Eric€J.
Zürcher. London: I. B. Taurus, 1999.
Index
Abdülhamid (sultan), 136
Abdülkadir Bey, 48
Abdülkadir Noyan (doctor), 30, 36, 49, 68,
147, 149, 169, 172, 174, 191
acute bronchitis, 95
Adana, 30, 31, 33, 102, 143, 147, 200
Adnan Adıvar (doctor), 188
Adolf Friedrich (Grand Duke of Mecklenburg), 48
Ağvanis Hospital, 45
Ahmet Emin, 96, 122, 123, 178
Ahmet Fikri, 171
Ahmet Lütfi (doctor), 172
Ahmet Şadi, 207
Akbaş, 74
Akçakale, 31
Akdere, 74
Akil Muhtar(doctor), 177
Alakilise, 47
Albania, 19
Al-Budayri, 194
Aleppo, 30, 31, 37, 83, 84, 85, 86, 89, 137,
138, 139, 140, 141, 149, 156, 194, 198
Ali Fuad, 159
Ali Osman, 42
Ali Selim, 207
Allenby, Edmund (general), 37
Altunian (doctor), 141
Alucra, 144
Amasya, 65, 100, 145, 151
American Missionary Board, 64
American Zionists, 161
Anafartalar, 74, 75, 207
Anatolia, 2, 6, 8, 11, 14, 20, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31,
32, 63, 64, 65, 67, 75, 78, 94, 98, 99, 100,
101, 102, 105, 115, 120, 124, 125, 128, 135,
136, 137, 140, 141, 142, 143, 147, 148, 149,
150, 154, 158, 159, 162, 163, 177, 184, 189,
190, 192, 198, 199, 202, 203
Ankara, 9, 98, 100, 101, 102, 123, 139, 145,
148, 151, 189, 190, 193, 194, 205
Antranik, 184
Anzac, 69, 70, 71, 73, 115
Ardahan, 181
Arıburnu, 114
Arif Bey, 51
Army Station Hospital, in Kut, 90
Asaf Derviş Pasha (doctor), 102
Asir, 124
Atlantic Ocean, 10, 92
Attila, 106
Australian Army Medical Services, 5, 13,
110, 112
Australian Army, 5, 13, 108, 110, 112
Austria-Hungary, 20, 108, 110
Austrian Army, 118
Austrians, 76, 118
Austro-Hungarian Army, 110
Austro-Hungarian Casualties, 110
Avni Pasha, 59
Aya Tura Abbey and Orphanage, 142, 161,
183, 184, 185
Ayastefanos, 189
Aydın, 64, 93, 151, 156
Aziz Samih, 59, 134
Baalbek, 86
Baghdad, 30, 31, 36, 37, 48, 88, 90, 91, 149,
150, 152, 174, 191, 192
Baku, 79, 136
267
268
index
Baldwin, Hanson, 109
Balıkesir, 64, 65, 66, 101
Balıkesir Society of National Defence, 64
Balkan, 3, 6, 8, 16, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 35,
47, 66, 96, 100, 135, 139, 165, 166, 169,
186, 199
Balkan War, 3, 6, 8, 16, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25,
35, 47, 66, 100, 135, 139, 165, 166, 169,
199
Baltic, 91
Baratov (general), 113
Basra, 88, 146
Batman Bridge, 50
Battle of Sarıkamış, 201
Batum, 152, 181
Bayburt, 36, 41, 62, 65, 79, 99, 142, 151, 167,
168, 175, 181, 198
Beirut, 86, 152, 159, 160, 161, 184
Belemedik, 148
Belgian, 107, 119
Besim Ömer (doctor), 96, 177
Bingöl, 113, 125
Biraben, J. N., 4
Birdwood (general), 71
Birseba, 140
Bitlis, 50, 62, 64, 135, 139, 163, 167, 168, 197
Black Sea, 19, 78, 95, 100, 124, 130, 143, 151
Bliss (doctor), 185
Boer War, 5, 6
Börnstein (doctor), 194
Boston, 91
British Army, 5, 72, 75, 87, 88, 114, 115, 116,
139; and Command in Egypt, 136
British casualties, 114
British Command, 12, 71, 75. See also British Army
British Navy, 30
bronchopneumonia, 95
Bucharest, 77
Bulanık, 62
Bulgaria, 6, 22, 111
Bulgarian Army, 19, 22, 169
Burdur, 156
Bursa, 101, 139
Butler, A. G., 5, 13, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112,
117
Çamlıhan, 148
Çan, 64
Canik, 100, 151, 190
Çapakçur Front, 87
casualties, 5, 13, 37, 52, 116, 117, 119, 124
Catos, 22
Caucasian Front, 208
Cavit, 144
Çekmece, 101
Cemal (captain), 59
Cemal Pasha, 31, 138, 139, 141, 142, 159, 160
Cemaleddin Efendi, 19, 25
Cemil Pasha, 25
Cemile, 139
Çengelköy, 12
Central Hospital of Erzincan, 80
Central Military Hospital in Baghdad, 149
Central Military Hospital in Damascus, 141
Central Powers, 7
Çeşme, 155
Champagne, 6, 112
Charing Cross Hospital, 20
China, 1, 91, 168
cholera, 16, 21, 23, 57, 148, 177; epidemic,
19
Christians, 136, 162
Christie, Mrs., 199
Cilicia, 139
Çilingir, 94
Colley (doctor), 54
Conkbayırı, 75
Çorlu, 4, 19
Council of Medical Affairs, 18
Crimean War, 5, 11, 12, 13, 14
Damascus, 83, 86, 140, 142, 161, 162, 194
Dardanelles Strait, 73
Davutpaşa, 27
deaths, in Baghdad, 153
Denizli, 101, 156
Der, 86
Derbisiye, 150
Dersim, 113
Deveboynu, 37, 45
Dimetoca, 23, 24
diphtheria, 95, 103
index
disease, 5, 13, 19, 38, 95, 97, 103, 123, 137, 177
Diyarbakır, 32, 44, 45, 62, 99, 143, 156, 167,
168, 176, 208
Dobruja, 76, 77
dysentery, 55, 57, 71, 123, 148
East Anatolia, 36, 66, 138, 205
Eceabat, 73
Edirne, 13, 15, 23, 24, 135, 207
Egypt, 20, 166
Egyptian Front, 116
Ekrem Kadri, 12, 18
Ekrem Şadi, 6, 25, 200
El-Arish, 11
Elazığ, 22, 62, 143, 164, 167, 168
Eloğlu, 33
Emin Çölaşan, 205
England, 20, 108, 111. See also Great Britain
Entente Powers, 114, 120, 161
Enver Pasha, 8, 50, 59, 63, 161, 179, 210, 211,
215
Erickson, Edward J., 123
erysipelas, 82, 95, 97
Erzincan, 31, 43, 53, 54, 58, 61, 62, 65, 80, 99,
104, 130, 142, 167, 168, 173, 174, 181, 189,
192, 193, 198
Erzurum, 10, 14, 22, 23, 29, 31, 35, 37, 38, 40,
41, 42, 43, 45, 47, 51, 53, 54, 55, 58, 59, 60,
61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 79, 80, 100, 102,
103, 113, 130, 134, 135, 136, 142, 143, 149,
151, 163, 166, 167, 168, 172, 174, 175, 178,
179, 180, 189, 190, 192, 193, 197, 199, 202
Eskişehir, 101
Euphrates River, 104, 146
Eyüp Cemetery, 15
Fahri Belen, 113, 120
Falkland Islands, 107
Farm of Jasmiyah, 139
Fatsa, 151, 152
Ferguson, Niall, 123
Fevzi Çakmak, 51, 52, 143
Finike, 101
First Expeditionary Force, 30
First National Medical Congress, 102
Flinn, M. W., 2
269
4th Army, 30, 36, 86, 127, 129, 138, 141, 142,
156, 157, 159, 160, 172, 183, 197, 198
France, 10, 12, 91, 92, 93, 107, 108, 109, 111,
113, 118, 198
French Army, 12, 112
French casualties, 112
French Front, 116
French Navy, 112
French-Prussian War, 5
Galicia, 76
Galician Front, 77
Galip (doctor), 198
Gallipoli, 13, 68, 69, 70, 73, 74, 75, 76, 107,
114, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125, 128, 131, 194,
207
“Gallipoli Gallop,” 69
Gallipoli Peninsula, 68, 76
Garian, 166
Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Pasha, 51
Gelibolu, 24
General Directorate of Health, 189
Genius Epidemicus, 149
George Washington, 107
German casualties, 116
German Consulate, 38
German Embassy, 15
Germans, 34, 54, 118, 141, 149, 173, 206
Germany, 4, 20, 54, 92, 93, 108, 111, 116, 141,
173, 174, 176, 198, 199, 210
Geron, A., 23
Giresun, 42, 99, 151, 152
Gleich, 48
Godley (general), 71
Goltz (field marshall), 48, 49, 86, 138, 174
Grand National Assembly, 98, 205
Great Britain, 92, 115, 116
Great War, 6, 28, 31, 35, 37, 47, 48, 49, 55, 56,
63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 80, 81, 91, 92, 93,
96, 98, 102, 106, 107, 109, 110, 114, 115,
116, 117, 119, 120, 122, 124, 128, 135, 137,
139, 142, 147, 163, 169, 174, 175, 177, 178,
186, 189, 190, 193, 194, 196, 198, 199, 200,
202, 203, 205, 207. See also World War I
Greece, 2, 92, 111
Greek Army, 104
270
index
Guhr, 44, 63
Gusse, 41
Gülek Pass, 29, 208
Gülhane Military Hospital, 172, 174
Gülhane Military Medical Academy, 61
Gülhane Park, 24
Gülnihal, 75
Gümüşhane, 130, 198
Gümüşsuyu Cemetery, 15
Hadımköy, 17, 20
Haerle (doctor), 48
Hafız Hakkı, 28, 47, 48, 65
Hakkari, 65
Halep, 156
Halide Edip, 32, 100, 142, 159, 183
Halil Bey, 49
Hama, 86, 139
Hamadan, 139
Hamdi Suat (doctor), 173, 174
Hamdi Village, 36
Hamdullah Suphi, 31, 32, 142
Hamilton, Ian (general), 71
Hamit Osman (doctor), 102
Harput, 44, 64, 100, 136
Hasan İzzet Pasha, 47, 211
Hasan Zühtü Nazif, 166
Hasanbeyli, 208
Hasankale, 37, 38, 40, 42, 50, 53, 59, 60, 61,
62, 167, 172, 175
Havran, 156
Havza, 145
Haydarpaşa, 12, 15, 28, 30
Heybeliada, 188
Hilmi Özkök (general), 202
Hınıs, 62
Hijaz Front, 159
Hikmet Bayur, 120
Hobsbawm, Eric, 106
Holland, 92, 93
Homs, 91
Hopa, 95
Hoy, 79
Hüdavendigar, 64
Humus, 86, 156
Hun, 106
hunger, 24, 86, 99, 104, 109, 162, 194
Hüsamettin Cindoruk, 205
Hüseyin (doctor), 172
İ. Hakkı, 29, 33
İbrahim (major), 179
İbrahim Tali (doctor), 176, 178
İhsan Aksoley, 91
Ilıca, 43, 59, 62, 192
Indian, 20, 39, 88, 89, 90, 92
Indian Muslims, 20
İnebolu, 99
infant deaths, 102
infectious diseases, 23, 26
influenza, 55, 57, 95
İskenderun, 30
Islahiye, 29
Ispartakule, 17
İspiye, 152
Italy, 92, 93, 108, 111, 118, 119
İzmir, 22, 91, 95, 96, 104, 139, 151, 156, 207
Jabal Lubnan (Mount Lebanon), 160
Jaffa, 11, 161
Jak Efendi, 214
James, Robert Rhodes, 69, 73
Japan, 91, 92, 111
Jewish School, 149, 191
Jews, 95, 102, 137, 178, 180
Kale-i Sultaniye, 64
Kan, 43, 59, 62
Kandıra, 170, 171
Kanlısırt, 75
Karacaahmet Cemetery, 15
Karahisar, 144, 189
Karakilise, 181
Karaman, 156
Karapınar, 29, 32, 33
Karasu, 113
Karesi, 155
Kartal, 22, 24, 189
Kasımpaşa, 12, 97
Kasır, 191
Kavak, 12, 145
Kayseri, 100, 151, 190, 200
index
Kelkit, 41, 113, 168
Kemal Özbay, 12
Kerevizdere, 75
Kerte, 75
Keteb-ul Halil, 83
Kiesling, 186
Kiğı, 45
Kilitbahir, 73
King of Spain, 160, 161
Kisling, 48
Konya, 24, 29, 61, 64, 137, 142, 194
Korean War, 92
Korna, 146
Koyulhisar, 47
Kressenstein, Kress von, 141
Kumkale, 73
Kurds, 103, 184, 210
Kuruçay, 100
Kütahya, 155
laboratory, 193
Lamouche (colonel), 48
Lapseki, 63
Larcher (commandant), 119, 120, 121
Lebanon, 142, 159, 160, 161, 184
Lenin, Vladimir, 7, 114
Liebert (doctor), 164
Lower Mesopotamia, 146
Lütfi (doctor, captain), 142
Lütfi Aksu (doctor), 64
malaria, 84, 95, 102, 123, 147, 148, 177, 190,
200
Malazgirt, 62
malnutrition, 95, 131
Malta, 96
Maltepe, 189
Mamahatun, 136, 181
Mamure, 29, 208
Manisa, 155, 207
Maraş, 33, 143
Mardin, 44, 64, 101
Maronite, 160
Marseilles, 158
massacres, 104
Maude (general), 49
271
Mayer (doctor), 58
Mazhar Osman, 181
McCarthy, Justin, 135, 142, 198
measles, 97, 103
Meclis-i Ayan, 187
Medina, 82, 159
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, 71
Mediterranean Fleet, 97
Mehmet Arif, 166
Mehmet Emin (doctor), 180
Mendep, 82, 83
meningitis, 97
Menteşe, 156
Merzifon, 145, 151, 183
Mesopotamian Front, 116
Mesudiye Recovery Center, 47
Middle East, 11, 107, 124, 186
Military Hospital in İzmit, 170
Ministry of War, 63, 155, 169, 183, 191
missing, 112, 116, 117, 118
Mişki, 62
Mobile Hospital, 75, 77
Moltke, 186
Mondros Armistice, 91, 119, 183
Montenegro, 111
Mosul, 30, 31, 34, 36, 37, 88, 89, 90, 91, 93,
147, 149, 150, 153, 154, 156, 157, 162, 191,
192
Müdürke, 45
Mühlens, P. (German hygiene expert), 4
Münim Mustafa, 30, 120
Murat-Çay, 136
Muratoff, Allen and Paul, 136
Muş, 62, 66, 113, 136, 167, 168, 197
Musa Kazım (doctor), 172
Mustafa (doctor), 23, 172
Mustafa Kemal Pasha, 102
Mustafa Şakir (doctor), 180
Nail (captain), 214
Nasiriyah, 146
Nazım Pasha, 21
Nazım Şakir (doctor), 192
Nazlimov, 19
Near East, 91
Nebi Han, 40
272
index
Nestorians, 103
Neşet Ömer, 138, 198
New York, 91
Niğde, 58, 66, 189, 190
Nightingale, Florence, 13
Nihat (lieutenant colonel), 120
Nikau, 44
Nothnagel (doctor), 165
North America, 92
Norway, 92
Nusaybin, 89, 90, 93, 154, 192
Nute, William L., 200
Oberndörfer (doctor), 49
Ognot, 113
Ordu, 144, 151, 152, 169
orphanage, 183
Osman Şevki (doctor), 11, 14, 122, 186
Osmaniye, 30
Ottoman Armenians, 125, 137
Ottoman Army, 6, 9, 11, 12, 14, 19, 20, 22,
28, 29, 30, 40, 43, 44, 58, 63, 64, 66, 74,
75, 77, 88, 89, 91, 93, 109, 110, 119, 120,
121, 122, 123, 124, 128, 132, 143, 166, 169,
173, 179, 182, 189, 192, 199, 200
Ottoman Empire, 4, 8, 9, 10, 19, 26, 29, 31,
47, 100, 105, 109, 119, 130, 142, 157, 160,
165, 177, 188, 190, 194, 195, 199, 202
Ottoman-German Treaty of Alliance, 7
Ottoman-Greek War, 166
Ottoman Ministry of Internal Affairs, 63
Ottoman-Russian War, 11, 14, 166
Ovtse Polje, 22
Ömer Besim Pasha, 101
Palestinian Jew, 36
Panzac, Daniel, 4, 10, 135, 154
Paraguin (major), 40
paratyphoid, 57
Paris, 107, 166
Pasinler Plain, 53, 211
Philippopolis, 4
plague, 10, 95, 97
Plevna, 14
pneumonia, 95
Polatlı, 98
Pomiankowsky, Joseph, 163, 197
Portugal, 92, 111
Pozantı, 30, 37, 87, 89, 147, 148, 149
prisoners, 116, 119
Prussia, 2, 3, 114
Pürk, 145
Radovishte, 22
Ragıp Bey, 200
Rahmi Bey, 151
Rami, 27
Recai (doctor), 61
Recovery House in Çorum, 144
Red Army, 7
Red Crescent (hospital), 61, 77
Red Crescent (Indian), 20
Red Crescent (mark), 10, 14, 21, 64, 77
Red Crescent (Ottoman), 99, 166, 174, 180,
185, 198
Red Crescent Society, 64
Red Cross, 20, 54, 55, 99, 166, 181, 182, 185,
193
Refik Saydam (doctor), 102, 174
Reşat Rıza (doctor), 23, 26, 172, 175
Restorf (major), 48
Rıza Nur, 122
Robeck (general), 71
Robertson, Sir William, 115
Rodenwalt (doctor), 151
Romania, 6, 20, 76, 111, 158, 159
Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 165
Rousso, Carl, 12
Rumelia, 75, 78, 154
Russian Army, 13, 14, 39, 51, 87, 103, 113, 137
Russian casualties, 113
Russian Caucasus Army, 50
Russian-Japanese War, 5
Ryan, Charles S., 10
Sadık Sabri (colonel), 35
Sağlam (doctor), 61, 169
Saint Sophia Mosque, 15
Şakir (doctor), 61
Salonika Front, 116
Samara, 66, 67
Samargha, 146
index
Samsun, 65, 93, 102, 143, 145, 151, 152
Sanders, Liman von, 34, 39, 44, 63, 114, 191
Sandrock, 49
Sarıkamış, 8, 28, 40, 42, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55,
62, 63, 66, 167, 179, 188, 200, 201, 202
Sarkis Karayan, 7
Scandinavian, 106
Schilling (doctor), 44
2nd Army, 44, 87, 125, 126, 129, 158, 180,
189, 207, 211
Seddülbahir, 73, 176
Şekip Habip (doctor), 169
Selimiye Barracks, 13, 27
Selmanpak Battle, 191
Serbia, 6, 67, 111, 112
Serbian Army, 109
Seres River, 77
Server Kâmil (doctor), 61
Serviburnu, 170, 175
Seuber, 31, 32, 85
Seyhan, 101
Siberia, 91, 92, 196
Sille, 24, 64
Silvan, 50
Sinai, 86, 140, 159
Sirkeci, 24
Sivas, 63, 65, 66, 100, 144, 151, 175, 177, 182,
189, 190, 192, 193
6th Army, 30, 40, 47, 49, 78, 86, 88, 89, 90,
125, 127, 129, 147, 149, 152, 153, 154, 157,
191
smallpox, 11, 95, 97, 103, 148
Soğanlık, 189
Sohumkale, 152
South America, 92
Southeast Asia, 92
Söke, 102
Spain, 92, 93, 106, 160
spotted fever, 172
St. George Hospital, 12
Stanford Shaw, 7
Stavuk, 43
Stip, 22
Sublime Porte, 7, 15
Süfyan (doctor), 61
Sultaniye, 64
273
Suşehri, 45, 47, 145, 182, 200
Suvla Bay, 114
Süleyman Numan (doctor), 53, 168
Sweden, 92, 93
Switzerland, 92, 106, 160
syphilis, 101, 102, 123
Şebinkarahisar, 66
Şemseddin, 59
Şemsettin Bey, 99
Tacettin (doctor), 180
Taiz, 82
Talas Hospital, 182, 183
Tarsus American School, 200
Tarsus, 150, 200
Tbilisi, 79, 141, 152
Tehama, 83
Telleübyas, 37
Tercan, 43, 192
tetanus, 81, 95
Tevfik Sağlam, 43, 55, 58, 65, 110, 131, 142,
151, 174, 175, 176, 178, 192, 201
3rd Army, 6, 16, 28, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42,
47, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61,
62, 63, 65, 79, 80, 81, 100, 126, 129, 130,
131, 132, 142, 144, 152, 153, 166, 169, 175,
176, 177, 178, 180, 181, 182, 183, 189, 190,
200, 201
Thrace, 18, 19, 76, 199
Tigris River, 31, 34, 89, 146, 150, 191
Tikrit, 149
Tokat Hospital, 172
Tokat, 65, 100, 151, 172
Toprakkale, 30
Trabzon, 22, 42, 53, 62, 65, 79, 94, 99, 142,
143, 144, 145, 151, 167, 181, 189, 190, 193,
197
trachoma, 94, 98
Tripoli, 91, 166
Trotsky, Leon, 22
Tselonika, 18
tuberculosis, 95, 97
Turkey, 7, 8, 9, 78, 91, 92, 93, 98, 101, 103,
108, 111, 119, 120, 123, 125, 133, 163, 168,
172
Turkish General Staff, 86, 121, 198
274
index
Turkish Military Archives, 75, 82, 83, 87,
120
Turks, 7, 22, 33, 49, 51, 68, 71, 92, 94, 95,
103, 104, 114, 129, 130, 178, 184, 186, 187,
194, 198, 200
Tuzla, 22, 26
typhoid, 55, 57, 70, 95, 97, 103, 148, 189,
196
Ulukışla, 29, 32, 54, 65, 130, 178, 208
United States, 3, 91, 92, 98, 107
Ünye, 151, 152
Urfa, 97, 156
Üsküdar, 207
Van, 62, 64, 65, 66, 103, 135, 142, 143, 163,
167, 181
Varna, 13
Vasfi Cindoruk, 205
Vehib Pasha, 144, 197
Velibaba, 35
Vietnam War, 92
Viranşehir, 30, 35
Virchow, Rudolf, 3
War of Liberation, 98, 101, 176
Weber Pasha, 71
Western Europe, 91, 92
White Army, 7
Wilson, Woodrow, 160
Witmann, William, 11
World War I, 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 20, 26, 29, 91,
94, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 106, 108,
109, 110, 117, 123, 133, 135, 154, 155, 157,
165, 168, 174, 190, 198, 203. See also Great
War
wounded, 13, 69, 112, 116, 117, 118, 119
Yakacık, 22, 97, 189, 205
Yalova, 189
Yassıviran, 16
Yassıviran Hospital, 169
Yemen, 82, 124, 207
Yeniköy, 192
Yerevan, 137
Yeşilköy Hospital, 23
Yeşilköy, 20, 21, 22, 23, 175
Young Turks, 163
Yozgat, 145
Yusuf Ziya, 14
Zahle, 86
Zemlin, 77
Zencidere Hospital, 182, 183
Zeytun, 66
Ziemann, Hans, 177
Zığındere, 75
Ziya Pasha, 24, 25
Zlosisti (doctor), 54
Zor, 156
Zouara, 91
Zürcher, Eric Jan, 8, 110
